People v. Burge

2021 IL 125642

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 125642)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.

CHALEAH BURGE, Appellant.

Opinion filed March 18, 2021.

JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Garman, Theis, Neville, Michael J.

Burke, and Carter concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 At issue in this appeal is whether the admonishment requirement of section 113-

4(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/113-4(c) (West

2016)) applies to guilty pleas other than those entered at arraignment and whether

the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea.

¶2 Defendant, Chaleah Burge, a certified nursing assistant (CNA) who was

formerly employed as a home health care provider, pled guilty to one count of theft,

a Class A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A), (b)(1) (West 2016)), after

stealing $280 from a client receiving home health care services. Ten days after

pleading guilty, defendant filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea and vacate the

judgment, claiming that her plea was not voluntarily entered. The circuit court of

Champaign County denied defendant’s motion, and the appellate court affirmed.

2019 IL App (4th) 170399. This court allowed defendant’s petition for leave to

appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019).

¶3 STATUTE INVOLVED

¶4 At the time defendant pled guilty in this case, section 113-4 of the Code

provided as follows:

“(a) When called upon to plead at arraignment the defendant shall be

furnished with a copy of the charge and shall plead guilty, guilty but mentally

ill, or not guilty.

(b) If the defendant stands mute a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him

and the trial shall proceed on such plea.

(c) If the defendant pleads guilty such plea shall not be accepted until the

court shall have fully explained to the defendant the following:

(1) the maximum and minimum penalty provided by law for the offense

which may be imposed by the court;

(2) as a consequence of a conviction or a plea of guilty, the sentence for

any future conviction may be increased or there may be a higher possibility

of the imposition of consecutive sentences;

(3) as a consequence of a conviction or a plea of guilty, there may be

registration requirements that restrict where the defendant may work, live,

or be present; and

(4) as a consequence of a conviction or a plea of guilty, there may be an

impact upon the defendant’s ability to, among others:

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(A) retain or obtain housing in the public or private market;

(B) retain or obtain employment; and

(C) retain or obtain a firearm, an occupational license, or a driver’s

license.

After such explanation if the defendant understandingly persists in his plea it

shall be accepted by the court and recorded.

(d) If the defendant pleads guilty but mentally ill, the court shall not accept

such a plea until the defendant has undergone examination by a clinical

psychologist or psychiatrist and the judge has examined the psychiatric or

psychological report or reports, held a hearing on the issue of the defendant’s

mental condition and is satisfied that there is a factual basis that the defendant

was mentally ill at the time of the offense to which the plea is entered.

(e) If a defendant pleads not guilty, the court shall advise him at that time

or at any later court date on which he is present that if he escapes from custody

or is released on bond and fails to appear in court when required by the court

that his failure to appear would constitute a waiver of his right to confront the

witnesses against him and trial could proceed in his absence.” 725 ILCS 5/113-

4 (West 2016).

¶5 BACKGROUND

¶6 In November 2016, the State charged defendant with one count of theft, a Class

A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A), (b)(1) (West 2016)), alleging that on

September 1, 2016, defendant knowingly exerted unauthorized control over the

victim’s property, namely United States currency having a value not in excess of

$500, intending to permanently deprive the victim of the use or benefit of the

property. An arraignment hearing was held on December 7, 2016, where defendant

was advised of the charges against her and the potential penalties for those charges,

as well as admonished of her various rights. After defendant acknowledged that she

understood the charge against her and the possible penalties, the trial court granted

her request to appoint the public defender to represent her. The trial court also

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accepted defendant’s plea of not guilty, set the case for a pretrial hearing, and

released defendant on her own recognizance upon posting a $1000 bond.

¶7 On March 20, 2017, defendant entered a fully negotiated guilty plea to the

charged offense. Prior to accepting her guilty plea, the trial court admonished

defendant pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a) (eff. July 1, 2012).

