Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2020 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UZUEGBUNAM ET AL. v. PRECZEWSKI ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–968. Argued January 12, 2021—Decided March 8, 2021

Petitioners are former students of Georgia Gwinnett College who wished

to exercise their religion by sharing their faith on campus while en-

rolled there. In 2016, Chike Uzuegbunam talked with interested stu-

dents and handed out religious literature on campus grounds. Uzueg-

bunam stopped after a campus police officer informed him that campus

policy prohibited distributing written religious materials outside areas

designated for that purpose. A college official later explained to Uzueg-

bunam that he could speak about his religion or distribute materials

only in two designated speech areas on campus, and even then only

after securing a permit. But when Uzuegbunam obtained the required

permit and tried to speak in a free speech zone, a campus police officer

again asked him to stop, this time saying that people had complained

about his speech. Campus policy at that time prohibited using the free

speech zone to say anything that “disturbs the peace and/or comfort of

person(s).” The officer told Uzuegbunam that his speech violated cam-

pus policy because it had led to complaints, and the officer threatened

Uzuegbunam with disciplinary action if he continued. Uzuegbunam

again complied with the order to stop speaking. Another student who

shares Uzuegbunam’s faith, Joseph Bradford, decided not to speak

about religion because of these events. Both Uzuegbunam and Brad-

ford sued certain college officials charged with enforcement of the col-

lege’s speech policies, arguing that these policies violated the First

Amendment. As relevant here, the students sought injunctive relief

and nominal damages. The college officials ultimately chose to discon-

tinue the challenged policies rather than to defend them, and they

sought dismissal on the ground that the policy change left the students

without standing to sue. The parties agreed that the policy change

rendered the students’ request for injunctive relief moot, but disputed

2 UZUEGBUNAM v. PRECZEWSKI

Syllabus

whether the students had standing to maintain the suit based on their

remaining claim for nominal damages. The Eleventh Circuit held that

while a request for nominal damages can sometimes save a case from

mootness, such as where a person pleads but fails to prove an amount

of compensatory damages, the students’ plea for nominal damages

alone could not by itself establish standing.

Held: A request for nominal damages satisfies the redressability element

necessary for Article III standing where a plaintiff’s claim is based on

a completed violation of a legal right. Pp. 3–12.

(a) To establish Article III standing, the Constitution requires a

plaintiff to identify an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the chal-

lenged conduct and to seek a remedy likely to redress that injury.

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 338. The dispute here concerns

whether the remedy Uzuegbunam sought—nominal damages—can re-

dress the completed constitutional violation that he alleges occurred

when campus officials enforced the speech policies against him. The

Court looks to the forms of relief awarded at common law to determine

whether nominal damages can redress a past injury. The prevailing

rule at common law was that a party whose rights are invaded can

always recover nominal damages without furnishing evidence of actual

damage. By permitting plaintiffs to pursue nominal damages when-

ever they suffered a personal legal injury, the common law avoided the

oddity of privileging small economic rights over important, but not eas-

ily quantifiable, nonpecuniary rights. Pp. 3–8.

(b) The common law did not require a plea for compensatory dam-

ages as a prerequisite to an award of nominal damages. Nominal dam-

ages are not purely symbolic. They are instead the damages awarded

by default until the plaintiff establishes entitlement to some other

form of damages. A single dollar often will not provide full redress,

but the partial remedy satisfies the redressability requirement.

Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 13. Re-

spondents’ argument that a plea for compensatory damages is neces-

sary to confer jurisdiction also does not square with established prin-

ciples of standing. And unlike an award of attorney’s fees and costs

which may be the byproduct of a successful suit, an award of nominal

damages constitutes relief on the merits. Pp. 8–11.

(c) A request for redress in the form of nominal damages does not

guarantee entry to court. In addition to redressability, the plaintiff

must establish the other elements of standing and satisfy all other rel-

evant requirements, such as pleading a cognizable cause of action.

Uzuegbunam experienced a completed violation of his constitutional

rights when respondents enforced their speech policies against him.

Nominal damages can redress Uzuegbunam’s injury even if he cannot

or chooses not to quantify that harm in economic terms. The Court

Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021) 3

Syllabus

does not decide whether Bradford can pursue nominal damages and

leaves for the District Court to determine whether Bradford has estab-

lished a past, completed injury. Pp. 11–12.

781 Fed. Appx. 824, reversed and remanded.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BREYER, ALITO,

SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.

KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissent-

ing opinion.

Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–968

_________________

CHIKE UZUEGBUNAM, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

STANLEY C. PRECZEWSKI, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[March 8, 2021]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

At all stages of litigation, a plaintiff must maintain a per-

sonal interest in the dispute. The doctrine of standing gen-

erally assesses whether that interest exists at the outset,

while the doctrine of mootness considers whether it exists

throughout the proceedings. To demonstrate standing, the

plaintiff must not only establish an injury that is fairly

traceable to the challenged conduct but must also seek a

remedy that redresses that injury. And if in the course of

litigation a court finds that it can no longer provide a plain-

tiff with any effectual relief, the case generally is moot.

This case asks whether an award of nominal damages by

itself can redress a past injury. We hold that it can.

I

According to the complaint, Chike Uzuegbunam is an

evangelical Christian who believes that an important part

of exercising his religion includes sharing his faith. In

2016, Uzuegbunam decided to share his faith at Georgia

Gwinnett College, a public college where he was enrolled as

a student. At an outdoor plaza on campus near the library

2 UZUEGBUNAM v. PRECZEWSKI

Opinion of the Court

where students often gather, Uzuegbunam engaged in con-

versations with interested students and handed out reli-

gious literature.

