The opinion
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
March 6, 2006
No. 04-15538
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 03-00184-CV-1-CB-M
SEVENTH STREET, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BALDWIN COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION,
BALDWIN COUNTY COMMISSION,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(March 6, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and GEORGE *, District Judge.
*
Honorable Lloyd D. George, United States District Judge for the District of Nevada,
sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
Seventh Street, L.L.C., appeals a summary judgment in favor of the Baldwin
County Planning and Zoning Commission and the Baldwin County Commission.
Seventh Street argues that some provisions of the Subdivision Regulations of
Baldwin County violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on
the ground that the County Commission lacked statutory authority to enact the
regulations and others violate due process on the ground that they are
unconstitutionally vague and standardless. Because Alabama law granted the
Commission the police power to enact the regulations and those regulations are not
vague as applied to Seventh Street, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Seventh Street sought approval from the Zoning Commission to build a
condominium complex in Lillian, Baldwin County, Alabama. Portions of the
parcel were not then subject to county zoning, but the entire parcel was designated
as a “flood prone area.” In March and April 2002, the Zoning Commission held
public hearings to consider the application of Seventh Street.
The Zoning Commission denied the application of Seventh Street based on
failure to comply with sections 10.3.2(b), 10.3.2(d), 10.3.3(a)(1), 10.3.3(a)(2),
10.3.5(f), 10.3.5(r), and 10.3.5(t) of the Subdivision Regulations. Section 10.3.2
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requires all planned developments to “meet the minimum development standards”
including to reserve ten percent of the land area in the development for open space,
Baldwin County, Ala., Subdivision Regulations § 10.3.2(b) (2002), and to limit
non-residential land uses to no more than twenty percent of the gross land area, id.
§ 10.3.2(d). Section 10.3.3(a) requires approval of the site plan by the
Commission after consideration of (1) “the value and character” of adjacent
properties and (2) the “objectives and purpose of the master plan.” Id. § 10.3.3(a).
Section 10.3.5 lists additional “site plan requirements,” including the “[n]ames and
addresses of the owners of the land immediately adjoining the site,” id. § 10.3.5(f);
“[p]roposed land uses and the location of proposed buildings and other structures,”
id. § 10.3.5(r); and “[t]he method proposed to maintain private common open
areas,” id. § 10.3.5(t).
On March 23, 2003, Seventh Street filed a complaint against the County
Commission and the Zoning Commission in federal district court and sought relief
on two grounds. First, Seventh Street argued that certain provisions of the
subdivision regulations were “promulgated without statutory authority and thus
application of those provisions to plaintiff’s application was arbitrary and
capricious in violation of due process.” Second, Seventh Street argued that two
provisions of the subdivision regulations were “so vague and standardless as to be
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arbitrary and capricious, in violation of due process.” The Commissions moved
for summary judgment, the district court granted the motion as to each claim, and
Seventh Street appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo the grant of summary judgment. Kingsland v.
City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1225-26 (11th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 124 Fed.
App’x 644 (11th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). We view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1225-26.
III. DISCUSSION
Seventh Street’s argument is twofold. First, Seventh Street argues that the
Subdivision Regulations violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because they are beyond the statutory authority of the County
Commission. Second, Seventh Street argues that provisions of the regulations are
so vague as to violate due process. We address each argument in turn.
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A. The Commission Has Statutory Authority to Enact the
Challenged Provisions.
Seventh Street argues that sections 10.3.2(b), 10.3.2(d), 10.3.3(a)(1),
10.3.3(a)(2), 10.3.5(f), 10.3.5(r), and 10.3.5(t) of the Subdivision Regulations
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because “the []
Commission lack[ed] statutory authority to promulgate” the provisions and “those
regulations are therefore arbitrary and capricious.” Because Seventh Street does
not contend that the Subdivision Regulations impair a fundamental right, we apply
“rational basis” scrutiny. Ga. Manufactured Hous. Ass’n v. Spalding County, 148
F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 1998). “The first step in determining whether
legislation survives rational-basis scrutiny is identifying a legitimate government
purpose . . . . The second step of rational-basis scrutiny asks whether a rational
basis exists for the enacting governmental body to believe that the legislation
would further the hypothesized purpose.” Id. A governmental entity does not have
a legitimate purpose to regulate beyond the authority conferred by its enabling
legislation. See Thorpe v. Hous. Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 280-81, 89 S. Ct. 518, 525
(1969). Because “a county can exercise only that authority conferred on it by law,”
Jefferson County v. Johnson, 333 So. 2d 143, 145 (Ala. 1976), this Court must turn
to Alabama law to determine whether the County Commission was empowered to
enact the regulations.