According to the State’s factual basis, the victim had undergone knee replacement

surgery and was receiving home health care from defendant, who worked for Help

at Home. The State further alleged that on or about September 1, 2016, while the

victim and defendant were running errands, the victim cashed a $280 check. The

State claimed that the cash was later stolen by defendant when the victim went into

a store and left her purse in the vehicle with defendant. The State concluded that it

was not until after running additional errands that the victim discovered the money

was missing.

¶8 The trial court accepted the State’s factual basis and entered judgment on

defendant’s plea of guilty, sentencing her to 12 months’ conditional discharge.

¶9 Ten days after pleading guilty, defendant filed a motion to withdraw her guilty

plea and to vacate the judgment, claiming her plea was not voluntarily entered. In

her motion, defendant claimed she was unaware that she would lose her job if she

pled guilty. Specifically, defendant asserted that the trial court failed, as required

by section 113-4(c) of the Code, to inform her of the collateral consequences of a

theft conviction on her ability to obtain and retain employment. 725 ILCS 5/113-

4(c) (West 2016). Defendant concluded that she lost her employment as a direct

result of her guilty plea.

¶ 10 At the hearing on defendant’s motion held in May 2017, defendant testified

that, when she pled guilty, she was no longer working for Help at Home, the home

health care company that had employed her when the State brought the underlying

charge. Rather, defendant testified that she had been working for a different home

health care company, Aging in Place, for three months when she pled guilty.

Defendant further stated that it was not until after she pled guilty and was sentenced

that Aging in Place terminated her employment. According to defendant, she had

been unable to find additional employment in the home health care career field.

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¶ 11 Following arguments on defendant’s motion, the trial court denied the motion

to withdraw the guilty plea, finding that defendant’s plea was voluntary because

she was properly admonished under Rule 402 and, therefore, informed of the nature

of the charge, the range of penalties, and her constitutional rights. The trial court

further held that withdrawal of defendant’s guilty plea was not required by section

113-4(c) because the provision is directory and the legislature lacked authority to

mandate additional admonishments beyond those required under Illinois Supreme

Court Rules governing admonishments. In particular, the trial court stated:

“I think that the statute that the defendant cites is directory. There are no

direct, immediate and automatic consequences under the court’s control that

deal with employment. What Rule 402 is about is advising the defendant of

those constitutional rights that she has that are involved with the criminal

process and that she is made aware of and then is advised giving up through the

entry of a plea of guilty. It’s clear that this is done in a voluntary fashion by—

according to the record, that this is done in a voluntary fashion by [defendant].

She was advised, as she was supposed to be, by Supreme Court Rule 402 of the

nature of the charge, the range of penalties and those essential constitutional

rights that are in Rule 402. That is the right to require the presumption of

innocence, the right to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to

confront and cross[-]examine witnesses, the right to proceed to trial, trial by

jury or trial by judge, the right to present witnesses and evidence on your behalf,

[and] the right to testify or choose not to testify. Those are the fundamental

constitutional rights that are at issue when someone enters a plea of guilty and

those [defendant] was advised of. That’s what’s consistent with Rule 402. So,

in addition to the statute being one that’s directory, the consequences that I

believe on the facts [defendant] did suffer are collateral. ***

The supreme court has decided what’s—what a person has to be advised of

when they enter a plea of guilty. That is not what’s in the, the statute. And I, I

think it’s correct that the legislature cannot add to what’s constitutionally

required by the supreme court rule.

So really the, the question then becomes, because I think the statute cannot

be imposed on the court, it is directory rather than mandatory and it does deal

with collateral consequences. To say they’re collateral doesn’t mean they’re not

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important because these things are important. Housing, employment, the ability

to have an occupational license or a firearm, driver’s license are important.

They’re not trivial. These are important things. That’s—I think that’s why the

statute addresses it. But they are collateral.”

¶ 12 The trial court also found no manifest injustice warranting withdrawal because

there was no evidence that defendant misapprehended the facts or the law or that

there was any doubt as to her guilt. As a result, the trial court denied defendant’s

motion.

