Medponics Illinois LLC v. Dept. of Agriculture

2021 IL 125443

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 125443)

MEDPONICS ILLINOIS, LLC, Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF

AGRICULTURE et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed May 20, 2021.

JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Garman, Theis, Neville, and Carter

concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Michael J. Burke took no part in the decision.

OPINION

¶1 The issue in this case involves certain provisions of the Compassionate Use of

Medical Cannabis Pilot Program Act (Act) (410 ILCS 130/1 et seq. (West 2014))

and the correlating rules adopted by the Illinois Department of Agriculture

(Administrative Rules) governing its enforcement of the relevant provisions of the

Act (see 8 Ill. Adm. Code 1000; 410 ILCS 130/15(b) (West 2014)) and how those

impact the propriety of the proposed location of a medical cannabis cultivation

center in conjunction with the zoning of two districts within the city of Aurora,

Illinois.

¶2 Plaintiff, Medponics Illinois, LLC (Medponics), petitioned for administrative

review of the decision of defendants, the Department of Agriculture, Director of

Agriculture Raymond Poe, and the Department of Agriculture’s chief of medicinal

plants, Jack Campbell (collectively DOA), awarding a permit to defendant Curative

Health Cultivation, LLC (Curative), to operate a medical cannabis cultivation

center in Aurora, Illinois. The circuit court of Lake County reversed the DOA’s

decision. Defendants the DOA and Curative appealed. The appellate court reversed

and ordered the permit reinstated to Curative. We allowed Medponics’ petition for

leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). For the following reasons, we

affirm the judgment of the appellate court, reverse the judgment of the circuit court,

and affirm the decision of the Department of Agriculture.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 The Act took effect on January 1, 2014. 410 ILCS 130/999 (West 2014). The

Act recognizes medical research that confirms the benefits of using cannabis in

treating or alleviating symptoms associated with several incapacitating medical

diagnoses. Id. § 5(a). The express purpose of the Act is “to protect patients with

debilitating medical conditions, as well as their physicians and providers, from

arrest and prosecution, criminal and other penalties, and property forfeiture if

patients engage in the medical use of cannabis.” Id. § 5(g).

¶5 The Act defines a “cultivation center” as “a facility operated by an organization

or business that is registered by the [DOA] to perform necessary activities to

provide only registered medical cannabis dispensing organizations with usable

medical cannabis.” Id. § 10(e). The DOA is charged with enforcing the provisions

of the Act related to registering and overseeing medical cannabis cultivation

centers. Id. § 15(b). Pursuant to that obligation, the Act directed the DOA to

establish the Administrative Rules. Id. § 165(a). Effective July 25, 2014, the DOA

adopted the Administrative Rules, governing its enforcement of the relevant

provisions of the Act. See 38 Ill. Reg. 16732 (eff. July 25, 2014).

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¶6 Section 105 of the Act sets forth, inter alia, requirements of and restrictions on

medical cannabis cultivation centers. 410 ILCS 130/105 (West 2014). Pertinent

here, section 105(c) of the Act provides that cultivation centers “may not be located

within 2,500 feet of *** an area zoned for residential use.” Id. § 105(c). The Act

does not provide a definition for “area zoned for residential use.” See id. § 10.

However, in the Administrative Rules, the DOA defines “[a]rea zoned for

residential use” as an “area zoned exclusively for residential use.” (Emphasis

added.) 8 Ill. Adm. Code 1000.10 (2014).

¶7 The Act charges the DOA with issuing medical cannabis cultivation center

permits. 410 ILCS 130/85 (West 2014). As part of the cultivation center permit

application process, the Administrative Rules require applicants to submit “[a] copy

of the current local zoning ordinance to the [DOA] and verification from the local

zoning authority that the proposed cultivation center is in compliance with the local

zoning rules issued in accordance with Section 140 of the Act.” 8 Ill. Adm. Code

1000.100(d)(17) (2015). Applicants must further submit a map of the area

surrounding the proposed cultivation center that demonstrates that the proposed

location is not located within 2500 feet of the property line of an area zoned for

residential use (8 Ill. Adm. Code 1000.100(d)(19) (2015)), which the

Administrative Rules indicate is an area zoned exclusively for residential use (8 Ill.

Adm. Code 1000.10 (2014)).

¶8 The Administrative Rules provide that the DOA may award only one cultivation

center permit in each of the 22 Illinois State Police (ISP) districts. 8 Ill. Adm. Code

1000.110(f) (2015). Applicants vying for a permit in the same ISP district are

judged by means of a competitive scoring system and receive points in several

different categories as set forth in the Administrative Rules. 8 Ill. Adm. Code

110(b), (c) (2015). The highest scoring qualified applicant is awarded the permit in

the ISP district in which it applied. 8 Ill. Adm. Code 110(f)(1) (2015).

¶9 In September 2014, Medponics and Curative both submitted applications to the

DOA for the medical cannabis cultivation center permit award in ISP District 2.

