Jan G. v. Semple

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JAN G. v. SCOTT SEMPLE ET AL.*

(AC 43794)

Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Oliver, Js.

Syllabus

The self-represented, incarcerated plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive

relief as well as monetary damages against the defendants, state correc-

tional employees, claiming state tort claims and violations of his federal

constitutional rights. Following the trial court’s termination of a protec-

tive order barring the plaintiff’s contact with his mother, M, a victim of

a crime he had committed, the plaintiff and M submitted various requests

to the Department of Correction to approve contact visits between them

while the plaintiff is incarcerated, which were denied. The plaintiff then

submitted two inmate grievance forms, which were also denied. The

plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants in both their

individual and official capacities. The trial court granted the defendants’

motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff’s claims against them

in their individual capacities were barred by statutory (§ 4-165) immunity

and the claims against them in their official capacities were barred by

sovereign immunity. On the plaintiff’s appeal to this court, held:

1. The trial court did not improperly conclude that it lacked subject matter

and personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims brought against the

defendants in their individual capacities:

a. The trial court did not improperly conclude that the defendants were

entitled to statutory immunity pursuant to § 4-165 (a) to the extent that

the plaintiff alleged state tort claims; in his complaint, the plaintiff merely

alleged that the defendants had denied his requests for contact visitation

with M during his incarceration in the discharge of their duties pursuant

to a certain Department of Correction administrative directive, and did

not allege that the defendants denied his requests in a wanton, reckless,

or malicious manner; accordingly, the court lacked subject matter juris-

diction.

b. The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s federal civil rights

claims brought pursuant to the applicable federal statute (42 U.S.C.

§ 1983) against the defendants in their individual capacities on the alter-

native basis of qualified immunity, as the plaintiff failed to plead facts

showing that the defendants violated a statutory or constitutional right:

the plaintiff failed to allege any incursion upon a constitutionally pro-

tected liberty interest, as an inmate does not have a liberty interest in

access to visitors, and, thus, the plaintiff failed to allege a violation of

his due process rights as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to

the United States constitution; moreover, the plaintiff failed to allege a

violation of his right to freedom of association as guaranteed by the

first amendment to the United States constitution because preventing

or limiting contact visits between inmates and the victims of their crimes,

even when such victims are immediate family members, bears a rational

relation to legitimate penological interests; accordingly, the court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction.

c. The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s claims brought against

the defendants in their individual capacities on the alternative basis of

lack of personal jurisdiction, as the plaintiff only effected service on

the defendants in their official capacities; by serving each defendant at

the Office of the Attorney General and not at their usual places of abode,

as required by statute (§ 52-57 (a)), the defendants were not served

properly in their individual capacities.

2. The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s claims brought against

the defendants in their official capacities for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, as the claims were barred by the doctrine of sovereign

immunity: the plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages were barred

because the plaintiff failed to allege in his complaint that the state

had waived sovereign immunity or that the claims commissioner had

authorized the plaintiff’s claims; moreover, the plaintiff’s claims for

declaratory and injunctive relief brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

were barred because the plaintiff failed to plead facts showing that the

defendants violated a statutory or constitutional right.

Argued October 15, 2020—officially released January 12, 2021

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the alleged

deprivation of the plaintiff’s federal constitutional

rights, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court

in the judicial district of New Haven, where the court,

Abrams, J., granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss

and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plain-

tiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Jan G., self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Jacob McChesney, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney gen-

eral, and Clare E. Kindall, solicitor general, for the

appellees (defendants).

Opinion

ALVORD, J. The self-represented plaintiff, Jan G.,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing

his action against the defendants, state employees of

the Department of Correction (department).1 On appeal,

the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over (1) his

claims against the defendants in their individual capaci-

ties on the basis of statutory immunity pursuant to

General Statutes § 4-165, and (2) his claims against the

defendants in their official capacities on the basis of

the doctrine of sovereign immunity.2 We affirm the judg-

ment of the trial court.

The following facts are alleged in the plaintiff’s com-

plaint. At all times relevant to this appeal, the plaintiff

has been incarcerated at the Cheshire Correctional

Institution (Cheshire). Prior to 2015, the court issued

a protective order barring the plaintiff’s contact with

his mother. In February, 2015, the court terminated

the protective order against the plaintiff. Following the

court’s termination of the protective order, the plaintiff

and his mother submitted to the department various

requests to approve contact visits between them while

the plaintiff is incarcerated. The defendant Scott Erfe,

then the warden of Cheshire, denied the plaintiff’s and

his mother’s requests.

