Estate of John McCarty v. Islamic Republic of Iran

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ESTATE OF JOHN MCCARTY, et al.

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Case No. 19-853 (RJL)

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, eae

FILED

DEC 2 8 2020

Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy

—. Courts for the District of Columbia

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(December 28 2020) [Dkt. # 24]

New Nee Nee ee Nee” eee” ee” ee” ee” Nee”

Defendant.

Plaintiffs are survivors of the terrorist hijacking of TWA Flight 847 from Athens,

Greece on June 14, 1985, as well as immediate family members and estate representatives.

Plaintiffs seek money damages against Iran for injuries and trauma caused by Iran’s

provision of material support to the hijackers pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, the terrorism

exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (““FSIA”). Having considered all of

the record evidence, including the record in Allan v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 17-338,

2019 WL 2185037 (D.D.C. May 16, 2019), a predecessor case with identically situated

plaintiffs, I find that plaintiffs here have similarly established grounds for default.

Therefore, for the following reasons, I GRANT plaintiffs’ motion for default judgmment,

see Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment (“‘Pls.’ Mot.”) [Dkt. # 24], and also GRANT

plaintiffs’ request for relief totaling approximately $59 million dollars, consistent with the

|

findings of the appointed Special Master as to damages in Allan, which are equally

applicable here.

BACKGROUND

On June 14, 1985, two Hezbollah hijackers boarded TWA Flight 847 leaving

Athens, Greece headed for Rome, Italy. Amended Complaint (“Compl.”) [Dkt. # 14] 4 18.

There were 143 passengers and 8 crewmembers on board at the time, 4 of whom are

passenger plaintiffs in this case. /d. Shortly after takeoff, two hijackers armed with hand

grenades commandeered the plane at gunpoint, id. § 19, shouting, “Americans come to

die!” Allan at *1; Pls.” Mot. at 6 (citing evidence relied on in Stethem v. Islamic Republic

of Iran, 201 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D.D.C. 2002)).! They held the three pilots at gunpoint and

ordered them to fly to Iran or Algeria. Compl. § 20; see also Pls.’ Mot., Ex. D (Stethem

Transcript, Testimony of Christian Zimmerman) (“Zimmerman Testimony”), at 123:14—

124:19. When informed that the plane did not have enough fuel to fly to either location,

the hijackers instructed the pilots to land in Beirut, Lebanon. Compl. 4 20.

What ensued was dramatic and terrifying. The hijackers forced some passengers

into the First Class cabin and beat them repeatedly. Pls.’ Mot. at 6. They began to single

out passengers who they suspected of being U.S. Military or Jewish. /d., Ex. D (Stethem

Transcript, Testimony of Clinton Suggs) (“Suggs Testimony’’)), at 87:1-90:23. They

' For the reasons explained below, infra at 5, this Court will consider the factual findings

and evidence presented in Al/an and Stethem, both of which covered the same incident, and

will reference testimony and declarations submitted in those cases, where necessary.

2

denigrated passengers’ religions, ethnicities, nationalities, and countries of residence.

Compl. 7 15. All seated passengers were forced to sit in a crash-landing position for hours

at a time, and were beaten if they broke position. /d. 4/21. The terrorists landed the plane

in Beirut hours after takeoff on June 14th. Pls.’ Mot. at 7; see also id., Ex. D (Zimmerman

Timeline) at 124. They demanded the release of nearly 800 prisoners in Israel and Kuwait.

Compl. § 22. In exchange for fuel, they released several women and children. Pls.’ Mot.

at 7.

The hijackers then ordered the pilots to fly the plane to Algiers, Algeria. Compl.

