The opinion
NUMBER 13-19-00597-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
RAYMONDVILLE INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Appellant,
v.
RUBEN RUIZ, Appellee.
On appeal from the 197th District Court
of Willacy County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
By one issue, appellant Raymondville Independent School District (Raymondville
ISD) challenges the trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. Raymondville ISD
filed its plea to the jurisdiction in response to appellee Ruben Ruiz’s employment
termination lawsuit. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from an alleged whistleblower claim. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 554.002. Ruiz was employed as a truancy officer for Raymondville ISD. On May 17,
2018, Ruiz sent a letter to the Chief of Police for Raymondville ISD to file a complaint
regarding a coworker. Ruiz addressed it to the Chief “as my immediate supervisor.” In the
letter, Ruiz detailed incidents he felt caused a hostile work environment due to an officer’s
comments about Ruiz and another employee and felt the officer was engaged in official
oppression.
On May 25, 2018, Ruiz was notified that he was “dismissed from employment with
Raymondville ISD.” Ruiz subsequently filed a lawsuit against Raymondville ISD
under § 554.002(a) of the Texas Government Code (the Texas Whistleblower Act). See
id. § 554.002(a). Raymondville ISD invoked the defense of sovereign immunity and filed
its plea to the jurisdiction, stating that Ruiz did not plead a claim that triggers the wavier
of sovereign immunity.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the plea to jurisdiction. This interlocutory
appeal followed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.04(a)(8) (permitting an appeal
from an interlocutory order that denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit.)
II. PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
By its sole issue, Raymondville ISD alleges the trial court erred in denying its plea
to the jurisdiction because Ruiz did not establish a waiver of Raymondville ISD’s
immunity.
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A. Standard of Review
The State and other state agencies are immune from suit and liability in Texas
unless the Legislature expressly waived sovereign immunity. State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d
876, 880 (Tex. 2009); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.034 (“A statute shall not be
construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and
unambiguous language.”). Sovereign immunity implicates a court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. Engleman Irrigation Dist. v. Shields Bros., Inc., 514 S.W.3d 746, 755 (Tex.
2017). A statute waives immunity from suit, immunity from liability, or both. See Tex. Dep’t
of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. 2004). Immunity from suit is
a jurisdictional question of whether the State has expressly consented to suit. Lueck, 290
S.W.3d at 880. On the other hand, immunity from liability determines whether the State
has accepted liability even after it has consented to suit. Id. In some statutes, immunity
from suit and liability are co-extensive, whereby immunity from suit is waived to the extent
of liability. Id.
Sovereign immunity from suit is properly asserted when the State files a plea to
the jurisdiction. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225–26. In contrast, immunity from liability is an
affirmative defense that cannot be raised by a plea to the jurisdiction. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d
at 880. However, when the facts underlying the merits and subject matter jurisdiction are
intertwined, the State may assert sovereign immunity from suit by a plea to the jurisdiction,
even when the trial court must consider evidence “necessary to resolve the jurisdictional
issues raised.” Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000); see also
Miranda, 113 S.W.3d at 223–24.
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When, as in this case, a jurisdictional challenge to a Whistleblower Act claim
challenges the existence of one or more elements of the claim, the challenge must be
denied if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, creates a
genuine issue of material fact as to each of the challenged elements. See Town of Shady
Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 552 (Tex. 2019) (explaining that when a challenged
to jurisdiction that implicates the merits is properly made and supported, “the plaintiff will
be required to present sufficient evidence on the merits of [his] claims to create a genuine
issue of material fact”). We review the trial court’s ruling on the challenge under a de novo
standard of review. Id.; see Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n v. Vestal, No. 03-19-
00509-CV, 2020 WL 7252320, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 10, 2020, no pet.) (mem.
op.).
B. Applicable Law and Discussion
In its brief, Raymondville ISD alleges that Ruiz failed to make a good faith report
of a violation of a law and failed to make a report to an appropriate law enforcement
authority for the purposes of a whistleblower claim.
The Texas Whistleblower Act, contained in § 554.002 of the government code,
states:
(a) A state or local governmental entity may not suspend or terminate
the employment of, or take other adverse action against, a public
employee who in good faith reports a violation of law by the
employing governmental entity or another public employee to an
appropriate law enforcement authority.