Medponics sought to operate a cultivation center in Zion, Illinois, and Curative

sought to operate a cultivation center in Aurora, Illinois.

¶ 10 On October 14, 2014, Curative filed a special use petition with the City of

Aurora, seeking authorization to use its proposed location as a medical cannabis

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cultivation center. On November 5, 2014, upon referral of Curative’s special use

petition by the Aurora City Council, the Aurora Planning Commission conducted a

public hearing and found the petition met the standards of the Aurora Zoning

Ordinance (Zoning Ordinance), recommended conditional approval of the special

use, and granted the special use permit to Curative, subject to conditions involving

landscaping on the property and review of the petition documents in the event a

state license was issued for the subject property. On November 6, 2014, the Aurora

Planning and Development Committee conducted a special meeting and

recommended approval of Curative’s special use permit.

¶ 11 On November 18, 2014, a city ordinance was passed and approved, granting

Curative a special use permit for a medical cannabis cultivation center on the

property. City of Aurora Ordinance No. O14-068 (eff. Nov. 18, 2014). The

ordinance indicates that the location of the proposed cultivation center is zoned as

“M-2(S) Manufacturing—General.” Id.

¶ 12 On April 29, 2015, the zoning administrator for the City of Aurora sent a letter

to the DOA’s general counsel, regarding “Aurora Non-‘Exclusively Residential’

Zoning [N]ear Curative Health Cultivation, LLC at 2229 Diehl Road, Aurora,

Illinois.” The letter advised that the location of Curative’s proposed cultivation

center was not within 2500 feet of any area zoned exclusively for residential use

for purposes of the Act because the Zoning Ordinance allows special use permits

for uses other than residential in residential districts, including the R-1 and R-5

districts. The letter referenced a “Frequently Asked Questions” (FAQ) document

located on the DOA website dated February 18, 2015, which addressed the issue as

follows:

“The definition of ‘area zoned residential’ is an area zoned ‘exclusively

residential.’ If the local municipality provides a letter that its zoning districts

located within 2500 feet of a cultivation center are not zoned ‘exclusively’

residential because in addition to residential uses, the zoning districts allow for

other uses such as churches, parks, schools, utility substations, and/or other

planned uses including commercial uses, will that satisfy this requirement?

Yes, but the applicant must verify setback regulations are also met, located

in [DOA] Administrative Rules section 1000.40(e). The [DOA] will rely heavily

on the local zoning authority’s approval.” Ill. Dep’t of Agric., Medical

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Cannabis Pilot Program Frequently Asked Questions 3 (Feb. 18, 2015), https://

www2.illinois.gov/sites/agr/Plants/MCPP/Documents/mcppfaq.pdf [https://

perma.cc/MP5Z-TFXR].

¶ 13 On October 30, 2015, the DOA awarded the cultivation center permit to

Curative and notified Medponics in a letter that its permit application was denied.

Of all permit applicants in ISP District 2, Curative finished first in scoring, while

Medponics finished fifth. Medponics was the only applicant to challenge the

DOA’s decision to award the permit to Curative.

¶ 14 The operative complaint in this case—a verified, second-amended complaint

for administrative review—was filed on February 24, 2017. Pursuant to the second-

amended complaint, Medponics alleged, inter alia, that it submitted to the DOA an

application for a permit to operate a medical cannabis cultivation center in Zion,

Illinois—located within ISP District 2—but the DOA deemed Curative as the

highest scoring applicant in ISP District 2. Accordingly, the DOA awarded Curative

the cultivation center permit and advised Medponics that its application was denied.

Medponics alleged that Curative’s application contained a fatal, disqualifying flaw,

namely that the proposed location of Curative’s cultivation center was “well within

2,500 feet of multiple properties zoned as exclusively residential in Aurora,

Illinois,” in violation of section 105(c) of the Act. See 410 ILCS 130/105(c) (West

2014).

¶ 15 Medponics alleged that the location of Curative’s proposed cultivation center

violated the Act because it was located within 2500 feet of the R-1 and R-5 districts

in Aurora, both of which Medponics alleged were zoned exclusively for residential

use. Accordingly, Medponics requested the circuit court to reverse the DOA’s

award of the cultivation center permit to Curative and award the permit to

Medponics.

¶ 16 Defendants responded that Medponics misapplied the location restriction

provided in section 105(c) of the Act. Defendants indicated that the location

restriction, as interpreted by the DOA in its Administrative Rules, requires that a

cultivation center must be more than 2500 feet from an area zoned exclusively for

residential use. See 8 Ill. Adm. Code 1000.10 (2014). Defendants further argued

that no areas in Aurora were zoned exclusively for residential use. Defendants

emphasized that the DOA found Curative’s proposed location satisfied the location

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requirement set forth in the Administrative Rules because it was not within 2500

feet of an area zoned exclusively for residential use due to the multiple

nonresidential uses authorized in Aurora’s R-1 and R-5 districts. Defendants argued

that the DOA properly declined to disqualify Curative on the basis of any location

requirement violation. Accordingly, defendants requested the circuit court to enter

an order affirming the DOA’s decision to award the permit to Curative.