In response to Erfe’s denial of the contact visitation

requests, the plaintiff submitted to the department two

inmate grievance forms—a May 9, 2018 inmate adminis-

trative remedy form (level one grievance), and a June

22, 2018 inmate grievance appeal form (level two griev-

ance). The plaintiff attached as exhibits to his com-

plaint, inter alia, his level one grievance, his level two

grievance, and the department’s responses to each. In

those grievance forms, the plaintiff again requested that

the department add his mother to his contact visitation

list, and he referenced the court’s termination of the

protective order against him. On June 21, 2018, the

department denied the plaintiff’s level one grievance,

stating: ‘‘Per Administrative Directive 10.6 [§ 5 (e) (iii),

a] visit between an inmate and the inmate’s victim shall

not be permitted unless approved in writing by the

[u]nit [a]dministrator. Your grievance is denied.’’3 On

August 1, 2018, the department denied the plaintiff’s

level two grievance, stating: ‘‘You are appealing a level

one grievance regarding visiting at [the] Cheshire [Cor-

rectional Institution]. The response given by [the

department] was appropriate. The removal of the pro-

tective order does not negate the fact that [your mother]

is a victim of your crime. Your level [two] grievance

appeal is denied.’’4

On January 2, 2019, the plaintiff commenced this

action against the defendants in both their individual

and official capacities. In his complaint, the plaintiff

alleged federal civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.5 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defen-

dants, by denying requests for contact visitation with

his mother, violated his right to freedom of association

and his right to due process of law as guaranteed by

the first and the fourteenth amendments to the United

States constitution.6 Additionally, in an ‘‘[i]ntroduction’’

to his complaint, the plaintiff alleged ‘‘the torts of denial

of visits of elderly infirm (80 year old) mother’’ and

‘‘denial of freedom of association.’’7 The plaintiff sought

declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary

damages.

On February 25, 2019, the defendants moved to dis-

miss the plaintiff’s action. With respect to the plaintiff’s

claims brought against them in their individual capaci-

ties, the defendants provided three bases for dismissing

the plaintiff’s claims. The defendants first argued that

the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them in their

individual capacities due to the plaintiff’s failure to

serve them in that capacity, as required by General

Statues § 52-57 (a).8 Second, the defendants argued that

the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the

plaintiff’s claims brought against them in their individ-

ual capacities as they are entitled to statutory immunity

pursuant to § 4-165.9 Third, the defendants argued that

they additionally are entitled to qualified immunity, bar-

ring the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims brought against them in

their individual capacities. With respect to the plaintiff’s

claims brought against the defendants in their official

capacities, the defendants argued that those claims are

barred by sovereign immunity.

On April 1, 2019, the plaintiff filed an objection to

the defendants’ motion to dismiss in which he argued

that ‘‘statutory and sovereign immunity does not apply

in a § 1983 federal civil rights action filed in state court’’

because ‘‘[t]he supremacy clause preempts state stat-

utes and state common law of Connecticut.’’ The plain-

tiff further argued that the defendants are ‘‘not entitled

to any qualified immunity.’’10

On August 20, 2019, the trial court granted the defen-

dants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff’s

claims against the defendants in their individual capaci-

ties are barred by statutory immunity pursuant to § 4-

165, and that his claims against the defendants in their

official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity.11

This appeal followed.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review. ‘‘A

motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdic-

tion of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff

cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of

action that should be heard by the court. . . . A motion

to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the

record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . .

‘‘Claims involving the doctrines of common-law sov-

ereign immunity and statutory immunity, pursuant to

§ 4-165, implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdic-

tion. . . . A determination regarding a trial court’s sub-

ject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When . . .

the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is

plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions

are legally and logically correct and find support in the

facts that appear in the record. . . .

‘‘When a . . . court decides a jurisdictional question

raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider

the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable

light. . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts

to be those alleged in the complaint, including those

facts necessarily implied from the allegations, constru-

ing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Lawrence v. Weiner, 154 Conn. App. 592, 596–97, 106

A.3d 963, cert. denied, 315 Conn. 925, 109 A.3d 921

(2015).

