Myles v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 20-875C

(Filed: February 19, 2021)

************************************ *

RONALD R. MYLES, JR., *

*

Plaintiff, *

* Pro Se Prisoner Claim; Collateral Attack

v. * on Criminal Conviction; Seizure of

* Property During Criminal Proceedings;

THE UNITED STATES, * Fifth Amendment Takings Claim; RCFC

* 12(b)(1); RCFC 12(b)(6)

Defendant. *

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Ronald R. Myles, Jr., Glenville, WV, pro se.

Zachary J. Sullivan, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

SWEENEY, Senior Judge

Plaintiff Ronald R. Myles, Jr., a prisoner in a federal corrections facility proceeding pro

se, asserts that he was wronged during his prosecution and conviction for armed bank robbery.

He seeks the return of confiscated property and hundreds of millions of dollars in damages.

Defendant moves to dismiss Mr. Myles’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction and, in the

alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons set forth

below, the court grants defendant’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Myles was arrested in 2016 and was found guilty on two counts of armed bank

robbery for bank robberies that took place on June 4 and June 17, 2016. 1 Compl. Exs. 9-10.

When he was arrested, authorities confiscated more than $137,000 in cash, marijuana, and a

Mercedes, along with other personal property. Id. at 9. As part of the proceedings in federal

district court, he moved to suppress evidence found in his hotel room and for the return of the

confiscated personal property. Id. at 10. His appeal of the district court’s rejection of his request

was denied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (“Sixth Circuit”). See id.

1

The court derives this background information from the complaint and attachments

thereto. Page references to these materials are provided by the court’s electronic filing system.

at 9-11; see also United States v. Myles, No. 17-3817, slip op. at 5 (6th Cir. Feb. 21, 2019)

(affirming district court’s judgment), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2679 (2019).

Mr. Myles is currently serving his sentence. In his complaint filed on July 13, 2020, the

following allegations are presented and give shape to his claims: (1) the district court engaged in

an “illegal Appellate Review” of a state court “warrant Ruling” rendered on July 21, 2016,

Compl. 4; (2) his conviction in federal district court was “invalid,” id. at 5; (3) he was the subject

of “malicious prosecution,” id. at 4, 6; (4) he is owed “pain and suffering” damages as well as

other kinds of damages related to the interruption of his music career, id. at 5-7; (5) he has been

the subject of “cruel” punishment in prison, id.; and (6) he has been deprived of his private

property, i.e., $150,000 in cash seized at the time of his arrest, id. He seeks $300,150,000 in

monetary compensation from the United States, composed of the following four elements:

$100,000,000 for “music & career damages/potential royalties”; $100,000,000 for the violation

of various laws and constitutional rights; $100,000,000 for the “Pain and Suffering value on the

level of his music career,” also characterized as “Punitive Damages”; and $150,000 for the

seized cash that was “taken by the Federal Government.” Id. at 6-8. Given that Mr. Myles also

seeks “Pro Se Legal Fees” at a rate of fifty percent of any damages award, his fee request could

add as much as $150,075,000 to the monetary compensation he requests in this suit. Id. at 8.

Defendant responded to the complaint by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”), arguing that the

court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Myles’s claims and, alternatively, pursuant to RCFC

12(b)(6), contending that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Mr. Myles responded to the motion by filing a document titled “Plaintiff[’]s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Rule 56),” which the court deemed a combined response brief and motion

for summary judgment. The court stayed proceedings on the summary judgment motion pending

the resolution of defendant’s motion to dismiss. Defendant then filed a reply in support of its

motion to dismiss. Because the court deems oral argument unnecessary, the motion is ripe for

adjudication.

II. Standards of Review

A. Pro Se Plaintiffs

Pro se pleadings are “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers” and are “to be liberally construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per

curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, the “leniency afforded

to a pro se litigant with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meet

jurisdictional requirements.” Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007); accord

Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The fact that [the plaintiff] acted pro

se in the drafting of his complaint may explain its ambiguities, but it does not excuse its failures,

if such there be.”). In other words, a pro se plaintiff is not excused from his burden of proving,

by a preponderance of evidence, that the court possesses jurisdiction. See Banks v. United

States, 741 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv.,

846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).

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B. Motion to Dismiss Under RCFC 12(b)(1)

When considering whether to dismiss a complaint for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to

RCFC 12(b)(1), the court assumes that the allegations in the complaint are true and construes

those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor. Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d

1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction to decide the

merits of a case is a threshold matter. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,

94-95 (1998). “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is

power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is

that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)

506, 514 (1868).

