Opinion

Bangmon v. Alexander

Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Aug 6, 2021
Status
Unpublished
Nature of suit
Prisoner w/ out Counsel
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 16.0%

The opinion

Case: 18-41043 Document: 00515968274 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/06/2021

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 6, 2021

No. 18-41043 Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Jerry Lenez Bangmon,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Damon Alexander; Sergio G. Buentello; Willie M.

Ratliff; Gretta K. Bennett; Beverly A. White; Aquisha

Guidry; Edgar J. Hulipas; Terry W. Speers; Emily

Shortridge,

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:14-CV-370

Before Jones, Southwick, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

An Texas state prison inmate brought suit alleging that various

correctional officers violated his civil rights. The district court dismissed

some claims as frivolous and granted summary judgment on others. We

*

Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

Case: 18-41043 Document: 00515968274 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/06/2021

No. 18-41043

AFFIRM in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND for further

proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jerry Lenez Bangmon, Texas prisoner # 1568309, filed a lawsuit

raising Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against several

defendants, all of whom were employees of the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice’s (“TDCJ”) Darrington Unit during the events alleged in

the complaint.

Many of Bangmon’s claims relate to an incident that occurred in

November 2012. We accept the description of that incident as described in

the complaint in this suit. Bangmon was walking in a hallway on crutches

when defendant Damon Alexander approached in a “very hostile and

aggressive man[ner].” Alexander threatened to sexually assault Bangmon,

grabbed him and, without provocation or justification, “intentionally,

maliciously and sadistically snatched [him] ten to eleven feet across the . . .

hallway and threw him into the wall.” Alexander pinned Bangmon there and

threatened to “stomp[]” him if he fell. Bangmon was injured during the

attack.

Bangmon sued Alexander. He also sued others. One defendant was

Sergio G. Buentello, a corrections officer who Bangmon claimed witnessed

the attack but failed to protect Bangmon or report the attack. Other

defendants are Willie M. Ratliff and Beverly A. White, corrections officers

who allegedly denied Bangmon’s requests for medical attention after the

attack. Also joined as defendants were Gretta K. Bennett, who allegedly

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No. 18-41043

conspired with others to cover up the attack; and Aquisha Guidry, who

allegedly failed to respond to video evidence of the attack. 1

Finally, Bangmon brought claims against two medical professionals at

Darrington. Bangmon alleges that defendant Edgar J. Hulipas’s deliberate

indifference included his failing to respond to Bangmon’s medical complaints

(including complaints related to the attack) and denying him use of

ambulatory devices. Bangmon alleges that defendant Terry W. Speers, a

Darrington nurse practitioner, violated his Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by denying him access to a walking cane or other walking

device.

The district court ordered the Texas Attorney General, who

represents all of the defendants except Buentello, to file a Martinez 2 report to

assist the court in evaluating Bangmon’s claims. The AG filed the report in

January 2018.

The district court thereafter entered a series of orders. It dismissed

the claims for money damages against all defendants in their official

capacities on Eleventh Amendment grounds. As for the claims against

defendants in their individual capacities, the court dismissed the claims

against Alexander and Buentello as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B). It granted summary judgment in favor of Ratliff, White,

Bennett, and Guidry, concluding that Bangmon had failed to exhaust his

1

Emily Shortridge is identified as a defendant in the caption for this appeal. In his

brief, Bangmon disclaims seeking relief against Shortridge.

2

This court has adopted the procedure used in Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317

(10th Cir. 1978), as a tool by which an administrative record is constructed to assist in

assessing whether prisoner complaints are frivolous. See Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286,

292–93 (5th Cir. 1997). The resulting administrative record is commonly referred to as a

“Martinez report.”

3

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No. 18-41043

administrative remedies on those claims. The court concluded that the

claims against Guidry and Bennett also should be dismissed for failure to state

a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B). As to the medical professionals, the

district court granted summary judgment in favor of Hulipas and Speers,

concluding that the conduct about which Bangmon complained did not rise

to the level of deliberate indifference. Bangmon appealed.

