Opinion

Cesar Martinez-Baez v. Monty Wilkinson

  • 986 F.3d 966
Court
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Filed
Feb 1, 2021
Status
Published
On the bench
Wood
Nature of suit
agency
Cited by
8 cases
Authority
More cited than 65.6%

explaining that a “procedural” contention “that the [Board] has completely ig- nored the evidence put forth by a petitioner” amounts to an allegation of “legal” error for purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(D) (in- ternal quotation marks omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that a “procedural” contention “that the [Board] has completely ig- nored the evidence put forth by a petitioner” amounts to an allegation of “legal” error for purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(D) (in- ternal quotation marks omitted)
  • granting petition for review where immigration judge ignored evidence of daughter’s developmental delay
  • emphasizing that “the [Board] does not commit an error of law every time an item of evidence is not explicitly considered or is described with imperfect accuracy”
  • “the [Board] does not commit an ‘error of law’ every time an item of evidence is not explicitly considered or is described with imperfect accuracy.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-1078

CESAR MARTINEZ-BAEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

MONTY WILKINSON,

Acting Attorney General of the United States,

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of an Order

of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A200-778-427

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 15, 2020 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 1, 2021

____________________

Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

WOOD, Circuit Judge. Cesar Martinez-Baez has been

fighting to remain in the United States ever since April 5, 2011,

when he first received notice of removal proceedings from the

immigration authorities. Martinez-Baez concedes that he is

removable, but he maintains that he is entitled to be

2 No. 20-1078

considered for discretionary cancellation of removal under

section 240A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The immigration judge did not see mat-

ters that way, finding instead that Martinez-Baez had not es-

tablished either of the legal prerequisites for cancellation:

10 years of continuous presence or exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship to a U.S. citizen relative. The Board of Im-

migration Appeals affirmed, and Martinez-Baez has now pe-

titioned this court for review.

We conclude that the Board was too quick to deny relief.

The IJ erred procedurally by failing to resolve whether

Martinez-Baez’s testimony about the most important fact in

this case—his date of entry—was credible. In addition, the IJ

and Board mischaracterized the evidence pertaining to the

asserted hardship. We therefore grant the petition and

remand for further proceedings.

I

Martinez-Baez was born in Veracruz, Mexico, in 1980. As

he tells it, in the summer of 2000 he unlawfully crossed the

U.S.-Mexico border. The exact date of his initial entry is un-

clear. The government agrees, however, that border patrol

agents apprehended Martinez-Baez and returned him to

Mexico three times in June of 2000. Martinez-Baez testified

that after his third return, he again slipped back into the coun-

try and at last succeeded in remaining undetected. If that is

true, then the starting point for his stay in the United States is

around late June or July of 2000.

After crossing the border, Martinez-Baez headed north to

Lake Geneva, Wisconsin, which is located about an hour

north-northwest of Chicago. There he purchased a social

No. 20-1078 3

security and work permit card for $60 under the assumed

name of Waldemar Oquendo. He soon began working at a

plastics factory, where he remained for more than seven

years. The first time he filed a federal tax return was in 2002.

Martinez-Baez settled in Lake Geneva and eventually had

three U.S.-citizen children with his partner. His youngest

daughter, Melanie, was born in January of 2012. Since starting

kindergarten, Melanie has experienced speech and language

impairments that make it difficult for her to communicate and

to understand directions. As it was required to do, the Lake

Geneva School system created an Individualized Education

Program (“IEP”) for Melanie. See Wisc. Stat. §§ 115.76(9),

115.787; Wisc. Admin. Code PI 11.36(5)(a).

Eight months before Melanie was born, the Department of

Homeland Security served Martinez-Baez with a Notice to

Appear. The NTA, dated April 5, 2011, charged that he was

removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(6)(A)(i) for being present

in the United States without admission or inspection.

Martinez-Baez appeared before an IJ on June 26, 2012, and

conceded removability, but he indicated that he would seek

cancellation of removal—a discretionary form of relief

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.

In order to obtain cancellation of removal, a noncitizen

must demonstrate that he satisfies the applicable eligibility re-

quirements and that he merits a favorable exercise of discre-

tion. § 1229a(c)(4)(A); see Perez-Fuentes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 506,

508 (7th Cir. 2016). There are four threshold eligibility require-

ments. Cancellation is possible, though not guaranteed, if the

noncitizen:

4 No. 20-1078

(A) has been physically present in the United States

for a continuous period of not less than 10 years imme-

diately preceding the date of [his] application;

(B) has been a person of good moral character dur-

ing such period;

(C) has not been convicted of an offense under sec-

tion 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) of this title,

subject to paragraph (5); and

(D) establishes that removal would result in excep-

tional and extremely unusual hardship to the [nonciti-

zen’s] spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the

United States or [a noncitizen] lawfully admitted for

permanent residence.

