Gloria Taylor v. City of Milford

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20‐1109

GLORIA TAYLOR, individually and as Independent Adminis‐

trator of the Estate of STEVEN TAYLOR, Deceased,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CITY OF MILFORD, a municipal corporation, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 2:17‐cv‐02183 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 22, 2021 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2021

____________________

Before WOOD, BRENNAN, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In 2016, Gloria Taylor called 911

seeking medical care for her husband, Steven, who was expe‐

riencing a diabetic emergency at their home in Milford, Illi‐

nois. Officer Joseph Garrett responded to the call and re‐

strained Steven in a prone position, face down on his bed, for

several minutes. Steven vomited and lost consciousness, and

he did not regain consciousness before passing away in the

2 No. 20‐1109

hospital ten days after the incident at sixty‐one years old. Af‐

ter the district court granted summary judgment to the De‐

fendants, Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment with

respect to whether Defendant Garrett was entitled to qualified

immunity based on his conduct within the Taylor home. As

we explain below, the district court erred in granting qualified

immunity to Garrett at the summary judgment stage.

I. Background

On August 17, 2016, Gloria called 911 for an ambulance

for her husband, a diabetic, whose blood sugar had dropped

dangerously low.1 Gloria reported that Steven had dropped a

plate and told her that “he was having a sugar spell.”

In addition to suffering from diabetes, Steven had experi‐

enced several cardiac events in the last several years. He suf‐

fered a heart attack in 2008 and underwent triple bypass sur‐

gery. He then received arterial stenting in 2012, 2013, and

2015, and suffered a second heart attack in 2016. He was re‐

leased from the hospital from treatment for his heart attack on

August 10, 2016, just one week prior to the diabetes incident

that led to this case.

Following Gloria’s 911 call, the county dispatcher re‐

quested an ambulance to respond to a person experiencing a

diabetic emergency. There are no full‐time firefighters or EMS

personnel in the small village of Milford, so two volunteer

EMTs, Frank and Fred Hines, responded to the dispatcher’s

1 We refer to members of the Taylor family by their first names to avoid

confusion, given that there are four different Taylor family members—

Gloria, Steven, and their nieces Serena and Shannon—involved in the

events leading to this case.

No. 20‐1109 3

request. As the Hineses drove to the fire station to collect an

ambulance to respond to Gloria’s call, they passed by Defend‐

ant Garrett, who indicated that he would also respond to the

call, since he was already close to the Taylor residence. Garrett

is Milford’s only full‐time police officer. He had previously

volunteered as an EMT for a different city, and he earned his

certification to serve as a paramedic from the State of Illinois

in 2004.

The parties’ accounts differ regarding what transpired in

the time between Garrett’s arrival at the Taylors’ home and

the ambulance’s departure from the home with Steven. It is

undisputed that Garrett entered the home, confronted Steven

in his bedroom, and placed Steven in a prone restraint on the

bed. Steven then vomited and lost consciousness sometime

before or shortly after the EMTs arrived, who then took Steven

to the hospital by ambulance. Steven did not regain con‐

sciousness and died in the hospital ten days later.

According to the Taylors, Steven was confused in his hy‐

poglycemic state when Garrett appeared in his bedroom. Ste‐

ven asked Garrett why he was there, and asked for some or‐

ange juice, which his niece Serena offered. Garrett ordered

Serena to step back and did not allow her to give Steven the

orange juice. Serena also explained to Garrett that Steven had

a bad heart and suggested that Garrett should speak calmly

to her uncle. Despite Serena’s warning, Garrett proceeded to

force Steven face down onto his bed. Garrett used his own

weight to hold Steven down, restrained Steven’s right hand

behind his back, and pressed Steven’s lower back into the bed

using his elbow. Garett also used his left hand to apply pres‐

sure behind Steven’s ears in order to inflict pain on Steven to

keep him in this position. With Steven’s knees on the ground,

4 No. 20‐1109

Garrett’s restraint position forced Steven’s face into the blan‐

kets on his bed. Steven protested that he could not breathe,

but Garrett continued to use his weight to keep Steven in this

prone position. The Taylors pleaded with Garrett to let up, but

he refused. While Garrett held Steven in this restraint on the

bed, Steven vomited, further obstructing his breathing. EMT

Fred Hines testified that Steven “coded” when the ambulance

arrived, and doctors told the Taylors that Steven had not been

breathing for around twenty‐five minutes by the time the am‐

bulance arrived at the hospital.

