Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, No. 19-17043

Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v. 2:15-cv-02151-

JAD-NJK

SATICOY BAY LLC, SERIES 9229

MILLIKAN AVENUE; MILLIKAN

AVENUE TRUST, OPINION

Defendants-Appellants,

and

INDEPENDENCE II HOMEOWNERS’

ASSOCIATION,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 13, 2021*

Pasadena, California

Filed May 5, 2021

*

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE V. SATICOY BAY

Before: Richard A. Paez and Lawrence VanDyke, Circuit

Judges, and Sharon L. Gleason, ** District Judge.

Opinion by Judge VanDyke

SUMMARY ***

Nevada Foreclosure Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary

judgment in favor of Nationstar Mortgage LLC in a diversity

action alleging claims arising from a nonjudicial foreclosure

by a homeowners’ association (“HOA”) on real property in

Nevada.

Fannie Mae purchased the loan, secured by a Deed of

Trust (“Deed”), on a home in Las Vegas, Nevada. The Deed

was eventually assigned to Bank of America, N.A.

(“BANA”), and then to Nationstar. As a result of the

homeowners’ failure to pay HOA dues, the HOA foreclosed

on the real property at issue. The buyer at the sale conveyed

the property to Saticoy Bay, LLC. Nationstar sued Saticoy

Bay to quiet title. The district court granted summary

judgment to Nationstar on the grounds that the Federal

Foreclosure Bar (prohibiting the foreclosure of Federal

Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) property without

**

The Honorable Sharon L. Gleason, United States District Judge

for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

***

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE V. SATICOY BAY 3

FHFA’s consent) prevented the extinguishment of Fannie

Mae’s Deed.

The panel rejected Saticoy’s two threshold challenges,

and held that Nationstar properly and timely raised its claims

based on the Federal Foreclosure Bar. Specifically, first, the

panel held that Nationstar had standing to invoke the Federal

Foreclosure Bar where Nationstar presented ample evidence

of its servicing relationship with Fannie Mae. This

relationship, along with the authority Fannie Mae delegated

to its loan servicers to protect Fannie Mae’s mortgage loans,

was more than sufficient to establish that Nationstar was

Fannie Mae’s loan servicer and had the authority to assert

the Federal Foreclosure Bar in this case. Second, Nationstar

timely invoked the Federal Foreclosure Bar because

Nationstar brought a quiet title action within the applicable

six-year statute of limitations under 12 U.S.C.

§ 4617(b)(12)(A).

The panel held that the Federal Foreclosure Bar applied

to the HOA foreclosure sale here. First, Fannie Mae was,

and remains, in FHFA conservatorship. Second,

Nationstar’s evidence demonstrated Fannie Mae’s

ownership interest in the loan. Third, Nationstar

demonstrated its agency relationship with BANA at the time

of the foreclosure sale. The panel held that, contrary to

Saticoy’s argument, Nationstar did not need to specifically

produce the Mortgage Selling and Servicing Contract to

establish BANA’s relationship with Fannie Mae – or its own

servicing relationship with Fannie Mae – because the

argument had been explicitly rejected by the Nevada

Supreme Court. The panel rejected Saticoy’s argument that

Nationstar’s supporting declaration was defective because it

was not based on “personal knowledge.” The panel also

rejected, as foreclosed by binding precedent, Saticoy’s

4 NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE V. SATICOY BAY

argument that Fannie Mae did not hold a valid ownership

interest in the loan because Nationstar failed to produce a

“signed writing” evincing such interest as required by the

Nevada statute of frauds. Given that Saticoy was not a party

to the underlying loan agreement pursuant to which Fannie

Mae acquired the loan, Saticoy could not raise the statute of

frauds. The panel also rejected Saticoy’s contention that

Fannie Mae did not comply with the “mandatory language”

of the Nevada recording statutes, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 111.315

& 111.325. It was sufficient that BANA, Fannie Mae’s loan

servicer and agent, was listed as the beneficiary on the

recorded Deed at the time of the foreclosure sale. Finally,

the panel held that even if Nevada’s bona fide purchaser

statutes were implicated here, Saticoy’s argument would still

be doomed because it had constructive notice of Fannie

Mae’s interest in the Deed. The panel concluded that Fannie

Mae held an enforceable interest in the loan at the time of

the HOA foreclosure sale, and the Federal Foreclosure

applied to this case.