A campus police officer soon informed Uzuegbunam that

campus policy prohibited distributing written religious ma-

terials in that area and told him to stop. Uzuegbunam com-

plied with the officer’s order. To learn more about this pol-

icy, he then visited the college’s Director of the Office of

Student Integrity, who was directly responsible for promul-

gating and enforcing the policy. When asked if Uzueg-

bunam could continue speaking about his religion if he

stopped distributing materials, the official said no. The of-

ficial explained that Uzuegbunam could speak about his re-

ligion or distribute materials only in two designated “free

speech expression areas,” which together make up just

0.0015 percent of campus. And he could do so only after

securing the necessary permit. Uzuegbunam then applied

for and received a permit to use the free speech zone.

Twenty minutes after Uzuegbunam began speaking on

the day allowed by his permit, another campus police officer

again told him to stop, this time saying that people had

complained about his speech. Campus policy prohibited us-

ing the free speech zone to say anything that “disturbs the

peace and/or comfort of person(s).” App. to Pet. for Cert.

151(a). The officer told Uzuegbunam that his speech vio-

lated this policy because it had led to complaints. The of-

ficer threatened Uzuegbunam with disciplinary action if he

continued. Uzuegbunam again complied with the order to

stop speaking. Another student who shares Uzuegbunam’s

faith, Joseph Bradford, decided not to speak about religion

because of these events.

Both students sued a number of college officials in charge

of enforcing the college’s speech policies, arguing that those

policies violated the First Amendment. As relevant here,

they sought nominal damages and injunctive relief. Re-

spondents initially attempted to defend the policy, stating

Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021) 3

Opinion of the Court

that Uzuegbunam’s discussion of his religion “arguably rose

to the level of ‘fighting words.’ ” Id., at 155(a). But the col-

lege officials quickly abandoned that strategy and instead

decided to get rid of the challenged policies. They then

moved to dismiss, arguing that the suit was moot, because

of the policy change. The students agreed that injunctive

relief was no longer available, but they disagreed that the

case was moot. They contended that their case was still live

because they had also sought nominal damages. The Dis-

trict Court dismissed the case, holding that the students’

claim for nominal damages was insufficient by itself to es-

tablish standing.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 781 Fed. Appx. 824

(2019). It stated that a request for nominal damages can

save a case from mootness in certain circumstances, such

as where a person pleads but fails to prove an amount of

compensatory damages. But, because the students did not

request compensatory damages, their plea for nominal

damages could not by itself establish standing.

We granted certiorari to consider whether a plaintiff who

sues over a completed injury and establishes the first two

elements of standing (injury and traceability) can establish

the third by requesting only nominal damages. 591 U. S.

___ (2020). We now reverse.

II

To satisfy the “ ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ ” of

Article III standing, a plaintiff must not only establish

(1) an injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the chal-

lenged conduct, but he must also seek (3) a remedy that is

likely to redress that injury. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578

U. S. 330, 338 (2016); see also Gill v. Whitford, 585 U. S.

___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 13–14). There is no dispute

that Uzuegbunam has established the first two elements.

The only question is whether the remedy he sought—nom-

inal damages—can redress the constitutional violation that

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Opinion of the Court

Uzuegbunam alleges occurred when campus officials en-

forced the speech policies against him.

A

In determining whether nominal damages can redress a

past injury, we look to the forms of relief awarded at com-

mon law. “Article III’s restriction of the judicial power to

‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ is properly understood to mean

‘cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable

to, and resolved by, the judicial process.’ ” Vermont Agency

of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529

U. S. 765, 774 (2000) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better

Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 102 (1998)); cf. Memphis Com-

munity School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U. S. 299, 306 (1986)

(relief for Ҥ1983 plaintiffs . . . is ordinarily determined ac-

cording to principles derived from the common law of

torts”). The parties here agree that courts at common law

routinely awarded nominal damages. They, instead, dis-

pute what kinds of harms those damages could redress.

Both sides agree that nominal damages historically could

provide prospective relief. The award of nominal damages

was one way for plaintiffs at common law to “obtain a form

of declaratory relief in a legal system with no general de-

claratory judgment act.” D. Laycock & R. Hasen, Modern

American Remedies 636 (5th ed. 2019). For example, a tres-

pass to land or water rights might raise a prospective threat

to a property right by creating the foundation for a future

claim of adverse possession or prescriptive easement.

Blanchard v. Baker, 8 Me. 253, 268 (1832) (“If an unlawful

diversion [of water] is suffered for twenty years, it ripens

into a right, which cannot be controverted”). By obtaining

a declaration of trespass, a property owner could “vindicate

his right by action” and protect against those future

threats. Ibid. Courts at common law would not declare

property boundaries in the abstract, “but the suit for nomi-

nal damages allowed them to do so indirectly.” Laycock,

Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021) 5

Opinion of the Court

supra, at 636.

The parties disagree, however, about whether nominal

damages alone could provide retrospective relief. Stressing

the declaratory function, respondents argue that nominal

damages by themselves redressed only continuing or

threatened injury, not past injury.

But cases at common law paint a different picture. Early

courts required the plaintiff to prove actual monetary dam-

ages in every case: “[I]njuria & damnum [injury and dam-

age] are the two grounds for the having [of] all actions, and

without these, no action lieth.” Cable v. Rogers, 3 Bulst.