¶ 17 On August 24, 2017, the circuit court entered an order setting aside the DOA’s

decision awarding the permit to Curative, finding clearly erroneous the DOA’s

interpretation of the Administrative Rules that the setback requirement applies

exclusively to areas where only residences are permitted. The circuit court

concluded that the City of Aurora defined the R-1 and R-5 districts as “zoned

exclusively for residential purposes,” notwithstanding that this designation allowed

certain additional special uses in the districts. The circuit court indicated that these

districts remained exclusively residential and, by the very terms of the DOA’s rule,

the Curative facility may not be within 2500 feet of areas zoned as exclusively

residential.

¶ 18 The circuit court further observed that neither the Act nor the Administrative

Rules contain a special use permit exception to the “area zoned for residential use”

requirement. The circuit court indicated that defendants’ position was inconsistent

with the plain meaning of the statute and that the mere fact that hospitals,

cemeteries, and other establishments are granted special use permits to operate in

the areas zoned exclusively for residential purposes does not take those areas out

of the purview of the Act or the Administrative Rules. The parties agreed that the

R-1 and R-5 districts are within 2500 feet of the proposed location of Curative’s

cultivation center, and the circuit court found those districts to be zoned exclusively

for residential use. Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that Curative’s

proposed location violated both the Act and the Administrative Rules and held the

DOA’s decision to award the permit to Curative was clearly erroneous.

¶ 19 The circuit court indicated that its finding that Curative did not qualify for the

permit was not a suggestion that Medponics should be awarded the permit. Citing

section 1000.40(d) of the Administrative Rules, the circuit court noted that, in the

event an awardee forfeits a permit, the permit shall be awarded to the next highest

qualified applicant in terms of points. See 8 Ill. Adm. Code 1000.40(d) (2014).

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Accordingly, the circuit court remanded the case for the DOA to rescore and

reassess the award in ISP District 2. The circuit court ordered defendants to file the

sealed and redacted version of the administrative record within 14 days and

continued the matter for 21 days, or until September 14, 2017, for entry of a final

order once the record was filed as ordered.

¶ 20 On September 12, 2017, the City of Aurora filed a petition to intervene,

contending the circuit court’s interpretation of Aurora’s zoning categories as

“exclusively residential” related to the validity and integrity of the Zoning

Ordinance and the circuit court’s interpretation contradicted those of the Aurora

zoning administrator contained in the April 29, 2015, letter to the DOA’s general

counsel. The City of Aurora argued that the petition to intervene was timely, as the

circuit court’s order of August 24, 2017, was not final.

¶ 21 On September 13, 2017, defendants filed a joint motion to supplement the

administrative review record with the following documents: (1) the permit award

letter dated October 30, 2015, from the DOA to Curative, (2) City of Aurora

Ordinance O14-068, which granted Curative a special use permit for a medical

cannabis cultivation center, and (3) the letter dated April 29, 2015, from Aurora’s

zoning administrator to the DOA’s general counsel regarding the “exclusively

residential” issue. The motion indicated that (1) the letter was located after the

August 24, 2017, administrative review hearing in the circuit court, (2) the letter

predates the DOA’s October 30, 2015, award of the cultivation center permit to

Curative, and (3) the letter “was clearly considered as part of the application

process” because it predated the permit award.

¶ 22 On November 3, 2017, the circuit court conducted a hearing on both the petition

to intervene and the joint motion to supplement the administrative review record.

The circuit court denied the petition to intervene as untimely, finding it “hard to

believe that the City of Aurora had absolutely no knowledge that this case was

pending or that Medponics was challenging the award by the [DOA].” The circuit

court acknowledged that its August 24, 2017, order required an interpretation of the

Zoning Ordinance’s zoning definitions. However, it emphasized that the only

remaining issue involved whether the DOA properly awarded the permit to

Curative based on the language of the Act and the Administrative Rules. Finally,

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the circuit court noted that Medponics and Curative were the most directly affected

parties and the City of Aurora’s economic interest in the litigation was remote.

¶ 23 The circuit court granted in part and denied in part the joint motion to

supplement the administrative review record. It allowed the October 30, 2015,

permit award letter and City of Aurora Ordinance O14-068 but denied the April 29,

2015, letter from Aurora’s zoning administrator to the DOA, finding no evidence

that the DOA ever reviewed the letter or considered it in awarding the permit.

¶ 24 On November 30, 2017, the circuit court entered its final order, incorporating

the August 24, 2017, order and granting Curative’s request for a stay of judgment

(Ill. S. Ct. R. 305(b) (eff. July 1, 2017)), pending appeal of the judgment. The circuit

court found no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal of the order.

Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).

¶ 25 Defendants appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the circuit court erred in finding

that Curative’s proposed cultivation center was within 2500 feet of an area zoned

“exclusively” for residential use. The appellate court reversed, finding that judicial

deference to the DOA’s interpretation of the Act and its Administrative Rules was

required because, although Medponics’ position was reasonable, the DOA’s

position was not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or unreasonable. 2019 IL App (2d)

170977-U, ¶ 35. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the judgment of the

circuit court and affirmed the DOA’s decision. Id. ¶ 45. This court allowed

Medponics’ petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019).

¶ 26 ANALYSIS

¶ 27 In this appeal, we determine the propriety of the DOA’s award of the cultivation

center permit to Curative. To do so, we must consider whether the R-1 and R-5

districts in Aurora are zoned exclusively for residential use, per the DOA’s

interpretation of the location requirement as set forth in the Administrative Rules.

The DOA found that Curative’s proposed location satisfied the location

requirement because it was not within 2500 feet of an area zoned exclusively for

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residential use due to the multiple nonresidential uses authorized in the R-1 and R-

5 districts. 1

¶ 28 In an administrative review action, we review the decision of the administrative

agency rather than that of the circuit court or the appellate court. Roselle Police

Pension Board v. Village of Roselle, 232 Ill. 2d 546, 551-52 (2009). Pursuant to

section 155 of the Act, judicial review of the decision of the DOA in this case is

governed by the Administrative Review Law set forth in article III of the Code of

Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2014)) and the rules adopted

thereunder. 410 ILCS 130/155 (West 2014). Section 3-110 of the Administrative

Review Law provides that the scope of judicial review of an administrative decision

is extended to all questions of law and fact presented in the record before the court.

735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2014).

¶ 29 The applicable standard of review will determine the level of deference given

to the administrative agency’s decision and is contingent on whether the question

is one of fact, one of law, or a mixed question of law and fact. AFM Messenger

Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 390 (2001). If

the question presented is one of fact, the administrative agency’s factual findings

are considered prima facie correct and will only be reversed by the reviewing court

if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Marconi v. Chicago Heights

Police Pension Board, 225 Ill. 2d 497, 540 (2006). Questions of law are subject to

de novo review. AFM Messenger Service, 198 Ill. 2d at 390. Mixed questions of

law and fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. at 391. A mixed

question is one where the facts are admitted, the rule of law is undisputed, and the

issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard or whether the rule of law is

violated when applied to the established facts. Id.

¶ 30 The facts here are undisputed, as the parties agree that the proposed location of

Curative’s cultivation center is closer than 2500 feet to the R-1 and R-5 districts in

Aurora. However, the rule of law is contested, as the parties disagree on the

1

Medponics asserts in a preliminary statement in its opening brief that deference to the DOA’s

interpretation of “area zoned for residential use” is not necessary because that language in the Act

is unambiguous. Medponics never raised this below and instead impliedly presumed the ambiguity

in proceeding to argue the propriety of the Administrative Rules construing the Act. Thus, we

likewise proceed to address the propriety of the DOA’s interpretation of its own Administrative

Rules and how that interpretation impacts the validity of the location of Curative’s cultivation center.

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propriety of the DOA’s interpretation of the location requirement in the

Administrative Rules (see 8 Ill. Adm. Code 1000.10 (2014)) and the application of

that interpretation to the zoning of the R-1 and R-5 districts in Aurora. Accordingly,

the question is one of law, which we review de novo. AFM Messenger Service, 198

Ill. 2d at 390; see also Roselle Police Pension Board, 232 Ill. 2d at 552 (issues of

statutory construction are questions of law which are reviewed de novo).

¶ 31 Notwithstanding our de novo standard of review, regulations adopted by an

administrative agency are presumptively valid. Hartney Fuel Co. v. Hamer, 2013

IL 115130, ¶ 38. Moreover, even applying a de novo review, an agency’s

interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference and weight,

as the agency makes informed judgments based on its expertise and experience and

provides a knowledgeable source in ascertaining the intent of the legislature. Id.

Additionally, an agency’s interpretation of a statute is given deference on de novo

review unless it is erroneous, unreasonable, or conflicts with the statute. Hadley v.

Illinois Department of Corrections, 224 Ill. 2d 365, 371 (2007).

¶ 32 To resolve the issue on appeal, we apply principles of statutory construction to

the question of the DOA’s interpretation of the location requirement in the

Administrative Rules in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the Zoning

Ordinance regarding the zoning of the R-1 and R-5 districts, as applied to the

location of Curative’s cultivation center. See People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois

Commerce Comm’n, 231 Ill. 2d 370, 380 (2008) (administrative rules have force

and effect of law and are construed under the standards governing construction of

statutes); City of Chicago v. Morales, 177 Ill. 2d 440, 447 (1997) (same rules

governing statutory construction are applied to construing municipal ordinances).