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion to

withdraw her guilty plea because the trial court’s failure to admonish her as required

by section 113-4(c) of the Code violated a mandatory statutory provision or,

alternatively, because accepting the plea after the inadequate admonishments

resulted in a manifest injustice.

¶ 14 In a split decision, the appellate court affirmed, holding that section 113-4(c)

applies only to guilty pleas entered at arraignment and that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea

because no manifest injustice occurred. 2019 IL App (4th) 170399, ¶ 46. The

majority, in dicta, also found that, even if section 113-4(c) did apply to defendant,

the statute is directory rather than mandatory and, thus, the failure to provide the

admonishments did not automatically require the trial court to grant a motion to

withdraw a guilty plea. Id. ¶¶ 29, 32-39. The special concurrence disagreed that

section 113-4(c) applies only to guilty pleas entered at arraignment but agreed,

albeit for a different reason, with the majority’s view that the admonishment

requirement is directory. Id. ¶ 51 (Harris, J., specially concurring). The special

concurrence further concurred with the majority that the defendant suffered no

manifest injustice when the trial court accepted her plea. Id. ¶ 63.

¶ 15 ANALYSIS

¶ 16 The threshold question to be resolved in this case is whether the admonishment

requirements contained under section 113-4(c) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/113-4(c)

(West 2016)) apply to guilty pleas entered subsequent to arraignment.

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¶ 17 Section 113-4(c) requires, in pertinent part, that “[i]f the defendant pleads guilty

such plea shall not be accepted until the court shall have fully explained to the

defendant” the various collateral consequences of pleading guilty. Id. Subsection

(c) is one of five provisions of section 113-4, titled “Plea,” which is contained in

article 113 of the Code, “Arraignment.” Id. art. 113. Effective January 1, 2017, the

General Assembly amended section 113-4(c) of the Code, adding subsections

(c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4) regarding various collateral consequences of pleading

guilty. Pub. Act 99-871 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017) (amending 725 ILCS 5/113-4). One such

admonishment, subsection (c)(4)(B), which is at issue here, informs the defendant

that “as a consequence of a conviction or a plea of guilty, there may be an impact

upon the defendant’s ability to *** retain or obtain employment.” 725 ILCS 5/113-

4(c)(4)(B) (West 2016). It is undisputed that when the trial court accepted

defendant’s guilty plea at a hearing subsequent to her arraignment, the trial court

did not advise defendant pursuant to subsection (c). Rather, the trial court advised

defendant pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 2012). People

v. Fuller, 205 Ill. 2d 308, 323 (2002) (“Substantial compliance with Rule 402 is

sufficient to establish due process.”); People v. Jamison, 197 Ill. 2d 135, 164 (2001)

(finding court did not abuse discretion by denying motion to withdraw guilty plea

where “defendant was fully admonished by the trial court in accord with Supreme

Court Rule 402(a)”).

¶ 18 Before this court, defendant argues that the plain language and statutory scheme

of section 113-4(c) require the trial court to admonish a defendant of the various

consequences at all times when a defendant is pleading guilty, not just at

arraignment. Defendant points to the fact that section 113-4(c) contains no language

limiting the provision only to pleas of guilty at arraignment. Rather, defendant

argues, the recent amendments to section 113-4(c) admonishments establish an

intent to bolster the assurance that a defendant is voluntarily and intelligently

waiving her right to trial by adding to the existing list of admonishments required

at any guilty plea hearing, not just to pleas of guilty made at arraignment.

¶ 19 The State counters that the plain language and structure of section 113-4, when

read in context with the other provisions in section 113-4, as well as when read in

connection to other sections of the Code, confirm that section 113-4(c) applies only

when a defendant pleads guilty at arraignment. We agree.

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¶ 20 It is well settled that the primary objective of this court in construing the

meaning of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature

and that the best indication of that intent is the statutory language itself, giving it

its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Hammond, 2011 IL 110044, ¶ 53. If the

language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we will give effect to the statute’s

plain meaning without resort to other aids of statutory construction. Palm v.