311, 312, 81 Eng. Rep. 259 (K. B. 1625). Later courts, how-

ever, reasoned that every legal injury necessarily causes

damage, so they awarded nominal damages absent evi-

dence of other damages (such as compensatory, statutory,

or punitive damages), and they did so where there was no

apparent continuing or threatened injury for nominal dam-

ages to redress. See, e.g., Barker v. Green, 2 Bing. 317, 130

Eng. Rep. 327 (C. P. 1824) (nominal damages awarded for

1-day delay in arrest because “if there was a breach of duty

the law would presume some damage”); Hatch v. Lewis, 2

F. & F. 467, 479, 485–486, 175 Eng. Rep. 1145, 1150, 1153

(N. P. 1861) (ineffective assistance by criminal defense at-

torney that does not prejudice the client); Dods v. Evans, 15

C. B. N. S. 621, 624, 627, 143 Eng. Rep. 929, 930–931 (C. P.

1864) (breach of contract); Marzetti v. Williams, 1 B. & Ad.

415, 417–418, 423–428, 109 Eng. Rep. 842, 843, 845–847

(K. B. 1830) (bank’s 1-day delay in paying on a check); id.,

at 424, 109 Eng. Rep., at 845 (recognizing that breach of

contract could create a continuing injury but determining

that the fact of breach of contract by itself justified nominal

damages).

The latter approach was followed both before and after

ratification of the Constitution. An early case about voting

rights effectively illustrates this common-law understand-

ing. Faced with a suit pleading denial of the right to vote,

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Opinion of the Court

the court rejected the plaintiff ’s claim because, among

other reasons, the plaintiff had not established actual dam-

ages. Ashby v. White, 2 Raym. Ld. 938, 941–943, 948, 92

Eng. Rep. 126, 129, 130, 133 (K. B. 1703). Dissenting, Lord

Holt argued that the common law inferred damages when-

ever a legal right was violated. Observing that the law rec-

ognized “not merely pecuniary” injury but also “personal in-

jury,” Lord Holt stated that “every injury imports a

damage” and that a plaintiff could always obtain damages

even if he “does not lose a penny by reason of the [viola-

tion].” Id., at 955, 92 Eng. Rep., at 137. Although Lord Holt

was in the minority, the House of Lords overturned the ma-

jority decision, thus validating Lord Holt’s position, 3 Salk.

17, 91 Eng. Rep. 665 (K. B. 1703), and this principle “laid

down . . . by Lord Holt” was followed “in many subsequent

cases,” Embrey v. Owen, 6 Exch. 353, 368, 155 Eng. Rep.

579, 585 (1851).

The dissent correctly notes that English courts differed in

some respects from courts under our system, but Lord

Holt’s position also prevailed in courts on this side of the

Atlantic. Applying what he called Lord Holt’s “incontro-

vertible” reasoning, Justice Story explained that a prevail-

ing plaintiff “is entitled to a verdict for nominal damages”

whenever “no other [kind of damages] be proved.” Webb v.

Portland Mfg. Co., 29 F. Cas. 506, 508–509 (No. 17,322) (CC

Me. 1838). Because the common law recognized that “every

violation imports damage,” Justice Story reasoned that

“[t]he law tolerates no farther inquiry than whether there

has been the violation of a right.” Ibid. Justice Story also

made clear that this logic applied to both retrospective and

prospective relief. Id., at 507 (stating that nominal dam-

ages are available “wherever there is a wrong” and that, “[a]

fortiori, this doctrine applies where there is not only a vio-

lation of a right of the plaintiff, but the act of the defendant,

if continued, may become the foundation, by lapse of time,

of an adverse right”).

Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021) 7

Opinion of the Court

The dissent discounts Justice Story’s statement, saying

that he took a potentially contradictory position elsewhere

and asserted that both actual damages and a violation of a

legal right are required. Post, at 7–8 (opinion of ROBERTS,

C. J.). But in the same source the dissent cites, Justice

Story said that nominal damages are “presumed” “[w]here

the breach of duty is clear.” Commentaries on the Law of

Agency §217, p. 211 (1839). Justice Story adopted the same

position a few years later. Whipple v. Cumberland Mfg. Co.,

29 F. Cas. 934, 936 (No. 17,516) (CC Me. 1843) (stating that

it is “well-known and well-settled” that “wherever a wrong

is done to a right,” at minimum “nominal damages will be

given”). And other jurists declared that “[t]he principle that

every injury legally imports damage, was decisively settled,

in the case of Ashby.” Parker v. Griswold, 17 Conn. *288,

*304–*306 (1845) (citing many cases on both sides of the

Atlantic, including Webb and Marzetti). This history is

hardly one of “indeterminate sources.” Post, at 8.

Admittedly, the rule allowing nominal damages for a vio-

lation of any legal right, though “decisively settled,” Parker,

17 Conn., at *304, was not universally followed—as is true

for most common-law doctrines. And some courts only fol-

lowed the rule in part, recognizing the availability of nomi-

nal damages but holding that the improper denial of nomi-

nal damages could be harmless error. Yet, even among

these courts, many adopted the rule in full whenever a per-

son proved that there was a violation of an “important

right.” E.g., Hecht v. Harrison, 5 Wyo. 279, 290, 40 P. 306,

309–310 (1895); accord, Reid v. Johnson, 132 Ind. 416, 419,

31 N. E. 1107, 1108 (1892) (“substantial right”). Nonethe-

less, the prevailing rule, “well established” at common law,

was “that a party whose rights are invaded can always re-

cover nominal damages without furnishing any evidence of

actual damage.” 1 T. Sedgwick, Measure of Damages 71,

n. a (7th ed. 1880); see also id., at 72 (citing Lord Holt’s

opinion in Ashby).