§ 1229b(b)(1). On May 25, 2018, the IJ denied relief, holding

that Martinez-Baez had failed to establish continuous pres-

ence (subpart A) and hardship (subpart D).

Although Martinez-Baez initially testified that he entered

in May or June of 2000, the IJ noted in his eventual decision

that “on cross-examination [Martinez-Baez] admitted that it

may have been July, 2000.” The judge then remarked: “How-

ever, there is no corroborative documentation for either 2000

or 2001.” He further noted that “[t]he respondent testified that

his documents under the name ‘Waldmaro [sic] Oquendo’

were lost,” and that “although [Martinez-Baez] stated that he

immediately obtained a job with a plastics factory (and main-

tained employment over the course of the next seven years),

he did not submit a letter to confirm this despite the fact that

his partner and the mother of their children … is employed

there now.” Last, the IJ noted that in Martinez-Baez’s

No. 20-1078 5

application for relief, he wrote that he started working for the

plastics factory in July 2002.

The IJ also held that Martinez-Baez had not shown that

Melanie would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship if he were removed. Martinez-Baez had submitted

Melanie’s IEP to the IJ, and at the hearing, the IJ heard testi-

mony from Martinez-Baez and Tracy Mitten (a speech

pathologist at Lake Geneva Public schools who helped to craft

Melanie’s IEP and worked directly with Melanie). The IJ

nonetheless found the record incomplete and complained

that he had to assess the IEP “without sufficient guidance” to

determine how much hardship Melanie was likely to suffer

without her father. The IJ believed that

the testimonies of the witnesses (including the re-

spondent) did not adequately address, and therefore

did not adequately establish, the severity of her condi-

tion, the impact (both short-term and long term) of the

respondent’s departure (with or without her), the

availability of similar treatment in Mexico if she were

to accompany him, why treatment would necessarily

have to be discontinued if he were to return to Mexico

alone, and her future prognosis.

The IJ thus denied relief. On appeal, the Board of Immigration

Appeals “adopted and affirmed” the portion of the IJ’s

decision pertaining to the hardship criterion. Holding that a

lack of hardship to Melanie sufficed to deny relief, the Board

dismissed the appeal; it declined to reach the continuous-

presence issue.

On January 14, 2020, Martinez-Baez asked us to review his

case. He maintained that the IJ’s decision was arbitrary and

6 No. 20-1078

capricious because the judge “failed to consider relevant tes-

timony of the Petitioner and the witness.” The Acting Attor-

ney General maintains that the IJ considered those testimo-

nies at length, and that apart from the merits of Martinez-

Baez’s claims, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips this court of ju-

risdiction even to entertain this petition.

II

The government correctly notes that the courts generally

lack jurisdiction to review denials of discretionary relief. Sec-

tion 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) of the statute provides that “no court shall

have jurisdiction to review,” among other things, any judg-

ment regarding the granting of relief under section 1229b

(cancellation of removal). But there are exceptions. Section

1252(a)(2)(D) limits the jurisdiction-stripping language of sec-

tion 1252(a)(2)(B) by providing that nothing in that section

“shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional

claims or questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). We have

interpreted the phrase “questions of law” in subparagraph

(D) narrowly, holding that legal questions are present only

when the “Board misinterprets a statute, regulation, constitu-

tional provision, or its own precedent, applies the wrong legal

standard, or fails to exercise its discretion at all.” Bachynskyy

v. Holder, 668 F.3d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 2011).

On this understanding, we often have declined to exercise

jurisdiction over removal cases in which the petitioner

wanted us to review whether a legal standard was correctly

applied to the facts of her case. Musa v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 1019,

1023 (7th Cir. 2016). We reasoned that the mere presence of a

“legal standard” on which the IJ or Board based its decision

could not give rise to a justiciable “legal question” under sec-

tion 1252(a)(2)(D). Our restraint has been founded on a belief

No. 20-1078 7

that if we were to proceed otherwise, “nearly all factual deter-

minations would fall within our jurisdiction despite Con-

gress’ mandate to the contrary.” Adebowale v. Mukasey, 546

F.3d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 2008). To avoid that result—one that we

have deemed inconsistent with the statutory scheme—we

have taken the position that a “question of law” does not arise

when the issue relates to the application of a legal standard to

the facts of the case—i.e. a mixed question of law and fact.

