observing that “the Eleventh Amendment generally deprives federal courts of jurisdiction” over certain suits
How later courts described this case
- observing that “the Eleventh Amendment generally deprives federal courts of jurisdiction” over certain suits
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 18-30699 Document: 00515940047 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/15/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
July 15, 2021
No. 18-30699 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Incorporated;
Planned Parenthood Center for Choice; Jane Doe #1;
Jane Doe #2; Jane Doe #3,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
versus
Courtney N. Phillips, in her official capacity as Secretary of the
Louisiana Department of Health,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:18-CV-176
Before Higginbotham, Elrod, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge:
Two Planned Parenthood entities and three Jane Does brought this
lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the Louisiana Department of
Health is unlawfully declining to act on Planned Parenthood Center for
Choice’s application for a license to provide abortion services in Louisiana.
The Department moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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No. 18-30699
12(b)(1) on several bases, including sovereign immunity. 1 The district court
denied the motion without prejudice, and the Department filed this
interlocutory appeal. The plaintiffs moved to dismiss this interlocutory
appeal, arguing that we lack appellate jurisdiction. Because the Department
asserted sovereign immunity in the district court, we DENY the motion to
dismiss the appeal. At least one of the plaintiffs’ requested forms of relief is
a valid invocation of federal jurisdiction under Ex parte Young. The judgment
of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. The
case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
Plaintiff Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast provides non-abortion
healthcare services at its clinics in Texas and Louisiana. Gulf Coast also
participates in Texas’s and Louisiana’s Medicaid programs. The three Jane
Doe plaintiffs are Gulf Coast patients.
Plaintiff Planned Parenthood Center for Choice, a Texas Corporation,
has a facilities and services agreement with Gulf Coast to provide abortion
services at Gulf Coast clinics and provides abortions services at Gulf Coast’s
clinics in Texas. Currently, however, Planned Parenthood is not licensed to
provide abortions anywhere in Louisiana. In September 2016, Planned
Parenthood applied for a license to operate an abortion clinic at a Gulf Coast
clinic in New Orleans, Louisiana. About six weeks later, the Department
notified Planned Parenthood that its application was incomplete and missing
information, which triggered a 90-day deadline for Planned Parenthood to
1
The nominal defendant is Dr. Courtney Phillips, Secretary of the Louisiana
Department of Health, who is substituted for former Secretary Dr. Rebekah Gee pursuant
to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2). Phillips is sued only in her official
capacity.
2
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respond. 2 Planned Parenthood did not respond until five months later, in
April 2017, allegedly with the Department’s permission to postpone the
response deadline. The Department continued its review of the application,
including inspecting Gulf Coast’s New Orleans clinic in May 2017.
Meanwhile, in December 2016, a Select Investigative Panel of the
United States House of Representatives began investigating Planned
Parenthood’s handling of fetal remains. The investigation was spurred in
part by videos recorded at Gulf Coast’s headquarters in Texas that
“depict[ed] two individuals posing as representatives from a fetal tissue
procurement company discussing the possibility of a research partnership
with PP Gulf Coast.” Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Fam. Plan. &
Preventative Health Servs., Inc. v. Kauffman, 981 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2020)
(en banc). 3 Among other findings, the Select Committee’s Final Report
related evidence that Gulf Coast had illegally received or sought financial
compensation in exchange for transferring fetal body parts to academic
institutions in Texas. 4 In December 2016, the Select Committee referred
several of those violations to the Texas Attorney General for investigation
and released a 450-page report documenting its findings.
The Department decided to withhold action on Planned Parenthood’s
application to let the Texas investigation run its course. In June 2017, the
Department sent Planned Parenthood a letter communicating its decision to
defer resolution of the application. The letter explained that, under
2
See La. Admin. Code tit. 48, pt. I, § 4405(E) (Jan. 2021) (giving an applicant “90
calendar days from receipt of the notification to submit the additional requested
information”).
3
The videos, in their entirety, are publicly available. Kauffman, 981 F.3d at 382
n.10 (Elrod, J., concurring) (linking to videos).
4
See 42 U.S.C. § 289g-2; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 48.02.