8 UZUEGBUNAM v. PRECZEWSKI

Opinion of the Court

That this rule developed at common law is unsurprising

in the light of the noneconomic rights that individuals had

at that time. A contrary rule would have meant, in many

cases, that there was no remedy at all for those rights, such

as due process or voting rights, that were not readily reduc-

ible to monetary valuation. See D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies

§3.3(2) (3d ed. 2018) (nominal damages are often awarded

for a right “not economic in character and for which no sub-

stantial non-pecuniary award is available”); see also Carey

v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 266–267 (1978) (awarding nominal

damages for a violation of procedural due process). By per-

mitting plaintiffs to pursue nominal damages whenever

they suffered a personal legal injury, the common law

avoided the oddity of privileging small-dollar economic

rights over important, but not easily quantifiable, nonpecu-

niary rights.

B

Respondents and the dissent attempt to discount this his-

torical line of cases by contending that something other

than nominal damages provided redressability. They argue

instead that courts could award nominal damages only

when a plaintiff pleaded compensatory damages but failed

to prove a specific amount. In those circumstances, they

say, the plea for compensatory damages is what satisfied

the redressability requirement, and courts awarded nomi-

nal damages merely as a technical matter. We do not agree.

To begin with, the cases themselves did not require a plea

for compensatory damages as a condition for receiving nom-

inal damages. Lord Holt spoke in categorical terms:

“[E]very injury imports a damage,” so a plaintiff who proved

a legal violation could always obtain some form of damages

because he “must of necessity have a means to vindicate

and maintain [the right].” Ashby, 2 Raym. Ld., at 953–955,

92 Eng. Rep., at 136–137. Justice Story’s language was no

less definitive: “The law tolerates no farther inquiry than

Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021) 9

Opinion of the Court

whether there has been the violation of a right.” Webb, 29

F. Cas., at 508. When a right is violated, that violation “im-

ports damage in the nature of it” and “the party injured is

entitled to a verdict for nominal damages.” Id., at 508.

Respondents and the dissent thus get the relationship be-

tween nominal damages and compensatory damages back-

wards. Nominal damages are not a consolation prize for the

plaintiff who pleads, but fails to prove, compensatory dam-

ages. They are instead the damages awarded by default

until the plaintiff establishes entitlement to some other

form of damages, such as compensatory or statutory dam-

ages. See, e.g., Dods, 15 C. B. N. S., at 621, 627, 143

Eng. Rep., at 929, 931 (prevailing plaintiff entitled to nom-

inal damages as a matter of law even where jury neglected

to find them); see also Stachura, 477 U. S., at 308 (rejecting

the argument that courts could presume, without proof,

damages greater than nominal).

The argument that a claim for compensatory damages is

a prerequisite for an award of nominal damages also rests

on the flawed premise that nominal damages are purely

symbolic, a mere judicial token that provides no actual ben-

efit to the plaintiff. That contention is not without some

support. See, e.g., Stanton v. New York & Eastern R. Co.,

59 Conn. 272, 282, 22 A. 300, 303 (1890) (“Nominal damages

mean no damages at all. They exist only in name, and not

in amount”); but cf. ibid. (still recognizing that nominal

damages are appropriate when a right is violated). But this

view is against the weight of the history discussed above,

and we have already expressly rejected it. Despite being

small, nominal damages are certainly concrete. The dissent

says that “an award of nominal damages does not change [a

plaintiff’s] status or condition at all.” Post, at 3. But we

have already held that a person who is awarded nominal

damages receives “relief on the merits of his claim” and

“may demand payment for nominal damages no less than

10 UZUEGBUNAM v. PRECZEWSKI

Opinion of the Court

he may demand payment for millions of dollars in compen-

satory damages.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103, 111, 113

(1992). Because nominal damages are in fact damages paid

to the plaintiff, they “affec[t] the behavior of the defendant

towards the plaintiff ” and thus independently provide re-

dress. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755, 761 (1987) (emphasis

deleted); accord, Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Temp-

nology, LLC, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 6) (“If

there is any chance of money changing hands, [the] suit re-

mains live”). True, a single dollar often cannot provide full

redress, but the ability “to effectuate a partial remedy” sat-

isfies the redressability requirement. Church of Scientology

of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 13 (1992).

The next difficulty faced by respondents and the dissent

is their inability to square their argument with established

principles of standing. Because redressability is an “ ‘irre-

ducible’ ” component of standing, Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 338,

no federal court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment unless

it provides a remedy that can redress the plaintiff ’s injury.

Yet early courts routinely awarded nominal damages alone.

Certainly, no one seems to think that those judgments were

without legal effect. Those nominal damages necessarily

must have provided redress. Respondents contend that a

request for compensatory damages at the pleading stage

was what provided the basis for nominal damages at the

judgment stage. But a plaintiff must maintain a personal

interest in the dispute at every stage of litigation, including

when judgment is entered, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U. S. 555, 561 (1992), and must do so “separately for

each form of relief sought,” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.

Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167,

185 (2000). As soon as a plea for compensatory damages

fails at the factfinding stage of litigation, that plea can no

longer support jurisdiction for a favorable judgment. The

dissent’s contrary assertion is unaccompanied by any cita-

tion.

Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021) 11

Opinion of the Court

Likewise, any analogy to attorney’s fees and costs fails.

A request for attorney’s fees or costs cannot establish stand-

ing because those awards are merely a “byproduct” of a suit

that already succeeded, not a form of redressability. Steel

Co., 523 U. S., at 107; see also Lewis v. Continental Bank

Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 480 (1990). In contrast, nominal dam-

ages are redress, not a byproduct.

III

Because nominal damages were available at common law

in analogous circumstances, we conclude that a request for

nominal damages satisfies the redressability element of

standing where a plaintiff’s claim is based on a completed

violation of a legal right.