It is possible that we have drawn too strict a line. Recently

the Supreme Court read the jurisdictional grant more gener-

ously. See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020). The

issue before the Court in that case concerned the Board’s de-

nial of the petitioner’s request for equitable tolling—a deci-

sion that required the Board to determine, in its discretion,

whether an applicant had exercised “diligence” in pursuing

his claim. The Fifth Circuit had found that it was barred from

reviewing the Board’s action because the question whether an

alien was diligent for purposes of equitable tolling was a fac-

tual one, outside the scope of section 1252(a)(2)(D).

The Supreme Court did not see the case that way. It de-

scribed the question before it as follows: “whether the statu-

tory phrase ‘questions of law’ includes the application of a le-

gal standard to undisputed or established facts.” 140 S. Ct. at

1068. The answer, it held, is yes. In the case before it, the peti-

tioners had been found to be removable based on certain

crimes they had committed. Section 1252(a)(2)(C) describes

the outer bounds of judicial review for such “orders against

criminal aliens,” and contains a jurisdiction-stripping provi-

sion functionally identical to the one found in section

1252(a)(2)(B)(i), the part of the statute that limits judicial re-

view of denials of discretionary relief. As is the case with

8 No. 20-1078

section 1252(a)(2)(B), subparagraph (C)’s jurisdictional re-

striction is limited by subparagraph (D). We see nothing in the

language or logic of Guerrero-Lasprilla that would indicate that

its holding is limited to subparagraph (C). It thus may be the

case that, to the extent that Martinez-Baez raises either pure

legal questions or “the application of a legal standard to un-

disputed or established facts,” he may take advantage of sec-

tion 242(a)(2)(D).

This case does not require us ultimately to take a position

on that issue. But it is a serious question. On the one hand,

both the Department of Justice and several of our sister

circuits have read Guerrero-Lasprilla not to go that far. The

Acting Attorney General argues that Guerrero-Lasprilla’s

“silence” (his word, not ours) on whether subparagraph (D)

“permits review of agency exercises of discretion” must mean

that Guerrero-Lasprilla did not authorize subparagraph (D) to

cover the discretionary decisions enumerated in

subparagraph (B). Persuaded by that reasoning, the Tenth

Circuit has held that Guerrero-Lasprilla notwithstanding,

subparagraph (D) does not authorize courts to review “how

the Board exercises its discretion,” even if that entails how the

Board applies an acknowledged legal standard to a

discretionary decision. Galeano-Romero v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1176,

1183–84 (10th Cir. 2020). And the Fifth Circuit recently held

that Guerrero-Lasprilla did not displace its jurisdiction-limiting

precedent, because its restraint is “not based on whether [a

discretionary decision] is too ‘factual’ to be a ‘question[ ] of

law,’” but is instead based “on the simple observation that the

Attorney Generalʹs power [to make that decision] is purely

discretionary.” Nastase v. Barr, 964 F.3d 313, 320 (5th Cir.

2020).

No. 20-1078 9

On the other hand, our sister circuits may have skipped

too quickly over the text of the statute, as now construed in

Guerrero-Lasprilla. Although “a subchapter heading cannot

substitute for the operative text of the statute,” Florida Dept. of

Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008), the

Supreme Court has recognized that “statutory titles and sec-

tions headings are tools available for the resolution of a doubt

about the meaning of a statute.” Id. (citations and quotation

marks omitted). With that in mind, we observe that the head-

ing of section 1252(a)(2)(B) provides that “Matters not subject

to judicial review” include “Denials of discretionary relief.”

Section 1252(a)(2)(B) then says that “no court shall have juris-

diction to review” the discretionary decisions enumerated

within that section “except as provided in subparagraph (D).”

(Emphasis added). Turning to subparagraph (D), we are told

that “nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C) … shall be construed

as precluding review” of constitutional claims or legal ques-

tions. Guerrero-Lasprilla may thus indicate that courts have a

role to play if, antecedent to or embedded in a discretionary

call, there is a constitutional claim or a question of law.