Holocker, 2018 IL 123152, ¶ 21. Importantly, a court must view the statute as a

whole, construing words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions

and not in isolation. State ex rel. Leibowitz v. Family Vision Care, LLC, 2020 IL

124754, ¶ 35. As such, courts may not depart from a statute’s plain language by

reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature did not express.

In re Hernandez, 2020 IL 124661, ¶ 18. Because the issue before us concerns a

matter of statutory construction, our review is de novo. In re Jarquan B., 2017 IL

121483, ¶ 21.

¶ 21 As mentioned, subsection (c) is one of five separate provisions that encompass

section 113-4. Subsection (a) states, “[w]hen called upon to plead at arraignment

the defendant shall be furnished with a copy of the charge and shall plead guilty,

guilty but mentally ill, or not guilty.” 725 ILCS 5/113-4(a) (West 2016). By its

plain terms, subsection (a) serves as a general provision that sets the scope for the

remainder of the provisions within section 113-4, as it explicitly directs the trial

court to provide the defendant with a copy of the charge and identifies the possible

types of pleas that may (or may not) be made by a defendant “at arraignment.” Id.

¶ 22 For instance, subsection (b) informs the trial court of the necessary procedure

if a defendant stands silent when informed of the charges and asked to make a plea,

stating that “[i]f the defendant stands mute a plea of not guilty shall be entered for

him and the trial shall proceed on such plea.” Id. § 113-4(b). Subsection (b) relates

back to subsection (a) by directing that, if the defendant fails to enter one of the

three pleas identified in subsection (a), then the trial court must enter a plea of not

guilty and proceed to trial.

¶ 23 Defendant argues that subsection (b)’s direction about proceeding to trial as

though the silent defendant pled not guilty suggests that subsection (b) is not

specifically directed at arraignment since it refers to “something that would occur

at a later date.” However, the procedural guidance of subsection (b) is consistent

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with a statute focused specifically on arraignment. Thus, subsection (b) can be

fairly construed to apply at arraignment because this is the only time the question

of a mute defendant could arise when making a plea.

¶ 24 Similarly, a plain reading of subsection (d), which states, “[i]f the defendant

pleads guilty but mentally ill, the court shall not accept such a plea until the

defendant” has undergone a medical examination and later a hearing on defendant’s

medical condition, also illustrates that section 113-4 applies at arraignment unless

otherwise directed. Id. § 113-4(d). That is so because, comparable to subsection (b),

subsection (d) guides the trial court on the proper procedure to follow when a

defendant pleads “guilty but mentally ill”—another possible plea that may occur at

arraignment as indicated under subsection (a). Additionally, subsection (d), like

subsection (b), contains no express language that indicates any broad application

beyond arraignment, and without such express language, we must read the

provision within the plain language of the statute as a whole and refrain from

including conditions not clearly intended by the legislature. People v. Legoo, 2020

IL 124965, ¶ 14 (“We may not depart from the plain language and meaning of a

statute by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the

legislature did not express.”).

¶ 25 Analogous to our analysis regarding subsections (b) and (d), examining the

plain language and the context in which it is used, subsection (e) provides further

support that the legislature intended section 113-4 to be read as a cohesive section

of article 113 that applies only at arraignment unless otherwise expressly specified.

¶ 26 Subsection (e) states,

“[i]f a defendant pleads not guilty, the court shall advise him at that time or at

any later court date on which he is present that if he escapes from custody or is

released on bond and fails to appear in court when required by the court that his

failure to appear would constitute a waiver of his right to confront the witnesses

against him and trial could proceed in his absence.” 725 ILCS 5/113-4(e) (West

2016).

When reading section 113-4, subsection (e) is the only subsection in section 113-4

to include the additional reference to “any later court date.” If, as defendant argues,

subsection (a) is the only subsection limited to arraignment, then this language

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specifying that subsection (e) applies beyond arraignment would be entirely

meaningless to include. However, we agree with the State that the legislature

expressly specified that subsection (e) applies after arraignment because, without

this expressed phrase, subsection (e) would be limited to arraignment, as explained

supra, and thus, the additional phrase “any later court date” ensures that defendants

who cannot receive subsection (e)’s admonishment at their arraignment nonetheless

receives the necessary admonishment prior to trial.