The dissent worries that after today the Judiciary will be

required to weigh in on legal questions “whenever a plain-

tiff asks for a dollar.” Post, at 9. But petitioners still would

have satisfied redressability if instead of one dollar in nom-

inal damages they sought one dollar in compensation for a

wasted bus fare to travel to the free speech zone. The dis-

sent “would place a higher value on Article III” than a dol-

lar. Post, at 1; but see Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC

Services, Inc., 554 U. S. 269, 305 (2008) (ROBERTS, C. J., dis-

senting) (“Article III is worth a dollar”). But Congress abol-

ished the statutory amount-in-controversy requirement for

federal-question jurisdiction in 1980. Federal Question Ju-

risdictional Amendments Act, 94 Stat. 2369. And we have

never held that one applies as a matter of constitutional

law.

This is not to say that a request for nominal damages

guarantees entry to court. Our holding concerns only re-

dressability. It remains for the plaintiff to establish the

other elements of standing (such as a particularized injury);

plead a cognizable cause of action, Planck v. Anderson, 5

T. R. 37, 41, 101 Eng. Rep. 21, 23 (K. B. 1792) (“if no [actual]

damage be sustained, the creditor has no cause of action”

12 UZUEGBUNAM v. PRECZEWSKI

Opinion of the Court

for some claims); and meet all other relevant requirements.

We hold only that, for the purpose of Article III standing,

nominal damages provide the necessary redress for a com-

pleted violation of a legal right.

Applying this principle here is straightforward. For pur-

poses of this appeal, it is undisputed that Uzuegbunam ex-

perienced a completed violation of his constitutional rights

when respondents enforced their speech policies against

him. Because “every violation [of a right] imports damage,”

Webb, 29 F. Cas., at 509, nominal damages can redress

Uzuegbunam’s injury even if he cannot or chooses not to

quantify that harm in economic terms.*

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the

case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

It is so ordered.

——————

*We do not decide whether Bradford can pursue nominal damages.

Nominal damages go only to redressability and are unavailable where a

plaintiff has failed to establish a past, completed injury. The District

Court should determine in the first instance whether the enforcement

against Uzuegbunam also violated Bradford’s constitutional rights.

Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021) 1

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–968

_________________

CHIKE UZUEGBUNAM, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

STANLEY C. PRECZEWSKI, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[March 8, 2021]

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.

I agree with the Court that, as a matter of history and

precedent, a plaintiff’s request for nominal damages can

satisfy the redressability requirement for Article III stand-

ing and can keep an otherwise moot case alive. I write sep-

arately simply to note that I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE

and the Solicitor General that a defendant should be able

to accept the entry of a judgment for nominal damages

against it and thereby end the litigation without a resolu-

tion of the merits. Post, at 11 (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting);

Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29–30.

Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021) 1

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–968

_________________

CHIKE UZUEGBUNAM, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

STANLEY C. PRECZEWSKI, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[March 8, 2021]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, dissenting.

Petitioners Chike Uzuegbunam and Joseph Bradford

want to challenge the constitutionality of speech re-

strictions at Georgia Gwinnett College. There are just a few

problems: Uzuegbunam and Bradford are no longer stu-

dents at the college. The challenged restrictions no longer

exist. And the petitioners have not alleged actual damages.

The case is therefore moot because a federal court cannot

grant Uzuegbunam and Bradford “any effectual relief what-

ever.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U. S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

The Court resists this conclusion, holding that the peti-

tioners can keep pressing their claims because they have

asked for “nominal damages.” In the Court’s view, nominal

damages can save a case from mootness because any

amount of money—no matter how trivial—“can redress a

past injury.” Ante, at 1. But an award of nominal damages

does not alleviate the harms suffered by a plaintiff, and is

not intended to. If nominal damages can preserve a live

controversy, then federal courts will be required to give ad-

visory opinions whenever a plaintiff tacks on a request for

a dollar. Because I would place a higher value on Article

III, I respectfully dissent.

2 UZUEGBUNAM v. PRECZEWSKI

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

I

In urging the ratification of the Constitution, Alexander

Hamilton famously wrote that “the judiciary, from the na-

ture of its functions, will always be the least dangerous” of

“the different departments of power.” The Federalist

No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). This was so, Hamilton

explained, because the Judiciary “will be least in a capacity

to annoy or injure” “the political rights of the Constitution.”

Ibid. Whereas “[t]he executive not only dispenses the hon-

ors but holds the sword of the community,” and “[t]he legis-

lature not only commands the purse but prescribes the

rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to

be regulated,” the Judiciary “may truly be said to have nei-

ther FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment.” Ibid.

But that power of judgment can nonetheless bind the Ex-

ecutive and Legislature—and the States. It is modest only

if confined to its proper sphere. As John Marshall empha-

sized during his one term in the House of Representatives,

“[i]f the judicial power extended to every question under the

constitution” or “to every question under the laws and trea-

ties of the United States,” then “[t]he division of power

[among the branches of Government] could exist no longer,

and the other departments would be swallowed up by the

judiciary.” 4 Papers of John Marshall 95 (C. Cullen ed.

1984) (quoted in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S.

332, 341 (2006)). To maintain adequate separation between

the Judiciary, on the one hand, and the political branches

and the States, on the other, Article III of the Constitution

authorizes federal courts to decide only “Cases” and

“Controversies”—that is, “cases of a Judiciary nature.”

2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 430

(M. Farrand ed. 1966) (J. Madison).