The panel held that the Federal Foreclosure Bar

preempted the Nevada HOA law. The panel noted that, as

with most questions in this case, that this issue had already

been clearly and repeatedly answered. The panel rejected

Saticoy’s argument that because Nationstar had an adequate

remedy at law, the district court inappropriately granted

Nationstar equitable relief from the recitals in the foreclosure

deed. Assuming without deciding that the relief granted by

the district court was indeed equitable in nature, the panel

held that Saticoy failed to explain how, under Nevada law,

monetary damages constituted an adequate remedy for loss

of real property rights.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE V. SATICOY BAY 5

COUNSEL

Michael F. Bohn, Law Offices of Michael F. Bohn Esq. Ltd.,

Henderson, Nevada, for Defendants-Appellants.

R. Aaron Chastain and Benjamin W. Perry, Bradley Arant

Boult Cummings LLP, Nashville, Tennessee, for Plaintiff-

Appellee.

Leslie Bryan Hart and John D. Tennert III, Fennemore Craig

P.C., Reno, Nevada; Asim Varma, Michael A.F. Johnson,

and Dirk C. Phillips, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP,

Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae Federal Housing

Agency.

OPINION

VANDYKE, Circuit Judge:

As the saying goes, “there is nothing new under the sun.”

That may be true of these types of Nevada homeowners

association (HOA) foreclosure lawsuits generally, given that

hundreds of such cases have been filed and addressed by

both state and federal courts. But it is certainly true of this

case in particular, where the arguments espoused by Saticoy

Bay LLC, Series 9229 Millikan Avenue (Saticoy) have all

been foreclosed by Ninth Circuit and Nevada Supreme Court

precedent. With a brooding sense of déjà vu all over again,

we re-revisit the interaction of the Federal Foreclosure Bar,

12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3), and Nevada state law, which

establishes that in the event a homeowner fails to pay a

certain portion of HOA dues, the HOA is authorized to

foreclose on a “superpriority lien” in that amount,

extinguishing all other liens and encumbrances on the

6 NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE V. SATICOY BAY

delinquent property recorded after the Covenants,

Conditions, and Restrictions attached to the title. See Nev.

Rev. Stat. § 116.3116 (Nevada HOA Law).

While Nevada law generally gives delinquent HOA dues

superpriority over other lienholders, it does not take priority

over federal law. And federal law, in the form of the Federal

Foreclosure Bar, prohibits the foreclosure of Federal

Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) property without FHFA’s

consent. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3). The Nevada HOA Law

and the Federal Foreclosure Bar intersect, for example, when

an HOA exercises its right under the Nevada HOA Law to

foreclose on a property that is subject to a first deed of trust

owned by the Federal National Mortgage Association

(Fannie Mae). This is because when Fannie Mae was placed

under FHFA’s conservatorship in 2008, FHFA immediately

succeeded to all rights in Fannie Mae’s assets. See 12 U.S.C.

§ 4617(b)(2)(A)(i). As a result, FHFA now holds the rights

to that first deed of trust—an asset of Fannie Mae’s—and as

such, the deed is now FHFA property and subject to the

Federal Foreclosure Bar. Fannie Mae’s involvement in the

mortgage industry, the enactment of the Federal Foreclosure

Bar, and the history of Fannie Mae going into

conservatorship have all been well documented, so we

decline to retread that ground here. See, e.g., Fed. Home

Loan Mortg. Corp. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 893 F.3d 1136,

1141–43 (9th Cir. 2018). But just like the questions

presented, the answers here are not new. Therefore, we

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar).

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2005, Christopher Haberman and Renee Houston took

out a $219,200 loan on their home in Las Vegas, Nevada.

The deed of trust (the Deed) securing the $219,200 note was

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE V. SATICOY BAY 7

recorded on February 25, 2005, and listed Countrywide

Home Loans, Inc. as the lender and Mortgage Electronic

Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the beneficiary and

nominee for the lender and the lender’s successors and

assigns. Fannie Mae purchased the loan in March 2005. On

October 28, 2010, MERS recorded an assignment of the

Deed to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP f/k/a Countrywide

Home Loans Servicing, LP (BAC). 1 BAC then merged into

Bank of America, National Association (BANA) effective

July 1, 2011.