I

On appeal, the plaintiff first claims that the trial court

improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over his claims brought against the defen-

dants in their individual capacities on the basis of statu-

tory immunity pursuant to § 4-165 (a). The defendants

contend that the court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s

state tort claims brought against them in their individual

capacities on the basis of statutory immunity pursuant

to § 4-165 (a). The defendants concede, however, that

there was ‘‘apparent error in [the court’s] overbroad

application of . . . § 4-165’’ to the plaintiff’s § 1983

claims brought against them in their individual capaci-

ties.12 Consistent with the defendants’ arguments set

forth in their memorandum of law in support of their

motion to dismiss, the defendants provide two alterna-

tive bases for affirming the court’s dismissal of the

plaintiff’s § 1983 claims brought against them in their

individual capacities: that the court lacked subject mat-

ter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims on the basis

of the doctrine of qualified immunity, and that the court

lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants in their

individual capacities.

We agree with the defendants that (A) the court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s

state tort claims brought against them in their individual

capacities on the basis of statutory immunity pursuant

to § 4-165 (a), and (B) the court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims brought

against them in their individual capacities on the basis

of the doctrine of qualified immunity. Furthermore, we

agree with the defendants that (C) the court lacked

personal jurisdiction over them in their individual capa-

cities. Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly

dismissed the plaintiff’s claims brought against the

defendants in their individual capacities.

A

We first address the plaintiff’s claim that the court

improperly concluded that the defendants are entitled

to statutory immunity pursuant to § 4-165 (a). The

defendants contend that, to the extent that the plaintiff

alleged state tort claims, the court properly dismissed

such claims brought against them in their individual

capacities on the basis of statutory immunity. We agree

with the defendants.

Section 4-165 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No state

officer or employee shall be personally liable for dam-

age or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused

in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope

of his or her employment. . . .’’ Section 4-165 ‘‘grants

state employees immunity from suit from negligence

claims regarding conduct arising out of the scope of

their employment, but such immunity does not extend

to conduct by a state employee that is alleged to be

wanton, reckless, or malicious.’’ Lawrence v. Weiner,

supra, 154 Conn. App. 594.

‘‘In the posture of this case, we examine the pleadings

to decide if the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts . . .

with respect to personal immunity under § 4-165, to

support a conclusion that the [defendant was] acting

outside the scope of [his] employment or wilfully or

maliciously. . . . The question before us, therefore, is

whether the facts as alleged in the pleadings, viewed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient

to survive a motion to dismiss on the ground of statutory

immunity. . . .

‘‘We thus turn to the matter of whether the plaintiff

has alleged facts that, if proven, are sufficient to demon-

strate that the defendant acted wantonly, recklessly, or

maliciously.13 In applying § 4-165, our Supreme Court

has understood wanton, reckless or malicious to have

the same meaning as it does in the common-law context.

. . . Under the common law, [i]n order to establish that

the defendants’ conduct was wanton, reckless, wilful,

intentional and malicious, the plaintiff must prove, on

the part of the defendants, the existence of a state of

consciousness with reference to the consequences of

one’s acts . . . . [Such conduct] is more than negli-

gence, more than gross negligence. . . . [I]n order to

infer it, there must be something more than a failure to

exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid

danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to

avoid injury to them. . . . It is such conduct as indi-

cates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety

of others or of the consequences of the action. . . .

[In sum, such] conduct tends to take on the aspect

of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme

departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a

high degree of danger is apparent.’’ (Citation omitted;

footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 598.

In his complaint, the plaintiff merely has alleged that

the defendants had denied his requests for contact visi-

tation with his mother during his incarceration. The

plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants denied his

requests in a wanton, reckless, or malicious manner.

Rather, in his complaint, the plaintiff indicated that the

defendants denied his requests in the discharge of their

duties pursuant to Administrative Directive 10.6.

Accordingly, we conclude that the defendants are enti-

tled to statutory immunity pursuant to § 4-165 (a). The

court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction over

the plaintiff’s state tort claims brought against the

defendants in their individual capacities, and the court

properly dismissed such claims.

B

We next address the defendants’ argument for

affirming the court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s § 1983

claims brought against them in their individual capaci-

ties on the alternative basis of the doctrine of qualified

immunity. The plaintiff contends that the defendants

are not entitled to qualified immunity. We agree with

the defendants.

The following well established legal principles guide

our analysis. ‘‘[A] claim for qualified immunity from

liability for damages under § 1983 raises a question of

federal law . . . and not state law. Therefore, in

reviewing these claims of qualified immunity we are

bound by federal precedent, and may not expand or

contract the contours of the immunity available to gov-

ernment officials.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Schnabel v. Tyler, 230 Conn. 735, 742–

43, 646 A.2d 152 (1994).