The case-or-controversy requirement imposes fundamen-

tal restrictions on who can invoke federal jurisdiction and

what types of disputes federal courts can resolve. As perti-

nent here, “when it is impossible for a court to grant any

Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021) 3

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party,” Chafin,

568 U. S., at 172 (internal quotation marks omitted), the

case is moot, and the court has no power to decide it, see

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 18 (1998). To decide a moot

case would be to give an advisory opinion, in violation of

“the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law

of justiciability.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 96 (1968)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

By insisting that judges be able to provide meaningful re-

dress to litigants, Article III ensures that federal courts ex-

ercise their authority only “as a necessity in the determina-

tion of real, earnest and vital controversy between

individuals.” Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman,

143 U. S. 339, 345 (1892); see Valley Forge Christian Col-

lege v. Americans United for Separation of Church and

State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 471 (1982) (“The constitutional

power of federal courts cannot be defined, and indeed has

no substance, without reference to the necessity ‘to adjudge

the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.’ ” (quot-

ing Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Com-

missioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885))). When

plaintiffs like Uzuegbunam and Bradford allege neither ac-

tual damages nor the prospect of future injury, an award of

nominal damages does not change their status or condition

at all. Such an award instead represents a judicial deter-

mination that the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the law is

correct—nothing more. The court in such a case is acting

not as an Article III court, but as a moot court, deciding

cases “in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society.”

Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v.

Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297, 305 (1983)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

II

The Court sees no problem with turning judges into ad-

vice columnists. In its view, the common law and (to a

4 UZUEGBUNAM v. PRECZEWSKI

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

lesser extent) our cases require that federal courts open

their doors to any plaintiff who asks for a dollar. I part

ways with the Court regarding both the framework it ap-

plies and the result it reaches.

Begin with the framework. The Court’s initial premise is

that we must “look to the forms of relief awarded at common

law” in order to decide “whether nominal damages can re-

dress a past injury.” Ante, at 4. Because the Court finds

that “nominal damages were available at common law in

analogous circumstances” to the ones before us, it “con-

clude[s] that a request for nominal damages satisfies the

redressability element of standing where a plaintiff ’s claim

is based on a completed violation of a legal right.” Ante, at

11.

Any lessons that we learn from the common law, how-

ever, must be tempered by differences in constitutional de-

sign. The structure and function of 18th-century English

courts were in many respects irreconcilable with “the role

assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power.”

Flast, 392 U. S., at 95. Perhaps most saliently, in England

“all jurisdictions of courts [were] either mediately or imme-

diately derived from the crown,” 1 W. Blackstone, Commen-

taries on the Laws of England 257 (1765), an organizational

principle the Framers explicitly rejected by separating the

Executive from the Judiciary. This difference in organiza-

tion yielded a difference in operation. To give just one ex-

ample, “English judicial practice with which early Ameri-

cans were familiar had long permitted the Crown to solicit

advisory opinions from judges.” R. Fallon, J. Manning, D.

Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal

Courts and the Federal System 52 (7th ed. 2015). We would

not look to such practice for guidance today if a plaintiff

came into court arguing that advisory opinions were in fact

an appropriate form of Article III redress. We would know

that they are not. We likewise should know that a bare re-

quest for nominal damages is not justiciable because the

Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021) 5

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

plaintiff cannot “benefit in a tangible way from the court’s

intervention.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment,

523 U. S. 83, 103, n. 5 (1998) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

We should of course consult founding-era decisions when

discerning the boundaries of our jurisdiction, for the Fram-

ers sought to limit the judicial power to “Cases” and “Con-

troversies,” as those terms were understood at the time.

See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion of

Frankfurter, J.). No question. But that does not mean that

the requirements of Article III are “satisfied merely because

a party requests a court of the United States to declare its

legal rights, and has couched that request for forms of relief

historically associated with courts of law in terms that have

a familiar ring to those trained in the legal process.” Valley

Forge, 454 U. S., at 471. A focus on common law analogues

cannot obscure the significance of the establishment of an

independent Judiciary—a “remarkable transformation”

from a system with courts operating as “appendages of

crown power.” Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Re-

view, 22 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1293, 1304 (1988). That trans-

formation carries with it the need to cabin the jurisdiction

of the Judiciary to ensure it does not trespass on the prov-

ince of the political branches.

It is in any event entirely unclear whether common law

courts would have awarded nominal damages in a case like

the one before us. There is no dispute that “nominal dam-

ages historically could provide prospective relief,” because

such awards allowed “plaintiffs at common law to ‘obtain a

form of declaratory relief in a legal system with no general

declaratory judgment act.’ ” Ante, at 4 (quoting D. Laycock

& R. Hasen, Modern American Remedies 636 (5th ed. 2019);

emphasis added); see Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment—

A Needed Procedural Reform, 28 Yale L. J. 1, 25–29 (1918)

(describing the development of declaratory judgments in

England in the second half of the 19th century). Yet the

6 UZUEGBUNAM v. PRECZEWSKI

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

petitioners in this case no longer seek prospective relief.

Although they initially asked for a declaratory judgment

and a preliminary injunction, they abandoned those re-

quests once the college rescinded the challenged policies.

The Court is correct to note that plaintiffs at common law

often received nominal damages for past violations of their

rights. Those awards, however, were generally limited to

situations in which prevailing plaintiffs tried and failed to

prove actual damages. See 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies

§3.3(2), p. 296 (2d ed. 1993) (describing nominal damages

awards as “a rescue operation”). Notwithstanding the

Court’s protestations to the contrary, nominal damages in

such cases were in fact a “consolation prize,” ante, at 9,

awarded as a hook to allow prevailing plaintiffs to at least

recover attorney’s fees and costs. See W. Hale, Handbook

on the Law of Damages 30–31 (1896) (“The importance of

the right to recover nominal damages often consists in its

effect on costs.”); 1 T. Sedgwick, Measure of Damages §96,

p. 164 (9th ed. 1912) (“[T]hey are a mere peg to hang costs

on.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The petitioners in

this case have asked to recover their fees and costs, but they

never sought actual damages, so the common law provides

little relevant support.