3
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Louisiana law, “the Department may deny a license if an investigation or
survey determines that the applicant is in violation of any federal or state law
or regulation.” 5
Referencing the Select Committee’s “criminal and regulatory referral
to the Texas Attorney General related to the operations of Planned
Parenthood Gulf Coast,” the letter explained that the Department needed to
“conduct[] an investigation to determine if Planned Parenthood Center for
Choice, either in its own name or through the actions of Planned Parenthood
Gulf Coast, is in violation of any federal or state law or regulation.” The
letter concluded by saying that the Department “is neither approving nor
denying [Planned Parenthood’s] application,” but that “[a]fter the
conclusion of this investigation, [the Department] will be in a position to
make a determination on [Planned Parenthood’s] license application.”
Then, in January 2018, Louisiana received a confidential complaint
regarding activity by Gulf Coast in Louisiana. The Louisiana Attorney
General is currently investigating that complaint for potential action by the
state. Because Planned Parenthood has a facilities and services agreement
with Gulf Coast to use Gulf Coast’s space, services, and staff, the
Department views the investigation as necessarily implicating Planned
Parenthood.
In February 2018, the plaintiffs sued the Department, asserting two
sets of claims. 6 The first set—the licensing claims—challenge the
5
See La. Stat. Ann. § 40:2175.6(G) (stating that the Department may deny a license
“if an investigation or survey determines that the applicant or licensee is in violation of any
provision of this Part, in violation of the licensing rules promulgated by the department, or
in violation of any other federal or state law or regulation”).
6
The plaintiffs’ claims, as set out by the district court, are as follows:
Claim I alleges that the [constructive] denial and [Louisiana’s House Bill
4
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Department’s handling of their application for a license to provide abortion
services in Louisiana. The plaintiffs allege that the Department’s letter and
decision to await more information constituted a “constructive denial” of
Planned Parenthood’s application and that the Department’s licensing
process is a “sham” intended to prevent Planned Parenthood from
performing abortions. The plaintiffs assert that this alleged denial violates
their rights to substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal
protection. They do not challenge the underlying statutes or regulations that
govern abortion-clinic licensing; they challenge only the Department’s
handling of this particular application.
On their licensing claims, the plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment
that the “denial” of their license violates the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and “is therefore void and
of no effect.” They also seek three injunctions on their licensing claims:
(1) an injunction preventing the Department from “withholding approval”
of its application; (2) an injunction ordering the Department to “promptly
606 (“HB 606”)] violate [Planned Parenthood’s] patients’ due process
rights to liberty and privacy as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
because they have the unlawful purpose or effect of imposing an undue
burden on women’s exercise of their right to an abortion. Claim II alleges
that the denial and HB 606 “single out” [Gulf Coast], [Planned
Parenthood], and their patients for unfavorable treatment without
justification in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Claim III alleges
that HB 606 violates 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) by denying [Gulf Coast’s]
Louisiana Medicaid patients the right to choose any willing, qualified
provider. Claim IV alleges that HB 606 violates the First Amendment and
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by placing an
unconstitutional condition on [Gulf Coast’s] eligibility to participate in
Medicaid based on the Plaintiffs’ exercise of constitutionally protected
activity. Finally, Claim V alleges that the denial violates [Planned
Parenthood’s] right to procedural due process by denying [Planned
Parenthood] a license without adequate procedural protections.
5
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rule” on the application “in accordance with all applicable constitutional
requirements”; and (3) an injunction ordering the Department to grant the
application and issue an abortion-clinic license to Planned Parenthood.
The plaintiffs’ second set of claims—their funding claims—
challenges Louisiana’s House Bill 606 (“HB 606”), which prohibits giving
taxpayer funds, including Medicaid funds, to abortion providers and their
affiliates. 7 The plaintiffs assert that, in the event that Planned Parenthood is
eventually granted a license, HB 606 would require Louisiana to cease
providing Gulf Coast with Medicaid funding. The plaintiffs claim that HB
606 violates their due process, equal protection, and First Amendment
rights, as well as a provision of the federal Medicaid Act. 8 They seek both
declaratory and injunctive relief on the funding claims.
The Department moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The
Department asserted sovereign immunity from the licensing claims because,
in the Department’s view, those claims call on the district court to
“supervise an ongoing State-law licensing process—the very kind of
situation” that deprives a federal court of jurisdiction under Pennhurst.
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (holding
that sovereign immunity prohibits federal courts from “instruct[ing] state
officials on how to conform their conduct to state law”).