23. After refueling again, they ordered the pilots to return to Beirut. /d. 4 23-24. The

airport authorities ordered the plane not to land, and placed obstacles on the runway to

enforce the order. Jd. § 24. Despite the dangerous conditions, the pilots were able to safely

land on the runway. /d. On the ground in Beirut for a second time, the hijackers demanded

that additional terrorists be allowed to board. Jd. 4] 25. They executed one passenger—a

navy diver named Robert Stethem—and tossed his body onto the tarmac. /d. Later that

day, ten additional militiamen from the Amal group and one Hezbollah spokesman boarded

the plane. /d.; Pls.’ Mot., Ex. D (Zimmerman Timeline) at 126. The plane then headed

back to Algeria for a second time. /d. § 26. During this period, the hijackers began

ramping up their harassment and abuse—threatening passengers with execution, beating

them, and robbing them of all their belongings. Jd. 4 26-27; Pls.’ Mot., Ex. B (Pls.’ Decls.)

at 24, 26, 62, 74. Certain other passengers were released during these stops. Compl. § 27.

On the morning of June 16, the hijackers ordered the plane back to Beirut for a third

time. Jd. § 26. At that point, the passengers still on board had endured 72 hours on the

aircraft with inadequate food, water, access to bathroom facilities, or sleep. /d. The plane

sat on the tarmac until the next morning, when the remaining passengers were removed

from the plane and taken into Beirut. /d. 27. For the next two weeks, the men were

threatened, vilified, and caused to believe that they would be excuted by a firing squad.

Compl. 927. The terrorists finally released the Beirut hostages to Syrian military personnel

on June 30, 1985. Jd. 28. The hijackers were indicted for their roles in the hijacking, but

never taken into United States custody. See Pls.’ Mot. at 12.

Plaintiffs filed this action on March 26, 2019. On January 15, 2020, plaintiffs served

Iran via diplomatic channels. Iran never accepted service, so the Clerk of the Court entered

default on March 22, 2020. On May 1, 2020, plaintiffs moved for default judgment and

damages.

ANALYSIS

I. Iran is Liable Under the FSIA’s Terrorism Exception—28 U.S.C. § 1605A

Plaintiffs argue that Iran should be held liable under the FSIA’s terrorism exception,

28 U.S.C. § 1605A, for providing material support to the terrorist groups that perpetrated

the 1985 hijacking incident aboard TWA Flight 847. I begin by noting, as I did in Al/an,

that this is not the first time the events at issue have been the subject of a suit under the

FSIA. In 2002, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson (“Judge Jackson”) granted default

judgment in two consolidated cases involving the same 1985 hijacking incident under an

older provision of the FSIA, § 1605(a)(7). See Stethem v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F.

Supp. 2d 78, 85 (D.D.C. 2002). The two consolidated cases before Judge Jackson included

the individual who was killed on the plane, Robert Stethem, as well as his surviving family

members.” On May 16, 2019, I granted default judgment for plaintiffs in Alan v. [slamic

Republic of Iran, a case involving plaintiffs identically situated to plaintiffs in the instant

case.> Keeping in mind that “the FSIA does not require this Court to relitigate issues that

have already been settled,” I find, as I did in Allan, that there are grounds to take judicial

notice of these “related proceedings and records in cases before the same court.” Brewer v.

Islamic Republic of Iran, 664 F. Supp. 2d 43, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Estate of Heiser

Vv, Istarate Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d. 229, 263 (D.D.C. 2006) (internal quotation

marks omitted)); see also Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 60

(D.D.C. 2010) (“[T]he Court may review evidence considered in an opinion that is

judicially noticed, without necessitating the re-presentment of such evidence.”).

I will therefore grant plaintiffs’ request to take judicial notice of the entire record

submitted, and adjudicative findings of fact reached, in Allan and Stethem, and to apply in

the instant case the damages benchmarks recommended by Special Master Alan Balaran,

who I appointed in Al/an to make findings on the Al/an plaintiffs’ motion for default as to

damages. Pls.’ Mot. on Liability at 2.

To find default judgment for the plaintiffs, I must first determine whether I have

jurisdiction under the FSIA. Section §1605A(a)(1) imposes three requirements to establish

* None of the Stethem plaintiffs are plaintiffs in the instant case.

> None of the Allan plaintiffs are plaintiffs in the instant case.