The ability of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“Court of Federal Claims”) to

entertain suits against the United States is limited. “The United States, as sovereign, is immune

from suit save as it consents to be sued.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).

The waiver of immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” United

States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969).

The Tucker Act, the principal statute governing the jurisdiction of this court, waives

sovereign immunity for claims against the United States that are founded upon the United States

Constitution, a federal statute or regulation, or an express or implied contract with the United

States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). However, the Tucker Act is merely a jurisdictional statute and

“does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages.”

United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). Instead, the substantive right must appear in

another source of law, such as a “money-mandating constitutional provision, statute or regulation

that has been violated, or an express or implied contract with the United States.” Loveladies

Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).

To determine whether it has jurisdiction, the court discerns the true nature of the claims

in the complaint and is not constrained by the plaintiff’s characterization of those claims. Katz v.

Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1994). If the court finds that it lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over a claim, RCFC 12(h)(3) requires the court to dismiss that claim.

C. Motion to Dismiss Under RCFC 12(b)(6)

A claim is subject to dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6) if it does not provide a basis for the

court to grant relief. Lindsay v. United States, 295 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“A motion

to dismiss . . . for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is appropriate when

the facts asserted by the claimant do not entitle him to a legal remedy.”). To avoid dismissal

under the rule, a plaintiff must include in his complaint “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In other

words, a plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In ruling on such a motion, the court must

“accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at

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94 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56). Further, “a court ‘must consider the complaint in its

entirety, . . . in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters

of which a court may take judicial notice.’” Rocky Mountain Helium, LLC v. United States, 841

F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.

308, 322 (2007)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Mr. Myles’s Principal Claim, a Collateral Attack on His Criminal Conviction, Must Be

Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction

In his complaint, Mr. Myles focuses primarily on his criminal conviction and the

“catastrophic financial damage” of that conviction on his life and music career. Compl. 5. This

is not the forum, however, to attempt to reverse the conviction that has affected his life. 2 As

defendant notes in its motion to dismiss, this court has no jurisdiction to review the validity of a

criminal conviction in a federal district court. See Def.’s Mot. 1 (citing Joshua v. United States,

17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Perkins v. United States, No. 13-023C, 2013 WL 3958350, at

*3 (Fed. Cl. July 31, 2013)). Because in this suit Mr. Myles’s primary claim challenges aspects

of federal district court criminal proceedings and his conviction and sentencing for armed bank

robbery, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the claim, which is, at bottom, a collateral attack

on his conviction. See Joshua, 17 F.3d at 380 (stating that “the Court of Federal Claims does not

have jurisdiction to review the decisions of district courts”).

Mr. Myles also fails to identify a money-mandating source of law that supports Tucker

Act jurisdiction for the claims underlying his attack on his criminal conviction. Cf. id. (affirming

the dismissal of a prisoner’s suit for lack of jurisdiction on the additional ground that he “did not

identify any substantive right, founded upon either a money mandating statute or the

Constitution, which might form the basis for his claim”). First, Mr. Myles repeatedly asserts that

the federal district court did not respect an evidentiary ruling of a state court. Compl. 2-8; Pl.’s

Resp. 3-6, 9-11.

Specifically, Mr. Myles contends that there was an irreconcilable conflict between, on

one hand, the state court’s ruling on the status of various search and arrest warrants and, on the

other hand, the validity of the search warrant that authorized the use of evidence obtained in his

hotel room. See Compl. 4-5 (stating that a state court ruling on July 21, 2016, invalidated the

search warrant that uncovered the evidence critical to his federal conviction on two counts of

armed bank robbery). Based on his interpretation of a statement made by the state court judge

and subsequent events, Mr. Myles contends that his federal conviction violates the full faith and

2

It appears from one of the documents attached to the complaint that Mr. Myles recently

advanced similar arguments in a federal district court suit where he sought $100,000,000 in

damages from the United States. Compl. Exs. 12-14. Once Mr. Myles’s district court complaint

was dismissed sua sponte on May 18, 2020, id., he turned to this court less than two months

later.