‘‘Under federal law, the doctrine of qualified immu-

nity shields officials from civil damages liability for

their discretionary actions as long as their actions could

reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights

they are alleged to have violated. Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed.

2d 523 (1987). Qualified immunity is an immunity from

suit rather than a mere defense to liability and, there-

fore, protects officials from the burdens of litigation

for the choices that they make in the course of their

duties. . . . Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105

S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985). Thus, the United

States Supreme Court has recognized qualified immu-

nity for government officials [when] it [is] necessary to

preserve their ability to serve the public good or to

ensure that talented candidates [are] not deterred by

the threat of damages suits from entering public service.

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 118 L.

Ed. 2d 504 (1992). Whether an official is entitled to

qualified immunity presents a question of law that must

be resolved de novo on appeal. Elder v. Holloway, 510

U.S. 510, 516, 114 S. Ct. 1019, 127 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1994).’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brooks v. Sweeney,

299 Conn. 196, 216, 9 A.3d 347 (2010).

‘‘Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials

from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts

showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly

established at the time of the challenged conduct. . . .

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S. Ct. 2074,

79 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011) . . . . If no constitutional right

would have been violated were the allegations estab-

lished, there is no necessity for further inquiries con-

cerning qualified immunity.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Braham v. Newbould, 160

Conn. App. 294, 302, 124 A.3d 977 (2015).

The plaintiff has alleged two constitutional bases for

his § 1983 claims: that the defendant’s denial of his

requests for contact visitation with his mother during

his incarceration violated his right to freedom of associ-

ation under the first amendment to the United States

constitution and his right to due process of law under

the fourteenth amendment to the United States consti-

tution.

We begin with the plaintiff’s due process claim pursu-

ant to the fourteen amendment to the United States

constitution, which provides in relevant part that ‘‘[n]o

State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or

property, without due process of law . . . .’’ U.S.

Const., amend. XIV, § 1. In the present case, the interest

at stake is the plaintiff’s liberty interest. ‘‘ ‘There are

two elements [that] must be established in order to find

a due process violation. First, because not every liberty

interest is protected, [the plaintiff] must establish that

he has a liberty interest that comes within the ambit

of the fourteenth amendment. Hewitt v. Helms, 459

U.S. 460, 466, 103 S. Ct. 864, 74 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983);

Meachum v. Fano, [427 U.S. 215, 223–24, 96 S. Ct. 2532,

49 L. Ed. 2d 451] (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408

U.S. 564, 571, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972);

Society for Savings v. Chestnut Estates, Inc., 176 Conn.

563, 571, 409 A.2d 1020 (1979). If it is determined that a

protected liberty is implicated, then the second element

that must be addressed is what procedural protections

are due. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577, 95 S. Ct. 729,

42 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, supra,

569–70; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.

Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972); see Williams v. Bart-

lett, 189 Conn. 471, 477, 457 A.2d 290 (1983). . . .

‘‘ ‘Due process analysis begins with the identification

of the interests at stake. Liberty interests protected

by the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment may arise from two

sources—the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause itself and the laws

of the [s]tates.’ . . . State v. Patterson, 236 Conn. 561,

568–69, 674 A.2d 416 (1996).’’ State v. Rupar, 293 Conn.

489, 502–503, 978 A.2d 502 (2009). Accordingly, we must

consider whether, under the fourteenth amendment or

under the laws of this state, the plaintiff has a constitu-

tionally protected liberty interest in access to contact

visits with his mother during his incarceration.

An inmate ‘‘does not have a liberty interest in access

to visitors.’’ Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction,

66 Conn. App. 868, 869, 786 A.2d 450 (2001); see also

Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S.

454, 461, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 104 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1989) (‘‘denial

of prison access to a particular visitor is well within

the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by

a prison sentence . . . and therefore is not indepen-

dently protected by the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause’’ (cita-

tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)); Santi-

ago v. Commissioner of Correction, 39 Conn. App. 674,

680, 667 A.2d 304 (1995) (‘‘inmates have no protected

liberty interest in access to visitors’’). Moreover, the

‘‘[D]epartment of [C]orrection Administrative Directive

§ 10.6 provides in relevant part that ‘visitation shall be

considered a privilege and no inmate shall have entitle-

ment to a [social] visit.’ ’’ Henderson v. Commissioner

of Correction, supra, 869; see Department of Correction,

Administrative Directive 10.6 § 4 (b) (effective Novem-

ber 6, 2020). The plaintiff fails to allege in his complaint

any incursion upon a constitutionally protected liberty

interest and, accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiff

has failed to allege a violation of his due process rights

as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the

United States constitution.