Likewise, the Department argued that granting the plaintiffs’
requested relief on their licensing claims would violate Pennhurst because
they “demand a change in the Department’s interpretation of State law.” It
also urged that the licensing claims involve the kinds of state-law
7
See La. Stat. Ann. §§ 36:21(B), 40:1061.6(A)(2), 40:2175.4(B).
8
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23).
6
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entanglements that require the district court to abstain and dismiss under
Burford. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 318, 332 (1943) (holding that a
federal court may abstain from exercising its equity jurisdiction where doing
so would “be prejudicial to the public interest” or would “so clearly involve[]
basic problems of [State] policy” (quoting United States ex rel. Greathouse v.
Dern, 289 U.S. 352, 360 (1933))). Finally, the Department urged dismissal
because the plaintiffs’ funding claims are contingent on the barred licensing
claims, are not ripe, and are therefore not justiciable.
The plaintiffs responded, arguing that the claims are ripe because the
Department’s actions up to this point have been “pretextual” and that the
Department “will continue to stall until this Court orders it to act.” They
also countered that Burford did not require the district court to abstain
because it is “unclear” whether state-court relief is available, and that
Pennhurst does not foreclose jurisdiction because their licensing claims are
about federal rights.
The district court denied the Department’s motion to dismiss without
prejudice to the renewal of the Department’s jurisdictional arguments once
the case returns to the district court after this interlocutory appeal. The
Department appealed. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss this
appeal for lack of jurisdiction, which was carried with the case.
II.
First, we must decide whether we have jurisdiction over this
interlocutory appeal. Normally, our jurisdiction reaches only appeals from
“final decisions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 9 Because an order denying a motion to
dismiss is not a final decision, it “ordinarily does not constitute an
9
The Department does not argue that this appeal satisfies any of the exceptions to
this rule set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1292.
7
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No. 18-30699
immediately appealable order.” Thomas ex rel. D.M.T. v. Sch. Bd. St. Martin
Par., 756 F.3d 380, 383 (5th Cir. 2014).
Nevertheless, beginning with Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
the Supreme Court has recognized narrow exceptions to this rule under what
is now termed the collateral-order doctrine. 337 U.S. 541, 545–47 (1949).
The collateral-order doctrine permits appellate courts to hear appeals of
interlocutory orders that “[1] conclusively determine the disputed question,
[2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action, and [3] [are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); accord
Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1708 n.3 (2017).
In Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., the
Supreme Court concluded that the collateral-order doctrine permits appeal
of a district court’s order denying a state “immunity from suit.” 506 U.S.
139, 141, 145 (1993). Because “[d]enials of States’ and state entities’ claims
to [sovereign] immunity purport to be conclusive determinations that they
have no right not to be sued in federal court,” the Supreme Court held that
the “elements of the Cohen collateral order doctrine” were satisfied and
therefore expanded the doctrine to appeals of denials of sovereign immunity.
Id. at 144–45.
The Department argues that we have appellate jurisdiction under
Metcalf & Eddy because, it says, it has always asserted “immunity from suit.”
Id. at 145. The Department says that it has consistently argued that sovereign
immunity bars the plaintiffs’ “entire suit.” McCarthy ex rel. Travis v.
Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2004) (exercising jurisdiction over
appeal of a denial of a motion to dismiss “asserting [sovereign] immunity
from the entire suit”). In its motion to dismiss, the Department stated that
the district court lacked jurisdiction over the entire case. Specifically, it
8
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urged that the plaintiffs’ licensing claims were barred by sovereign immunity
and Pennhurst, 10 that all of the requested forms of relief on the licensing
claims were barred by sovereign immunity and Pennhurst, 11 that the funding
claims were enveloped by and contingent on the licensing claims, 12 and that
the funding claims were unripe anyway. Thus, the Department argues that
it asserted immunity from this suit and that we have jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs argue that we do not have jurisdiction because, they
contend, the Department asserted sovereign immunity from only certain
forms of relief, and not others. This argument is without merit. As the
Department explained in its motion, “Pennhurst covers all the licensing
claims, and all the relief Plaintiffs request on those claims, because all demand
a change in the Department’s interpretation of State law.”
10
The Department’s reply in support of its motion to dismiss states that
“Pennhurst covers all the licensing claims.”