Such an interpretation would not wreak havoc with the

statutory review scheme. Many discretionary decisions will

be unaffected by a nonfrivolous question of law, and thus

they will continue to be unreviewable pursuant to the general

rule of subparagraph (B) or (C). Discretion normally has some

boundaries, however, and courts are authorized under sub-

paragraph (D) to ensure that those statutory limits are re-

spected. The Guerrero-Lasprilla Court was concerned about the

risk of unduly constricting the scope of section 1252(a)(2)(D),

which it dubbed the Limited Review Provision. 140 S. Ct. at

1067. The Court ruled as it did in order to preserve the respec-

tive roles of sections 1252(a)(2)(D) and the two subparagraphs

10 No. 20-1078

that it affects. To hold that review is never possible so long as

the Board accurately recites the letter of the law, the Court

warned, would permit the Board perpetually to evade review

of a great number of legal issues. 140 S. Ct. at 1070.

As we said, however, we do not need to wrestle these dif-

ficult questions to the ground. Pertinent to Martinez-Baez’s

case, we know that even if the final decision whether to cancel

removal is discretionary, legal questions can and do arise

along the way. We thus proceed to look at the issues before us

in accordance with our established cases.

III

The Board adopted and affirmed the decision of the IJ on

the “presence” issue without supplementing the IJ’s

reasoning. Thus, the relevant “final agency determination”

for our review is the IJ’s decision. See Hussain v. Gonzales, 424

F.3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2005). Martinez-Baez’s appeal presents

procedural questions, which are legal in nature. The first is

whether an IJ commits error when he fails to make an express

credibility finding, and then holds that gap in the record

against the applicant. Such an error would go to the

procedural sufficiency of the hearing, which is a legal point.

See Perez-Fuentes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 2016).

The second question relates to the hardship issue and the IJ’s

and Board’s application of the standard for such evidence to

the facts before them.

A. Continuous Presence

The first requirement for cancellation of removal under

section 1229b(b)(1) requires that the applicant establish con-

tinuous physical presence for at least the 10 years immedi-

ately preceding his receipt of a Notice to Appear. Duron-Ortiz

No. 20-1078 11

v. Holder, 698 F.3d 523, 527 (7th Cir. 2012). The burden is on

the applicant to establish continuous presence.

§ 1229a(c)(4)(B). The IJ has the authority to order that the “ap-

plicant should provide evidence which corroborates other-

wise credible testimony,” and the applicant “must” comply

“unless [he] demonstrates that [he] does not have the evi-

dence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” Id.

1

The only evidence that Martinez-Baez produced to estab-

lish continuous presence was his own testimony at the May 7,

2018 removal hearing. Prompted by his attorney, he initially

stated that he had “entered in June of 2000” and began work-

ing at a plastics factory soon after. On cross examination, the

government’s attorney asked Martinez-Baez whether he had

any documents to show he was in the United State before

2002, because the earliest documentary evidence on record

was a 2002 tax return. Martinez-Baez replied, “Well, yes. I had

some documents. I don’t really know what happened. I had

them under the other name, name of Waldemar Oquendo, but

I think they were lost. I, I lost them, but I, I also had an ac-

count, a bank account, and also, they should have records at

the factory that I worked in.”

Right after this exchange, the government’s attorney

sought to impeach Martinez-Baez’s account of his date of en-

try by asking whether he recalled being returned to Mexico

by border patrol agents in the summer of 2000. Martinez-Baez

said yes. The government’s attorney then asked whether he

could recall in which month those returns took place:

A: Not exactly, but since I remember I got here in June,

possibly in May it would have been.

12 No. 20-1078

Q: So, would it surprise you to know that all three of

those returns were in July 2000?

A: Well, I donʹt remember exactly. I really donʹt re-

member exactly whether it’s June or July, but they

were one after the other. So, after that, I didnʹt go and

do it again.

Q: Okay. And then right after that, is that when you

came into the United States?

A: Just right after that, yes.

Q: Okay. So is it fair to say you did not enter the United

States in June of 2000?

A: Well, the truth is I donʹt remember exactly, so itʹs

difficult for me to say yes or no. What I do remember

is that I came in either in June or July.

The IJ ultimately held that Martinez-Baez failed to carry

his burden of establishing continuous presence. In his opin-

ion, the IJ criticized what he saw as Martinez-Baez backtrack-

ing on cross-examination about his precise date of entry and

the lack of “corroborative evidence for either 2000 or 2001.”