In Garrett’s telling, he only restrained Steven because it

was clear that Steven was a danger to himself. As the district

court summarized, Garrett “testified that he started to restrain

Steven after Steven head‐butted the wall and hit the closet

with his fist, causing Garrett to believe Steven was going to

harm himself more and needed to be restrained for his own

safety.” Garrett further testified that “Mr. Taylor was showing

signs where he could potentially be dangerous. He was start‐

ing [to] get in an aggressive stance. He was not making sense.

He was confused, incoherent speaking.” As a result, Garrett

called for backup from the county, so that “if I had to go

hands‐on with him, … more people [would be] there.” Garrett

testified that he told Steven that the ambulance was on its

way, and that Steven stumbled and fell onto the bed before

Garrett had put his hands on him. Steven hit the closet with

“his whole upper body” and hit his head. Garrett maintains

that he did not feel threatened by Steven, but he decided to

use “pressure points and hand control tactics to place him on

the bed.” He then forced Steven into a position where his up‐

per body was on the bed and his legs were on the floor. Ac‐

cording to Garrett, Steven kept “trying to push up … to turn

over one way or the other … kept trying to kick me with his

No. 20‐1109 5

feet … [and] he was grabbing my duty belt, my shirt right

around my duty belt and my vest.” So he used “pressure

points behind the ear to keep him – to get [Steven] back down

when he started lifting me up off the bed.” When Serena of‐

fered orange juice, Garrett was unsure that Steven would

drink it, but he denies stopping Serena from giving Steven the

juice. Garrett testified that although he saw vomit on Steven’s

face once the EMTs placed him on the stretcher to be taken to

the hospital, Garrett did not see vomit on his face in the bed‐

room and he did not know when Steven had vomited. Addi‐

tionally, Garrett testified that Steven had not lost conscious‐

ness before the EMTs arrived, because he “was still thrashing

about,” but that he did lose consciousness at some point,

“[w]hen he stopped thrashing about and just stood still or laid

still.”

Serena and Shannon agreed that Steven was stumbling

and mumbling when Garrett arrived at the Taylor home.

Serena insists, however, that Steven was not behaving vio‐

lently. She did not see her uncle headbutt the wall, but she did

testify that he accidentally hit a lamp and the closet door

while stumbling around the bedroom. Their description of

Steven’s hypoglycemia symptoms is consistent with the testi‐

mony of one of Steven’s treating physician’s, Dr. Zasada, who

explained that hypoglycemic patients may act confused,

“tired[,] sluggish, lethargic,” and possibly “rowdy defen‐

sively because they don’t understand what’s going on, but not

aggressive.” Both Serena and Shannon testified that their un‐

cle requested orange juice in Garrett’s presence, but Garrett

did not allow them to give it to him.

Once at the scene, the EMTs initiated CPR, but Steven

never regained consciousness. He died on August 28, 2016

6 No. 20‐1109

when life support was withdrawn. One of his treating physi‐

cians, Dr. Brian Field, testified that the primary causes of Ste‐

ven’s death were poor oxygenation of the brain, acute hypoxic

respiratory failure, and cardiac arrest, though an autopsy was

not performed. During his time in the hospital,2 he also con‐

tracted pneumonia and suffered respiratory failure.

After Steven’s passing, Gloria, both individually and as

the administrator of Steven’s estate, sued Officer Garrett and

the City of Milford under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Monell v. Depart‐

ment of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Illinois Wrong‐

ful Death Act, and the Illinois Survival Act. At summary judg‐

ment, the district court found in Officer Garrett and the City

of Milford’s favor on all counts and entered judgment in favor

of Defendants. On appeal, Gloria has not challenged the dis‐

trict court’s rulings on her Monell and state law claims, and

only challenges the district court’s finding that Garrett was

entitled to qualified immunity. In response, Garrett urges us

to affirm the district court’s qualified immunity analysis, or in

the alternative, to find that he is still entitled to summary

judgment based on the plaintiff’s failure to establish causa‐

tion.