11
The Department’s reply in support of its motion to dismiss states that
“Pennhurst covers all the licensing claims, and all the relief Plaintiffs request on those
claims, because all demand a change in the Department’s interpretation of State law.” The
Department’s motion to dismiss states that “the relief Plaintiffs demand on their license
claim—including an injunction requiring issuance of a license to Planned Parenthood—
would require this Court to override the Department’s interpretation of State law. This
Court has no authority to issue such relief.” The motion to dismiss also states that, “even
if it were appropriate for this Court to review the State’s ongoing licensing processes,
Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek from their licensing claim. . . . Plaintiffs
demand a declaration . . . and an injunction.”
12
The Department’s motion to dismiss states:
Plaintiff[s’] [funding] claim is premised on the theory that if [Planned
Parenthood] receives a license, then [Planned Parenthood’s] State
Medicaid funding would be threatened. Plaintiffs’ challenge to HB 606 is
therefore not even arguably ripe until [Planned Parenthood] receives an
abortion clinic license. But [Planned Parenthood] does not have a license.
Plaintiffs’ [funding] claims are nonjusticiable until a concrete case or
controversy arises.
9
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Alternatively, the plaintiffs argue that the Department asserted
sovereign immunity only on the licensing claims and only a ripeness challenge
on the funding claims. Because the Department did not assert sovereign
immunity from the funding claims independent of the licensing claims, the
plaintiffs contend that we do not have jurisdiction under Metcalf & Eddy.
But Metcalf & Eddy is not as limited as the plaintiffs say that it is. The
jurisdictional inquiry is not overly technical; it is straightforward. Under
Metcalf & Eddy, we ask: Did the state assert sovereign immunity from suit?
See Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. at 144 (“This withdrawal of jurisdiction
effectively confers an immunity from suit.”); see also id. (“Once it is
established that a State . . . [is] immune from suit . . . .”). As we
characterized it in McCarthy, a proper invocation of sovereign immunity will
be from the “entire suit.” McCarthy, 381 F.3d at 411.
Metcalf & Eddy’s straightforward, entire-suit standard fulfills the
purpose of jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals in this context, which is to
ensure that a state has not been deprived of this “fundamental constitutional
protection” before a lawsuit proceeds to trial. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. at
143–45. “[T]he value to the States of their [sovereign] immunity . . . is for
the most part lost as litigation proceeds past motion practice.” Id. at 145.
The potential injury is being wrongly “haled into court” and the only way to
truly protect that right is to ask simply whether the state asserted immunity
from the lawsuit. Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 258
(2011).
Here, we hold that we have jurisdiction because the Department
asserted sovereign immunity from this entire lawsuit. Simply put, the
Department has always argued that a proper application of sovereign
10
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immunity would remove it from this litigation and require dismissal of all
claims. We therefore have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. 13
In rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that we should undertake a hyper-
technical inquiry to exercise jurisdiction, we find ourselves in good company.
The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Metcalf & Eddy. There,
the respondent argued “that a distinction should be drawn between cases in
which the determination of a State[’s] . . . claim to [sovereign] immunity is
bound up with factual complexities whose resolution requires trial and cases
in which it is not.” Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. at 147. Just as the Supreme
Court saw “little basis for drawing such a line” and rejected that argument,
we reject the plaintiffs’ argument here. Id. We have jurisdiction.
III.
We next examine whether the district court erred in denying the
Department’s motion to dismiss. As discussed above, the Department first
and foremost argues that sovereign immunity mandates dismissal of this
entire case.
The states’ sovereign immunity is derived from the principle of
federalism woven throughout our constitutional framework. Federalism
recognizes our dual sovereignties—the states and the federal government—
13
This is not the first time that we have exercised jurisdiction over an interlocutory
appeal where the state asserted absolute immunity from only some, and not all, of a
plaintiff’s claims in the district court. In BancPass, Inc. v. Highway Toll Administration,
L.L.C., we held that we had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal even though the state
agency asserted immunity from a defamation claim, but not from a tortious interference
with contract claim. 863 F.3d 391, 396, 398 (5th Cir. 2017). Indeed, this appeal presents
an even stronger case for finding jurisdiction than the situation in Bancpass did because the
state agency in Bancpass asserted immunity from only one claim—never arguing that a
sovereign-immunity win on that claim would dispose of the entire lawsuit—whereas here
the Department has always argued that a win on the sovereign-immunity issue would
protect it from the entire lawsuit.
11
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and “secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of
sovereign power.” Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013) (quoting
Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011)).
