Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

DAVID KAANAANA et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

S253458

Second Appellate District, Division Eight

B276420 and B279838

Los Angeles County Superior Court

BC496090

March 29, 2021

Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which

Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Cuéllar,

Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred.

Justice Kruger filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief

Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justice Jenkins concurred.

KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

S253458

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

California’s prevailing wage law is a minimum wage

provision that generally applies to those employed on public

works. Different provisions define the term “public works” in

various contexts. As relevant here, the term includes “work

done” for certain types of government districts. (Lab. Code,

§ 1720, subd. (a)(2).)1 Plaintiffs are contract workers who act as

belt sorters for a county sanitation district. We hold that their

work falls within the definition of public works in section 1720,

subdivision (a)(2) (hereafter section 1720(a)(2)).

I. BACKGROUND

Los Angeles County Sanitation District No. 2 (the District)

maintains and operates a system for the transfer and disposal

of refuse. (Health & Saf. Code, § 4741.) The Downey Area

Recycling and Transfer Facility and the Puente Hills Material

Recovery Facility are part of that system. At these warehouse-

style sites, refuse is received, recyclables are removed, and the

residual waste is transferred to landfills.

Defendant Barrett Business Services, Inc. (Barrett)

contracted with the District to provide belt sorters and others to

staff and operate the two facilities. These workers were under

Barrett’s supervision and not considered District employees. In

1

Further unspecified section references are to the Labor

Code.

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KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

each site, refuse is deposited onto a conveyor belt and manually

sorted. Belt sorters remove nonrecyclable materials, clear

obstructions, sort recyclables, and put them into containers.

Plaintiffs in this class action sued Barrett and a former

manager on behalf of all belt sorters employed at the two

locations from April 2011 to September 2013. The complaint

alleged causes of action for failure to: (1) pay minimum and/or

prevailing wages; (2) pay overtime at prevailing wage rates; (3)

provide meal periods; and (4) timely pay all wages owed at the

time of termination. It also alleged unfair business practices

and sought both civil penalties and restitution of wages.

Plaintiffs alleged their work fell under section 1720(a)(2),

entitling them to prevailing wage compensation. Barrett moved

to strike plaintiffs’ prevailing wage allegations, arguing they

were not entitled to those wages because the District does not

fall under the statutory definition of a covered district and

plaintiffs’ labor was not the type of work covered by section

1720(a)(2). The trial court granted the motion to strike.2

In a split decision, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial

court’s ruling on the motion to strike. The majority concluded

that plaintiffs’ belt sorting qualified as public work under

2

An order granting a motion to strike is interlocutory and

generally not subject to immediate review absent extraordinary

circumstances. (See Oeth v. Mason (1967) 247 Cal.App.2d 805,

808.) After the trial court granted Barrett’s motion, the parties

stipulated to certain facts and trial proceeded on plaintiffs’ other

claims.

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KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

section 1720(a)(2).3 (Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc.

(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 778, 798 (Kaanaana).)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

There is no factual dispute about the kind of work

plaintiffs performed. Whether they were entitled to the

prevailing wage because their labor fell under the applicable

statutory definition of “public works” is a question of law we

review de novo. (City of Long Beach v. Department of Industrial

Relations (2004) 34 Cal.4th 942, 949 (City of Long Beach).)

Since the original public works statutes were passed

nearly 90 years ago, the Legislature has enacted many

provisions relating to public works. Lawmakers have used

various formulations to describe what they intended to

designate as public works for purposes of these enactments.

When different formulations are used over the evolving history

of a concept, often reflecting the prevailing forces of the times or

the realities at play in different segments of the workplace,

courts occasionally encounter the need for statutory

interpretation. This is one such case.

The essence of Barrett’s argument is that some definitions

of public work are limited to labor that generally involves

construction. Perforce, they urge that all public works

provisions should be interpreted as so limited. The particular

3

The Court of Appeal also addressed plaintiffs’ other trial

claims, and Barrett challenged those holdings in its petition for

review. We limited the scope of review to the question of

whether plaintiffs were employed on public works.

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KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

provision at issue here does not include the limitation Barrett

insists upon.

B. The Statutory Framework

California’s prevailing wage law was first enacted in 1931

as an uncodified measure.4 (Public Wage Rate Act or 1931 Act;

Stats. 1931, ch. 397, §§ 1‒6, p. 910‒912.) Congress enacted a

federal counterpart (40 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq.) the same year.

Both sets of legislation responded to the dire economic

conditions of the Great Depression, when private construction

diminished severely and “the oversupply of labor was exploited

by unscrupulous contractors to win government contracts . . . .”

(State Building & Construction Trades Council of California v.

Duncan (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 289, 294 (Duncan); see also

Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu (1981) 450 U.S. 754, 773–

774.) The goal of prevailing wage laws was to give local

contractors and labor a fair opportunity to work on public

building projects that might otherwise be awarded to

contractors who hired cheaper out-of-market labor.

(Universities Research Assn., at p. 774.)

The overarching purpose of the prevailing wage law is to

“protect and benefit employees on public works projects.”

(Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry (1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 985

(Lusardi).) “This general objective subsumes within it a number

of specific goals: to protect employees from substandard wages

that might be paid if contractors could recruit labor from distant

4

The prevailing wage law replaced an earlier law that

“required payment of at least $2 per day for labor on public

works.” (State Building & Construction Trades Council of

California v. City of Vista (2012) 54 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 2 (City

of Vista), citing Stats. 1897, ch. 88, § 1, p. 90.)

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KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

cheap-labor areas; to permit union contractors to compete with

nonunion contractors; to benefit the public through the superior

efficiency of well-paid employees; and to compensate nonpublic

employees with higher wages for the absence of job security and

employment benefits enjoyed by public employees.” (Id. at p.

987.) Courts liberally construe the law to fulfill these purposes.