This latter point seemed especially to trouble him. He also re-

marked that Martinez-Baez had not managed to produce a

letter to confirm his alleged employment in the plastics fac-

tory, “despite the fact that his partner and the mother of their

children … is employed there now.” He also noted the lack of

any corroboration that Martinez-Baez had a bank account in

2000.

2

The INA grants the IJ discretion to ask for corroborative

evidence to support an applicant’s petition for relief. If asked,

No. 20-1078 13

the applicant must either produce such evidence or explain

why he cannot do so. If he does neither, the IJ is authorized to

deny relief. See § 1229a(c)(4)(B); Weiping Chen v. Holder, 744

F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Unless [the applicant] can prove

that he could not have reasonably obtained corroborating ev-

idence, his failure to produce such evidence is ‘fatal to [his]

claims.’”). There is no need for an IJ to warn the applicant of

the consequences of failing to furnish the corroborative evi-

dence before making an adverse ruling. See Rapheal v.

Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 530 (7th Cir. 2008).

Nonetheless, when a credibility finding is “inextricably in-

tertwined with the IJ’s ruling on the need for corroborative

evidence,” Id. at 528, the Board must consider the applicant’s

“credibility before ruling on the need for corroborative evi-

dence.” Id. Logically, this implies that when an IJ says nothing

about credibility, yet later based his decision on the appli-

cant’s failure to produce evidence supporting otherwise un-

disputed testimony, he commits procedural error.

3

The INA expressly imposes on the IJ the duty to make and

explain his credibility finding in removal proceedings:

In evaluating the testimony of the applicant or other

witness in support of the application, the immigration

judge will determine whether or not the testimony is

credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts suffi-

cient to demonstrate that the applicant has satisfied the

applicant’s burden of proof. In determining whether

the applicant has met such burden, the immigration

14 No. 20-1078

judge shall weigh the credible testimony along with

other evidence of record.

8 USC § 1229a(c)(4)(B) (emphasis added). As used here, the

word “will” reflects a mandate. See Garner’s Dictionary of Le-

gal Usage 947 (3d ed. 2011) (Will: “must”). (The other possi-

bility is as an indicator of the future tense, but no one would

read the language quoted above that way.) And this determi-

nation must take place during the process of evaluating the

testimony.

The second sentence in the excerpt tells the IJ that he

“shall” weigh the “credible testimony along with other evi-

dence of record” when determining whether the applicant

has met his burden of proof. § 1229a(c)(4)(B). The word

“shall” typically connotes a command, not a discretionary op-

tion, and that is how the INA consistently uses it. For exam-

ple, it states that the “immigration judge shall administer

oaths, receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-

examine the alien and any witnesses.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1)

(emphasis added). In order to carry out his duty under section

1229a(c)(4)(B), the IJ must know which evidence falls on the

“credible” side of the line, and which does not. And for our

purposes, meaningful review is possible only if we know how

the IJ assessed the evidence—indeed, we are barred from

making an independent determination on that factual issue.

See Boadi v. Holder, 706 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 2013).

Section 1229a(c)(4)(C) concludes by establishing what

happens if for some reason the IJ fails to make an express

credibility finding: “There is no presumption of credibility[;]

however, if no adverse credibility determination is explicitly

made, the applicant or witness shall have a rebuttable pre-

sumption of credibility on appeal.” (Emphasis added.) In

No. 20-1078 15

other words, at the outset there is no presumption in favor of

the applicant’s credibility, but if the IJ makes no express find-

ing on the point, then a rebuttable presumption of credibility

arises.

4

In Martinez-Baez’s case, the IJ failed to make this critical

finding. Instead, in his brief discussion of the continuous-

presence requirement, the judge noted only that “the

respondent has not presented sufficient probative evidence”

and that he has not furnished “corroborative documentation

for either 2000 or 2001.” (Emphasis added). (Recall that any

arrival time before April 5, 2001, would have sufficed to

satisfy the ten-year rule.) In addition, the judge specifically

stated that Martinez-Baez was not barred from relief because

of his moral character. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). What we do not

know is whether this was a back-handed way of saying that

Martinez-Baez’s testimony was not credible, or if the IJ

thought the testimony was credible (perhaps noting that the

evidence of his unsuccessful efforts in 2000 to cross the border

provided some corroboration for a 2000 arrival). If we could

read it as a credibility finding, then we would defer to the IJ’s

finding. But we cannot squeeze a credibility finding out of this

record. That leaves us with a missing step: an express

assessment of credibility. This is not a procedural gap that we

are authorized to fill.