Under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts cannot tell state
officials “how to conform their conduct to state law”—for one can hardly
imagine “a greater intrusion on state sovereignty.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at
106. Letting a federal court tell state officials how to act under state law
would “conflict[] directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the
Eleventh Amendment.” Id. Hence, the Eleventh Amendment generally
deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to hear “suits by individuals against
nonconsenting states” and suits “against state officials in their official
capacities.” McCarthy, 381 F.3d at 412; id. at 418 (Garza, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
Importantly, however, sovereign immunity is not boundless and one
of its limits is the Ex parte Young doctrine. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The doctrine
grants a federal court jurisdiction over a lawsuit against a “state official in his
official capacity if the suit seeks prospective relief to redress an ongoing
violation of federal law.” Williams ex rel. J.E. v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729, 736
(5th Cir. 2020), stay denied, No. 20A126, 2021 WL 1306942 (Apr. 8, 2021).
For Ex parte Young to apply, “three criteria must be satisfied: (1) A ‘plaintiff
must name individual state officials as defendants in their official capacities’;
(2) the plaintiff must ‘allege[] an ongoing violation of federal law’; and (3)
the relief sought must be ‘properly characterized as prospective.’” Green
Valley Special Util. Dist. v. City of Schertz, 969 F.3d 460, 471 (5th Cir. 2020)
(en banc) (internal citations omitted) (first quoting Raj v. La. State Univ., 714
12
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F.3d 322, 328 (5th Cir. 2013); then quoting Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).
Ex parte Young is a “necessary exception” to sovereign immunity,
preventing state officials from using their state’s sovereignty as a shield to
avoid compliance with federal law. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. at 146. The
“premise” of the doctrine, which applies to state officials but not to the states
themselves, is that a “state official is ‘not the State for sovereign-immunity
purposes’ when ‘a federal court commands [her] to do nothing more than
refrain from violating federal law.’” Williams, 954 F.3d at 736 (quoting Va.
Off. for Prot. & Advoc., 563 U.S. at 255). The inquiry requires us to give
“careful consideration [to] the sovereign interests of the State as well as the
obligations of state officials to respect the supremacy of federal law.”
Verizon, 535 U.S. at 649 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Ex parte Young’s purpose is to “give[] life to the Supremacy Clause”
and prevent violations of federal rights. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68
(1985). Accordingly, the exception does not apply when plaintiffs seek to
vindicate state-law rights, because there is no “greater intrusion on state
sovereignty” than when a federal court instructs a state official on how to
conform her conduct to state law. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106. “[I]f there are
no federal rights for the plaintiff to vindicate then the justification for the
Young exception is not present in the case and the state’s right to [sovereign]
immunity should be honored.” McCarthy, 381 F.3d at 419 (Garza, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
“In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young” applies, “a
court need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the]
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly
characterized as prospective.’” Verizon, 535 U.S. at 645 (alteration in
original) (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296
13
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(1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
“[T]he inquiry into whether suit lies under Ex parte Young does not include
an analysis of the merits of the claim.” Id. at 646.
A.
Here, the first and third criteria of Ex parte Young are satisfied,
because the state official is sued in her official capacity and the plaintiffs seek
prospective relief. See Green Valley, 969 F.3d at 471. Consequently, our task
is to decide whether Ex parte Young’s second criterion has been satisfied: Do
the plaintiffs allege violations of federal law such that the Ex parte Young
exception to sovereign immunity allows this lawsuit to proceed in federal
court, or do the plaintiffs allege only violations of state law such that
sovereign immunity requires dismissal of the entire lawsuit? See id.
On their licensing claims, the plaintiffs allege that the Department has
“constructively denied” their application and that the investigations
purportedly preventing the Department from officially ruling on the
application are in fact “shams.” The plaintiffs assert that the Department’s
actions violate their federal constitutional rights to equal protection,
substantive due process, and procedural due process. They seek injunctions
directing the Department: (1) to “not withhold approval” of the license; (2)
to “promptly rule” on the application “in accordance with all applicable
constitutional requirements”; or (3) to “grant” the license.