DISCUSSION

Bangmon proceeded pro se in the district court and continues to do so

on appeal. We liberally construe arguments in a pro se brief, Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), but we still require pro se parties to brief their

arguments adequately, Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995).

Liberally construed, Bangmon’s brief challenges the district court’s

dismissal of the claims against Alexander and Buentello and the entry of

summary judgment in favor of Ratliff, White, Bennett, and Guidry. 3

Bangmon also challenges the denial of his motion to compel production of a

video of the alleged use of force. We will separately review these arguments.

I. Dismissal

Bangmon argues that the district court erred by holding, in part based

on qualified immunity, that the claims against Alexander and Buentello were

frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

A claim may be dismissed as frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)

“if it does not have an arguable basis in fact or law.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587

3

Bangmon also claims error in the dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B) of the

claims against Guidry and Bennett. Because we conclude that entry of summary judgment

in favor of Guidry and Bennett was proper, we do not reach the question of whether

Bangmon failed to state a claim against these defendants.

4

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F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2009). We review such dismissals for abuse of

discretion. Id. A “district court by definition abuses its discretion when it

makes an error of law.” Kane v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 535 F.3d 380, 384

(5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

Bangmon sued Alexander for excessive use of force. “To establish the

use of excessive force in violation of the Constitution, a plaintiff must prove:

(1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was

clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly

unreasonable.” Elizondo v. Green, 671 F.3d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 2012)

(quotation marks and citation omitted). In the context of an excessive-force

claim against prison officials, the “core judicial inquiry” is “whether force

was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.

1, 6–7 (1992). Force beyond that which is reasonably required to maintain or

restore discipline is “wanton and unnecessary.” Id. at 7.

Bangmon’s complaint claimed that Alexander threw him against a

wall without justification. Bangmon also submitted the declarations of two

inmates that provide some corroboration of his account. Bangmon alleges he

suffered an injury as a result of the incident.

The district court determined that these allegations were

“conclusory” because they were refuted by the administrative and medical

records in the Martinez report. However, a Martinez report may not be used

to resolve genuine disputes of material facts when the information conflicts

with the plaintiff’s pleadings. Several unpublished opinions of this court

have so held, and we adopt them here as valid analysis. See, e.g., Cardona v.

Taylor, 828 F. App’x 198, 201 (5th Cir. 2020); Newby v. Quarterman, 325 F.

App’x 345, 354 (5th Cir. 2009); Williams v. Mason, 210 F. App’x 389, 390

(5th Cir. 2006). Bangmon’s complaint provided a detailed explanation of this

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No. 18-41043

event that was not frivolous. The district court should not have resolved

factual disputes based on the Martinez report’s findings.

Bangmon brings a claim against Buentello for bystander liability. The

failure to protect an individual from the use of excessive force by other

officers can give rise to liability under Section 1983. Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d

914, 919 (5th Cir. 1995). The district court’s dismissal of Bangmon’s claim

against Buentello is premised entirely upon its dismissal of the claim against

Alexander. Since the district court erred in its dismissal of the claim against

Alexander, we conclude that the district court also erred in dismissing the

claim against Buentello.

II. Summary judgment

Bangmon argues that the district court erred by granting summary

judgment on his remaining claims. We review the entry of summary

judgment de novo, viewing “all facts and evidence in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party.” Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co.,

784 F.3d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is proper if “there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

A. Defendants Ratliff, White, Bennett, and Guidry

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ratliff,

White, Bennett, and Guidry, concluding that Bangmon failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies against these defendants.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a prisoner to exhaust

administrative remedies prior to filing a Section 1983 lawsuit. 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement gives officials “time and opportunity

to address complaints internally.” Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 516 (5th

Cir. 2004) (quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525 (2002)). To exhaust

administrative remedies, a prisoner must pursue all available avenues of relief

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and comply with all administrative remedies and procedural rules. Woodford

v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89–95 (2006).