(b) In this section, a report is made to an appropriate law enforcement
authority if the authority is part of a governmental entity or of the
federal government that the employee in good faith believes is
authorized to:
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(1) regulate under or enforce the law alleged to be violated in the
report; or
(2) investigate or prosecute a violation of criminal law.
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.002. To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff seeking the Texas
Whistleblower Act’s protection must prove that the report was made to an appropriate law
enforcement authority or that the employee had a good faith belief that it was. Tex. Dep’t
of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 320 (Tex. 2002). An employee’s belief is in good
faith if: (1) the employee believed that the governmental entity qualified, and (2) the
employee’s belief was reasonable in light of the employee’s training and experience. Id.
at 321. While the first element is subjective, the second element is an objective one: the
reporting employee only receives Whistleblower Act protection if a reasonably prudent
employee in similar circumstances would have believed the governmental entity to which
he reported a violation of law was an appropriate authority. Id. at 320–21.
An authority’s power to discipline its own or investigate internally does not support
a good-faith belief that it is an appropriate law enforcement authority. Univ. of Tex. Sw.
Med. Ctr. v. Gentilello, 398 S.W.3d 680, 686 (Tex. 2013). Instead, the authority must have
outward-looking powers. McMillen v. Tex. Health & Human Serv. Comm’n., 485 S.W.3d
427, 429 (Tex. 2016). “It must have the authority to enforce, investigate, or prosecute
violations of law against third parties outside of the entity itself, or it must have authority
to promulgate regulations governing the conduct of such third parties.” Gentilello, 398
S.W.3d at 686. Under the Act, the authority’s power to “regulate under” or “enforce” must
pertain to “the law alleged to be violated in the report.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
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§ 554.002(b)(1).
Because “the particular law the public employee reported[ly] violated is critical to
the determination” of whether the authority is an appropriate law enforcement authority,
we begin by examining the statute, which prompted Ruiz’s complaint that a Raymondville
ISD police officer violated allegedly violated. See McMillen, 485 S.W.3d at 429 (quoting
Needham, 82 S.W.3d at 320). Ruiz argues that the officer’s action fell under the provisions
of official oppression. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.03. Official oppression is defined
as follows:
(a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment
commits an offense if he:
(1) intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest,
detention, search, seizure, dispossession, assessment, or
lien that he knows is unlawful;
(2) intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or
enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing
his conduct is unlawful; or
(3) intentionally subjects another to sexual harassment.
Id.
Ruiz believed the behavior he reported to his superior constituted official
oppression. Ruiz’s letter stated the officer in question asked other officers to take
photographs of Ruiz and another employee, that the officer reported Ruiz to the Chief
when he changed the parking procedures at an event he worked, and repeatedly told
other officers that Ruiz was a “nobody” in the department. Ruiz stated he felt that the
officer’s behavior conflicted with the employee handbook’s requirement that employees
“were expected to work together in a cooperative spirit . . . and be courteous to one
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another.”
We conclude that Ruiz could have believed that the officer’s treatment of him
constituted “mistreatment” as contained in the official oppression statute. See Ryser v.
State, 453 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (stating that
“mistreatment is not defined by statute”). Based on the evidence attached to the parties’
responses in the trial court, other employees of Raymondville ISD stated that the behavior
complained of could be oppressive behavior. Therefore, there was evidence of a good
faith belief on the part of Ruiz and genuine issue of material fact on this requirement. See
Town of Shady Shores, 590 S.W.3d at 552.
The Whistleblower Act also required Ruiz to make his complaint to an appropriate
law enforcement authority. Even though he reported it to the Chief of Police as his
“immediate supervisor,” the Raymondville ISD Police Department has “outward-looking
powers” and the authority to enforce and investigate violations of the Texas Penal Code,
including oppressive conduct. See McMillen, 485 S.W.3d at 429; Gentilello, 398 S.W.3d
at 686. Raymondville ISD Police Department qualifies as an “appropriate law enforcement
authority” under the Texas Whistleblower Act because it had the authority to investigate
the violation of criminal law alleged by Ruiz. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.002(b)(2).
The trial court did not err in denying Raymondville ISD’s plea to the jurisdiction.
Here, there was enough evidence to establish Ruiz acted under a good faith belief and
there was evidence presented to the trial court that showed a genuine issue of material
fact. See Town of Shady Shores, 590 S.W.3d at 552. We overrule Raymondville ISD’s
sole issue.
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III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s ruling.
GINA M. BENAVIDES
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
4th day of March, 2021.
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