As a result of the homeowners’ failure to pay HOA dues,

the Independence II Homeowners’ Association ultimately

foreclosed on the property and sold it to Millikan Avenue

Trust at a foreclosure sale on October 5, 2012. In August

2013, BANA recorded an assignment of the Deed to

Nationstar, and in September 2013, Millikan Avenue Trust

conveyed the property to Saticoy. On November 11, 2015,

Nationstar sued Saticoy seeking to quiet title and obtain a

declaration that Fannie Mae’s Deed was not extinguished by

the HOA foreclosure sale. The district court granted

summary judgment to Nationstar on the grounds that the

Federal Foreclosure Bar prevented the extinguishment of

Fannie Mae’s Deed.

Saticoy appeals from this decision by the district court.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review

the grant of summary judgment de novo. See Berezovsky v.

Moniz, 869 F.3d 923, 927 (9th Cir. 2017).

1

The record includes a second assignment of the Deed from MERS

to BAC that was recorded on July 20, 2011. It is unclear why another

assignment of the same import was made and recorded, but it only further

supports the conclusion that BAC was the beneficiary under the Deed at

the time of the foreclosure sale.

8 NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE V. SATICOY BAY

II. ANALYSIS

A. Nationstar properly and timely raised its claims

based on the Federal Foreclosure Bar.

Saticoy asserts two threshold challenges: (1) that

Nationstar lacks standing to invoke the Federal Foreclosure

Bar, and (2) that Nationstar did not timely raise it. But the

Nevada Supreme Court has declared that “a loan servicer has

standing to assert the Federal Foreclosure Bar on behalf of

. . . Fannie Mae.” Daisy Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

445 P.3d 846, 847 n.1 (Nev. 2019) (en banc). And

Nationstar presented ample evidence of its servicing

relationship with Fannie Mae—including Fannie Mae

business records, supported by a declaration from Mr.

Curcio, an Assistant Vice President for Fannie Mae,

identifying Nationstar as the current loan servicer. This

relationship, together with the authority Fannie Mae

delegates to its loan servicers to protect Fannie Mae’s

mortgage loans, 2 was more than sufficient to establish that

Nationstar was Fannie Mae’s loan servicer and had the

authority to assert the Federal Foreclosure Bar in this case.

See id. at 850 (concluding that employee declarations

confirming the current loan servicer, combined with the

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)

seller/servicer guide authorizing the loan servicer to

“represent and defend Freddie Mac’s interest in the

applicable [m]ortgage(s),” gave the loan servicer standing to

2

The Fannie Mae Single Family Servicing Guide defines the agency

relationship between Fannie Mae and its loan servicers. Under that

guide, “[t]he servicer must . . . [a]ppropriately handle legal matters

affecting Fannie Mae mortgage loans,” including “[a]n attempt by

another lienholder to . . . extinguish Fannie Mae’s interests.”

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE V. SATICOY BAY 9

assert the Federal Foreclosure Bar (citing Berezovsky,

869 F.3d at 932–33)).

Nationstar also timely invoked the Federal Foreclosure

Bar because Nationstar brought a quiet title action, arguing

that the Deed had not been extinguished because of the

Federal Foreclosure Bar, three years and one month after the

HOA foreclosure sale, and the applicable statute of

limitations is six years under 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(12)(A). M

& T Bank v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 963 F.3d 854, 856 (9th

Cir. 2020), cert. denied, No. 20-908, 2021 WL 1602655

(U.S. Apr. 26, 2021). Therefore, Saticoy’s threshold

arguments fail because they are foreclosed by established

precedent.

B. The Federal Foreclosure Bar applies to the HOA

foreclosure sale here.

Saticoy makes several arguments related to whether the

Federal Foreclosure Bar preserved Fannie Mae’s Deed.

Saticoy generally asserts that the foreclosure of the HOA’s

superpriority lien in accordance with the Nevada HOA Law

extinguished the Deed before it was assigned to Nationstar.

This argument fails if the Federal Foreclosure Bar applies

and that Bar preempts Nevada state law. The Federal

Foreclosure Bar applies if, at the time of the foreclosure sale,

(1) Fannie Mae was in FHFA conservatorship, see

Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 928; (2) Fannie Mae owned the

Deed; and (3) Fannie Mae had an agency relationship with

BANA (formerly BAC), the beneficiary of record on the

Deed. See id. at 931–32.

With respect to the first factor, Fannie Mae was placed

under FHFA’s conservatorship on September 6, 2008,

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 893 F.3d at 1140, and

remains there today. See LN Mgmt., LLC Series 5664 Divot

10 NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE V. SATICOY BAY

v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 957 F.3d 943, 946 (9th Cir.