¶ 27 As this court in People v. Garner, 147 Ill. 2d 467, 481 (1992), discussed, section

113-4(e)’s in absentia warnings during arraignment are indispensably important for

a trial court to provide, “[g]iven that the necessity of trial is determined at

arraignment,” since that is when the defendant is also being informed of other

significant protections, such as the right to counsel and the right to a jury. In Garner,

this court went on to further note that “[w]e do not read section 113-4(e) as

providing the court with an option for when the admonition should be given as

much as we read it as not precluding an opportunity for a later admonishment.” Id.

at 482. Accordingly, this court held that subsection (e) was drafted to afford the

trial court with a mechanism for an additional and later, yet no less effective,

opportunity to admonish the defendant when he pleads not guilty. Id. Likewise, in

Phillips, this court found that subsection (e) “applies only to a defendant when he

appears in open court and pleads not guilty at the time of his arraignment, or is

present in court at any later date after his arraignment.” People v. Phillips, 242 Ill.

2d 189, 196 (2011). This court’s prior statements regarding section 113-4(e)

support our interpretation that the legislature intended the provisions of section 113-

4 to apply at arraignment unless otherwise specified.

¶ 28 Accordingly, subsection (e) reveals that the legislature knew how to express its

intent that a particular subsection should not be limited to only arraignment. In re

K.C., 186 Ill. 2d 542, 549-50 (1999) (“It is well established that, by employing

certain language in one instance and wholly different language in another, the

legislature indicates that different results were intended.”). As such, we find the

phrases “at that time” and “or any later court date” indicative of the legislature’s

clear intent to distinguish subsection (e)’s application beyond arraignment. In other

words, subsection (e) “serves as the procedural mechanism to effect a formal waiver

of a defendant’s right to be present” (Phillips, 242 Ill. 2d at 197 (citing Garner, 147

Ill. 2d at 483)) and provides that a defendant who pleads not guilty must be advised

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about trial in absentia “at that time”—that is, when he pleads “not guilty” at

arraignment—“or at any later court date on which he is present” (725 ILCS 5/113-

4(e) (West 2016)).

¶ 29 Turning to the issue at bar, reading subsection (c) as an integrated whole with

the other provisions of section 113-4 (People ex rel. Madigan v. Wildermuth, 2017

IL 120763, ¶ 17 (we consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject

it addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it)), it is clear the

legislature intended that the admonishments incorporated in subsection (c) apply

only at arraignment, unless otherwise specified.

¶ 30 Comparably to subsections (b), (d), and (e), subsection (c) addresses an

alternate response a defendant may provide at arraignment: a plea of guilty. Unlike

subsection (e), where the legislature included an additional reference to “any later

court date,” subsection (c), like subsections (b) and (d), contains no such qualifying

language giving it broad application beyond arraignment. Thus, without express

language providing broader application, we can properly assume that the legislature

intended for the provision to be limited to only arraignment. See People v. Edwards,

2012 IL 111711, ¶ 27 (“Where language is included in one section of a statute but

omitted in another section of the same statute, we presume the legislature acted

intentionally and purposely in the inclusion or exclusion.”); State Bank of Cherry

v. CGB Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 113836, ¶ 56 (same). Stated differently, had the

legislature intended for trial courts to admonish defendants of the collateral

consequences contained in subsection (c) at a later court date, it could have easily

done so. It did not, and we must refrain from reading such a requirement into the

statute. See Schultz v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 237 Ill. 2d 391, 408 (2010)

(“A court may not add provisions that are not found in a statute, nor may it depart

from a statute’s plain language by reading into the law exceptions, limitations, or

conditions that the legislature did not express.”); People v. Shinaul, 2017 IL

120162, ¶ 17 (“Absent express language in the statute providing an exception, we

will not depart from the plain language and read into the statute exceptions,

limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express.”).