We next turn to the plaintiff’s allegation that the

defendants violated his freedom of association as guar-

anteed by the first amendment to the United States

constitution. ‘‘The fact of confinement and the needs

of the penal institution impose limitations on constitu-

tional rights, including those derived from the [f]irst

[a]mendment, which are implicit in incarceration. . . .

[A] prison inmate retains those [f]irst [a]mendment

rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a

prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives

of the corrections system. Thus, challenges to prison

restrictions that are asserted to inhibit [f]irst [a]mend-

ment interests must be analyzed in terms of the legiti-

mate policies and goals of the corrections system, to

whose custody and care the prisoner has been commit-

ted in accordance with due process of law.

‘‘Perhaps the most obvious of the [f]irst [a]mendment

rights that are necessarily curtailed by confinement are

those associational rights that the [f]irst [a]mendment

protects outside of prison walls. The concept of incar-

ceration itself entails a restriction on the freedom of

inmates to associate with those outside of the penal

institution. Equally as obvious, the inmate’s ‘status as

a prisoner’ and the operational realities of a prison

dictate restrictions on the associational rights among

inmates.’’ Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor

Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125–26, 97 S. Ct. 2532, 53 L.

Ed. 2d 629 (1977).

The United States Supreme Court has explained that

‘‘the [c]onstitution protects certain kinds of highly per-

sonal relationships . . . . And outside the prison con-

text, there is some discussion . . . of a right to main-

tain certain familial relationships, including association

among members of an immediate family and association

between grandchildren and grandparents. . . . Some

curtailment of that freedom must be expected in the

prison context.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131,

123 S. Ct. 2162, 156 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2003).

To the extent that a prison regulation curtails an

inmate’s freedom of association, an inmate’s constitu-

tional right is not violated if the regulation ‘‘bear[s] a

rational relation to legitimate penological interests.’’ Id.,

132. In determining whether the prison regulation bears

a rational relation to legitimate penological interests,

‘‘[w]e must accord substantial deference to the profes-

sional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a

significant responsibility for defining the legitimate

goals of a corrections system and for determining the

most appropriate means to accomplish them.’’ Id.

It is apparent from the plaintiff’s complaint that the

department denied the plaintiff’s requests for contact

visits with his mother during his incarceration because

the department determined that the plaintiff’s mother

was the victim of a crime that he had committed. The

department denied the plaintiff’s requests pursuant to

its Administrative Directive 10.6 § 5 (e) (iii), which pro-

vides in relevant part: ‘‘A visit between an inmate and

the inmate’s victim shall not be permitted unless

approved in writing by the [u]nit [a]dministrator or

[d]irector of [p]arole and [c]ommunity [s]ervices or des-

ignee. . . .’’ Evaluating the department’s regulation in

the light of safeguarding institutional security, a central

objective of prison administration; see Bell v. Wolfish,

441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979);

we conclude that preventing or limiting contact visits

between inmates and the victims of their crimes, even

when such victims are immediate family members,

bears a rational relation to legitimate penological inter-

ests.14 Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiff has

failed to allege a violation of his right to freedom of

association as guaranteed by the first amendment to

the United States constitution.

In light of our determinations that the plaintiff fails

to allege a violation of his right to freedom of associa-

tion or his right to due process of law as guaranteed

by the first and fourteenth amendments to the United

States constitution, we further conclude that the plain-

tiff has failed to plead facts showing that the defendants

violated a statutory or constitutional right. Therefore,

the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims asserted against the defen-

dants in their individual capacities are barred on the

basis of qualified immunity, and the trial court properly

dismissed such claims for lack of subject matter juris-

diction. See Braham v. Newbould, supra, 160 Conn.

App. 306–307 (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claims on

basis of qualified immunity).

C

We next address the defendants’ argument for

affirming the court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims

brought against them in their individual capacities on

the alternative basis that the court lacked personal juris-

diction over them in their individual capacities. Specifi-

cally, the defendants assert that the plaintiff only

effected service on them in their official capacities by

serving each defendant at the Connecticut Office of the

Attorney General on January 2, 2019. The defendants

argue that because the plaintiff failed to effect proper

service against them personally or at their usual place

of abode as required by § 52-57 (a), the court lacked

personal jurisdiction over them in their individual capa-

cities. The plaintiff declined to address this argument

in his objection to the defendants’ motion to dismiss

and in his briefing before this court. We agree with

the defendants.