II. Analysis

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

and Officer Garrett’s assertion of qualified immunity de novo.

See Balsewicz v. Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2020). To affirm,

we must find that no genuine issue of material fact exists and

2 The EMTs initially brought Steven to Iroquois Hospital but an emer‐

gency room physician transferred him to St. Mary’s Hospital in Kankakee

shortly after Steven arrived at Iroquois in order to get a neurological con‐

sult.

No. 20‐1109 7

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “On summary judgment a court

may not make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence,

or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; these are

jobs for a factfinder.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th

Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

255 (1986)). “In applying this standard, all disputed issues of

fact are to be resolved in favor of the non‐moving party.” Ab‐

dullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2005) (cit‐

ing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).

A. Garrett’s Liability under Section 1983 and Qualified Im‐

munity

The central question in this appeal is whether Garrett is

entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. Qualified

immunity is an affirmative defense, but once the defendant

raises it, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to defeat it.” Leiser

v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696, 701 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.

2722 (2020).

Qualified immunity “protects government officials from

liability for civil damages when their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.” McAllister v. Price,

615 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2010). When assessing a defendant’s

assertion of qualified immunity, we ask: “whether the plain‐

tiff’s allegations make out a deprivation of a constitutional

right, and whether the right was clearly established at the

time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. Our “focus ‘is on

whether the officer had fair notice that [his] conduct was un‐

lawful.’” Balsewicz, 963 F.3d at 656–57 (quoting Kisela v.

Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)).

8 No. 20‐1109

1. Fourth Amendment Right

The Fourth Amendment grants that the “right of the peo‐

ple to be secure in their persons, … against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const.

amend. IV. Although police officers may use force to seize an‐

other person under appropriate circumstances, the Fourth

Amendment protects against the use of excessive force. Wein‐

mann v. McClone, 787 F.3d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 2015). “The ques‐

tion whether a particular use of force has crossed the consti‐

tutional line is governed by the Fourth Amendment, which

prohibits unreasonable seizures.” Id. at 448 (citing Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). We analyze excessive force

cases under an objective reasonableness standard. Graham,

490 U.S. at 388.

This analysis “requires a careful balancing of the nature

and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth

Amendment interests against the countervailing governmen‐

tal interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (internal quotations omitted).

“[T]he question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively

reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting

them, without regard to their underlying intent or motiva‐

tion.” Id. at 397. “Such an analysis is inherently fact‐depend‐

ent, requiring consideration of such factors as the severity of

the crime at issue, whether the person posed an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether the

person was actively resisting the officers.” Williams v. Ind.

State Police Dep’t, 797 F.3d 468, 472–73 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

When it comes to deadly force, “a person has a right not

to be seized through the use of deadly force unless he puts

another person (including a police officer) in imminent

No. 20‐1109 9

danger or he is actively resisting arrest and the circumstances

warrant that degree of force.” Weinmann, 787 F.3d at 448; see

also Strand v. Minchuk, 910 F.3d 909, 915 (7th Cir. 2018). In Ten‐

nessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), the Supreme Court held that

a police officer violated a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights

when the officer shot the suspect as he tried to flee the scene.

Though the officer feared that the suspect would escape ar‐

rest, the Court stated plainly that “[a] police officer may not

seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him

dead.” Id. at 11.

Viewing all of the facts in the light most favorable to the

Plaintiff, we find that a reasonable jury could conclude that

Garrett violated Steven’s Fourth Amendment right to be free

from unreasonable seizures when Garrett applied deadly

force to a non‐suspect civilian who was not resisting arrest

and did not pose an imminent threat to any officer, bystander,

or himself. Garrett used physical force in a manner that re‐

strained Steven’s liberty, effectuating a seizure of Steven.

Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 995 (2021). Moreover, the na‐

ture and quality of the intrusion by Garrett was severe—as

told by Serena and Shannon, Garrett aggressively restrained

Steven for several minutes using his full body and police tac‐

tics intended to inflict pain and induce submission to the of‐

ficer’s will despite the fact that Steven was not a threat to him.