¶ 31 Moreover, if we construed subsection (c) as defendant requests, we would

render another section of the Code, section 115-2(a) (725 ILCS 5/115-2(a) (West

2016)), superfluous. Section 115-2, which governs the acceptance of pleas of guilty

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before or during trial, states “[b]efore or during trial a plea of guilty may be

accepted when *** [t]he court has informed the defendant of the consequences of

his plea and of the maximum penalty provided by law which may be imposed upon

acceptance of such plea.” Id. § 115-2(a)(2). Thus, if the admonishment contained

in section 113-4(c) also applied to every plea of guilty besides only at arraignment,

then there would be no need for section 115-2(a), provided that the first subsection

of section 113-4(c) is essentially identical to section 115-2(a). Compare id. § 113-

4(c)(1) (“If the defendant pleads guilty such plea shall not be accepted until the

court shall have fully explained to the defendant the following: (1) the maximum

and minimum penalty provided by law for the offense which may be imposed by

the court[.]”), with id. § 115-2(a)(2) (supra). However, we can easily resolve any

apparent conflict by interpreting section 115-2(a) as the more general provision

concerning pleas of guilty, while section 113-4(c) is the more specific provision

used when a defendant pleads guilty at arraignment, since it provides additional,

more specific admonishments than what is contained in subsection 115-2(a). By

reading the two provisions harmoniously, we adhere to the general principle that,

whenever a legislative body enacts a provision, it has in mind previous statutes

relating to the same subject matter such that they should all be construed together.

See Knolls Condominium Ass’n v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 459 (2002) (“Statutes

relating to the same subject must be compared and construed with reference to each

other so that effect may be given to all of the provisions of each if possible.” (citing

Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 392 (1998))); Land v. Board

of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002) (sections of the

same statute should also be considered in pari materia, and each section should be

construed with every other part or section of the statute to produce a harmonious

whole); Board of Education of the City of Chicago v. Moore, 2021 IL 125785, ¶ 40

(“Where there is an alleged conflict between different sections of the same statute,

a court has a duty to interpret those sections in a manner that avoids an

inconsistency and gives effect to both sections, where such an interpretation is

reasonably possible.”).

¶ 32 We further note that the recent amendments to section 113-4(c) further support

our interpretation. The more specific admonishments of subsection (c) became

effective in 2017, well after the enactment of the general admonishments found

under section 115-2. See Pub. Act 82-553, § 2 (eff. Sept. 17, 1981). Prior to the

2017 amendments, section 113-4(c) required only that the trial court admonish a

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defendant pleading guilty regarding “the consequences of such plea and the

maximum penalty provided by law for the offense which may be imposed by the

court.” 725 ILCS 5/113-4(c) (West 2014). The previous version was nearly

identical to section 115-2(a) in that the admonishment was very general. Compare

id., with 725 ILCS 5/115-2(a) (West 2016). However, the amended admonishments

include a greater number of warnings a trial court is required to provide to a

defendant. Section 113-4(c)’s more specific admonishments reveal the intent to

safeguard defendants from the consequences of pleading guilty without the

opportunity to consult with counsel, which may happen more frequently at

arraignment. Thus, the legislature provided a defendant pleading guilty at

arraignment with admonishments additional to those in the previous version, as

well as those incorporated under section 115-2’s general admonishments, and as

required by Rule 402. This is logical given that, unless specifically stated otherwise,

there is no requirement for the trial court to admonish a defendant about the

collateral consequences of pleading guilty pursuant to section 113-4(c) other than

at arraignment because once counsel has been retained or appointed, as in this case,

it is defense counsel’s duty to advise the defendant about those consequences. See

People v. Correa, 108 Ill. 2d 541, 550 (1985) (“It is counsel’s responsibility, and

not the court’s, to advise an accused of a collateral consequence of a plea of guilty

***.”); People v. Huante, 143 Ill. 2d 61, 71 (1991) (noting the general view that a

defendant’s awareness of collateral consequences is not a prerequisite to the entry

of a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371

(2010) (“It is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her client with

available advice about an issue like deportation ***.”); see also People v. Hughes,

2012 IL 112817, ¶¶ 54-59 (highlighting various American Bar Association

standards concerning the duties of defense counsel to advise a defendant of the

collateral consequences of pleading guilty). Thus, the legislature determined that

only at arraignment, prior to the appointment of counsel, must a trial court

admonish a defendant of the collateral consequences of pleading guilty. That is not

the situation here, where defendant pled guilty after arraignment with defense

counsel appointed and was properly admonished pursuant to Rule 402.