(City of Long Beach, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 949–950; see also

Azusa Land Partners v. Department of Industrial Relations

(2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1, 15 (Azusa).)

Generally, prevailing wages must be paid to all those

“employed on public works” (§ 1771), including those “employed

by contractors or subcontractors in the execution of any contract

for public work”5 (§ 1772). This requirement only applies to

work performed under contract, not to “work carried out by a

public agency with its own forces.” (§ 1771.) The body awarding

a public work contract must obtain the prevailing wage rate for

each type of worker needed. (§ 1773.) A “contractor to whom

the contract is awarded . . . shall pay not less than the specified

prevailing rates of wages to all workmen employed in the

execution of the contract.” (§ 1774.) A contractor who fails to do

so is liable for the deficiency and subject to a penalty. (§ 1775.)

The statutory obligation to pay prevailing wages is independent

of any contractual requirement. (Lusardi, supra, 1 Cal.4th at

5

The prevailing wage law uses the plural term “public

works” as well as the singular term “public work.” (See §§ 1720,

subd. (a)(1) & (2), 1770, 1771, 1772.) We use the terms

interchangeably.

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KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

pp. 981–982.) Prevailing wages must be paid regardless of any

private agreement. (Id. at p. 988.)

“Public works” is a term of art defined by section 1720 and

the sections that follow. (See §§ 1720(a), 1720.2‒1720.9.) The

protections afforded by the prevailing wage laws only extend to

activities that qualify as public work. Section 1720(a) sets out

eight separate definitions of the term. It provides in full that

“[a]s used in this chapter,[6] ‘public works’ means all of the

following: [¶] (1) Construction, alteration, demolition,

installation, or repair work done under contract and paid for in

whole or in part out of public funds, except work done directly

by a public utility company pursuant to order of the Public

Utilities Commission or other public authority. For purposes of

this paragraph, ‘construction’ includes work performed during

the design, site assessment, feasibility study, and other

preconstruction phases of construction, including, but not

limited to, inspection and land surveying work, regardless of

6

The chapter mentioned is chapter 1 of part 7 of division 2

of the Labor Code, entitled “Public Works.” It will be referred to

as the “Public Works Chapter.” In addition to the above-noted

prevailing wage provisions, it contains the following statutes

governing aspects of employment on public works: (1) section

1778, which makes it a felony to take for one’s own use wages

earned by a worker for services rendered upon any public work;

(2) section 1779, which makes it a misdemeanor to charge or

collect a fee to assist any person in procuring or registering for

public work; and (3) section 1811, which limits to eight hours

the workday of any worker employed on public work. When the

Labor Code was codified in 1937, this chapter also contained a

statute prohibiting the employment of those who were not

United States citizens. (Public Works Alien Employment Act;

Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 1850, p. 246, amended by Stats. 1973, ch.

77, § 19, pp. 129‒130.) The significance of these other statutes

is explained below.

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KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

whether any further construction work is conducted, and work

performed during the postconstruction phases of construction,

including, but not limited to, all cleanup work at the jobsite. For

purposes of this paragraph, ‘installation’ includes, but is not

limited to, the assembly and disassembly of freestanding and

affixed modular office systems. [¶] (2) Work done for irrigation,

utility, reclamation, and improvement districts, and other

districts of this type. ‘Public works’ does not include the

operation of the irrigation or drainage system of any irrigation

or reclamation district, except as used in Section 1778 relating to

retaining wages. [¶] (3) Street, sewer, or other improvement

work done under the direction and supervision or by the

authority of any officer or public body of the state, or of a

political subdivision or district thereof, whether the political

subdivision or district operates under a freeholder’s charter or

not. [¶] (4) The laying of carpet done under a building lease-

maintenance contract and paid for out of public funds. [¶] (5)

The laying of carpet in a public building done under contract and

paid for in whole or in part out of public funds. [¶] (6) Public

transportation demonstration projects authorized pursuant to

Section 143 of the Streets and Highways Code. [¶] (7) (A)

Infrastructure project grants from the California Advanced

Services Fund pursuant to Section 281 of the Public Utilities

Code. [¶] (B) For purposes of this paragraph, the Public Utilities

Commission is not the awarding body or the body awarding the

contract, as defined in Section 1722. [¶] (8) Tree removal work

done in the execution of a project under paragraph (1).” (Italics

added.)

This case involves the italicized definition, which contains

three basic elements: (1) work; (2) done for an irrigation, utility,

reclamation, improvement, or other similar district (a covered

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KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

district); except (3) the operation of an irrigation or drainage

system for an irrigation or reclamation district (irrigation

exclusion). This dispute revolves around the first element.

Barrett concedes that the District is a covered district and that

the irrigation exclusion does not apply.7 But Barrett argues that

the only “work” covered by section 1720(a)(2) is the work of

“[c]onstruction, alteration, demolition, installation, or repair”

described in the inclusive detail of section 1720, subdivision

(a)(1) (hereafter section 1720(a)(1)).8 Because plaintiffs’ sorting

duties did not involve any of those activities, Barrett argues they

were not employed on public works under section 1720(a)(2).

Plaintiffs counter that the term “work” encompasses a broader

range of activities, including their own.

In essence, Barrett argues the construction and

installation provision (§ 1720(a)(1)) modifies the covered district

provision (§ 1720(a)(2)). Plaintiffs argue section 1720(a) sets out

eight independent definitions of “public work.” Plaintiffs have

the better argument.

7

On appeal, Barrett argued plaintiffs’ work fell within that

exclusion because it was the “operational” work of the District.

The court concluded Barrett had waived the argument by failing

to raise it in the motion to strike. Nevertheless, the court held

plaintiffs’ work did not fall within the exclusion because the

“operation of a recycling system for a sanitation district is not

the operation of an irrigation or drainage system of an irrigation

or reclamation district.” (Kaanaana, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at

p. 798.) Barrett does not challenge that conclusion.