Practice Book § 10-30 (b) provides that ‘‘[a]ny defen-

dant, wishing to contest the court’s jurisdiction, shall

do so by filing a motion to dismiss within thirty days

of the filing of an appearance.’’ Practice Book § 10-30

(a) (2) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] motion to

dismiss shall be used to assert . . . lack of jurisdiction

over the person . . . .’’ In this case, the defendants

properly contested the court’s personal jurisdiction

over them in their individual capacities.15

‘‘[T]he Superior Court . . . may exercise jurisdiction

over a person only if that person has been properly

served with process, has consented to the jurisdiction

of the court or has waived any objection to the court’s

exercise of personal jurisdiction. . . . [S]ervice of pro-

cess on a party in accordance with the statutory require-

ments is a prerequisite to a court’s exercise of [personal]

jurisdiction over that party.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Sosa v. Commissioner of Correction, 175

Conn. App. 831, 837, 169 A.3d 341 (2017).

To serve a defendant properly in his or her individual

capacity, service of process must be made in accor-

dance with § 52-57 (a). Section 52-57 (a) provides that

‘‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided, process in any civil

action shall be served by leaving a true and attested

copy of it, including the declaration or complaint, with

the defendant, or at his usual place of abode, in this

state.’’ By contrast, where a plaintiff commences a civil

action against ‘‘the state or against any institution,

board, commission, department or administrative tribu-

nal thereof, or against any officer, servant, agent or

employee of the state or of any such institution, board,

commission, department or administrative tribunal’’ in

their official capacity, service of process ‘‘may be made

by a proper officer . . . [on] the Attorney General at

the office of the Attorney General in Hartford . . . .’’

General Statutes § 52-64 (a).

‘‘Pursuant to . . . § 52-57 (a), a defendant in any civil

action must be served in hand or at his usual place of

abode. This requirement includes civil suits brought

against state defendants who are sued in their individual

capacities. . . . Thus, a plaintiff who serves a state

defendant pursuant to . . . § 52-64 (a) by leaving a

copy of the process at the Office of the Attorney General

has properly served the defendant only in his or her

official capacity and has failed to properly serve the

defendant in his or her individual capacity.’’ (Citation

omitted; footnotes omitted.) Sosa v. Commissioner of

Correction, supra, 175 Conn. App. 837–38.

Here, the plaintiff served the defendants at the Office

of the Attorney General and not at their usual places

of abode. The defendants, therefore, were not served

properly in their individual capacities. Accordingly, we

conclude that the court lacked personal jurisdiction

over the defendants in their individual capacities and

that the court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s claims

against them in their individual capacities. See id., 838;

Harnage v. Lightner, 163 Conn. App. 337, 347, 137 A.3d

10 (2016), aff’d in part, 328 Conn. 248, 179 A.3d 212

(2018).

II

The plaintiff next claims that the trial court improp-

erly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction

over his claims brought against the defendants in their

official capacities on the basis of the doctrine of sover-

eign immunity. The defendants contend that the court

properly determined that the plaintiff’s claims brought

against them in their official capacities, both for injunc-

tive and declaratory relief as well as for monetary dam-

ages, are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

We agree with the defendants.

‘‘It is well established that [t]he doctrine of sovereign

immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is

therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Machado v. Taylor,

326 Conn. 396, 403, 163 A.3d 558 (2017). ‘‘The principle

that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or

sovereign immunity, is well established under our case

law. . . . It has deep roots in this state and our legal

system in general, finding its origin in ancient common

law. . . . Not only have we recognized the state’s

immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized

that because the state can act only through its officers

and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a

matter in which the officer represents the state is, in

effect, against the state.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Allen v. Commissioner of Revenue Services,

324 Conn. 292, 298–99, 152 A.3d 488 (2016), cert. denied,

U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 2217, 198 L. Ed. 2d 659 (2017).

‘‘Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly con-

strued under our jurisprudence.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept.

of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 349, 977 A.2d 636

(2009).

‘‘[T]he sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state is

not absolute. There are [three] exceptions: (1) when the

legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary

implication, statutorily waives the state’s sovereign

immunity . . . (2) when an action seeks declaratory

or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim

that the state or one of its officers has violated the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights . . . and (3) when an

action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis

of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to pro-

mote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer’s statu-

tory authority. . . . In the absence of a proper factual

basis in the complaint to support the applicability of

these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss

on sovereign immunity grounds is proper.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 349–50.