In response, the Department argues that the complaint asserts only
state-law claims disguised as federal claims. It says that the plaintiffs’ real
complaint is that the Department has incorrectly interpreted the Louisiana
statute that forbids granting abortion-clinic licenses to applicants in violation
14
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of “federal or state law.” 14 Specifically, one way to read the plaintiffs’
complaint is that it says that the state statute is confined to actual violations
of federal or Louisiana law—not potential violations of other states’ laws, as
the Department reads the statute. 15 If that is the real thrust of the complaint,
the Department says, then the plaintiffs are asking a federal court to order a
state official “to conform [her] conduct to [the plaintiffs’ interpretation of]
state law,” which the Department says that Pennhurst forbids. Pennhurst, 465
U.S. at 106. The Department also argues that all forms of relief sought by the
plaintiffs on their licensing claims are barred by Pennhurst.
The district court rejected the Department’s argument. It held that
the licensing claims were supported by “extensive allegations spanning many
years that, when taken in the light most favorable to [the plaintiffs], suggest
that [the Department’s] current proffered interpretation of state law is the
latest in a series of largely pretextual decisions made to indefinitely prevent
[the plaintiffs] from providing abortions.” The district court held that
“while [the Department] is correct that ‘particular abortion providers do not
have a federal constitutional right to a license,’ . . . to parse the federal
constitutional right a[t] issue as simply the right to ‘a license’ under state law
reads the issue too narrowly at least at this early stage.”
We hold that the plaintiffs have established federal jurisdiction on
their requested injunction to “promptly rule.” Specifically, under
Rule 12(b)(1)’s straightforward inquiry, plaintiffs’ procedural due process
and equal protection claims seeking an injunction directing the Department
to rule on their license application satisfy Ex parte Young. Plaintiffs’
14
See La. Stat. Ann. § 40:2175.6(G).
15
But see Doe I v. Landry, 909 F.3d 99, 112 (5th Cir. 2018) (“When the state official
charged with implementing a statute has provided an interpretation of how to enforce it,
we will defer unless that explanation is inconsistent with the statutory language.”).
15
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No. 18-30699
complaint alleges that Planned Parenthood is entitled to a license under
Louisiana law and that the Department’s “constructive denial” of their
license application occurred “without sufficient procedural protections.” It
also alleges that throughout the licensing process Planned Parenthood was
treated differently than other similarly situated applicants. An injunction
ordering the Department to provide the procedural protections guaranteed
by the federal Due Process Clause and heed the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause does not order the Department to conform to state law in
violation of Pennhurst. See Brown v. Ga. Dep’t of Revenue, 881 F.2d 1018, 1023
(11th Cir. 1989) (“Under Pennhurst, however, the determinative question is
not the relief ordered, but whether the relief was ordered pursuant to state or
federal law.”).
We emphasize that the Rule 12(b)(1) inquiry “does not include an
analysis of the merits of the claim,” and accordingly do not comment on
whether plaintiffs can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Verizon, 535
U.S. at 646; see also McCarthy, 381 F.3d at 416 (“[T]he Court [in Verizon]
made clear that analyzing the applicability of the Ex parte Young exception
should generally be a simple matter, which excludes questions regarding the
validity of the plaintiff’s cause of action.”). We note, however, that to
survive a such a motion, plaintiffs’ complaint must identify which procedural
protections guaranteed by the Due Process Clause are lacking. Allegations
that the Department is not following Louisiana law or is applying that law
incorrectly are insufficient because “[t]he constitutional procedural
standards of the due process clause are . . . wholly and exclusively federal in
nature.” Stern v. Tarrant Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 778 F.2d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir.
1985) (en banc). “[A] violation of state law is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for a finding of a due process violation.” Id.; see also
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944) (“Mere violation of a state statute
16
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does not infringe the federal Constitution.”). 16 Similarly, to state a valid
equal protection claim, plaintiffs must point to other similarly situated
applicants who were treated differently. See, e.g., Priester v. Lowndes Cnty.,
354 F.3d 414, 424 (5th Cir. 2004).
B.
The plaintiffs alternatively request two other injunctions commanding
the Department to “grant” them a license or “not withhold approval” of
their license application. 17 These injunctions are fundamentally different
from the “promptly rule” injunction. They would share the same result,
which is that the plaintiffs would receive the license. They also share the
same fatal flaw, which is that the plaintiffs have no free-standing “federal
right” to an abortion-clinic license. Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc., 563 U.S. at
260. Conducting our “straightforward inquiry,” it is clear that these
injunctions ask a federal court to tell a state official to grant an abortion-clinic
license—the right to which arises entirely under state law. Coeur d’Alene
Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. at 296 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Under Pennhurst, a federal court can do no such
thing.