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. And Garrett continued to apply this

force, despite Steven’s alleged pleas that he could not breathe

and even after he vomited and lost consciousness. Yet the

“countervailing governmental interest[] at stake” was slight—

Steven did not pose an immediate threat to himself or anyone

else, and paramedics who could offer medical treatment for

Steven’s suspected hypoglycemia were already on their way.

See id. Furthermore, Garrett did not carry a first aid kit with

10 No. 20‐1109

him, he did not check or monitor Steven’s vital signs, and he

did not permit Steven to drink the orange juice that his niece

offered (which was likely the most immediately accessible

treatment for hypoglycemia). If we accept, as we must, Plain‐

tiff’s version of the facts, the force Garrett deployed against

Steven was not a proportional response to Steven’s mumbling

and stumbling around his bedroom.

2. Clearly Established

Our analysis next turns to whether Garrett’s violation of

Steven’s constitutional rights was clearly established in 2016.

Lopez v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 993 F.3d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 2021).

This step of the analysis requires specificity—“[f]or the law to

be clearly established, the ‘existing precedent must have

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond de‐

bate.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al‐Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).

Though specificity is important, it does not require a case pre‐

senting the exact same facts. Id. at 988. The right must be “suf‐

ficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand

what he is doing violates that right.” Weinmann, 787 F.3d at

450. “Law enforcement officers, the [Supreme] Court has

stressed, ‘can still be on notice that their conduct violates es‐

tablished law even in novel factual circumstances.’” Strand,

910 F.3d at 915 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741

(2002)).

Here, determining whether Garrett’s violation of Steven’s

rights was clearly established in 2016 requires findings of fact,

which we cannot make at this stage of the litigation. Indeed,

several cases leave us with the firm conviction that under Gra‐

ham, and taking the facts most favorable to the Plaintiff, a jury

could conclude that Garrett applied excessive force to Steven

in violation of Steven’s clearly established rights. See

No. 20‐1109 11

McAllister, 615 F.3d at 885 (“While none of these cases involve

the same scenario at issue here—the use of force against a di‐

abetic following a car accident resulting from hypoglycemic

shock—they do suggest that [the defendant officer] should

have been on notice that elements of his conduct could violate

[the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.”); McCue v. City of Ban‐

gor, Me., 838 F.3d 55, 64 (1st Cir. 2016) (“Even without partic‐

ular Supreme Court and First Circuit cases directly on point,

it was clearly established in September 2012 that exerting sig‐

nificant, continued force on a person’s back while that [per‐

son] is in a face‐down prone position after being subdued

and/or incapacitated constitutes excessive force.”) (internal

quotations omitted) (citing Weigel v. Broad, 544 F.3d 1143, 1155

(10th Cir. 2008); Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d

893, 903 (6th Cir. 2004)).

First, “[i]t is clear, … that police officers do not have the

right to shove, push, or otherwise assault innocent citizens

without any provocation whatsoever.” Clash v. Beatty, 77 F.3d

1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 1996). In Clash, officers responded to a 911

call reporting that someone was armed—in fact, it was the

plaintiff’s 12‐year‐old who had pointed a toy gun at his sib‐

ling in a grocery store parking lot while waiting for their par‐

ents. Id. at 1046–47. A “virtual armada” of officers pulled over

the plaintiff’s vehicle, ordered the family out, and searched

the driver for weapons. Id. They found none. Id. Still, officers

handcuffed him and shoved him into a patrol car, injuring his

knees. Id. We agreed with the district court that the record did

not clearly show whether or not the officer had violated

clearly established law and dismissed the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction. Id. at 1048–49.

12 No. 20‐1109

Here, the Plaintiff’s account of the facts also “draw[s] into

question the objective reasonableness of the police action.”

Clash, 77 F.3d at 1048–49. Resolving the factual disputes in fa‐

vor of the Plaintiff leaves us with a scenario in which an officer

deployed aggressive restraint tactics—tactics that were much

more forceful than the shoving and pushing described in

Clash—against an innocent civilian, without any provocation

beyond some mumbling and stumbling around a bedroom in

his own home.