On this last point, the Court acknowledges in several

places that the historical record is mixed as to whether legal

violations were actionable at all without a showing of com-

pensable harm. See ante, at 5, 7. And the Court does not

cite any case in which plaintiffs sought only nominal dam-

ages for purely retrospective injuries. The Court instead

relies on several decisions that contained live damages

claims, see Barker v. Green, 2 Bing. 317, 130 Eng. Rep. 327

(C. P. 1824) (“actual damage was the gist of the action”);

Hatch v. Lewis, 2 F. & F. 467, 469, 175 Eng. Rep. 1145, 1146

(N. P. 1861) (defendants’ ineffective assistance allegedly

caused plaintiff to be “deprived of the profits and emolu-

ments he might otherwise have obtained”); Dods v. Evans,

Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021) 7

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

15 C. B. N. S. 621, 143 Eng. Rep. 929 (C. P. 1864) (action for

damages), or involved prospective harm to the plaintiff ’s

reputation, see Marzetti v. Williams, 1 B. & Ad. 415, 420,

109 Eng. Rep. 842, 844 (K. B. 1830) (bank’s failure to timely

pay “was injurious to the character of the plaintiff in his

trade”); see also C. Addison, Law of Torts 46–47 (1860) (def-

amation actionable without proof of damage).

The Court also appeals to “categorical” and “definitive”

statements by Lord Chief Justice Holt and Justice Story,

that “every injury imports a damage,” Ashby v. White, 2

Raym. Ld. 938, 955, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 137 (K. B. 1703), and

that “[t]he law tolerates no farther inquiry than whether

there has been the violation of a right,” Webb v. Portland

Mfg. Co., 29 F. Cas. 506, 508 (No. 17,322) (CC Me. 1838).

Ante, at 8–9. These statements, however, bear less weight

than the Court suggests. Lord Holt was alone in dissent in

Ashby (no shame there), and although his opinion has been

cited favorably by subsequent cases and commentary, his

colleagues disagreed with him. The Court writes that “the

House of Lords overturned the majority decision, thus vali-

dating Lord Holt’s position,” ante, at 6, but the House of

Lords likely paid scant attention to Lord Holt’s analysis. It

appears instead that the majority decision was reversed as

collateral damage in a Whig-Tory political dispute, and “lit-

tle weight was given to reasoning or eloquence.” 2 J. Camp-

bell, Lives of the Chief Justices of England 160 (1849).

(Ashby had tried to vote for a Whig candidate, and his ballot

had been rejected as part of a Tory election-rigging scheme.

Id., at 156–157.) Regardless, the House of Lords held that

Ashby “should recover his damages assessed by the jury” at

trial, suggesting that the fact of injury alone did not “im-

port” them. Ashby v. White, 1 Bro. P. C. 62, 64, 1 Eng. Rep.

417, 418 (1703).

Justice Story is no more helpful to the Court—despite the

supposedly “definitive” nature of his statement in Webb—

as he took the position elsewhere in his writings that a legal

8 UZUEGBUNAM v. PRECZEWSKI

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

violation alone was not sufficient to ground a lawsuit. See

Commentaries on the Law of Agency §236, p. 200 (1839)

(“[T]he rule applies, that though it is a wrong, it is without

any damage; and, to maintain an action, both must concur;

for damnum absque injuria, and injuria absque damno, are

equally objections to any recovery.”). Perhaps Justice

Story’s conflicting statements can be reconciled, see ante, at

7; Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93

Cornell L. Rev. 275, 283, n. 38 (2008), but neither his com-

mentary nor Lord Holt’s dissent provides firm footing for

the position that a plaintiff could seek nominal damages

without alleging actual damages or prospective harm.

At bottom, the Court relies on a handful of indeterminate

sources to justify a radical expansion of the judicial power.

The Court acknowledges that “the rule allowing nominal

damages for a violation of any legal right . . . was not uni-

versally followed,” ante, at 7, but even this concession un-

derstates the equivocal nature of the historical record. I

would require more before bursting the bounds of Article

III.

The Court spends little time trying to reconcile its analy-

sis with modern justiciability principles. It cites in passing

our decisions in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247 (1978), Mem-

phis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U. S. 299

(1986), and Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103 (1992), but those

cases made no mention of Article III, and none involved a

standalone claim for nominal damages. The Court also con-

tends that nominal damages must provide redress because

courts would otherwise lack jurisdiction to award them,

even where a plaintiff tries and fails to prove actual dam-

ages. See ante, at 10. But a claim for actual damages pre-

serves a live controversy, see Memphis Light, Gas & Water

Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8–9 (1978), and a court does not

lose jurisdiction just because that claim ultimately fails.

Finally, the Court argues that nominal damages provide

Article III relief because they “affec[t] the behavior of the

Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021) 9

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

defendant towards the plaintiff ” by requiring “money

changing hands.” Ante, at 10 (internal quotation marks

omitted). If this were the standard, then the prospect of

attorney’s fees and costs would confer standing at the be-

ginning of a lawsuit and prevent mootness throughout—a

proposition we have squarely rejected. See Lewis v. Conti-

nental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 480 (1990). The Court

posits that “nominal damages are redress,” whereas fees

and costs “are merely a byproduct of a suit that already suc-

ceeded.” Ante, at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).