8

To avoid needless repetition, we refer to all of the activities

encompassed in section 1720(a)(1) as construction or

installation work, or construction-type work.

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KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

C. Analysis

Familiar principles guide our consideration. Our

fundamental task is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent and

effectuate the law’s purpose, giving the statutory language its

plain and commonsense meaning. (Garcia v. McCutchen (1997)

16 Cal.4th 469, 476.) We examine that language in the context

of the entire statutory framework to discern its scope and

purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.

(Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles

(2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737.) “If the language is clear, courts

must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal

interpretation would result in absurd consequences the

Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits

more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider

other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and

public policy.” (Ibid.) The wider historical circumstances of a

law’s enactment may also assist in ascertaining legislative

intent, supplying context for otherwise ambiguous language.

(See California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24

Cal.3d 836, 844.)

Unlike the construction and installation provision of

section 1720(a)(1), the covered district provision defines public

work not in terms of the tasks performed but in terms of the

governmental district for which it is done. It does not set out an

assortment of activities as the construction and installation

provision does. Instead, the covered district provision simply

refers to “work.” Standing on its own, this generic term may

embrace myriad endeavors. However, words used in a statute

are considered in context, not isolation. Bearing this context in

mind, it appears the Legislature intended the covered district

provision to include a wider array of tasks than construction-

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KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

type labor. Other provisions in section 1720(a) contain limiting

language when defining street and sewer work, carpet laying,

demolition and infrastructure projects, and tree removal as

public work. The covered district definition does not. It speaks

only of “work.” This lack of any limiting language is significant.

Moreover, the legislative history of the statute and surrounding

provisions indicate the language used by the Legislature

reflected an informed choice.

1. Statutory Definitions of Public Works

a. Section 1720, subdivision (a)

When the Public Wage Rate Act was enacted in 1931, the

law’s application was expressly limited to workers engaged in

construction work. (See Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Whitsett

(1932) 215 Cal. 400, 415–416.) The law’s operative provision

required payment of prevailing wages “to all laborers, workmen

and mechanics employed by or on behalf of” the state or a local

government “engaged in the construction of public works,

exclusive of maintenance work.” (Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 1, p.

910, italics added.) The law’s definitional provision made clear

that this construction limitation also applied to work done for

covered districts. It specified that the following activities “shall

be held to be ‘public works’ within the meaning of this act”: (1)

“[c]onstruction work done for irrigation, utility, reclamation,

improvement and other districts, or other public agency or

agencies, public officer or body”; (2) “street, sewer and other

improvement work done under the direction and supervision or

by the authority of any officer or public body of the state, or of

any political subdivision, district or municipality thereof”; and

(3) “construction or repair work done under contract, and paid

for in whole or in part out of public funds, other than work done

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KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

directly by any public utility company pursuant to order of the

railroad commission or other public authority.” (Stats. 1931, ch.

397, § 4, pp. 911‒912, italics added.)

In 1937, the Legislature enacted the Labor Code,

incorporating the core provisions of the Public Wage Rate Act

into the newly codified Public Works Chapter. (See Stats. 1937,

ch. 90, §§ 1720‒1721, 1724, 1726‒1729, 1770‒1777, pp. 241‒

244.) In section 1720, the Legislature set out the three

definitions of public works that would apply to this new chapter.

Two of the definitions were substantively identical to those in

the Public Wage Rate Act. The covered district provision was

not. The Legislature changed that definition in two ways. First,

it added the irrigation exclusion and, second, it removed the

word “construction” as a modifier of “work.”9

When the Legislature alters statutory language, “as for

example when it deletes express provisions of the prior version,”

9

As enacted, section 1720 provided that “[a]s used in this

chapter, ‘public works’ means: [¶] (a) Construction or repair

work done under contract and paid for in whole or in part out of

public finds, except work done directly by any public utility

company pursuant to order of the Railroad Commission or other

public authority. [¶] (b) Work done for irrigation, utility,

reclamation and improvement districts, and other districts of

this type. ‘Public work’ shall not include the operation of the

irrigation or drainage system of any irrigation or reclamation

district, except as used in sections 1850 to 1854 of this code

relating to employment of aliens, and section 1778 relating to

retaining wages. [¶] (c) Street, sewer or other improvement work

done under the direction and supervision or by the authority of

any officer or public body of the State, or of any political

subdivision or district thereof, whether such political

subdivision or district operates under a freeholder’s charter or

not.” (Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 1720, p. 241.)

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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

the presumption is that it intended to change the law’s meaning.

(Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 461.) Here, the

Legislature’s deletion of the word “construction” indicates an

intent to expand, beyond construction work, the assortment of

activities that would qualify as public works when done for a

covered district. (Cf. County of Los Angeles v. State of California

(1987) 43 Cal.3d 46, 55.) 10

Barrett concedes the Legislature removed the word

“construction” from the covered district provision. But it argues

that apart from this “ambiguous deletion,” there is no evidence

the Legislature intended to enlarge section 1720(a)(2)’s

application beyond “publicly funded construction or repair

projects.” Barrett points to section 2, which provides that

insofar as its provisions “are substantially the same as existing

provisions relating to the same subject matter, [they] shall be

construed as restatements and continuations thereof and not as

new enactments.” Barrett also points to this court’s statements

in City of Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th 547, that when the Legislature

“established the Labor Code in 1937, it replaced the 1931 Public

Wage Rate Act with a revised, but substantively unchanged,

version of the same law” and that “the prevailing wage law’s

general purpose and scope remain largely unchanged.” (City of

10

Barrett and amici curiae argue that plaintiffs’

interpretation of section 1720(a)(2) would make the prevailing

wage law applicable to every type of contract worker doing work

for a covered district, including accountants, lawyers, and other

professionals. They urge this was not the Legislature’s intent.