¶ 33 Our legislative interpretation comports with the general understanding that “[i]t

is presumed that every amendment to a statute is made for some purpose, and effect

must be given to the amended law in a manner consistent with the amendment.”

People v. Youngbey, 82 Ill. 2d 556, 563 (1980). As such, it is reasonable to view

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the amendments as the legislature’s intent to further differentiate section 113-4

from section 115-2, thereby further proving that section 113-4 is a specific section

of the Code pertaining to pleas made at arraignments.

¶ 34 Accordingly, applying section 113-4(c) to only arraignment proceedings is

reasonable considering each subsection of section 113-4 as constituting a single,

cohesive statute regarding “pleas” that fall within the greater statute concerning

“arraignment.” 1 We find that defendant interprets subsection 113-4(c) in isolation,

thereby losing focus on how the provision is closely integrated with the other

provisions of section 113-4. See Wildermuth, 2017 IL 120763, ¶ 17 (words and

phrases should not be construed in isolation but must be interpreted in light of other

relevant provisions of the statute); Jarquan B., 2017 IL 121483, ¶ 22 (the

fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that statutes must be read as a

whole and not as isolated provisions). Essentially, defendant requests this court to

judicially amend section 113-4(c) with language comparable to section 113-4(e)’s

requirement that the provision must be given “at any later court date.” We decline

to read into the provision additional language. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 323

(2007) (“Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must

apply it as written, without resort to extrinsic aids to statutory construction. We do

not depart from the plain language of the statute by reading into it exceptions,

limitations, or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent.”) Rather, we find

it clear that the five subsections logically flow together to create a simple,

comprehensive procedural guide regarding pleas (or lack thereof) made at

arraignment. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by failing to admonish

defendant of subsection (c) when she pled guilty at a hearing subsequent to her

initial arraignment hearing. 2

1

We note that section 113-4(c) is not limited to pleas at arraignment merely because it is

contained in article 113 but, rather, section 113-4’s plain language, internal structure, and

relationship to other statutes governing acceptance of pleas show that the legislature intended that

subsection (c) apply only to pleas at arraignment.

2

Because the trial court was not required to admonish defendant of section 113-4(c), we need

not address whether the trial court’s failure to admonish her pursuant to section 113-4(c) violated a

mandatory statutory provision.

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¶ 35 Manifest Injustice

¶ 36 We next consider defendant’s alternative contention that even if we hold that

the trial court was not required to admonish her of section 113-4(c) prior to her

guilty plea, a manifest injustice occurred because she pled guilty under the

misapprehension that she would not automatically lose her employment as a direct

result of pleading guilty. As such, defendant argues that not receiving the

information regarding possible adverse consequences on her employment, she was

prevented from voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entering her plea.

Defendant claims that she was prejudiced by this misapprehension when,

immediately following her guilty plea, she lost her employment.

¶ 37 A defendant does not have an automatic right to withdraw her guilty plea, as

“[a] plea of guilty is a grave act that is not reversible at the defendant’s whim.”

People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 47. Rather, a defendant must establish a manifest

injustice under the facts involved. People v. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, 520 (2009).

A guilty plea may be withdrawn where it was entered through a misapprehension

of the facts or law or where there is doubt as to the guilt of the accused and justice

would be better served by conducting a trial. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 32. In

order to vacate a plea based on a misapprehension of law or fact, the defendant must

establish, under an objective standard, that her mistaken beliefs or impressions were

reasonably justified under the circumstances as they existed at the time of the plea.