2020). Regarding the second and third factors, Nationstar’s

evidence appropriately demonstrates both Fannie Mae’s

ownership interest in the loan and its agency relationship

with BANA at the time of the foreclosure sale. Specifically,

Nationstar introduced Fannie Mae’s business records—i.e.,

printouts from its internal database—and the supporting

declaration from Mr. Curcio, showing that: (1) Fannie Mae

acquired the loan on March 1, 2005, and continued to own it

through the October 2012 HOA foreclosure sale, and

(2) BANA served as Fannie Mae’s loan servicer prior to

transferring that responsibility to Nationstar on April 30,

2013. In further support of the agency relationship between

BANA and Fannie Mae, Nationstar presented excerpts of the

Fannie Mae Single Family 2012 Servicing Guide (the

Guide), which defined Fannie Mae’s relationship with its

loan servicers at the time of the foreclosure sale. The Guide

provides that when Fannie Mae purchases a mortgage,

“Fannie Mae may take any and all action with respect to the

mortgage loan it deems necessary . . . including recordation

of a mortgage assignment . . . from the servicer to Fannie

Mae or its designee.” The Guide also gives BANA, as a loan

servicer for Fannie Mae, certain authority to foreclose on the

loan on Fannie Mae’s behalf.

This court and the Nevada Supreme Court have

previously concluded that for purposes of the Federal

Foreclosure Bar, virtually identical evidence established

both an enforceable property interest in the loan and an

agency relationship with the loan servicer, which was

identified as the beneficiary of record on the relevant deed.

See, e.g., Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 932–33 & n.8 (noting that

“Freddie Mac’s database printouts [were] admissible

business records” sufficient to support a “valid and

enforceable” property interest under Nevada law and that

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE V. SATICOY BAY 11

substantially similar language in Freddie Mac’s servicer

guide “mirrors Montierth’s description of the requisite

agency relationship”) (referencing In re Montierth, 354 P.3d

648, 650–51 (Nev. 2015) (en banc)); see also Daisy Tr.,

445 P.3d at 850–51. Contrary to Saticoy’s argument,

Nationstar did not need to specifically produce the Mortgage

Selling and Servicing Contract to establish BANA’s agency

relationship with Fannie Mae—or its own servicing

relationship with Fannie Mae, for that matter. This argument

has been explicitly rejected by the Nevada Supreme Court.

See Daisy Tr., 445 P.3d at 849–50 (rejecting the argument

that Freddie Mac must provide the “actual loan servicing

agreement” to establish an agency relationship with the

servicer and its own ownership interest).

Saticoy further argues that Nationstar’s supporting

declaration was defective because it was not based on

“personal knowledge.” But Mr. Curcio, the declarant in

Nationstar’s declaration, permissibly based his testimony on

his knowledge of Fannie Mae’s recordkeeping system and

the data contained in Fannie Mae’s business records. See,

e.g., id. at 850. Mr. Curcio could properly testify to the data

entered into Fannie Mae’s database, even though “he did not

input each piece of data . . . . [because] there is no dispute

that [Mr. Curcio] . . . was qualified to testify about the

business practices and procedures for inputting the

underlying data. It is not necessary for each individual who

entered a record . . . into the database to testify as to the

accuracy of each piece of data entered.” U-Haul Int’l, Inc.

v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 576 F.3d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir.

2009).

Saticoy also argues that Fannie Mae does not hold a valid

ownership interest in the loan because Nationstar failed to

produce a “signed writing” evincing such interest as required

12 NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE V. SATICOY BAY

by the Nevada statute of frauds. See Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 111.205(1). That argument, too, is foreclosed by binding

precedent. The Nevada Supreme Court has recognized that

“[t]he defense of the statute of frauds is personal, and

available only to the contracting parties or their successors

in interest,” Harmon v. Tanner Motor Tours of Nevada, Ltd.,

377 P.2d 622, 628 (Nev. 1963), and thus “cannot ordinarily

be asserted by third persons.” Easton Bus. Opportunities,

Inc. v. Town Exec. Suites-E. Marketplace, LLC, 230 P.3d

827, 832 n.4 (Nev. 2010) (citation omitted). Given that

Saticoy was not a party to the underlying loan agreement

pursuant to which Fannie Mae acquired the loan, Saticoy

cannot raise the statute of frauds. The fact that Fannie Mae

completed such an acquisition more than fifteen years ago

further undermines the applicability of the statute of frauds

in this case. See Edwards Indus., Inc. v. DTE/BTE, Inc.,

923 P.2d 569, 574 (Nev. 1996) (per curiam) (explaining that

“[f]ull performance by one party may also remove a contract

from the statute of frauds”). We therefore reject this

argument.