The Texas prison system provides a two-step process for filing

grievances, and a prisoner must pursue a grievance through both steps to

satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Johnson, 385 F.3d at 515. In an

unpublished opinion, we held that a prisoner did not exhaust administrative

remedies when he raised issues for the first time in step two of the grievance

process. Randle v. Woods, 299 F. App’x 466, 467 (5th Cir. 2008). That

conclusion is correct, and we will not repeat that panel’s analysis.

We agree with the district court that Bangmon did not exhaust his

administrative remedies with regard to the alleged misconduct of Ratliff,

White, Guidry, and Bennett. As for Ratliff, White, and Guidry, Bangmon did

not mention any misconduct against these defendants in a step 1 or step 2

grievance. Although Bangmon mentioned Bennett in a step 2 grievance, that

belated reference was inadequate to give TDCJ the time and opportunity to

address his complaint. Bangmon fails to show that the district court erred by

granting summary judgment in favor of Ratliff, White, Bennett, and Guidry. 4

B. Defendants Hulipas and Speers

Bangmon contends that the district court erred by granting summary

judgment in favor of Hulipas and Speers on his deliberate indifference claims.

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment when they demonstrate deliberate indifference to a

prisoner’s serious medical needs, which indifference amounts to an

4

Liberally construing his brief, Bangmon asserts that Ratliff, White, Alexander,

Buentello, Guidry, and Bennett conspired to cover up Alexander’s attack by refusing to file

use-of-force reports. These allegations are conclusory and do not appear in Bangmon’s

complaint. Further, the record lacks evidence that Bangmon exhausted his administrative

remedies as to these claims.

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No. 18-41043

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

104 (1976) (citation omitted). To prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference

to medical needs, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant denied him

treatment, purposefully gave him improper treatment, or ignored his medical

complaints. Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir.

2001). “Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical

malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference, nor does a prisoner’s

disagreement with his medical treatment, absent exceptional

circumstances.” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006).

“Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.” Domino,

239 F.3d at 756.

Bangmon insists that Hulipas and Speers violated his Eighth

Amendment rights by denying his requests for ambulatory devices and

delaying his receipt of surgery based upon incomplete medical records and

their incorrect beliefs that he was malingering. Bangmon does not

meaningfully respond to the district court’s reasoning that the treatments in

question were based on clinical observations and medical indications, and

that his mere disagreement with his course of treatment is insufficient to

establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346. His

assertion that treatments were based on incomplete or incorrect information

at best alleges negligence or malpractice, neither of which, if proven, would

establish deliberate indifference. See id.

Bangmon fails to show that the district court erred by granting

summary judgment in favor of Hulipas and Speers.

III. Discovery

Bangmon alleges that there is a video of the use of force by Alexander.

In the district court, he moved to compel production of the video. Among

the exhibits attached to the Martinez report was an affidavit from the TDCJ’s

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No. 18-41043

Administrative Monitor for the Use of Force Department who certified that

“after a diligent search, no Use of Force Report(s) to include

videos/photographs has been located in the name of Jerry Bangmon . . .

pertaining to a use of force incident that occurred on November 16, 2012”

(“no-use-of-force affidavit”). In pro se objections to the Martinez report,

Bangmon insisted that, despite the no-use-of-force affidavit, a video of the

incident could be “obtained from the surveillance [camera] system, memory-

storage, mainframe, archives etc.”

The district court denied Bangmon’s motion to compel the video

without explaining its reasoning. In light of our holding vacating the dismissal

of the claims against Alexander and Buentello, we also VACATE the district

court’s order denying the motion to compel and remand with instructions to

permit such discovery as the district court deems necessary, which may

include discovery of whether TDCJ’s previous search efforts included the

sources identified in Bangmon’s motion and, if not, whether relevant video

footage in fact could be obtained from one or more of those sources.

IV. Motions

We DENY Bangmon’s motions for appointment of counsel and for

sanctions against the defendants. Bangmon is free to renew his motion for

appointment of counsel before the district court upon remand.

We VACATE the dismissal of the claims against Alexander and

Buentello, AFFIRM the entry of summary judgment on the remaining

claims, VACATE the order on the motion to compel, and REMAND for

further proceedings.

9

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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