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credit provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1738. 3

Mr. Myles’s claim based an alleged violation of § 1738 is not within this court’s

jurisdiction. The first step in the jurisdictional inquiry is to determine whether § 1738 is a

money-mandating statute. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en

banc) (stating that “the trial court at the outset shall determine . . . whether the Constitutional

provision, statute, or regulation is one that is money-mandating”). As defendant notes in its

motion to dismiss, this court has held that the full faith and credit provision in the United States

Constitution, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, which is applied to federal courts by the full faith and

credit language in § 1738, Graybill v. U.S. Postal Serv., 782 F.2d 1567, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1986), is

not money-mandating so as to establish Tucker Act jurisdiction for claims in this court. See

Brown v. United States, No. 19-671C, 2019 WL 5681549, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 1, 2019) (citing

Republic of New Morocco v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 463, 468 (2011)). Because § 1738 is not

money-mandating, an alleged violation of § 1738 is not a claim within this court’s Tucker Act

jurisdiction.

In addition, Mr. Myles’s malicious prosecution claim, to the extent that claim could be

distinguished from the collateral attack on his criminal conviction, is also outside of this court’s

jurisdiction because it sounds in tort. See, e.g., Bennett v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 300, 300-01

(1961) (describing a malicious prosecution claim as a tort claim and dismissing the claim for

lack of jurisdiction); Hernandez v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 195, 203 (2010) (same); C.B.C.

Enters., Inc. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 1, 2 (1991) (same); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)

(excluding claims “sounding in tort” from Tucker Act jurisdiction). Mr. Myles also includes in

the complaint a long list of constitutional rights that were allegedly violated by his prosecution,

conviction, and incarceration, Compl. 8, but the constitutional provisions guaranteeing those

rights—the Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments—are not money-mandating so

as to support Tucker Act jurisdiction in this court. See Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621,

623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Fourth Amendment not money-mandating); Trafny v. United States, 503

F.3d 1339, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Eighth Amendment not money-mandating); Milgroom v.

United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 779, 800 (2015) (Tenth Amendment not money-mandating), aff’d,

651 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2016); LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir.

1995) (Fourteenth Amendment not money-mandating).

Because none of the sources of law relied upon by Mr. Myles for the claims underlying

his attack on his criminal conviction is money-mandating, dismissal of these claims for lack of

jurisdiction is appropriate. See Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1173 (“If the court’s conclusion is that the

source as alleged and pleaded is not money-mandating, the court shall so declare, and shall

dismiss the cause for lack of jurisdiction, a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal—the absence of a money-

mandating source being fatal to the court’s jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.”).

In sum, Mr. Myles’s principal claim is a collateral attack on his criminal conviction. This

3

The Sixth Circuit rejected Mr. Myles’s challenge to the legitimacy of the search

warrant and the evidence used to convict him. Compl. Exs. 11-12; see also Myles, slip op. at 4.

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court of limited jurisdiction does not serve as an appellate forum for Mr. Myles to challenge the

federal district court proceedings that have, in his view, cost him millions of dollars in damages.

See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 898, 900 (1981) (“If plaintiff had valid

constitutional defenses to his convictions on criminal charges, he should have asserted them on

appeal in the proper court. This is not such a court and he cannot here be heard to make a

collateral attack on his convictions under the guise of a claim for money damages.”). Mr.

Myles’s claim for money damages related to the impact of his conviction on his life and career

must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court turns next to Mr. Myles’s

other claims: a takings claim and a breach-of-contract claim.

B. Mr. Myles’s Remaining Claims Must Be Dismissed for Failure to State a Claim Upon

Which Relief Can Be Granted

1. Property Seizure During Arrest Does Not Give Rise to a Takings Claim

Once defendant filed its motion to dismiss, Mr. Myles expanded upon the nature of his

claims and explicitly asserted that one of his claims was founded on the Takings Clause of the

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 4 Pl.’s Resp. 6. The argument he makes in

this regard is that the cash in his possession at the time of his arrest, $150,000, was private

property that was taken for public use when it was seized, and that he is now owed just

compensation in the amount of $150,000. Id. at 4-8. But as this court has held, seizure of

property in the course of a criminal investigation is not a taking under the Fifth Amendment. See

Seay v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 32, 35 (2004) (“The reason that these claims do not amount to

a taking is because items properly seized by the government under its police power are not seized

for ‘public use’ within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.”). Property seizures in the course

of a criminal investigation, in other words, are not a valid basis for a takings claim. See Acadia

Tech., Inc. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1327, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“When property has been

seized pursuant to the criminal laws . . . , such deprivations are not ‘takings’ for which the owner

is entitled to compensation.”). Thus, Mr. Myles’s claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth

Amendment must be dismissed pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. See Kam-Almaz v. United States, 682 F.3d 1364, 1371-72 (Fed.