¶ 33 Medponics first argues that the location of Curative’s proposed cultivation

center is within 2500 feet of the R-1 and R-5 districts in Aurora, which Medponics

alleges are zoned exclusively for residential use. Citing section 4.1 of the Zoning

Ordinance, Medponics points out that the City of Aurora is divided into “Use

Districts.” City of Aurora Ordinance No. O15-062, § 4.1 (approved Oct. 13, 2015).

Section 4.1 identifies the R-1 and R-5 districts as “residential districts.” Id. District

R-1 is a one-family dwelling district and district R-5 is a multiple-family dwelling

district. Id.

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¶ 34 Medponics concedes that the Zoning Ordinance does not define “residential

district” but asserts that it defines “residential area” as “[a] zoning lot or portion of

a zoning lot designed or used exclusively for residential purposes.” Id. § 3.3.

Medponics thus contends that the ordinary meanings of “district” and “area,” when

viewed in the context of the purpose of the R-1 and R-5 districts, establish that the

R-1 and R-5 “residential districts” are synonymous with “residential areas,” which

per section 3.3 of the Zoning Ordinance are “used exclusively for residential

purposes.” See id. Accordingly, Medponics argues that the location of Curative’s

proposed cultivation center violates the Act’s location requirement and the DOA’s

Administrative Rules governing that requirement because it is less than 2500 feet

from the R-1 and R-5 districts, both of which are zoned exclusively for residential

use under the Zoning Ordinance.

¶ 35 Defendants respond that the Zoning Ordinance clearly provides for

nonresidential uses in the R-1 and R-5 districts and contains nothing to indicate that

entire districts are to be “exclusively residential.” We agree with defendants. A

review of the entirety of the Zoning Ordinance refutes Medponics’ argument that

“residential districts” and “residential areas” are synonymous. 2 Section 7 of the

Zoning Ordinance governs “residential districts.” Id. § 7. Section 7.1 of the Zoning

Ordinance enumerates the purposes of residential districts. Id. § 7.1. Again,

Medponics contends that the ordinary meanings of “district” and “area” establish

that the R-1 and R-5 “residential districts” are also “residential areas,” “particularly

when considered within the context of the intent and purpose of the R-1 and R-5

districts.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 36 The purposes of residential districts are set forth in section 7.1 of the Zoning

Ordinance and contradict Medponics’ argument. Id. Indeed, three of those purposes

expressly provide that residential districts are established “[t]o protect residential

areas” from various hazards and perils. (Emphasis added.) Id. §§ 7.1-1.1, 1.2, 1.3.

2

Although certain sections of the Zoning Ordinance are not included in the administrative

record, we take judicial notice of the omitted sections as they appear in the current zoning ordinance

for the purpose of construing the ordinance as a whole. Aurora Code of Ordinances, Appendix A

(amended Feb. 25, 2020); see People v. Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d 237, 243 (2008) (when interpreting a

statute, the statute is construed as a whole; words and phrases are not viewed in isolation but are

considered in light of other provisions of the statute); Charles v. City of Chicago, 413 Ill. 428, 435

(1953) (court may properly take judicial notice of zoning ordinances).

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The fact that the Zoning Ordinance references residential districts and residential

areas separately in the same section makes clear that these terms are distinct. The

pronouncement that residential districts were created, in part, to protect residential

areas further supports that these terms are not interchangeable.

¶ 37 Moreover, as noted, the Zoning Ordinance defines “residential area” as “[a]

zoning lot or portion of a zoning lot designed or used exclusively for residential

purposes.” Id. § 3.3. A “zoning lot” is defined as “[a] plot of ground, made up of

one (1) or more parcels that is or may be occupied by a use, building[,] or buildings

including the open spaces required by this ordinance.” Aurora Code of Ordinances,

Appendix A, § 3.3 (amended Feb. 25, 2020). If a residential area may be composed

of a portion of a zoning lot, and a zoning lot in turn may be composed of only one

parcel, a residential area could potentially consist of less than one parcel. This

likewise establishes that a residential district is not the same as a residential area,

as the Zoning Ordinance gives no indication that an entire residential district may

consist of only one parcel or a portion thereof. The Zoning Ordinance is devoid of

support for Medponics’ position that the R-1 and R-5 residential districts are the

same as residential areas.

¶ 38 The DOA asserts that Medponics’ suggestion—that the location requirement is

violated when a proposed cultivation center is located within 2500 feet of any area

zoned as a residential district—does not comport with the plain language of the

Administrative Rules. We agree. The Administrative Rules address a particular

instance where the location requirement is violated merely because an area within

2500 feet of a proposed cultivation center is zoned as a residential district, namely

when the municipality’s population exceeds 2 million people. The relevant

provision is situated in the Administrative Rules at the end of the definition of “area

zoned for residential use.” 8 Ill. Adm. Code 1000.10 (2014). According to that

provision: “ ‘Area zoned for residential use’ means an area zoned exclusively for

residential use; provided that, in municipalities with a population over 2,000,000

people, ‘an area zoned for residential use’ means an area zoned as a residential

district or a residential planned development.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Accordingly,

this provision eliminates the “zoned exclusively for residential use” requirement in

cities with populations exceeding 2 million people and only requires the relevant

area to be zoned as a residential district or residential planned development. Id.