We need not specify the precise outer boundaries of section

1720(a)(2) here. For our purposes, it suffices to observe that the

prevailing wage law is designed to protect laborers, workers,

and mechanics employed on public works (see §§ 1771, 1723)

and that plaintiffs fall squarely within that class.

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KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

Vista, at p. 555.) Based on those authorities, Barrett contends

that the “codification of the 1931 Act into the present-day Labor

Code was not meant to overhaul existing law in general, or

subsection 1720(a)(2) in particular.”

Barrett’s characterization sweeps too broadly and

overlooks important qualifiers in the authorities it cites. Section

2, as might be expected in a new codification of existing law,

points to the nature of the transition. Insofar as the

codifications are substantially the same as existing provisions

they are to be construed as restatements, not new enactments.

If the Legislature intended the codification to make no changes

from the 1931 Act, it could simply have adopted the existing

language or been more categorical and said in section 2 that any

change wrought by codification was not intended to modify

existing law. It did neither. The covered district provision it

codified is not substantially the same as the comparable

provision in the 1931 Act. This court’s general characterizations

in City of Vista do not suggest to the contrary. That case did not

address the scope of the covered district provision or any other

provision in the prevailing wage law. It also used qualifying

language similar to section 2.

Other textual indications in the three definitions adopted

in 1937 support a conclusion that section 1720(a)(2) covers more

than just construction-type work. First, the other two public

works definitions clearly referred to the specific kinds of work

included: “[c]onstruction . . . or repair work” and “[s]treet, sewer

or other improvement work.” (§ 1720, former subds. (a), (c),

renumbered as subds. (a)(1), (a)(3) by Stats. 2001, ch. 938, § 2,

pp. 7509‒7510, italics added.) The Legislature chose not to

employ such limitations as to work done for covered districts. It

is not for us to insert a limitation the Legislature excluded. (See

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Wasatch Property Management v. Degrate (2005) 35 Cal.4th

1111, 1118.) A court “may not rewrite a statute, either by

inserting or omitting language, to make it conform to a

presumed intent that is not expressed.” (Cornette v. Department

of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 73–74.)

Second, section 1720(a)(2) excludes from its definition of

public works the operation of an irrigation or drainage system.

This exclusion would be unnecessary if the scope of section

1720(a)(2) were limited to construction-type work, as Barrett

argues. The Legislature “does not engage in idle acts, and no

part of its enactments should be rendered surplusage if a

construction is available that avoids doing so.” (Mendoza v.

Nordstrom, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1074, 1087.)

Barrett reads this exclusionary language differently. It

starts from the premise that the covered district provision only

applies to construction-type work, and thus that the operation

of an irrigation or drainage system is not “public works” under

that definition. It then contends that the exclusionary language

should be read to mean that such operational work is included

in the definition of “public works,” but only for purposes of

section 1778 and the now-repealed Public Works Alien

Employment Act. This argument does not withstand scrutiny.

It depends on a reading which adds the word “construction” to

the first sentence of the statute, a reading we have already

rejected. Moreover, if the Legislature intended section

1720(a)(2) to work as proposed, it could have done so by limiting

the subdivision’s reach to construction-type work, as it did in

section 1720(a)(1), and then adding that “the operation of the

irrigation or drainage system of an irrigation or reclamation

district” also qualified as public works for limited purposes.

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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

The plain language of section 1720(a)(2), when read in

context, indicates that its scope is not limited to construction-

type work. That interpretation serves the prevailing wage law’s

purposes. It protects those who work under contract for covered

districts from substandard wages, benefits the public through

the superior efficiency of well-compensated workers, and results

in higher wages to make up for lack of job security and benefits

that normally attach to public employment.

The proposed Labor Code, drafted by the California Code

Commission in 1936, also supports a conclusion the Legislature

intended to broaden the range of activities that would qualify as

public work when done for a covered district. The preface to the

proposed Labor Code explained that its purpose was to “present

in a single statute all of the existing statutory law relating to

[the] subject” of labor, including “conditions of employment.”

(Cal. Code Com. Office, Proposed Lab. Code (1936) p. v. (1936

Proposed Labor Code).) The public works definitions eventually

codified in section 1720 were taken word for word from the

Commission’s proposed code. (See 1936 Proposed Lab. Code,

§ 1720, p. 85.) The proposed code thus provides guidance in

interpreting the codified statute. (Cf. Fluor Corp. v. Superior

Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1175, 1194–1195 [reviewing the

proposed Ins. Code to interpret the Ins. Code].)

In a note to proposed section 1720, the Code Commission

explained how it devised each definition of “public works.” The

commission stated that subdivision (a) of the proposed statute,

the substance of which is now the construction and installation

provision (§ 1720(a)(1)), was taken “verbatim” from the

analogous definition of public works in the 1931 Act. (1936

Proposed Lab. Code, note to § 1720, p. 85.) The covered district

provision (§ 1720(a)(2)), on the other hand, was crafted from four

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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

separate statutes governing aspects of public works

employment. (1936 Proposed Lab. Code, note to § 1720, p. 85.)

Those statutes were the 1931 Act, the Public Works Alien

Employment Act, and former sections 653c and 653g of the

Penal Code.11 (1936 Proposed Lab. Code, note to § 1720, p. 85.)

A brief summary of the scope of each provision illuminates the

scope of the definition eventually adopted.

As noted, the 1931 Act only applied to “construction work.”

(Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 4, pp. 911‒912.) The Public Works Alien

Employment Act was also adopted in 1931. (Stats. 1931, ch. 398,

§§ 1‒5, pp. 913‒915.) It prohibited any contractor acting “upon

any public work” from employing anyone who was not a United

States citizen. (Stats. 1931, ch. 398, § 1, p. 913.) It identified as

“ ‘public work’ within the meaning of this act” any “[w]ork done

for irrigation, utility, reclamation, improvement and other

districts, or other public agency or agencies, public officer or

body.” (Stats. 1931, ch. 398, § 3, p. 914.) This definition did not

limit its application to construction work.

Former section 653c of the Penal Code, enacted in 1905,

established an eight-hour workday for “any laborer, workman,

or mechanic employed upon any of the public works of,” or “upon

work done for,” the state or any political subdivision. (Stats.

1905, ch. 505, § 1, p. 666.) It did not define public works or

otherwise set out its scope. In 1929, the Legislature amended

the statute to embrace “[w]ork done for irrigation, utility,

11

The Code Commission also cited former section 653d of the

Penal Code, which made it a felony to take, keep, or receive the

wages of any laborer upon public works. (Stats. 1905, ch. 505,

§ 2, p. 667.) That statute, however, did not specifically define

the term “public works” or delineate its scope.

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reclamation and improvement districts, and other districts of

this type . . . ; provided, however, that nothing in this section

shall apply to the operation of the irrigation or drainage system

of any irrigation or reclamation district.” (Stats. 1929, ch. 793,

§ 1, p. 1603.) Two points are noteworthy. Again, the definition

of public works was not limited to construction work for covered

districts. And the Legislature demonstrated its ability to create

exceptions or limitations when it so intended.

Former section 653g of the Penal Code made it a crime to

charge a fee to register or place any person in public work, or to

give information as to where such employment might be

procured. (Stats. 1933, ch. 174, § 1, p. 620.) It defined the “term

‘public work’ as used in this section” to include “construction,

alteration and repair work done for irrigation, utility,

reclamation and improvement districts, and other districts of

this type.” (Stats. 1933, ch. 174, § 1, p. 621.) Similar to the 1931

Act, this definition limited the activities that qualified as public

work when done for a covered district to construction, alteration,

and repair work.

The operative provisions of each of these enactments were

placed in the Public Works Chapter when the Labor Code was

passed.12 The Code Commission’s explanatory note makes clear

the definition of public work adopted for the covered district

provision was an amalgam of different existing statutes. These

various enactments demonstrate that the Legislature knew how

12

(See Stats. 1937, ch. 90, §§ 1720‒1721, 1724, 1726‒1729,

1770‒1777, pp. 241‒244 [1931 Act]; Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 1850,

p. 246 [Public Works Alien Employment Act]; Stats. 1937, ch.

90, § 1811, p. 245 [former § 653c of the Pen. Code]; Stats. 1937,

ch. 90, § 1779, p. 244 [former § 653g of the Pen. Code]; Stats.

1937, ch. 90, § 1778, p. 244 [former § 653d of the Pen. Code].)

17

KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

to limit the definition of public work to construction-type work

but knowingly eschewed such a limitation in drafting section

1720(a)(2). That it did so undermines Barrett’s argument that

the unlimited term “work” in section 1720(a)(2) must be

restricted by the different formulation in section 1720(a)(1).

b. Barrett’s Other Arguments

Barrett argues the other seven definitions of “public

works” in the current version of section 1720(a) describe

activities that “consist of or [are] closely allied with the

‘construction, alteration, demolition, installation, or repair’ of

public infrastructure.” Relying on the principle “that words

grouped in a list should be given related meaning” (Third

National Bank v. Impac Limited, Inc. (1977) 432 U.S. 312, 322),

Barrett urges that the term “work” in section 1720(a)(2) should

be similarly limited in scope. This argument’s premise is

unsupported.

The types of projects included in section 1720(a)’s

definitions of “public works” reflect no clear common theme, but

rather a scattershot series of subjects. Section 1720(a)(4) and

section 1720(a)(5) apply to carpet laying. Section 1720(a)(6)

covers specific types of public transportation demonstration

projects. Section 1720(a)(8) treats some tree removal work as

public works. Barrett’s argument might have force if the other

parts of section 1720(a) centered around a unified type of work,

but it has limited purchase given the actual breadth of topics

treated as public works by the statute as written. Contrary to

Barrett’s assertion, the language of the other definitions shows

that the Legislature knows how to circumscribe the range of

activities that qualify as public works when it chooses to do so.

18

KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

Relying on the principle of in pari materia, Barrett argues

the term “work” in section 1720(a)(2) must be limited to

construction work to make that statute consistent with other

statutes defining public works. Barrett points to sections

1720.2, 1720.3, 1720.6, 1720.7, and 1750, subdivision (b)(1).

Statutes are considered to be in pari materia when they

relate to the same person or thing, or class of persons or things,

or have the same purpose or object. (Walker v. Superior Court

(1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 124, fn. 4.) Such statutes should “be

construed together so that all parts of the statutory scheme are

given effect.” (Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050,

1090–1091.) “Identical language appearing in separate

provisions dealing with the same subject matter should be

accorded the same interpretation.” (Walker, at p. 132.)

The first four statutes cited by Barrett provide that for

certain limited purposes, including the application of prevailing

wage laws, the term “public works” also means: (1) “any

construction work done under private contract,” if certain

conditions exist (§ 1720.2); (2) the hauling of certain refuse from

a public works site to an outside disposal location (§ 1720.3,

subd. (b)); (3) “any construction, alteration, demolition,

installation, or repair work done under private contract,” if

certain conditions exist (§ 1720.6); and (4) “any construction,

alteration, demolition, installation, or repair work done under

private contract on a project for a general acute care hospital”

(§ 1720.7). Barrett points out that each of these statutes limits

the activities that qualify as public works to construction or

infrastructure-related work. It urges us to similarly limit the

types of activities that qualify as public works under section

1720(a)(2) to harmonize the statutes.