Martinez-Baez’s case is similar to Rapheal v. Mukasey, su-

pra, 533 F.3d 521. There, based on an inconsistency between

the content of the applicant’s testimony and an earlier written

representation to the court, an IJ found that the testimony was

not credible. 533 F.3d at 524–25. The critical question was

whether the applicant’s family name, Rapheal, would make

16 No. 20-1078

her vulnerable to persecution if she were returned to Liberia,

her country of origin. Id. She testified that her father, Michael

Rapheal, was well known as a supporter of the notorious

Charles Taylor regime, but there was a handwritten note indi-

cating that her maiden name was “Kocoker,” which was not

a family associated with Taylor. The IJ denied relief, holding

that she did not meet “her burden of proof through credible,

consistent testimony or a combination of testimony and cor-

roboration.” Id.

On appeal, the Board declined to reach the issue of Rap-

heal’s credibility, holding that it was sufficient for dismissal

that she “did not provide corroborative evidence and could

have done so.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). We granted her petition

for review and remanded. We reasoned that in cases such as

Rapheal’s—where the statute permits relief solely on the basis

of credible testimony and an IJ determines that corroborative

evidence is required because the applicant’s testimony is not

credible—the Board is required independently to assess cred-

ibility. Id. at 528. When the Board “bypasse[s] the credibility

finding,” the reviewing court is unable to ascertain whether

relief may have been granted had a positive finding of credi-

bility been made. Id.

The same principle holds at the IJ level (and recall, the

Board essentially adopted the IJ’s decision on this point). If

the IJ bypasses the credibility finding and demands corrobo-

rative evidence, we need to know whether the judge is doing

so in order to buttress otherwise credible testimony or to over-

come testimony that is not credible.

“This is not a case of the IJ ruling alternatively, i.e., holding

that even if [the applicant] were credible, her petition would

be denied because of the lack of corroborative evidence.” Id.

No. 20-1078 17

at 528. All we know here is that the IJ faulted Martinez-Baez

for not producing corroborative documentation. But we can-

not confidently forecast how the IJ might have weighed the

evidence of continuous presence in the final analysis, had he

made a positive credibility finding about Martinez-Baez’s tes-

timony. The IJ’s failure to make a credibility finding is thus a

procedural legal error.

The statute requires the IJ to make an express credibility

finding, both to ensure that the evidence is properly assessed,

and to facilitate meaningful review by both the Board and the

court. Because the IJ did not do so here, we cannot rely on this

ground for his decision. Perhaps the Board had a similar con-

cern, as it chose to rest its decision exclusively on the hardship

ground. We thus move on to that issue, recalling again that

Martinez-Baez may not prevail unless he can demonstrate re-

viewable error on both points.

B. Extreme Hardship

As we noted earlier, section 1229b(b)(1)(D) requires an al-

ien to “establish[] that removal would result in exceptional

and extremely unusual hardship to the [noncitizen’s] spouse,

parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States … .” For

this part of the case, we review the decision of the Board,

which found that “the respondent has not submitted suffi-

cient evidence to establish that the hardship to his U.S. citizen

would rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual

[sic] upon his removal to Mexico.” The requisite hardship for

this purpose must be “substantially different from, or beyond,

that which would be normally expected from the deportation

of an alien with close family members in the United States.”

Cruz–Moyaho v. Holder, 703 F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 2012) (quot-

ing In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (BIA 2001))

18 No. 20-1078

(alterations omitted). Notably, the Board has recognized that

a “strong applicant [for relief] might have a qualifying child

with very serious health issues, or compelling special needs

in school.” In Re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 63 (BIA

2001). Martinez-Baez contends that his daughter Melanie is

such a child.

1

We acknowledge at the outset that we lack jurisdiction to

review a petitioner’s contention that an agency should have

exercised discretion in his favor. Mireles v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d

965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006). We have applied this jurisdictional re-

straint to the Board’s determination of the factual question

whether the petitioner has shown “exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship” to the qualifying U.S. citizen. See Jimenez-

Aguilar v. Barr, 977 F.3d 603, 605 (7th Cir. 2020). Jurisdiction is

unavailable “whether the alien’s argument is that the agency

abused its discretion or that it failed to conduct a thorough

review of the record.” Mireles, 433 F.3d at 968.