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¶ 39 If we were to accept Medponics’ suggestion that the location requirement is

automatically violated when a proposed cultivation center is within 2500 feet of

any area zoned as a residential district, the above-referenced provision would be

rendered superfluous. See People ex rel. Illinois Department of Corrections v.

Hawkins, 2011 IL 110792, ¶ 23 (courts will not interpret a statute in such a way

that renders any part of it superfluous or meaningless). If the DOA had intended

the location requirement to be violated every time a proposed cultivation center was

within 2500 feet of an area merely zoned as a residential district, it would not have

included the above provision making the same applicable to cities exceeding 2

million people. See 8 Ill. Adm. Code 1000.10 (2014). For these reasons, we reject

Medponics’ argument that the location of Curative’s proposed cultivation center is

within 2500 feet of the R-1 and R-5 districts in Aurora, which Medponics alleges

are zoned exclusively for residential use.

¶ 40 Medponics next argues that the DOA’s interpretation of the location

requirement in the Administrative Rules impermissibly treats special use permits

as zoning amendments. Medponics distinguishes zoning amendments from special

uses, asserting that a zoning amendment changes the original zoning ordinance

(Jones v. City of Carbondale, 217 Ill. App. 3d 85, 89 (1991)), while a special use

is permitted within a zoning district by the zoning ordinance so long as the use

satisfies certain criteria (City of Chicago Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full

Gospel Church & Ministries, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2001)). Medponics further cites

caselaw indicating that special uses do not change the zoning designations of the

districts in which the special uses occur. See Consumers Illinois Water Co. v.

County of Will, 220 Ill. App. 3d 93, 96 (1991) (creation of a special use in existing

zoning district does not change the underlying zoning map or zoning classification);

County of Cook v. Monat, 365 Ill. App. 3d 167, 175 (2006) (special use is not the

equivalent of zoning amendment).

¶ 41 Medponics references defendants’ argument below that the R-1 and R-5

districts are not zoned exclusively for residential use because the Zoning Ordinance

allows special use permits for nonresidential uses in those districts. Medponics then

mischaracterizes this argument, alleging that defendants “thus maintain that the

availability of special use permits within these districts changes their zoning

designations to something other than exclusively residential.” We disagree and

emphasize that the manner in which Medponics frames this argument incorporates

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a presumption that the R-1 and R-5 districts are zoned as exclusively residential—

an issue that we are called on to resolve in this appeal.

¶ 42 We find nothing to indicate that defendants in any way advanced this argument

as Medponics claims. Nor is there any suggestion in the Zoning Ordinance that the

R-1 and R-5 districts are, or ever were, zoned as exclusively residential. Although

R-1 and R-5 are designated as “residential districts,” the Zoning Ordinance

demonstrates that they are not zoned exclusively for residential use as contemplated

by the location requirement in the Administrative Rules. 8 Ill. Adm. Code 1000.10

(2014).

¶ 43 Section 20 of the Zoning Ordinance titled “Use Categories” presents a chart in

“Table One” illustrating all the authorized uses in the districts of Aurora. Aurora

Code of Ordinances, Appendix A, Table 1 (amended Feb. 25, 2020). The use

categories confirm that nonresidential uses in the R-1 and R-5 districts are

authorized by special use permits. Such uses include housing services for the

elderly; major community residences; transitional community residences;

transportation services; air passenger transportation terminals; rail transportation;

nonresidential parking facilities; above-ground communication facilities; electric

utility facilities; utilities and utility services; community centers; public or private

golf courses; educational services; public facilities and services; health and human

services; day cares; nursing, supervision, and other rehabilitative services; hospitals

or sanatoria; mental health facilities; cemeteries or mausoleums; social service

agencies; charitable organizations; health-related facilities and similar uses when

not operated for pecuniary profit; and planned development. Id.

¶ 44 In addition to the nonresidential uses requiring special use permits, the use

categories also include several other nonresidential uses in the R-1 and R-5 districts

that do not require special use permits. Id. These uses are classified as accessory

uses, permitted-by-right uses, and limited-but-permitted uses. Id. Such uses include

home occupations, minor community residences, automated business devices,

garage sales, residential parking facilities, alternative energy systems, public

drinking water well houses, natural and other recreational parks, convents,

monasteries, rectories, parsonages, ministerial homes, parish houses, reading

rooms, truck gardening, stormwater management facilities, drainage areas, and

common landscaping areas. Id. Nonresidential uses classified as “permitted but

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may require a Special Use” are also authorized in the R-1 and R-5 districts and

apply to religious institutions. Id.

