Opinion

Charter Township of York v. Donald Miller

Court
Michigan Court of Appeals
Filed
Jan 28, 2021
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 14.8%

The opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF YORK, FOR PUBLICATION

January 28, 2021

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant- 9:15 a.m.

Appellant,

v No. 335344

Washtenaw Circuit Court

DONALD MILLER, KATHERINE NULL, and LC No. 15-000847-CZ

DAVID MILLER,

Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs-

Appellees.

ON REMAND

Before: SAWYER, P.J., and BECKERING and M. J. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In a published opinion, this Court affirmed a May 16, 2016 judgment in which the circuit

court declared that plaintiff’s zoning ordinance, to the extent that it prohibited the outdoor growth

of medical marijuana in all zoning districts, conflicted with the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act

(MMMA), MCL 333.26421 et seq., and was unenforceable. York Charter Twp v Miller, 322 Mich

App 648; 915 NW2d 373 (2018). The Supreme Court has vacated this Court’s judgment and

remanded for reconsideration in light of DeRuiter v Byron Twp, 505 Mich 130; 949 NW2d 91

(2020). York Charter Twp v Miller, ___ Mich ___; 948 NW2d 555 (2020). After reconsideration,

we conclude that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in DeRuiter, the zoning ordinance at issue

does not directly conflict with the MMMA.

In DeRuiter, 505 Mich at 134-136, 136 n 5, the Supreme Court addressed whether a

“locational restriction,” a phrase which it used “to denote a zoning restriction that regulates where

an activity may occur within a municipality,” directly conflicted with the MMMA. The defendant

township’s zoning ordinance allowed for the cultivation of medical marijuana by primary

caregivers but only as “a home occupation.” Id. at 135-136. Under the home-occupation

requirement, the ordinance mandated that “the ‘medical use’ of marijuana by a primary caregiver

be ‘conducted entirely within a dwelling or attached garage[.]’ ” Id. at 136 (citation omitted). The

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plaintiff, a licensed qualifying patient and a registered primary caregiver, began growing marijuana

on rented commercially zoned property because she did not want to grow marijuana at her

residence. Id. at 135. At the rented commercially zoned property, she grew the marijuana in “an

‘enclosed, locked facility.’ ” Id. After learning about the plaintiff’s operation, the defendant

township’s supervisor determined that the operation violated the defendant township’s zoning

ordinance. Id. The defendant township sent the plaintiff’s landlord a letter, directing the landlord

to cease and desist the plaintiff’s cultivation of marijuana and to remove all marijuana and related

equipment or be subject to enforcement action. Id. at 137. The plaintiff filed a complaint and

sought a declaratory judgment that the zoning ordinance was preempted by the MMMA and,

therefore, unenforceable. Id. The defendant township filed a counterclaim, requesting a

declaratory judgment and abatement of the alleged nuisance. Id.

The Supreme Court held that the MMMA does not nullify a local unit of government’s

authority to regulate land use under the MZEA so long as the unit of government does not prohibit

or penalize all medical marijuana cultivation and so long as the unit of government “does not

impose regulations that are ‘unreasonable and inconsistent with regulations established by state

law.’ ” Id. at 147-148 (citation omitted).

The plaintiff in DeRuiter argued that the defendant township’s ordinance directly

conflicted with the MMMA because the MMMA “protects a registered caregiver from ‘penalty in

any manner’ for ‘assisting a qualifying patient . . . with the medical use of marihuana’ so long as

the caregiver abides by the MMMA’s volume limitations and restricts the cultivation to an

‘enclosed, locked facility.’ ” Id. at 142-143. The Supreme Court disagreed with the argument:

Were we to accept [the plaintiff’s] argument, the only allowable restriction

on where medical marijuana could be cultivated would be an “enclosed, locked

facility” as that term is defined by the MMMA. MCL 333.26423(d). Because the

MMMA does not otherwise limit cultivation, the argument goes, any other

limitation or restriction on cultivation imposed by a local unit of government would

be in conflict with the state law. We disagree. The “enclosed, locked facility”

requirement in the MMMA concerns what type of structure marijuana plants must

be kept and grown in for a patient or caregiver to be entitled to the protections

offered by MCL 333.26424(a) and (b); the requirement does not speak to where

marijuana may be grown. In other words, because an enclosed, locked facility

could be found in various locations on various types of property, regardless of

zoning, this requirement is not in conflict with a local regulation that limits where

medical marijuana must be cultivated. [Id. at 143-144; emphasis in original.]

According to the Supreme Court, a local ordinance is preempted when it bans an activity

that is authorized and regulated by state law. Id. at 144. But this does not mean that a local unit

of government “cannot ‘add to the conditions’ in the MMMA.” Id. at 145 (citation omitted).

Rather, the Court said that “an ordinance is not conflict preempted as long as its additional

requirements do not contradict the requirements set forth in the statute.” Id. at 147.

In DeRuiter, 505 Mich at 147-148, the Supreme Court indicated that a zoning ordinance

can directly conflict with the MMMA in two ways. An ordinance directly conflicts with the

MMMA if it prohibits or penalizes all medical marijuana cultivation. Id. The zoning ordinance

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in this case does not prohibit or penalize all medical marijuana cultivation. It allows primary

caregivers to cultivate medical marijuana but places limitations on where a caregiver may cultivate

the marijuana (i.e., in “the main building” of “a single-family detached dwelling”). See DeRuiter,

505 Mich at 142. Because the zoning ordinance does not prohibit or penalize all medical marijuana

cultivation, the “immunity language” in the MMMA, MCL 333.26424(a) and (b), cannot serve as

the source of any conflict. See DeRuiter, 505 Mich at 145.

The second manner in which an ordinance can directly conflict with the MMMA is when

it imposes regulations that are unreasonable and inconsistent with regulations established by state

law. Id. at 148. The zoning ordinance here is very similar to the defendant township’s ordinance

in DeRuiter. Both ordinances allow for the cultivation of medical marijuana by primary caregivers

as a “home occupation” and require that the caregiver cultivate the marijuana inside a residence. 1

Given the similarity of the two ordinances, because the Supreme Court concluded in DeRuiter that

the defendant township’s ordinance did not directly conflict with the MMMA, we conclude that

there is no direct conflict between the Zoning Ordinance and the MMMA.

For these reasons, we conclude that the zoning ordinance at issue here does not directly

conflict with the MMMA. The ordinance does not prohibit or penalize all cultivation of medical

marijuana, and it does not impose regulations that are unreasonable and inconsistent with the

regulations established by the MMMA. DeRuiter, 505 Mich at 147-148. Accordingly, we reverse

the declaration in the May 16, 2016 judgment that the zoning ordinance, to the extent that it

prohibits the outdoor cultivation of medical marijuana, is unenforceable because it conflicts with

the MMMA.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not

retain jurisdiction. Plaintiff may tax costs.

/s/ David H. Sawyer

/s/ Jane M. Beckering

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

1

The zoning ordinance requires that the cultivation occur in “the main building” of “a single-

family detached dwelling,” while the ordinance in DeRuiter required that the cultivation occur in

“a dwelling or attached garage.”

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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