Abortion-clinic licensing is a creature of state law. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (abortion services
are “part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State”); Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Lab’ys, Inc.,
471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985) (holding local health ordinance not preempted
16
The district court should address in the first instance how the plaintiffs can
reconcile their concession that there are no constitutional issues with Louisiana’s licensing
statute or regulation with their burden to show a violation of the Constitution.
17
The district court did not explicitly discuss the “grant” and “not withhold
approval” requested injunctions.
17
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because “the regulation of health and safety matters is primarily, and
historically, a matter of local concern”); Women’s Med. Ctr. of Nw. Hous. v.
Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that “without violating the
Constitution, the State could have required all abortion providers to be
licensed”); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d
570, 579 n.8 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[W]hat [abortion providers] think is medically
necessary does not cabin, under the state’s legitimate power, the regulation
of medicine, as Casey holds.”). 18
Because abortion-clinic-licensing is quintessentially a matter of state
law, there is no free-standing federal right to receive an abortion-clinic
license. Just as there is no free-standing federal right to receive a medical
license. Or a law license. A federal court cannot tell a state official, absent a
violation of federal law, to deny or approve a license application—the
potential right to which arises entirely from state law. And plaintiffs cannot
circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity by suing a state official and
adding magic words like “federal law” and “constitution” to their
complaint. Unlike the plaintiffs’ “promptly rule” injunction demanding a
decision on their application, the “grant” and “not withhold approval”
18
See also United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 688 (5th Cir. 1997) (DeMoss, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“There is no national regulatory scheme
regarding the provision of abortion services. The federal government does not license
abortion clinics, does not approve the training of abortion providers, and does not regulate
the delivery of abortion services to ensure that any minimum health standards are met. The
federal government has not created any administrative agency nor designated any
department of the federal government to regulate the abortion industry in order to stabilize
the supply of abortion services or encourage the demand for such services.”).
18
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injunctions have no underlying federal right and no basis outside of state law.
These forms of relief are therefore barred by sovereign immunity.
C.
The plaintiffs also request a declaratory judgment “that the denial of
[the] license violates the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and is therefore void and of no effect.” It is
unclear what exactly the plaintiffs seek with this form of relief. To the extent
that this declaratory judgment would allow the district court to tell the
Department to grant or deny the license, this requested form of relief is also
barred by Pennhurst for the same reasons that the “grant” and “not withhold
approval” injunctions are barred. And, to the extent that this is some sort of
place-holder claim to evaluate an anticipated, formal denial of the plaintiffs’
application, we express no opinion on that here.
D.
In sum, we hold that the plaintiffs’ second requested injunction—
directing the Department to “promptly rule” on their application “in
accordance with all applicable constitutional requirements”—is not barred
by Pennhurst because the plaintiffs allege a potential violation of their
procedural-due-process rights pursuant to Ex parte Young and because
requiring the Department to make a decision on the application and comply
with the federal Constitution does not infringe the state’s sovereign
immunity. We also hold that the first and third of the plaintiffs’ requested
injunctions—directing the Department to “not withhold approval” of their
19
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application or “grant” them a license—are barred by Pennhurst because
there is no free-standing federal right to receive an abortion-clinic license.
IV.
The Department raised other issues in the district court that it argues
we could exercise our pendant jurisdiction to decide on appeal. For example,
the Department urges us to consider its ripeness and standing challenges to
the plaintiffs’ funding claims. Although we have the discretion to exercise
our pendant jurisdiction to consider these issues, we decline to do so. See
Hosp. House, Inc. v. Gilbert, 298 F.3d 424, 429 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that
when a court has “interlocutory appellate jurisdiction to review a district
court’s denial of [sovereign] immunity, [it] may first determine whether
there is federal subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying case”).
At oral argument, the plaintiffs conceded that on remand the
Department will be able to bring a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, raising
ripeness, standing, and other jurisdictional objections. 19 Oral Argument at
24:33–25:20. The district court should carefully consider the Department’s
jurisdictional challenges before proceeding to the merits. Regarding
ripeness, the plaintiffs allege that HB 606 will disqualify Gulf Coast from
receiving Medicaid funds once Planned Parenthood “begins
providing . . . abortions at the New Orleans Health Center,” i.e., if and when
it receives a license. For a claim to be ripe, there must be a “hardship to the
parties of withholding court consideration.” Choice Inc. of Tex. v. Greenstein,
691 F.3d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v.
Council of City of New Orleans, 833 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1987)). Given that
19
Prior to this appeal, the district court permitted the Department to file only a
Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. See Oral Argument at 24:47–24:58 (“The only motion
that [the Department was] permitted to bring was a 12(b)(1) motion and make the immunity
argument. . . . The district court was sequencing things.”).