For the purposes of this appeal, only the first and the

second exceptions to the state’s sovereign immunity

are relevant.16

The first exception to the state’s sovereign immunity

is relevant to the plaintiff’s claims for monetary dam-

ages brought against the defendants in their official

capacities. ‘‘In the absence of a statutory waiver of

sovereign immunity, the plaintiff may not bring an

action against the state for monetary damages without

authorization from the claims commissioner to do so.’’

Id., 351; see also Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 315–16,

828 A.2d 549 (2003) (plaintiffs seeking monetary dam-

ages for constitutional violations required to seek

waiver from claims commissioner). ‘‘When a plaintiff

brings an action for money damages against the state,

he must proceed through the [O]ffice of the [C]laims

[C]ommissioner pursuant to chapter 53 of the General

Statutes, §§ 4-141 through 4-165. Otherwise, the action

must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.’’ Prigge v.

Ragaglia, 265 Conn. 338, 349, 828 A.2d 542 (2003). ‘‘This

is true even where, as here, claims are brought pursuant

to the United States constitution.’’ Tuchman v. State,

89 Conn. App. 745, 752, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275

Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005); see also Prigge v.

Ragaglia, supra, 349 (dismissing claims seeking dam-

ages brought under first and fourteenth amendments

to United States constitution where permission not

received from claims commissioner). ‘‘In each action

authorized by the Claims Commissioner . . . the

claimant shall allege such authorization and the date

on which it was granted . . . .’’ General Statutes § 4-

160 (c).

In the present action, the plaintiff fails to allege in

his complaint that the state had waived sovereign immu-

nity or that the claims commissioner had authorized

the plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, we conclude that the

plaintiff has failed to meet the first exception to the

state’s sovereign immunity and that his claims for mone-

tary damages brought against the defendants in their

official capacities are barred.

The second exception to the state’s sovereign immu-

nity is relevant to the plaintiff’s claims for declaratory

and injunctive relief brought against the defendants in

their official capacities. ‘‘For a claim made pursuant to

the second exception, complaining of unconstitutional

acts, we require that [t]he allegations of such a com-

plaint and the factual underpinnings if placed in issue,

must clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitu-

tionally protected interests.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Trans-

portation, supra, 293 Conn. 350.

In part I B of this opinion, we concluded that the

plaintiff has failed to plead facts showing that the defen-

dants violated a statutory or constitutional right. For

those foregoing reasons, we conclude that the allega-

tions in the plaintiff’s complaint fail to clearly demon-

strate an incursion upon constitutionally protected

interests and, therefore, that the plaintiff has failed to

meet the second exception to the state’s sovereign

immunity. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for

declaratory and injunctive relief brought against the

defendants in their official capacities are barred.

We conclude that the court properly dismissed the

plaintiff’s claims brought against the defendants in their

official capacities for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018); we

decline to identify any party protected or sought to be protected under a

protective order or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or

others through whom that party’s identity may be ascertained.

1

The defendants, at all times relevant, were employees of the department.

The employees of the department named as defendants are Scott Semple,

former Commissioner of Correction, Scott Erfe, former warden of the Chesh-

ire Correctional Institution, and Angel Quiros, former district administrator.

2

Throughout his complaint, the plaintiff alleged claims on behalf of his

mother. In the defendants’ memorandum of law in support of their motion

to dismiss, the defendants argued that the plaintiff lacked standing to raise

claims on behalf of his mother. In its memorandum of decision dismissing

the complaint, the court agreed with the defendants that it was ‘‘without

jurisdiction over any claims the plaintiff [was] making on behalf of his

mother.’’ On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly

determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims that the plaintiff raised

on behalf of his mother. In support of his argument, the plaintiff maintains

that his mother is ‘‘infirm and speak[s] little English . . . .’’ We conclude

that the trial court properly determined that the plaintiff lacked standing

to raise such claims on behalf of his mother. See State v. Iban C., 275 Conn.

624, 665, 881 A.2d 1005 (2005) (‘‘[u]nder long established principles, a party

is precluded from asserting the constitutional rights of another’’ (internal

quotation marks omitted)); Frillici v. Westport, 264 Conn. 266, 281, 823 A.2d

1172 (2003) (‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that a party does not have standing to raise

the rights of another’’); see also Collins v. West Hartford Police Dept., 324

Fed. Appx. 137, 139 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claims because plaintiff lacked ‘‘standing to challenge constitutional depriva-

tions alleged to have been experienced by his mother’’).