In keeping with that rule, Martinez-Baez does not allege

that the IJ should have been more thorough in his review of

the record, or that he should have referred expressly to each

shred of evidence in his written opinion, or that he abused his

discretion. Rather, he argues that the IJ failed to recognize the

existence of an entire swath of evidence that was pertinent to

the hardship issue. He argues that this went beyond a simple

failure to discuss certain evidence or to describe it properly.

As our sister circuit has held, “the [Board] does not commit

an ‘error of law’ every time an item of evidence is not explic-

itly considered or is described with imperfect accuracy, but

where, as here, some facts important to the subtle determina-

tion of ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ have

No. 20-1078 19

been … seriously mischaracterized, we conclude that an error

of law has occurred.” Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 323 (2d

Cir. 2009).

2

An applicant’s asserted hardship to a qualifying relative

“must be considered on its own individual facts.” In Re

Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323 (BIA 2002). The Board

has held that while some comparison between other

applicants’ asserted hardships is necessary in order to apply

the comparative hardship standard, the IJ and Board must

consider individual hardships on their own terms—

generalizations will not do. Id. at 323. This mandate places an

outer limit on an IJ’s ability to characterize the evidence

before him. At some point, the “individual hardship”

described by an IJ will diverge too much from the actual

hardship shown in the record. The error in such a case is

procedural: the failure to take into account the entire record,

no matter what the final conclusion might be.

To support his claim of exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship to Melanie, Martinez-Baez presented three pieces of

evidence: (1) the Individualized Education Program created

by the Lake Geneva School District for Melanie; (2) his own

testimony pertaining to Melanie’s hardship and how it affects

her life; and (3) the testimony of Trisha Mitten, a speech

pathologist at Lake Geneva Schools who works with Melanie

and developed the IEP.

In holding that Martinez-Baez failed to establish hardship,

the IJ relied exclusively on a perceived deficiency in the testi-

monies of Martinez-Baez and Mitten. We set forth the full text

of the judge’s rationale:

20 No. 20-1078

Although the respondent submitted a copy of

[Melanie’s] IEP plan, the testimonies of the witnesses

(including the respondent) did not adequately

address, and therefore did not adequately establish,

the severity of her condition, the impact (both short-

term and long term) of the respondent’s departure

(with or without her), the availability of similar

treatment in Mexico if she were to accompany him,

why treatment would necessarily have to be

discontinued if he were to return to Mexico alone, and

her future prognosis. … .

This statement makes no sense. The IJ himself just three pages

earlier wrote that Mitten had “stated that Melanie’s stuttering

problem is mild to moderate, but that it creates problems not

only with verbal communications but also socially/behavior-

ally because it creates the false perception that she acts aggres-

sively.” The Board picked up the “mild to moderate” charac-

terization. The problem is worse than the fact that this is not

an accurate account of Mitten’s testimony: it is that this sup-

posed evaluation of the severity of Melanie’s condition ap-

pears nowhere in the record.

In her testimony, Mitten described Melanie as presenting

with “accessory stuttering.” “She stutters due to learning lan-

guage, and also, to controlling her, her ability to define

words,” Mitten then explained how the condition affects

Melanie’s daily life:

Q: So, she has, she has—does she have trouble com-

municating with other people?

A [Mitten]: Yes. She—

No. 20-1078 21

Q: Okay. Now, how would you categorize that trouble

communicating with other people? Now would you call

it mild? Would you call it extreme? Somewhere in be-

tween?

A: Itʹs mild to moderate.

Q: Mild to moderate.

A: Mild to moderate, depending on the day. There’s—

it’s—because people who stutter, it highly varies.

There’s good days. There’s bad days.

(Emphasis added). To be precise, it was the trouble communi-

cating with others that was “mild to moderate,” not the stut-

ter. The IJ and later the Board missed this distinction. The se-

verity of a symptom does not tell us anything about the sever-

ity of the ailment of which the symptom is only one visible

manifestation.

Melanie’s case illustrates this point. The IEP indicates that

Melanie suffers from “Speech/Language Impairment.” Wis-

consin’s administrative code defines that as “an impairment

of speech or sound production, voice, fluency, or language

that significantly affects educational performance or social,

emotional or vocational development.” Wisc. Admin. Code PI

11.36(5)(a) (emphasis added). Melanie’s IEP states that her im-

pairment causes a delay in auditory comprehension and in-

terferes with her ability to express her thoughts and ideas.