People v. Hale, 82 Ill. 2d 172, 176 (1980). We review the trial court’s decision to

grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of

discretion. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 519. An abuse of discretion will only be found

“where the court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or no reasonable

person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Id.

¶ 38 Here, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to

admonish her of the collateral consequences found in section 113-4(c). As

defendant correctly acknowledges in her brief, any failure to admonish her of

potential employment consequences does not amount to a constitutional violation.

That is so because, generally, “[d]ue process does not require that the defendant be

informed of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea.” Id. at 520-21. A collateral

consequence is one that does not relate to the length or nature of the sentence

imposed on the basis of the plea. People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 372 (1999).

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“Examples of collateral consequences have included loss of employment, loss of

voting rights, license suspension, and dishonorable discharge from the

military.” Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 36. Because loss of employment is a

collateral consequence, any failure to admonish defendant to that regard does not

affect the voluntariness of her plea. Id. Nonetheless, although the failure to

admonish a defendant of the collateral consequence of the potential loss of

employment does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, “reversal may

yet be required if real justice has been denied or if the defendant has been prejudiced

by the inadequate admonishment.” Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 522.

¶ 39 At the hearing on defendant’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the trial court

considered whether defendant showed a manifest injustice under the facts. While

the trial court found defendant was adversely impacted by her decision to plead

guilty, i.e., she later lost her employment, the trial court found nothing to indicate

any doubt of defendant’s guilt or that she was acting under a misapprehension of

the facts or of the law at the time she pled guilty. Although defendant claims she

acted under a misapprehension of how pleading guilty would impact her

employment, this belief is dubious given the fact she pled guilty to stealing from

one of her home health care clients. As the appellate court aptly put it, common

sense dictates that any health care provider, current or future, would have legitimate

concerns about an employee’s ability to care for a patient when he or she is

convicted of a crime against someone for whom she was employed to provide care.

¶ 40 Moreover, even if defendant were admonished of section 113-4(c), it would

have been unlikely that it would have corrected her alleged misapprehension

because section 113-4(c) requires only that a defendant be admonished that “there

may be an impact upon the defendant’s ability to *** retain or obtain employment”

as a consequence of pleading guilty, not that a defendant will automatically lose

her employment if she pleads guilty. 725 ILCS 5/113-4(c)(4)(B) (West 2016).

Thus, section 113-4(c) would not have definitively informed defendant that she

would lose her job. Rather, section 113-4(c) is a general, commonsense

admonishment that pleading guilty could possibly affect one’s employment.

¶ 41 Additionally, the trial court was not in the proper position to comprehensively

advise defendant of the collateral consequences of pleading guilty, given that

defendant’s continued employment is based on her maintaining her CNA license

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under state law. See 225 ILCS 65/70-5(b)(3) (West 2016) (statute providing

grounds for disciplinary action of a CNA license holder if the licensee is convicted

of a misdemeanor that is either “directly related to the practice of the profession”

or “an essential element of which is dishonesty”). This specific collateral

consequence of pleading guilty is precisely the type of advice defense counsel

would provide to a defendant prior to entering a plea of guilty. Again, even if the

trial court advised defendant that, “as a consequence of a conviction or plea of

guilty, there may be an impact upon the defendant’s ability to, among others ***

retain or obtain employment,” section 113-4(c)’s admonishment would not inform

her about the licensing requirement that specifically pertains to her employment.

As such, defendant fails to show that, but for the absence of an admonishment that

she could lose her job if she pled guilty, she would not have pled guilty.

Accordingly, we find that defendant has failed to meet her burden to establish she

entered her plea of guilty on a misapprehension of fact or law and that the trial court

abused its discretion in denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea.

¶ 42 CONCLUSION

¶ 43 For the reasons stated, we find that the admonishments under section 113-4(c)

are not required to be given when a defendant pleads guilty other than at

arraignment. Additionally, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion

in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Accordingly, we affirm

the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the judgment of the circuit

court.

¶ 44 Affirmed.

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