In his principal appellant brief, the plaintiff also vaguely references unde-

fined freedom of religion and freedom of speech violations. The plaintiff

did not allege such constitutional violations in his complaint. We, therefore,

do not consider these references.

3

Department of Correction, Administrative Directive 10.6 § 5 (e) (iii)

(effective October 23, 2013) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A visit between an

inmate and the inmate’s victim shall not be permitted unless approved in

writing by the [u]nit [a]dministrator or [d]irector of [p]arole and [c]ommunity

[s]ervices or designee. . . .’’

4

In the department’s response to the plaintiff’s level two grievance, the

department indicated that the plaintiff had ‘‘exhausted the [d]epartment’s

[a]dministrative [r]emedies,’’ and that an ‘‘[a]ppeal to [l]evel [three] will not

be answered.’’

5

Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983, provides in relevant part:

‘‘Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-

tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,

or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person

within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding

for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for

an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief

shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory

relief was unavailable. . . .’’

‘‘Section 1983 provides a civil claim for damages against any person who,

acting under color of state law, deprives another of a right, privilege or

immunity secured by the [c]onstitution or the laws of the United States.

. . . Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a

procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.’’

(Citations omitted.) Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.

denied, 512 U.S. 1240, 114 S. Ct. 2749, 129 L. Ed. 2d 867 (1994).

6

In a section of his complaint titled ‘‘[i]ntroduction,’’ the plaintiff alleged

that the defendants were in ‘‘violation of [the first] amendment of the United

States constitution of freedom of association of families, children, relatives,

[etc.], and in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment

of the United States constitution.’’ Despite apparent references in the intro-

duction of his complaint to two constitutional violations, the plaintiff’s

complaint contained only one cause of action for ‘‘Violation of the Due

Process.’’ This claim, however, appeared to have incorporated a freedom

of association claim by reference to being denied such rights ‘‘without due

process of law.’’

7

In his complaint, the plaintiff subsequently noted that the ‘‘tort’’ refer-

enced by the plaintiff in the introduction of his complaint was actually a

‘‘tort action of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under the law within the

state of Connecticut.’’

8

General Statues § 52-57 (a) provides: ‘‘Except as otherwise provided,

process in any civil action shall be served by leaving a true and attested

copy of it, including the declaration or complaint, with the defendant, or

at his usual place of abode, in this state.’’

9

General Statutes § 4-165 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No state officer

or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton,

reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his or her duties or within

the scope of his or her employment. . . .’’

10

The plaintiff’s objection to the defendants’ motion to dismiss failed to

address the defendants’ argument that the court lacked personal jurisdiction

over them in their individual capacities.

11

The court did not reach the defendants’ alternative arguments that the

court lacked personal jurisdiction over them in their individual capacities

or that, with respect the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the defendants in

their individual capacities, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

12

Although ‘‘[s]tate courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims

brought under § 1983 . . . [c]onduct by persons acting under color of state

law which is wrongful under . . . § 1983 . . . cannot be immunized by

state law.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullins

v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 133–34, 913 A.2d 415 (2007). Accordingly, we

conclude that the court erred in determining that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims brought against the defendants

in their individual capacities on the basis of statutory immunity pursuant

to § 4-165 (a).

13

It is undisputed that the defendants were acting in the scope of their

employment when they undertook the actions that form the basis of the

plaintiff’s complaint.

14

We note that the plaintiff has alleged in his complaint only that the

defendants denied the plaintiff contact visits with his mother. The plaintiff

has not alleged that the defendants denied the plaintiff alternative means

of associating with his mother. Courts addressing the constitutionality of

prison policies that are alleged to curtail a prisoner’s freedom of association

consider ‘‘whether alternative means are open to inmates to exercise the

asserted right . . . .’’ Overton v. Bazzetta, supra, 539 U.S. 132; see also Pell

v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1974)

(regulations must be ‘‘viewed in . . . light of the alternative means of com-

munication permitted under the regulations with persons outside the

prison’’). ‘‘We need not attempt to explore or define the asserted right

of association at any length or determine the extent to which it survives

incarceration because the challenged [regulation] bear[s] a rational relation

to legitimate penological interests.’’ Overton v. Bazzetta, supra, 131–32.

15

The defendants filed their initial appearance on January 29, 2019, and

their motion to dismiss and memorandum of law in support of their motion

to dismiss on February 25, 2019, within thirty days of the filing of their

appearance.

16

The plaintiff’s complaint lacks any allegations that the defendants per-

petuated wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of their

statutory authority.