This classification just begs the question of what qualifies

as redress. To satisfy Article III, redress must alleviate the

plaintiff ’s alleged injury in some way, either by compensat-

ing the plaintiff for a past loss or by preventing an ongoing

or future harm. Nominal damages do not serve these ends

where a plaintiff alleges only a completed violation of his

rights. They are not intended to approximate the value of

tangible or intangible harms, or the deterrent effect re-

quired to prevent future misconduct. And they are not cal-

culated with reference to either of these purposes. Because

such an award performs no remedial function—and because

“[r]elief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot

bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court,” Steel Co., 523 U. S.,

at 107—nominal damages cannot preserve a live contro-

versy where a case is otherwise moot.

III

Today’s decision risks a major expansion of the judicial

role. Until now, we have said that federal courts can review

the legality of policies and actions only as a necessary inci-

dent to resolving real disputes. Going forward, the Judici-

ary will be required to perform this function whenever a

plaintiff asks for a dollar. For those who want to know if

their rights have been violated, the least dangerous branch

will become the least expensive source of legal advice.

In an effort to downplay these consequences, the Court

10 UZUEGBUNAM v. PRECZEWSKI

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

argues that plaintiffs who seek nominal damages will often

be able to seek actual damages as well. In this case, for

example, the Court notes that Uzuegbunam and Bradford

“would have satisfied redressability if instead of one dollar

in nominal damages they sought one dollar in compensation

for a wasted bus fare to travel to the free speech zone.”

Ante, at 11. Maybe they would have, and maybe they

should have. The Court is mistaken, however, to equate a

small amount of actual damages with the token award of

nominal damages. The former redresses a compensable

harm and satisfies Article III, while the latter is a legal fic-

tion with “no existence in point of quantity.” J. Mayne, Law

of Damages 27 (1856) (internal quotation marks omitted);

see Dobbs, Law of Remedies §3.3(2), at 294 (“Nominal dam-

ages are damages in name only . . . .”).

The Court also insists that not every “request for nominal

damages guarantees entry to court.” Ante, at 11. Yet its

holding admits of no limiting principle. As then-Judge

McConnell remarked in an insightful concurrence on the is-

sue before us, “[i]t is hard to conceive of a case in which a

plaintiff would be unable to append a claim for nominal

damages, and thus insulate the case from the possibility of

mootness.” Utah Animal Rights Coalition v. Salt Lake City

Corp., 371 F. 3d 1248, 1266 (CA10 2004). The Court today

reinforces this point by emphasizing that “every violation of

a right imports damage,” ante, at 12 (emphasis added; al-

terations and internal quotation marks omitted)—even

though we have definitively and recently held that a plain-

tiff must allege a concrete injury even where his rights have

been violated, see Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A., 590 U. S. ___,

___ (2020) (slip op., at 5) (“This Court has rejected the ar-

gument that ‘a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-

in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a

statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue

to vindicate that right.’ ” (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,

578 U. S. 330, 341 (2016))).

Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021) 11

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

The best that can be said for the Court’s sweeping excep-

tion to the case-or-controversy requirement is that it may

itself admit of a sweeping exception: Where a plaintiff asks

only for a dollar, the defendant should be able to end the

case by giving him a dollar, without the court needing to

pass on the merits of the plaintiff ’s claims. Although we

recently reserved the question whether a defendant can

moot a case by depositing the full amount requested by the

plaintiff, Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U. S. 153, 166

(2016), our cases have long suggested that he can, see, e.g.,

California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313–

314 (1893). The United States agrees, arguing in its brief

in “support” of the petitioners that “the defendant should be

able to end the litigation without a resolution of the consti-

tutional merits, simply by accepting the entry of judgment

for nominal damages against him.” Brief for United States

as Amicus Curiae 29. The defendant can even file an offer

of judgment for one dollar, rendering the plaintiff liable for

any subsequent costs if he receives only nominal damages.

See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 68(d). This is a welcome caveat,

and it may ultimately save federal courts from issuing

reams of advisory opinions. But it also highlights the flim-

siness of the Court’s view of the separation of powers. The

scope of our jurisdiction should not depend on whether the

defendant decides to fork over a buck.

* * *

Five years after Hamilton wrote Federalist No. 78, Secre-

tary of State Thomas Jefferson sent a letter on behalf of

President George Washington to Chief Justice John Jay

and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, asking for

advice about the Nation’s rights and obligations regarding

the ongoing war in Europe. Washington’s request must

have struck him as reasonable enough, since English sover-

eigns regularly sought advice from their courts. Yet the

12 UZUEGBUNAM v. PRECZEWSKI

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

Justices declined the entreaty, citing “the lines of separa-

tion drawn by the Constitution between the three depart-

ments of the government.” 3 Correspondence and Public

Papers of John Jay 488 (H. Johnston ed. 1891). For over

two centuries, the Correspondence of the Justices has stood

as a reminder that federal courts cannot give answers

simply because someone asks.

The Judiciary is authorized “to say what the law is” only

because “[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases, must

of necessity expound and interpret the rule.” Marbury v.

Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). To-

day’s decision abandons that principle. When a plaintiff

brings a nominal damages claim in the absence of past dam-

ages or future harm, it is not “necessary to give an opinion

upon a question of law.” San Pablo, 149 U. S., at 314. It is

instead a “gratuitous” exercise of the judicial power, Simon

v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26,

38 (1976), and expanding that power encroaches on the po-

litical branches and the States. Perhaps defendants will

wise up and moot such claims by paying a dollar, but it is

difficult to see that outcome as a victory for Article III.

Rather than encourage litigants to fight over farthings,

I would affirm the judgment of the Court of

Appeals.