19

KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

But the principle of harmonization does not authorize

courts to rewrite statutes. (State Dept. of Public Health v.

Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 956.) Where the

Legislature chooses to define the same term differently in two

different provisions, neither definition should be “rewritten

under the guise of an in pari materia construction.” (People v.

Honig (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 289, 328.)

The last cited statute, section 1750, subdivision (b)(1),

defines the phrase “public works project” for purposes of article

1.5 of the Public Works Chapter. That article addresses the

rights of a nonwinning bidder to sue a winning bidder when the

winning bidder violated the law to secure the bid. (§ 1750, subd.

(a)(1).) It defines the phrase “ ‘public works project’ ” as “the

construction, repair, remodeling, alteration, conversion,

modernization, improvement, rehabilitation, replacement, or

renovation of a public building or structure.” (§ 1750, subd.

(b)(1).) Barrett urges that the meaning of public works in

section 1720(a)(2) should be similarly limited. Obviously, the

phrase “public works project” is different from the term “public

work.” “Public works project” is used to denote the scope of the

contract put out for bid. There is no indication that, when the

Legislature addressed the availability of civil litigation among

private parties, it intended to amend or limit the scope of the

term “public work” in other contexts.

Next, Barrett argues that statutes outside the Labor Code

show that the term “public works” is commonly understood as

being limited to “construction of works to be owned by and used

for the benefit of the public.” Barrett points to the following

statutes: Health and Safety Code section 50675.4, subdivision

(c)(2); Health and Safety Code section 50898.2, subdivision

(c)(1)(E); Health and Safety Code section 125290.65, subdivision

20

KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

(b)(1)(E); Public Utilities Code section 3354; Government Code

section 63036; Government Code section 5956.8; Streets and

Highways Code section 27189; and Fish and Game Code section

1350, subdivision (a). All but the last of these provisions

mandate payment of prevailing wages on construction projects

authorized or funded by various state laws and programs. 13

According to Barrett, these statutes show that the Legislature

has consistently applied prevailing wage requirements only to

construction- and infrastructure-related work activities.

This argument fails for two reasons. First, the fact

construction projects authorized by other statutes must comply

with prevailing wage laws does not mean that those laws only

apply to construction projects. Second, each of the statutes

Barrett cites was enacted years after and did not purport to

amend section 1720(a)(2).14 They provide little insight as to

what the Legislature intended when it enacted the covered

district provision.

13

Fish and Game Code section 1350, subdivision (a) provides

that agreements between the Department of Fish and Wildlife

and other agencies to provide for the construction, management,

or maintenance of facilities are not exempt from prevailing

wages laws.

14

(See Stats. 1957, ch. 754, § 1 [adding § 1350 to Fish & G.

Code]; Stats. 1957, ch. 1455, § 1 [adding § 27189 to Sts. & Hy.

Code]; Stats. 1994, ch. 94, § 1 [adding § 63036 to Gov. Code];

Stats. 1996, ch. 1040, § 1 [adding § 5956.8 to Gov. Code]; Stats.

1999, ch. 637, § 2 [adding § 50675.4 to Health & Saf. Code];

Stats. 2000, ch. 957, § 2 [adding § 50898.2 to Health & Saf.

Code]; Stats. 2001, 1st Ex. Sess. 2001–2002, ch. 10, § 1 [adding

§ 3354 to Pub. Util. Code)].) Section 125290.65 was added to the

Health and Safety Code by an initiative measure, Proposition

71, as approved by voters in November 2004.

21

KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

Finally, Barrett points to Public Contract Code sections

1101, 7103, subdivision (e), and 22200, subdivision (a), each of

which defines the terms “public work” or “public works contract”

for limited purposes. But again, these definitions only apply for

the limited purposes involved. They do not apply to the Public

Works Chapter.

2. Case Law and Administrative Decisions

The parties argue that case law and administrative

decisions interpreting section 1720(a)(2) support their

respective positions.

a. Case Law

Plaintiffs rely on three cases: Reclamation Dist. No. 684 v.

Department of Industrial Relations (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1000

(Reclamation Dist. No. 684); Azusa, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th 1;

and Reliable Tree Experts v. Baker (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 785

(Reliable Tree Experts). Each case tangentially addressed

whether labor other than construction and installation qualified

as public work.

Azusa is the most relevant of the three. In that case, a

developer challenged a ruling that contract workers doing

construction work for a group of government entities, including

a community facilities district, were entitled to prevailing wages

under section 1720(a)(1). (Azusa, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at pp.

10–13.) The developer argued that some of the work qualified

as public work under section 1720(a)(2), because it was done for

a covered district, and that only that work should be subject to

prevailing wage requirements. It urged that, if all the work

were deemed to be covered by section 1720(a)(1), section

1720(a)(2) would be rendered superfluous. (Azusa, at p. 19.)

The Court of Appeal rejected that argument, concluding that not

22

KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

all of section 1720(a)(2) is “subsumed” by section 1720(a)(1).

(Azusa, at p. 20.) The court reasoned that section 1720(a)(2)

covered work done for a narrower range of government entities,

but that it applied to a broader range of tasks. (Azusa, at p. 20.)

While section 1720(a)(1) was limited to construction-type work,

section 1720(a)(2) had “no similar limitation as to the type of

work that may be performed for improvement districts.” (Azusa,

at p. 20.) Though Azusa did not address whether the work done

for the district was public work under section 1720(a)(2), the

case sheds light on our understanding of the broader statutory

scheme. Most significantly, Azusa treated section 1720(a)(1)

and section 1720(a)(2) as separate provisions with “equal

dignity.” (Kaanaana, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 797.) This

treatment undermines Barrett’s argument that any of section

1720(a)’s definitions limits another one of its definitions. The

same can be said for the other two cases plaintiffs cite. (See

Reclamation Dist. No. 684, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006

[“[t]he general rule is that any work done for a reclamation

district is ‘public work’ ”]; see also Reliable Tree Experts, supra,

200 Cal.App.4th at p. 795, fn. 8.)

b. Administrative decisions

The Legislature has granted the Director of the

Department of Industrial Relations (Department) “quasi-

legislative authority to determine coverage of projects or types

of work under the prevailing wage laws.” (§ 1773.5, subd. (d).)