Second, we have previously held that continuing to apply

unnecessary force against a civilian once he is already sub‐

dued may be an unreasonable use of force. See Strand, 910 F.3d

at 915 (“If the facts and circumstances show that an individual

who once posed a threat has become ‘subdued and complying

with the officer’s orders,’ the officer may not continue to use

force.”); see also Johnson v. Rogers, 944 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir.

2019) (“[T]here is no doubt that an unnecessary kick, after a

suspect is under control, violates the suspect’s clearly estab‐

lished rights.”); Abdullahi, 423 F.3d at 764–66. In Abdullahi, we

held that questions of fact precluded a finding of qualified im‐

munity on summary judgment where officers restrained a ci‐

vilian suffering from a PTSD episode. 423 F.3d at 464–66.

There, officers responded to a 911 call from a nurse who had

stopped to help a man who appeared to be in distress but who

had attacked the nurse when she approached him. Id. at 764–

65. Three officers worked together to subdue him on his stom‐

ach. Id. One officer ended up placing his knee on the dece‐

dent’s back and “applied his weight to keep [him] from

squirming of flailing.” Id. The officer “increased the pressure

on [the decedent’s] back until [he] stopped arching his back

upward.” Id. The decedent lost consciousness and died two

and a half minutes after “officers had taken him to the

No. 20‐1109 13

ground.” Id. at 766. Under those circumstances, we held that

the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, pre‐

cluded summary judgment on qualified immunity for the de‐

fendant officer. Id. at 773. There, we said that “the record sup‐

ports an inference that [the officer] knelt on [the decedent]

with enough force to inflict lethal injuries.” Id. at 770.

The facts of Abdullahi, at the summary judgment stage, are

not so different from the facts of this case.3 Here, viewing all

of the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Gar‐

rett continued to apply significant restraints to Steven even

after he was restrained on the bed and had vomited and lost

consciousness. We acknowledge that Garrett tells the facts dif‐

ferently. But, as we observed in Abdullahi, though different in‐

ferences can be drawn from the facts, “it is for a jury, and not

for us, to weigh all the evidence and choose between compet‐

ing inferences.” Id.

Third, existing case law demonstrates that a medical emer‐

gency does not extinguish a civilian’s Fourth Amendment

rights. See id. The district court eschewed the cases cited above

and others cited by Plaintiff because those cases did not in‐

volve a medical emergency in which the officers involved did

not play some kind of law enforcement role. This reasoning is

flawed. Though a medical emergency may in some cases jus‐

tify the use of force when providing medical aid, we reject the

notion that responding to a medical emergency gives police

officers an absolute license to disregard the Fourth

3 The facts of Abdullahi do differ from the facts here in that the civilian

there had attacked a nurse; whereas here, there is no argument that Steven

posed a threat to Garrett or another third party.

14 No. 20‐1109

Amendment.4 “[A] person’s Fourth Amendment rights are

not eviscerated simply because a police officer may be acting

in a noninvestigatory capacity for ‘it is surely anomalous to

say that the individual … is fully protected by the Fourth

Amendment only when the individual is suspected of crimi‐

nal behavior.’” United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1560 (10th

Cir. 1993) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court of City and Cnty.

of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967)); see also Policky v. City

of Seward, Neb., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (D. Neb. 2006). Rather,

courts should consider medical necessity, and the role that a

law enforcement officer plays in addressing that medical ne‐

cessity, as part of their assessment of the Graham factors.

McAllister lends guidance. In that case, officers responded

to a traffic accident that the plaintiff caused when his “blood

sugar level plummeted, sending him into a severe hypoglyce‐

mic state.” 615 F.3d at 879. Believing that the plaintiff was in‐

toxicated, the defendant officer forcibly removed the plaintiff

from his car, threw him to the ground, and used a knee to

subdue him, despite indications that the plaintiff may have

been suffering from a medical emergency, rather than intoxi‐

cation. Id. The officer handcuffed the driver once he was on

the ground and left him convulsing on the pavement. Id. The

plaintiff suffered a broken hip and bruised lung as a result. Id.

4Moreover, while an “officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth

Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; … an

officer’s good intentions [will not] make an objectively unreasonable use

of force constitutional.” Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 950 (7th Cir. 2018)

(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). Garrett’s subjective intent to aid Steven

is thus irrelevant.