Saticoy further contends that Fannie Mae did not comply

with the “mandatory language” of the Nevada recording

statutes, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 111.315 & 111.325, and its

failure to record its ownership of the Deed means that

interest is void as to Saticoy under Nevada law. But

Nevada’s recording statutes do not require Fannie Mae to be

identified as the beneficiary of record on the Deed in order

to establish its ownership interest in the loan, see Daisy Tr.,

445 P.3d at 847, nor do they require Fannie Mae “to

[otherwise] publicly record its ownership interest as a

prerequisite for establishing that interest.” Id. at 849. It was

sufficient that BANA (formerly BAC), Fannie Mae’s loan

servicer and agent, was listed as the beneficiary on the

recorded Deed at the time of the foreclosure sale. See

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE V. SATICOY BAY 13

Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 932. 3 As a result, we—like the

Nevada Supreme Court—“need not address [Saticoy’s]

argument that the Federal Foreclosure Bar [does not]

preempt[] Nevada’s recording statutes; nor is it necessary to

address [Saticoy’s] argument that it is protected as a bona

fide purchaser from the Federal Foreclosure Bar’s effect.”

Daisy Tr., 445 P.3d at 849.

Even if we assumed, without deciding, that Nevada’s

bona fide purchaser statutes were implicated here, Saticoy’s

argument would still be doomed because it had constructive

notice of Fannie Mae’s interest in the Deed. See Shadow

Wood Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc.,

366 P.3d 1105, 1115 (Nev. 2016) (en banc) (reasoning that

a “subsequent purchaser is bona fide . . . if it takes the

property . . . without notice of facts which upon diligent

inquiry would be indicated and from which notice would be

imputed to him, if he failed to make such inquiry” (citation

3

Here and elsewhere, Saticoy attempts to distinguish squarely on-

point precedent by arguing that the controlling cases do not discuss the

particular statute(s) invoked by Saticoy in this appeal. For example,

Saticoy claims that Berezovsky is inapposite because it does not “even

mention[] the mandatory language in . . . [Nevada recording statute]

NRS 111.315.” But the Berezovsky court did not need to enumerate all

Nevada recording statutes in treatise-like fashion for its conclusion to be

binding that “[a]lthough the recorded deed of trust here omitted Freddie

Mac’s name, Freddie Mac’s property interest is valid . . . under Nevada

law.” 869 F.3d at 932. Saticoy’s repeated attempts to avoid on-point

precedent merely by pointing to some statute or case that the precedent

didn’t expressly address is neither an appropriate nor helpful way to

distinguish precedent. A case whose holding is directly applicable may

not be distinguished merely by pointing to some authority the case didn’t

expressly address. The fact that a binding precedent failed to take some

important authority into account may be a valid reason to ask that the

case be reconsidered en banc; it is not a valid reason to ask us to ignore

the case.

14 NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE V. SATICOY BAY

and quotation marks omitted)). Saticoy had record notice of

the adverse interest in the property, as reflected by the

recorded Deed, and the fact that the note could be “sold one

or more times without prior notice.” The first page of the

Deed itself, and the first page of each rider thereto, also

included a footer indicating Fannie Mae’s possible

involvement. We thus decline to conclude that Saticoy is a

bona fide purchaser based on the above evidence of Fannie

Mae’s potential interest in the property. See Huntington v.

Mila, Inc., 75 P.3d 354, 356 (Nev. 2003) (per curiam) (“A

subsequent purchaser with notice . . . of an interest in

property superior to that which he is purchasing is not a

purchaser in good faith, and is not entitled to the protection

of [Nevada’s] recording act.”).

In conclusion, Fannie Mae held an enforceable interest

in the loan at the time of the HOA foreclosure sale, as

established by evidence of Fannie Mae’s acquisition and

continued ownership of the loan throughout that time and by

evidence of its agency relationship with BANA (formerly

BAC), the named beneficiary on the recorded Deed. Fannie

Mae’s interest in the loan, coupled with the fact that it was

under FHFA conservatorship at the time of the sale, means

the Federal Foreclosure Bar applies to this case.