20
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it is unclear if and when Planned Parenthood will receive a license, it is
difficult to see how the absence of a judicial decision on the hypothetical
future impact of HB 606 causes the plaintiffs any harm in the present. 20
Relatedly, the Department argued in the district court that the
plaintiffs do not have standing because they have not suffered an injury. The
bulk of the district court’s jurisdictional analysis was not conducted plaintiff-
by-plaintiff, despite the fact that the various plaintiffs occupy very different
positions with respect to Louisiana’s licensing scheme. But “standing is not
dispensed in gross.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 (1996). And even
if Planned Parenthood has standing to challenge the alleged constructive
denial of its license application, it is unclear how such a constructive denial
directly injures Gulf Coast or the Jane Does, who are patients of Gulf Coast’s.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (describing the
closer inquiry demanded when “a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the
government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone
else”). The Jane Does do not appear to allege that they wish to receive
abortion services at all—much less with the type of specificity that Lujan
requires. 21 See id. at 564 (holding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an
actual or imminent injury because they presented merely “‘some day’
20
The district court noted that purely legal questions are often ripe. But “even
where an issue presents purely legal questions, the plaintiff must show some hardship in
order to establish ripeness.” Choice Inc., 691 F.3d at 715 (quoting Cent. & S. W. Servs., Inc.
v. EPA, 220 F.3d 683, 690 (5th Cir. 2000)).
21
The district court also stated that it is “well established that third parties may
sometimes sue to protect the abortion rights of others.” However, the district court’s
analysis on this point was perfunctory. It cited only a case in which this court held that
physician-plaintiffs had a sufficiently “‘close’ relationship” with their patients such that
they could assert the patients’ rights. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health
Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 589 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S.
125, 130 (2004)). But there are no physician-plaintiffs in this case. The plaintiffs here are
two Planned Parenthood entities and three patients.
21
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intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any
specification of when the some day will be”). Moreover, our en banc court
has held that Medicaid patients do not have an individual right to contest a
State’s determination that a particular provider is not qualified under
Medicaid. Kauffman, 981 F.3d at 368; see also id. at 376 (Elrod, J.,
concurring).
The Department also argued that the district should abstain under
Burford, 319 U.S. at 333–34. The district court rejected that argument
because the availability of a special state forum for resolution of licensing
disputes was “unclear.” Yet the Department notes that applicants allegedly
injured by its licensing decisions may seek intra-Department review under
state law, 22 and it admitted at oral argument that this review is available now
to the plaintiffs. Oral Argument at 14:44–14:59. The Department estimated
the length of that review process to be only “a matter of weeks.” Oral
Argument at 15:43. The Department further notes that a party dissatisfied
with the result of intra-Department review may seek review in the
appropriate parish district court under another state-law provision. 23
The plaintiffs have not pursued these remedies. Indeed, when
pressed to explain how they could maintain a procedural-due-process claim
at all without having taken advantage of these state-law procedures—given
the Department’s concession that they are available—the plaintiffs only
pointed out that they “don’t just have a procedural-due-process claim, [they]
also have an equal-protection claim and an undue-burden claim.” Oral
Argument at 21:46.
22
See La. Admin. Code, tit. 48, pt. I, § 4415(E).
23
See La. Stat. Ann. § 49:964(B).
22
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We expect the district court to carefully consider each jurisdictional
challenge—including whether and how they impact each of the plaintiffs and
each of the claims—before proceeding to the merits. See In re Gee, 941 F.3d
153, 159 (5th Cir. 2019) (“A district court’s obligation to consider a challenge
to its jurisdiction is non-discretionary.”); see also Ramming v. United States,
281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he plaintiff constantly bears the
burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.”).
* * *
The motion to dismiss the appeal is DENIED. The judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. The case is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The
district court shall either strike from the complaint the barred forms of relief
or allow the plaintiffs to re-plead and delete those barred forms of relief in
accordance with this opinion’s holdings.
23