No. 20‐1109 15

at 880. In affirming the district court’s denial of qualified im‐

munity, we held that:

[Our case law] would not suggest to a reasonable of‐

ficer that he may slam an unresponsive, convulsing

driver into the ground with force sufficient to break the

driver’s hip and place his knee on the driver’s back

with enough force to bruise his lung. Such conduct

goes beyond the bounds of the plaintiff’s clearly estab‐

lished Fourth Amendment rights and thus deprives the

defendant of qualified immunity.

Id. at 886. Accordingly, we held that “[e]ven if [the defendant

officer] was justified in using some force to remove [the plain‐

tiff] from the vehicle, using the force involved here against a

non‐resisting suspect could have been unreasonable given the

circumstances.” Id. at 884.

The Sixth Circuit addressed a similar situation in McKenna

v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432, 435 (6th Cir. 2010) where it affirmed the

denial of qualified immunity to two officers who restrained a

civilian who was suffering from a seizure. When officers ar‐

rived at the home in response to a 911 call that an individual

was choking or having a seizure, the officers instructed the

seizing individual to get out of bed and put his pants on. Id.

When he could not comply, the officers tried to pick him up

and ultimately handcuffed him. Id. at 435–36. While in the

home, the officers searched the house, ran the decedent’s car’s

plates, and questioned others about the decedent’s drug use.

On appeal, the court reasoned that the officers’ entitlement to

qualified immunity depended on whether the officers acted

as law enforcement or as emergency medical responders at

the decedent’s home. Id. at 439–40. The court noted that this

inquiry was an objective one. Thus it was irrelevant “whether

16 No. 20‐1109

[the officers] had a law‐enforcement or medical‐response in‐

tent; the focus must be on what role their actions reveal them

to have played.” Id. at 440 (emphasis added). Finally, the court

held “the objective determination of the role that the officers

played … is properly a jury question because the legal ques‐

tion of immunity is completely dependent upon which view

of the disputed facts is accepted by the jury.” Id. at 441 (inter‐

nal quotations omitted).

To review, three principles are clear: First, officers do not

have a right to assault civilians without provocation. Clash, 77

F.3d at 1048. Second, officers may not use unnecessary force

when a civilian is already subdued or compliant. Strand, 910

F.3d at 915. Third, a medical emergency impacts the objective

reasonableness of a seizure, but an emergency does not “evis‐

cerate” the civilian’s Fourth Amendment rights. Taking these

principles together, it has been clearly established that the

method and manner of restraint must fit the circumstances of

the particular case. See McAllister, 615 F.3d at 879–80. Officers

can employ only those means of restraint appropriate in a

given situation. This is especially so for lethal force. In other

words, it was clearly established by 2016 that an officer who

forcibly restrained a civilian who was not a suspect of a crime

and who did not pose a threat to those around him, resulting

in vomiting and loss of consciousness before the officer re‐

leased the civilian, violated that civilian’s Fourth Amendment

rights.

We acknowledge that the Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s ac‐

counts of the events diverge with respect to the facts sur‐

rounding the incident, including whether Steven was a threat

to himself or others, whether Garrett’s actions served a medi‐

cal or law enforcement purpose, and whether the force used

No. 20‐1109 17

was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Each of

these material disputes of fact must be determined by the

jury, so that the court can properly assess Garrett’s entitle‐

ment to qualified immunity.

“[S]ince the Graham reasonableness inquiry ‘nearly always

requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions,

and to draw inferences therefrom, we have held on many oc‐

casions that summary judgment or judgment as a matter of

law in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.’” Ab‐

dullahi, 423 F.3d at 773 (citing Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853

(9th Cir. 2002)); see also Siler v. City of Kenosha, 957 F.3d 751,

759 (7th Cir. 2020) (“‘[S]ummary judgment is often inappro‐

priate in excessive‐force cases because the evidence surround‐

ing the officer’s use of force is often susceptible of different

interpretations,’ particularly where ‘the one against whom

force was used has died, because the witness most likely to

contradict the officer’s testimony—the victim—cannot tes‐

tify.’”) (quoting Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 862

(7th Cir. 2010)). Here, the district court erred by implicitly

crediting Garrett’s version of the facts and finding that Garrett

was acting in a medical capacity and therefore entitled to

qualified immunity.