¶ 45 Because of the numerous nonresidential uses in those districts as established by

the Zoning Ordinance—some requiring special use permits and others not—we

conclude that the R-1 and R-5 residential districts are not zoned exclusively for

residential use. Accordingly, we reject Medponics’ argument that the DOA’s

interpretation of “area zoned exclusively for residential use” impermissibly treats

special use permits as zoning amendments.

¶ 46 Medponics next argues that the appellate court erred in basing its decision on

material outside the administrative record. As observed, section 3-110 of the

Administrative Review Law provides that the scope of judicial review of an

administrative decision is extended to all questions of law and fact presented in the

record before the court. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2014); see also Krachock v.

Department of Revenue, 403 Ill. 148, 152 (1949) (on administrative review, court

may act only upon the record).

¶ 47 Here, Medponics asserts that, in making its decision, the appellate court

considered two items that were not included in the administrative record: (1) the

April 29, 2015, letter from the City of Aurora to the DOA advising that the location

of the proposed cultivation center was not within 2500 feet of any area zoned

exclusively for residential use and (2) the FAQ document located on the DOA

website, which the City of Aurora referenced in the April 29, 2015, letter.

¶ 48 Medponics protests that, although the letter was not a part of the administrative

record, the appellate court discussed it in the “Background” section of its opinion

“as if it were a part of the administrative record.” According to Medponics, this

demonstrates that the appellate court erroneously considered the letter in reaching

its decision. Medponics further contends that, although the FAQ document predated

the DOA’s award of the permit to Curative, no evidence in the administrative record

indicates that the DOA relied on it as part of the permit application process.

Accordingly, Medponics claims that, in addition to the letter, the appellate court

also erroneously relied on the FAQ document in reaching its decision.

¶ 49 We do not necessarily agree that the DOA did not consider the letter in making

its decision to award the permit to Curative, given that the Administrative Rules

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require each applicant to submit, inter alia, verification from the local zoning

authority that the property location complies with the local zoning rules issued in

accordance with section 140 of the Act. See 8 Ill. Adm. Code 1000.100(d)(17)

(2014). However, the letter was not included in the administrative record, as the

record reflects that it was located after the administrative review hearing and the

circuit court denied defendants’ joint motion to supplement the administrative

record with the letter. That decision was challenged by defendants in the appellate

court, thus providing a plausible explanation as to why the subject material was

discussed in the “Background” section of the order. 2019 IL App (2d) 170977-U,

¶ 8. However, given its reversal of the circuit court’s administrative review

findings, the appellate court declined to address the issue regarding the joint motion

to supplement the administrative record. Id. ¶ 43. Nor is that issue before this court,

as defendants did not raise it on cross-appeal.

¶ 50 We reiterate that, in this administrative review, we determine the propriety of

the decision of the DOA rather than that of the circuit court or the appellate court.

Roselle Police Pension Board, 232 Ill. 2d at 551-52. Moreover, on administrative

review, we make our determinations based on anything that appears in the

administrative record, regardless of whether the lower courts relied on that ground.

Village of Bartonville v. Lopez, 2017 IL 120643, ¶ 34.

¶ 51 Applying these principles to the case at bar, we find ample evidence in the

administrative record to support our decision, independent of the letter and the FAQ

document. We emphasize that the letter memorializes what is readily ascertainable

in the Zoning Ordinance, which is included in the administrative record. Although

we discuss the letter and the FAQ document in our opinion, we do so for the limited

purpose of addressing Medponics’ claim that the appellate court improperly relied

on these items in reaching its decision. Whether the appellate court relied on the

letter and/or the FAQ document is of no consequence here because we do not rely

on them, and any action of the lower courts does not influence our decision. See

Roselle Police Pension Board, 232 Ill. 2d at 551-52; Village of Bartonville, 2017

IL 120643, ¶ 34. For these reasons, we find immaterial Medponics’ argument that

the appellate court improperly relied on the letter and the FAQ document.

¶ 52 Finally, Medponics argues that the location requirement as interpreted by the

DOA impermissibly limits the scope of the Act. See Hadley, 224 Ill. 2d at 377

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(rules adopted by agency may not limit the statutory scope). At the outset, we note

that Medponics forfeited this argument by not raising it in the lower courts. See

1010 Lake Shore Ass’n v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 2015 IL 118372, ¶ 14

(issues not raised in the circuit court or appellate court are forfeited). However,

forfeiture notwithstanding, we opt to address this claim on the merits. See Klaine

v. Southern Illinois Hospital Services, 2016 IL 118217, ¶ 41 (forfeiture is a

limitation on the parties, which may be overlooked by reviewing court in interest

of maintaining a uniform body of precedent).