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Alabama Code Title 11, Chapter 19 provides a “grant of zoning powers” to
each county over land “within the flood-prone area of the county.” Ala. Code §
11-19-16. The section lists powers that, as Seventh Street admits, amount to a
grant of general police power to the County over flood-prone areas. See id.
Seventh Street concedes that if Chapter 19 applies, the County Commission has
authority to enact the challenged regulations, but Seventh Street argues that the
County Commission failed to avail itself of Chapter 19 powers. See Jefferson
County, 333 So. 2d at 148. In Jefferson County, the Alabama Supreme Court
interpreted a predecessor statute to Chapter 19 and held “the provisions of these
sections are not controlling unless the county governing body has adopted or
established comprehensive land-use and control measures or building codes for
flood-prone areas.” Id.
The County Commission adopted regulations for flood-prone areas under
Chapter 19. In Town of Orange Beach v. Baldwin County, 491 So. 2d 945, 946
(Ala. 1986), the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a finding that “Baldwin County
has duly adopted the necessary resolutions authorizing it to exercise the authority
granted by the legislature of the State of Alabama contained in sections 11-19-1
thr[ough] 11-19-24 . . . .” Id. Although Seventh Street argues Town of Orange
Beach is a factual rather than legal determination and is due no deference from this
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Court, we conclude otherwise, especially in the light of other evidence presented
by the County Commission. In 1978, the County Commission adopted the “Flood
Damage Prevention Ordinance”; in April 1994, the County Commission adopted a
building code for the flood prone areas; in June 1994, the County Commission
imposed additional requirements for coastal areas; and in January 2000, the
building codes were updated.
Seventh Street alternatively argues that Alabama Act Number 98-655
preempts Chapter 19, but that argument fails. See Ala. Act No. 98-665, 1998 Ala.
Acts 935. Act Number 98-655 provides that the County Commission cannot
“exercise its planning and zoning powers and jurisdiction in any planning district
established under this act until the majority of the qualified electors of the district
voting in an election shall have voted their desire to come within the planning and
zoning authority of the Baldwin County Commission.” Id. § 1(8). The Act states,
“All laws or parts of laws which conflict with this act are repealed.” Id. § 4. The
problem with the argument of Seventh Street is that Chapter 19 does not conflict
with Act Number 98-655.
Chapter 19 and Act 98-655 pertain to distinct subjects. Act Number 98-655
applies to “all unincorporated areas of Baldwin County,” Act No. 98-655 § 1(3),
but Chapter 19 applies only to “flood-prone areas,” Ala. Code § 11-19-3. Act 98-
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665 provides general zoning power to the County Commission, but Chapter 19
provides the County Commission with the authority to regulate flood-prone areas.
Act 98-655 did not remove that authority of the County Commission over flood-
prone areas.
B. The Reasons for Denying the Application Were Not
Unconstitutionally Vague.
Seventh Street argues that sections 10.3.3(a)(1) and 10.3.3(a)(2) of the
Subdivision Regulations were applied in violation of due process to deny its
application because they “give the [] Commission unlimited discretion, and fail to
provide clearly drawn standards that can be uniformly applied and give the
applicant reasonable notice of requirements with which it must comply to obtain
approval.” When a regulation does not affect constitutionally protected conduct,
the provision is valid unless “the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 494-95, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (1982). “[E]conomic regulation is subject
to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow, and
because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can
be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action.” Id. at 498, 102 S.
Ct. at 1193 (footnote omitted). “[T]he statute must be ‘so vague and indefinite as
really to be no rule or standard at all.’” Seniors Civil Liberties Ass’n v. Kemp, 965
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F.2d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123, 87
S. Ct. 1563, 1566 (1967)).
The Zoning Commission provided ample support for its decision to deny the
application of Seventh Street under sections sections 10.3.3(a)(1) and 10.3.3(a)(2)
of the Subdivision Regulations. The Zoning Commission conducted two public
hearings, and it notified Seventh Street of the deficiencies in its application. The
record reflects that Seventh Street failed to comply with various sections of the
Subdivision Regulations, including failure to obtain permits, submit construction
plans, and conduct necessary studies, failure to identify the size and location of
water and sewage lines to which it would connect, and failure to calculate pre- and
post-development water runoff. Because the reasons articulated by the Zoning
Commission were legitimate and not “so vague and indefinite as really to be no
rule or standard at all,” Kemp, 965 F.2d at 1036, summary judgment was
appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
The summary judgment in favor of the County Commission and Zoning
Commission is
AFFIRMED.
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