Defendant urges us to approve the district court’s reading

of our decision in Thompson v. Cope, 900 F.3d 414 (2018), but

that decision does not control the outcome of this case. In

Thompson, a paramedic responded to an emergency call to

treat an animal bite. Id. at 418. Upon arriving at the scene, the

paramedic discovered that the animal bite was in fact a hu‐

man bite, inflicted by a naked and belligerent suspect who

law enforcement officers were struggling to restrain. Id. The

paramedic believed the suspect to be high on amphetamines

18 No. 20‐1109

and administered a sedative to calm the suspect down. Id. At

some point, the suspect stopped breathing and ultimately

passed away eight days later. Id.

The district court held that the paramedic had acted as a

law enforcement officer and denied summary judgment, so

we reviewed the interlocutory appeal for legal error only. Id.

at 419. We reversed the district court’s denial of qualified im‐

munity for the paramedic because the administration of the

sedative to a “combative” and likely under‐the‐influence sus‐

pect (who had bitten another person) was not a clearly estab‐

lished violation of the decedent’s constitutional rights. Id. at

423. We were skeptical that a “paramedic (or his lawyer) …

would have understood that the Fourth Amendment … ap‐

plies to treatment in the field during a medical emergency.”

Id. at 422–23.

The facts and posture of this case differ from Thompson.

First, although Garrett may have had training as a paramedic,

he responded to Gloria’s 911 call dressed and equipped as a

law enforcement officer, arriving without any kind of medical

supplies or equipment with which he might have treated a ci‐

vilian suffering from a hypoglycemic “sugar spell.” Thus a

jury could reasonably infer that Garrett responded as a law

enforcement officer, not as an emergency medical provider.

Though we do not suggest that labels alone should dictate the

analysis in this kind of situation,5 the function of the state ac‐

tor is certainly a relevant consideration in assessing the objec‐

tive reasonableness of a particular use of force. Second, unlike

5Cf. Currie v. Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[F]rom the

perspective of the arrestee, it matters not a whit whether it is the jailer or

the doctor whose conduct deprives him of life‐saving medical care.”).

No. 20‐1109 19

the undisputed facts in Thompson, it is not at all clear that Gar‐

rett was providing medical care to Steven by restraining him

in the manner described. Here, critical facts are in dispute that

may render Garrett’s use of force unreasonable, and those

facts must be decided by the jury.

Though rare, trial courts may consider qualified immunity

after trial. Estate of Escobedo v. Martin, 702 F.3d 388, 398 n.4 (7th

Cir. 2012). And although the Supreme Court has urged lower

courts to determine the applicability of qualified immunity as

soon as practicable,6 it is sometimes impossible to resolve the

qualified immunity question before trial. See id.; see also Clash,

77 F.3d at 1048 (where “the facts draw into question the objec‐

tive reasonableness of the police action under the alleged cir‐

cumstances, they must be developed in the district court be‐

fore a definitive ruling on the defense can be made.”). This is

one such case. There may be a set of facts, established at trial,

under which Garrett’s use of force was not excessive, or was

not clearly established as excessive. But taking the facts in the

light most favorable to the Plaintiff at this stage, we cannot

agree with the district court that Garrett’s use of force did not

violate Steven’s clearly established constitutional rights. We

thus reverse. Assuming this case goes to trial, the district court

would be well‐advised to use a specific jury verdict form to

probe the facts that the jury finds to aid in any post‐verdict

determination of qualified immunity. See Smith v. Finkley, ‐‐

F.4th ‐‐, 2021 WL 3660880, at *19 (7th Cir. Aug. 18, 2021)

(“When the issue of qualified immunity remains unresolved

at the time of trial, … the district court may properly use spe‐

cial interrogatories to allow the jury to determine disputed

6 See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2009).

20 No. 20‐1109

issues of fact upon which the court can base its legal determi‐

nation of qualified immunity.”) (quoting Warlick v. Cross, 969

F.2d at 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 1992)).

B. Causation

Garrett argues in the alternative that Plaintiff failed to es‐

tablish causation as to Steven’s injuries, so that he is entitled

to summary judgment even if we find he is not entitled to

qualified immunity.