¶ 53 Medponics alleges that, under the DOA’s interpretation, the location

requirement does not apply to all municipalities in the State but only to “those

which do not allow special use permits for non-residential uses in areas zoned

exclusively residential.” We disagree and perceive in this statement the inference

that the location requirement does not apply to the City of Aurora under the DOA’s

interpretation. We further note that Medponics frames this argument in a manner

that once again incorporates a presumption that the R-1 and R-5 districts are zoned

as exclusively residential—an allegation that, as explained above, is not supported

by the language of the Zoning Ordinance.

¶ 54 Nevertheless, Medponics cites Hadley, 224 Ill. 2d 365, to support its argument.

In Hadley, the plaintiff inmate filed a class action lawsuit seeking to enjoin the

Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) from charging indigent inmates a $2 co-

pay for nonemergency medical and dental treatment. Id. at 367. The Unified Code

of Corrections (UCC) (730 ILCS 5/3-6-2(f) (West 2004)) provided that an indigent

inmate is “exempt” from such a co-pay. Hadley, 224 Ill. 2d at 368. However, the

DOC’s rules provided that the accounts of indigent inmates were to be charged for

the co-pays and the inmate could apply for an indigence exemption upon release to

satisfy the balance due. Id. at 372-74. This Court held the DOC’s rule was clearly

erroneous, as it restricted the scope of the UCC’s indigence exemption by excluding

inmates serving life sentences. Id. at 376. Under the DOC’s rule, no action could

be taken on the UCC’s exemption until discharge from the DOC—an occurrence

that could never be realized by inmates incarcerated for life. Id. Medponics asserts

that the DOA’s interpretation of the Administrative Rules here impermissibly limits

the scope of the Act’s location requirement, as did the DOC’s interpretation of the

rule in Hadley. We disagree.

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¶ 55 As previously observed, the General Assembly charged the DOA with the duty

of enforcing the provisions of the Act related to registering and overseeing medical

cannabis cultivation centers. 410 ILCS 130/15(b) (West 2014). The General

Assembly granted the DOA latitude by directing it to adopt rules governing its

enforcement of the Act. Id. § 15(a). In facilitating its roles, the DOA saw fit to

provide a definition for the Act’s reference to “area zoned for residential use.” See

id. § 105(c). Accordingly, the DOA defined that term in the Administrative Rules

as an “area zoned exclusively for residential use.” 8 Ill. Adm. Code 1000.10 (2014).

¶ 56 The DOA was also duty bound to ensure the Zoning Ordinance was not in

conflict with the Act. See 8 Ill. Adm. Code 1000.100(d)(17) (2015); 410 ILCS

130/85(e)(2) (West 2014). To that regard, the City of Aurora was versed on the

requirements of the Act well before it issued the special use permit to Curative. The

City of Aurora passed an ordinance on July 22, 2014, amending its zoning to,

inter alia, authorize medical cannabis cultivation centers in the city as a special use

in zoning districts ORI, M-1, and M-2, so long as the cultivation centers complied

with, inter alia, the “geographic location restrictions, as set forth in the *** Act.”

City of Aurora Ordinance No. O14-042 § 4.3-3(N)(i) (eff. July 22, 2014).

¶ 57 Contrary to Medponics’ claims, the location requirement as interpreted by the

DOA applies equally to all municipalities statewide. The DOA approved Curative’s

proposed location after determining that the R-1 and R-5 districts are not zoned

exclusively residential due to the multitude of nonresidential uses authorized in

those districts. The location requirement contains requisite criteria. The mere fact

that the criteria are not met in a particular municipality does not mean that the

location requirement is inapplicable to the municipality. Here, the location

requirement and its requisite criteria fully apply to the City of Aurora. However,

the criteria were met because Curative’s proposed cultivation center is not located

within 2500 feet of an area zoned exclusively for residential use. We find nothing

to establish that the location requirement as interpreted by the DOA impermissibly

limits the scope of the Act. Accordingly, we reject Medponics’ argument.

¶ 58 In conclusion, we do not find that the DOA’s interpretation of the location

requirement is erroneous, unreasonable, or in conflict with the Act. See Hadley,

224 Ill. 2d at 371. To the contrary, we are satisfied that the definition is reasonable

and that it harmonizes with the purpose of the Act—to protect patients and their

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providers from prosecution for using medical cannabis to treat debilitating medical

conditions. 410 ILCS 130/5(g) (West 2014). Thus, we give due deference to the

DOA’s reasonable interpretation of the location requirement of the Act. See

Hartney Fuel Co., 2013 IL 115130, ¶ 38.

¶ 59 CONCLUSION

¶ 60 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the DOA properly awarded the

cultivation center permit to Curative. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the

appellate court and reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 61 Appellate court judgment affirmed.

¶ 62 Circuit court judgment reversed.

¶ 63 Department decision affirmed.

¶ 64 JUSTICE MICHAEL J. BURKE took no part in the consideration or decision

of this case.

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