The IEP further states that Melanie’s developmental delay

in language acquisition “impairs oral communication in [her]

natural environment,” and her language and fluency impair-

ment “significantly affects [her] educational performance or

social, emotional, or vocational development.” In formal test-

ing for language articulation and phonology, Melanie scored

22 No. 20-1078

“at or below 1.75” standard deviations below the mean of

children her age. In formal testing to “reveal her grammar use

in her native language in order to fluently formulate her

thoughts,” Melanie scored over two standard deviations be-

low the mean for Spanish-speaking children of her age. Fi-

nally, the IEP concludes that “Melanie’s identified speech and

language needs require an individualized program[,] which

supplementary aids and/or services are [unable] to provide in

the regular education classroom,” such that “Melanie will not

participate full time with non-disabled peers” at school.

We mention these facts because they are conspicuously ab-

sent from the IJ’s explanation, reproduced above. The IJ and

the Board cannot simply announce that there is no evidence

on a point that is in fact well covered in the record. Between

the IEP and Mitten’s testimony, there was ample disinterested

evidence on which to base an assessment of the severity of

Melanie’s condition. We have no way of knowing whether,

had the IJ and Board looked at this evidence, they still would

have found that Martinez-Baez failed to establish the requisite

hardship to a qualifying relative.

The IJ also acted as if there was no evidence about the na-

ture of Melanie’s condition, even though Mitten also covered

this in her testimony. When describing what would happen if

treatment were discontinued, Mitten noted that the “higher

the emotion that [Melanie] has internally, the worse [the con-

dition] gets.” Further, Mitten state that Melanie has a “very

fast rate of speaking,” and that “her anxiety will increase” if

treatment were to stop. This testimony highlights aggravating

factors that exacerbate the condition.

Accordingly, this record contains significant evidence that

the emotional hardships that would ordinarily be expected to

No. 20-1078 23

result from an alien’s deportation may be exceptionally severe

in Melanie’s case, given that her hardship is aggravated by

emotional turmoil. The IJ and the Board never grappled with

this. In addition, their failure to consider the future hardship

faced by a qualifying relative is error under the Board’s own

legal standard, which holds that the hardship inquiry is pro-

spective. See Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 323 (“the rela-

tive level of hardship a person might suffer cannot be consid-

ered entirely in a vacuum. It must necessarily be assessed, at

least in part, by comparing it to the hardship others might

face.”) (emphasis added).

Nothing we have said would prevent the Board from con-

cluding on remand that Melanie’s condition does not amount

to exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. But its cur-

rent reasoning, based on the IJ’s flawed approach to the rec-

ord, cannot stand. As we noted in Iglesias v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d

528 (7th Cir. 2008), “a claim that the [Board] has completely

ignored the evidence put forth by a petitioner is an allegation

of legal error.” Id. at 531.

3

Last, the IJ committed legal error by holding that

Martinez-Baez needed to establish that similar treatment was

unavailable in Mexico. That question is relevant only if the

qualifying relative would be accompanying the applicant

upon removal. The Board puts it this way: “to the extent that

a claim [for relief] is based on the health of a qualifying

relative, an applicant needs to establish that the relative has a

serious medical condition and, if he or she is accompanying the

applicant to the country of removal, that adequate medical care

for the claimed condition is not reasonably available in that

country.” Matter of J-J-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 808, 811 (BIA 2020)

24 No. 20-1078

(emphasis added). If the qualifying relative will be staying in

the United States, the applicant needs only to establish the

seriousness of the condition.

It “is the applicant’s burden to establish that a qualifying

relative will accompany him or her to the country of

removal.” Id. at 811 n. 3. When Martinez-Baez was asked “if

you went back to Mexico, would your kids go with you?” he

replied “Possibly.” When asked if his partner would go with

him, he said “Possibly so.” The government’s attorney then

followed up, “So you haven’t decided one way or the other,”

and Martinez-Baez said “yes.” On this record, it is entirely

possible that Melanie will exercise her right as a U.S. citizen

to stay in the country, either with her mother or some other

qualified adult. We do not underestimate the emotional pain

that such an outcome would entail. Nonetheless, since it is by

no means clear that Melanie would end up in Mexico,

Martinez-Baez did not need to delve into the quality of care

she hypothetically might receive there. He needed only to

show that his removal from the United States would result in

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her. It was

thus error for the IJ to demand that Martinez-Baez prove the

unavailability of care in Mexico.

IV

Accordingly, we GRANT the petition for review and

REMAND for further proceedings.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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