Section 1983 requires the plaintiff to show that Garrett

“cause[d]” the deprivation of Steven’s constitutional rights.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Causation is fundamentally a jury question.

Kaiser v. Johnson & Johnson, 947 F.3d 996, 1016 (7th Cir. 2020);

Wisc. Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States, 441 F.3d 502, 505 (7th Cir.

2006). We have previously held that expert testimony is not

necessary to prove causation in a § 1983 action, though it is

difficult to establish causation without it. See Cyrus v. Town of

Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 864 (7th Cir. 2010). “[T]he general

rule is that expert testimony is not necessary to prove causa‐

tion ‘if all the primary facts can be accurately and intelligibly

described to the jury, and if they, as men of common under‐

standing, are as capable of comprehending the primary facts

and of drawing correct conclusions from them.’” Id. (quoting

Salem v. U.S. Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962)).

Here, Plaintiff has presented evidence that men of com‐

mon understanding could comprehend. See id. Taking the ev‐

idence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Garrett applied

police restraint techniques to Steven, who vomited and then

lost consciousness while in those restraints and never re‐

gained consciousness. But Plaintiff does not simply have to

rely on these facts, because she has also presented two expert

No. 20‐1109 21

witnesses who opined that Steven died due to the force Gar‐

rett used to restrain him. Dr. Richard Friedlander, a cardiolo‐

gist with forty years of experience opined that:

It is my professional opinion based upon a reasona‐

ble degree of medical certainty that respiratory fail‐

ure or respiratory compromise can result in a car‐

diac event in some instances. It is also my profes‐

sional opinion based upon a reasonable degree of

medical certainty that hypoglycemia does not nec‐

essarily lead to a cardiac event in every individual

experiencing them. … [P]lacing the patient in a

prone position and applying pressure to his body

resulted in respiratory compromise which in turn

led to loss of consciousness and a respiratory ar‐

rest. … Th[e] series of events strongly suggests that

the cardiovascular collapse was not the result of a

cardiac event. In other words, to a reasonable degree

of medical certainty, this series of events strongly

suggests that the cardiovascular collapse experi‐

enced by Mr. Taylor was the result of the respiratory

compromise that resulted due to the pressure ap‐

plied to his body.

A second doctor, Dr. Joel Silverman, who has twenty years of

experience in critical medical care and pulmonology opined

that, “[i]f the family’s version of events is taken as true, given

the condition Mr. Taylor was in, with a reasonable degree of

medical certainty the cardiopulmonary arrest likely could

have been caused by obstruction of his airway by Officer Gar‐

rett.”

Doctors who treated Steven before his death could not say

with certainty what series of medical events led to Steven’s

22 No. 20‐1109

death. For instance, one of the emergency room doctors who

treated Steven opined that “there is no definite way” to deter‐

mine whether Steven had first suffered from respiratory ar‐

rest or cardiac arrest. This treating physician also testified that

he had never seen hypoglycemia itself lead to respiratory ar‐

rest. Steven’s cardiologist also could not say with certainty

which medical event came first—he could not “say what ex‐

actly caused Mr. Taylor’s cardiac arrest.”

Although the medical examiner did not perform an au‐

topsy in this case, the expert opinions of Drs. Friedlander and

Silverman adequately create a question of fact regarding

whether Garrett’s restraint tactics caused Steven’s death. It

may be the case that Steven’s pre‐existing medical conditions

contributed to his inability to recover consciousness, but Ste‐

ven’s treating physicians’ testimony further confirms that the

question of causation is still clouded by factual disputes.

Given the expert testimony and the “eggshell skull” rule,7

causation is also a question for the jury.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further

proceedings. As the parties and the district court prepare for

7“The tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him. That is the ‘eggshell

skull’ rule, which like most principles of the common law of torts is appli‐

cable to a constitutional tort case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Richman

v. Sheahan, 512 F.3d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Brackett v. Peters, 11 F.3d

78, 81 (7th Cir. 1993); Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1192–93 (9th

Cir. 2002)).

No. 20‐1109 23

trial, we suggest the use of a special verdict form to probe any

determination by the jury to aid the district court should it

need to reconsider the qualified immunity determination

post‐trial.