C. The Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts the Nevada

HOA Law.

Having established that Fannie Mae owned the loan at

the time of the sale, and that it was in FHFA conservatorship,

the final question is whether the Federal Foreclosure Bar

preempts the Nevada HOA law. As with most questions in

this case, that too has already been clearly and repeatedly

answered: “The Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts the

Nevada superpriority lien scheme.” M & T Bank, 963 F.3d

at 856 (citing Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 931); see also Saticoy

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE V. SATICOY BAY 15

Bay LLC Series 9641 Christine View v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg.

Ass’n, 417 P.3d 363, 368 (Nev. 2018) (en banc) (“[T]he

Federal Foreclosure Bar implicitly preempts [the Nevada

HOA Law] to the extent that a foreclosure sale extinguishes

the deed of trust.”). The Federal Foreclosure Bar therefore

preserved Fannie Mae’s Deed, unless FHFA consented to

the HOA sale. See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3). Saticoy presents

no evidence that FHFA affirmatively consented; FHFA

denies that it did; and Saticoy, although it argues FHFA’s

consent should be implied, “cites no authority for the

proposition that [FHFA] inaction in this context conveys

consent, implicit or otherwise.” Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at

929; see also Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9641 Christine View,

417 P.3d at 368 (“Saticoy Bay argues that the FHFA

implicitly consented to the extinguishment of Fannie Mae’s

deed of trust during the foreclosure sale by failing to act. We

disagree.”).

Saticoy finally argues that because Nationstar had an

adequate remedy at law, the district court inappropriately

granted Nationstar equitable relief from the recitals in the

foreclosure deed, namely the default recital. Even assuming,

without deciding, that the relief granted by the district court

was indeed equitable in nature, Saticoy fails to explain how,

under Nevada law, monetary damages constitute an adequate

remedy for loss of real property rights. See, e.g., Dixon v.

Thatcher, 742 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Nev. 1987) (per curiam)

(reasoning that “real property and its attributes are

considered unique and loss of real property rights generally

results in irreparable harm”); Nev. Escrow Serv., Inc. v.

Crockett, 533 P.2d 471, 472 (Nev. 1975) (per curiam)

(reversing the trial court’s denial of a preliminary injunction

to halt foreclosure on properties because, unlike the trial

court—which concluded that “there existed an adequate

remedy at law, to wit, money damages”—the Nevada

16 NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE V. SATICOY BAY

Supreme Court determined “[i]n this instance the equitable

remedy is so far superior that the legal remedy may be

rendered inadequate”). 4

III. CONCLUSION 5

For the reasons above, we AFFIRM the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to Nationstar. 6

4

We need not reach Nationstar’s alternative excuse of tender

arguments because Fannie Mae’s Deed was not extinguished as a result

of the application of the Federal Foreclosure Bar. That was the basis for

the district court’s decision and is the basis for our decision here.

5

As this court has acknowledged on multiple occasions, most of

Saticoy’s arguments are clearly foreclosed by Ninth Circuit and Nevada

Supreme Court decisions directly on point. See, e.g., Berezovsky,

869 F.3d at 931 (concluding the Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts the

Nevada HOA Law); Daisy Tr., 445 P.3d at 847 (same). Yet Saticoy

continues to raise these arguments in superficially different forms. See

generally Bank of Am., N.A. v. Los Prados Cmty. Ass’n, No. 20-15582,

2021 WL 1157924 (9th Cir. Mar. 26, 2021); Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v.

Casa Mesa Villas Homeowners Ass’n, 839 F. App’x 45 (9th Cir. 2020);

Saticoy Bay LLC Series 452 Crocus Hill v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp.,

826 F. App’x 610 (9th Cir. 2020). We again warn Saticoy not to pursue

frivolous appeals. See Alessi & Koenig, LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series

10250 Sun Dusk LN, 804 F. App’x 475, 477–78 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e

note that Saticoy previously made many of the same arguments in [a

2017 action]—and this court rejected them. Indeed, this court has

repeatedly rejected these same arguments in other cases. [collecting

cases]. Saticoy has other appeals pending before this court advancing

these same, explicitly rejected arguments. The court cautions Saticoy

against pursuing non-meritorious appeals.”). Simultaneous with the

filing of this opinion, we also issue an order to show cause why Saticoy

and its counsel should not be sanctioned for these practices.

6

Saticoy’s Motion to Stay the Appeal (ECF No. 51) is DENIED.