Cir. 2012).

2. There Is No Plausible Contract Claim in Either the Complaint or Plaintiff’s Response

Brief

Finally, the court addresses plaintiff’s unexplained reference to a breach of contract by

4

In his response brief, Mr. Myles also references, without explanation, a “contract” as

support for his allegation that this court possesses jurisdiction over his claims, a topic that will be

discussed in Section III.B.2 of this opinion. See Pl.’s Resp. 1 (mentioning a “contractual

agreement enforceable against the defendant”), 4 (referencing a “5th Amendment contract

violation”), 7 (alluding to a “5th Amendment Takings Clause Contract”), 8 (employing the term

“breach of contract”).

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the United States in the context of his conviction for armed bank robbery. Pl.’s Resp. 8. The

court notes, first, that this theory is nowhere mentioned in the complaint, and only appeared in

plaintiff’s response brief after the court’s jurisdictional limits were discussed by defendant in its

motion to dismiss. To the extent that the complaint could now be read to have been informally

amended to include a breach-of-contract claim, such a claim is not plausible given the factual

allegations in the complaint.

Mr. Myles’s contract theory appears to be associated with the Fifth Amendment. See

Pl.’s Resp. 4 (referencing a “5th Amendment contract violation”), 7 (alluding to a “5th

Amendment Takings Clause contract”). If Mr. Myles is attempting to buttress his takings claim

with the addition of “contract” vocabulary extracted from the Tucker Act, see id. at 1-2 (quoting

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) and underlining the words “any express or implied contract”), his takings

claim, discussed in Section III.B.1 of this opinion, is unimproved by the addition of the word

“contract” and still must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

Mr. Myles does not explain his reference to a contract that was breached by the United

States. However, he acknowledges that certain elements must be pled to state a plausible

contract claim. Pl.’s Resp. 8 (citing San Carlos Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. United States, 877

F.2d 957, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). The four required elements are: “(1) a valid contract between

the parties, (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract, (3) a breach of that duty, and

(4) damages caused by the breach.” San Carlos Irrigation & Drainage Dist., 877 F.2d at 959.

Mr. Myles has not alleged any of the first three elements so as to state a plausible contract claim.

For this reason, to the extent that the complaint was informally amended to include a contract

claim, that claim must be dismissed pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. See, e.g., Bell/Heery v. United States, 739 F.3d 1324, 1326, 1334

(Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming a dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6) where the elements of a breach of

contract claim were not plausibly alleged).

IV. CONCLUSION

There is no jurisdiction in this court for the claims stated by Mr. Myles in his complaint,

except for a takings claim that was not presented with any clarity until his response brief was

filed and, even then, the allegations failed to state a claim. The court therefore grants

defendant’s motion to dismiss brought under RCFC 12(b)(1). Mr. Myles’s takings claim and his

contract claim, which was only presented informally in his response brief, must also be

dismissed; therefore, the court grants defendant’s motion to dismiss those two claims under

RCFC 12(b)(6).

Consequently, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss, DENIES plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment as moot, DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the claims in

the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, except for his takings and contract claims, and

DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the takings and contract claims for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.

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As for the filing fee that is due and owing for having brought this lawsuit, the court

granted Mr. Myles’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and waived his prepayment of the

filing fee. Notwithstanding the court’s waiver, prisoners seeking to proceed in forma pauperis

are required to pay, over time, the filing fee in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). Thus, Mr. Myles shall

be assessed, as a partial payment of the court’s filing fee, an initial sum of twenty percent of the

greater of (1) the average monthly deposits into his account, or (2) the average monthly balance

in his account for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint. See

id. § 1915(b)(1). Thereafter, Mr. Myles shall be required to make monthly payments of twenty

percent of the preceding month’s income credited to his account. See id. § 1915(b)(2). The

agency having custody of Mr. Myles shall forward payments from his account to the clerk of the

Court of Federal Claims each time the account balance exceeds $10 and until such time as the

filing fee is paid in full. See id.

No costs are awarded. The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. Further, the

court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be

taken in good faith because, as alleged, Mr. Myles’s claims are clearly beyond the subject matter

jurisdiction of this court or clearly fail as a matter of law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

MARGARET M. SWEENEY

Senior Judge

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