Although ultimate responsibility for statutory interpretation

rests with the courts, an agency’s interpretation “is ‘one among

several tools available to the court’ when judging the [statute’s]

meaning and legal effect.” (Oxbow Carbon & Minerals, LLC v.

Department of Industrial Relations (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 538,

546; see also City of Long Beach, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 951.)

23

KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

An agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference if it is long-

standing, consistent, and contemporaneous. (Duncan, supra,

162 Cal.App.4th at p. 303.) A vacillating position warrants no

deference. (Ibid.) Such is the case here.

The trial court relied on a 2006 Department decision15 in

granting Barrett’s motion. The question was whether workers

hauling biosolids for a sanitation district were entitled to

prevailing wages. (Orange County Biosolids, supra, at p. 1.) The

Department concluded they were not, stating, “[T]he most

reasonable way to define the scope of section 1720(a)(2) is to

require that the work fall within one of the types of covered work

enumerated” in section 1720(a)(1). (Orange County Biosolids, at

p. 4.) Because the hauling of biosolids was “not an activity

encompassed by” section 1720(a)(1), it was “not covered work

under section 1720(a)(2).” (Orange County Biosolids, at p. 4.)

In an amicus brief, the District and others urge us to defer

to the interpretation of section 1720(a)(2) in Orange County

Biosolids. They argue plaintiffs’ position contradicts the

Department’s long-standing interpretation of section 1720(a)(2).

They assert the Department has ruled three times in the last 15

years that the activities encompassed by section 1720(a)(2) must

be limited to those listed in section 1720(a)(1). They cite Orange

County Biosolids and two other Department decisions. (See

Dept. of Industrial Relations, PW Case No. 2006-022 (Jan. 12,

15

(Dept. of Industrial Relations, PW Case No. 2005-009

(Apr. 21, 2006) <https:www.dir.ca.gov/OPRL/coverage/

year2006/2005-009.pdf> [as of Mar. 29, 2021] (Orange County

Biosolids)). All Internet citations in this opinion are archived

by year, docket number, and case name at

<http://www.courts.ca.gov/38324.htm>.

24

KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

2007) <https:www.dir.ca.gov/OPRL/coverage/year2007/2006-

022.pdf> [as of Mar. 29, 2021]; Dept. of Industrial Relations, PW

Case No. 2005-039 (Apr. 25, 2007)

<https://www.dir.ca.gov/OPRL/coverage/year2007/2005-

039.pdf> [as of Mar. 29, 2021].)

Deference to these decisions is unwarranted. The

Department’s interpretation in these decisions is neither long-

standing nor consistent. Contrary to amici curiae’s argument,

these decisions do not span 15 years. All three were issued

within a 13-month period in 2006 and 2007. Before and after

that time, the Department gave a broader meaning to the term

work in section 1720(a)(2). In 2002, the Department concluded

that the hauling and disposing of wastewater materials for a

utility district qualified under section 1720(a)(2) “because it is

work done for a utility district.” (Dept. of Industrial Relations,

PW Case No. 2002-005 (July 1, 2002) p. 2

<https://www.dir.ca.gov/OPRL/coverage/year2002/2002-

005.pdf> [as of Mar. 29, 2021].) Later the same year, it

concluded the inspecting and testing of sewer lines for a

sanitation district was subject to prevailing wage requirements

because it was “work done for” a covered district. (Dept. of

Industrial Relations, PW Case No. 2001-068 (July 19, 2002) p. 6

<https://www.dir.ca.gov/OPRL/coverage/year2002/2001-

068.pdf> [as of Mar. 29, 2021].) Finally, the Department ruled

in 2016 “that maintenance of equipment for a water district

constituted a public work” under section 1720(a)(2). (Kaanaana,

supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 796, citing Dept. of Industrial

Relations, PW Case No. 2015-016 (Feb. 5, 2016)

<https://www.dir.ca.gov/OPRL/coverage/year2016/2015-

016.pdf> [as of Mar. 29, 2021].) None of those decisions

25

KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

suggested that the range of activities that qualify as “work”

under section 1720(a)(2) is limited by section 1720(a)(1).

Where, as here, an administrative body has repeatedly

changed its stance on the scope of a statute over a short period,

its position does not warrant the deference it might typically be

accorded. (See Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007)

40 Cal.4th 1094, 1105, fn. 7.) Moreover, as the Court of Appeal

noted, Department has “de-designated” these past decisions as

precedential, suggesting Department has concluded they should

not be entitled to deference. (Kaanaana, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th

at p. 795.) Finally, the issue here is “a pure one of statutory

interpretation”; thus, Department has no “ ‘ “comparative

interpretative advantage over the courts.” ’ ” (Duncan, supra,

162 Cal.App.4th at p. 304; see also Center for Biological

Diversity v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 62 Cal.4th 204,

236.)

3. Other Claims

Barrett argues there is no logical reason why the

Legislature would have applied the prevailing wage laws to a

broader range of activities when done for covered districts than

for other government agencies.16 But it offers no reason to think

that belt sorters materially differ from laborers whose work falls

under the other provisions of section 1720(a), in terms of their

16

Barrett cites Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765 for

support. The case is inapposite. Westbrook addressed a claim

by San Francisco voters that the state Constitution’s two-thirds

majority approval requirement for incurring public debt (Cal.

Const., art. XI, § 18) violated their equal protection rights by

weighting individual votes differently. (Westbrook, at p. 781.)

The opinion manifestly involves a completely different question

from that presented here.

26

KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

vulnerability to exploitation, their risk of receiving substandard

wages, or their need for higher compensation to make up for the

lack of benefits normally associated with public employment.

Neither the statute nor its legislative history explains why

the Legislature singled out work done for covered districts in

section 1720(a)(2). But the fact remains that it did. The

Legislature is permitted to attack problems one step at a time,

deciding in which context an issue is most pressing. “Such line

drawing is the province of legislative bodies, and ‘the precise

coordinates of the resulting legislative judgment [are] virtually

unreviewable, since the legislature must be allowed leeway to

approach a perceived problem incrementally.’ ” (California

Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177, 210.)

D. Conclusion

The most reasonable interpretation of “public works” in

section 1720(a)(2) is that it is not limited by a different definition

set out in section 1720(a)(1). This interpretation gives effect to

all parts of the covered district provision and recognizes the

difference between definitions based on the tasks performed and

section 1720(a)(2), whose coverage turns on the governmental

entity for which the work is done. The belt sorters’ labor

qualifies as “public works” under section 1720(a)(2).

27

KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

CORRIGAN, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

LIU, J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.

28

KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

S253458

Concurring Opinion by Justice Kruger

I agree with the majority opinion, which I have signed.

The result in this case follows from the text of Labor Code

section 1720, which defines the term “public works” much more

broadly when the work is performed for irrigation districts,

utility districts, and others of a similar type than when it is

performed for any other kind of public agency. Wherever the

outer limits of this special districts definition may lie, the belt-

sorting work performed by plaintiffs in this case falls well within

its scope. I write separately, however, to call attention to the

seeming incongruity in the statute we are interpreting: Why,

precisely, did the Legislature choose to treat work for utility and

other covered districts so differently from work for other public

agencies? (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 27.) Whatever reasons the

Legislature may once have had, they have been lost in the mists

of time. Now, more than 80 years after the statute was first

enacted, the Legislature may wish to revisit the issue.

Part of the mystery stems from the nature of the statutory

definition in Labor Code section 1720. It so happens that this is

a prevailing wage case, but section 1720 is not part of the

prevailing wage law. It is, rather, the product of a 1930’s

consolidation of a series of public works definitions, each

adopted to apply only to an individual statute, into a single

omnibus definition simultaneously applicable to a chapter’s

worth of statutory protections — including, but not at all limited

to, the prevailing wage law. (Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 1720, p. 241;

1

KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Kruger, J., concurring

see Stats. 1929, ch. 793, § 1, p. 1603 [prior definition for eight-

hour day statute]; Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 4, pp. 911–912 [prior

definition for the Prevailing Wage Act]; Stats. 1931, ch. 398, § 3,

p. 914 [prior definition for the Public Works Alien Employment

Act]; Stats. 1933, ch. 174, § 1, p. 621 [prior definition for

prohibition on charging fees to place workers in public work].)

That consolidation resulted in a multiprong definition under

which irrigation, utility, reclamation, improvement, and similar

special districts, alone among public agencies, were singled out

to have an apparently broader slice of their activities treated as

public works. (See Lab. Code, § 1720, former subd. (b), enacted

by Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 1720, p. 241; Lab. Code, § 1720, subd.

(a)(2).)

This is at least a little peculiar. There is nothing

immediately and obviously distinctive about irrigation districts,

reclamation districts, and the like, that explains why they

should be singled out in this fashion. The prong of the definition

governing irrigation and other special districts first appeared,

in substantially similar form, in a maximum-hour law. (See

Stats. 1929, ch. 793, § 1, p. 1603.) It is not clear why the

maximum-hour law had included a special definition for the

covered districts, however, nor is it clear why the Legislature

saw fit to apply the same definition for purposes of all of the

other public works protections in the Labor Code. Certainly the

Legislature is entitled to draw such distinctions. (See maj. opn.,

ante, at p. 27.) But if the Legislature had a considered reason

for this differential treatment of various kinds of public

agencies, that reason is not readily apparent from the historical

record.

This feature of the statutory public works definition was

apparently obscure enough that, for decades after its enactment,

2

KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.

Kruger, J., concurring

it appears no one thought to apply the language of the special

districts definition to the sort of work plaintiffs here perform.

That omission does not license us to disregard the language of

the governing definition, which is most naturally read to cover

such work, and the majority opinion rightly declines to do so.

But it does suggest that any incongruity in the scope of public

works coverage for these districts, as opposed to other public

entities, may simply have flown under the radar until now.

With today’s decision, that is no longer the case. Whether the

result is desirable policy is a matter beyond our purview, but it

is not beyond the Legislature’s. The Legislature can, if it sees

fit, adjust the statutory definition to align with its current

conception of the appropriate scope of the prevailing wage law

and the other protections to which the definition applies.

KRUGER, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

JENKINS, J.

3

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XX 29 Cal.App.5th 778

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S253458

Date Filed: March 29, 2021

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Los Angeles

Judge: John Shepard Wiley, Jr.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Hayes Pawlenko, Matthew B. Hayes and Kye D. Pawlenko for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Hinshaw & Culbertson, Frederick J. Ufkes and Filomena E. Meyer for Defendants and Respondents.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Lann G. McIntyre, Claire Hervey Collins and Paul J. Beck for County

Sanitation District No. 2 of Los Angeles County, League of California Cities, California State Association

of Counties, California Special Districts Association, California Association of Sanitation Agencies and

Association of California Water Agencies as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Kye Pawlenko

Hayes Pawlenko LLP

595 E. Colorado Blvd., Suite 303

Pasadena, CA 91101

(626) 808-4357

Frederick J. Ufkes

Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP

350 S. Grand Ave., Suite 3600

Los Angeles, Ca 90071

(310) 909-8058