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subject matter jurisdiction: 1) that the claims be against a foreign state that was designated

a state sponsor of terrorism at the time the acts occurred, § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(1); 2) that

plaintiffs be U.S. nationals at the time the acts occurred, § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii); and 3) that

plaintiffs be seeking money damages for personal injury or death caused by the foreign

state’s acts of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, and hostage taking, or by the

foreign state’s provision of material support or resources for such acts. § 1605A(a)(1); see

also Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Having considered

the record evidence, I find that plaintiffs satisfy each of these requirements in the instant

case.

A. Iran Was a State Sponsor of Terrorism at the Time of the Hijacking

First, as plaintiffs argue, Iran was designated a state sponsor of terrorism on January

19, 1984, and remained a designated state sponsor of Hezbollah at the time of the hijacking.

See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. D (Statement of U.S. Secretary of State, 49 Fed. Reg. 2836-02);

Stethem, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 85 (relying on evidence that Iran is the “patron state” of

Hezbollah); Pls.’ Mot., Ex. D (Clawson Expert Report) at {] 23, 38-39, 51 (Iran committed

substantial support to fund Hezbollah’s acts of “terrorism as an official means of

forwarding foreign policy” in the early 1980s); see also Allan at *3.

B. Plaintiffs Meet the Requirements of U.S. Citizenship

Second, the record shows that all of the passenger plaintiffs were U.S. citizens at

the time of the hijacking. See Pls.’ Mot. at 22; Pls.” Mot., Ex. B (Pls.’ Decls.) (attaching

citizenship documents).

C. Iran Provided Material Support to the Terrorist-Hijackers

Finally, plaintiffs are seeking “money damages ... against [Iran] for personal injury

or death that was caused by an act of torture . . . aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the

provision of material support or resources for such an act... .” FSIA § 1605A(a)(1). In

Stethem, Judge Jackson determined that Iran had indeed provided “material support” to

Hezbollah and Amal for the hijacking and hostage taking, including funding, training,

logistical and weapons support, and professional guidance and tactical expertise. 201 F.

Supp. 2d at 87 (“[A]s the Court has previously found in so many similar cases before it,

the evidence conclusively establishes that the Islamic Republic of Iran and its MOIS

provided ‘material support or resources’ to Hizballah, and Hizballah and its co-conspirator

Amal were the perpetrators of these heinous acts of terrorism.”). Because the FSIA did not

provide an independent federal cause of action at the time of Stethem, plaintiffs had to

prove that they met the elements of their D.C. state law claims (in that case, wrongful death

and survival claims), and additionally had to prove that the court had jurisdiction under the

FSIA. /d. at 87-88.

In 2008, however, Congress replaced § 1605(a) with § 1605A and created a private,

federal cause of action against foreign governments in § 1605A(c) so that plaintiffs are no

longer required to prove state law claims to secure relief. See Owens, 864 F.3d at 765.

However, the causation requirement—that plaintiff's injury result from material support of

acts of terrorism—has not changed, and the language in § 1605A(a)(2) largely mirrors the

prior language in § 1605(a)(7). Owens, 864 F.3d at 796-99. Most courts have interpreted

this so-called “jurisdictional causation” requirement loosely, finding that where a foreign

government’s support of terrorist activities could be shown generally, plaintiffs need not

prove whether the government had “provided material support and resources that caused

this particular act.” See Shoham v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 12-cv-508, 2017 WL

2399454, at *10, 16-17 (D.D.C. June 1, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted); Owens,

864 F.3d at 794-99 (finding jurisdictional causation where defendant-Sudan provided safe

harbor and preferential tax treatment to al Qaeda, despite Sudan’s ignorance of al Qaeda’s

specific plans to launch attacks on US embassies in Africa). Having considered the record

evidence in this case, I find, consistent with Judge Jackson’s opinion in Stethem and my

prior opinion in Allan, that Iran provided “material support” to terrorist groups Hezbollah

and Amal sufficient to meet the requirements of § 1605A(a)(1).

D. Plaintiffs Suffered Personal Injuries as a Result of the Hijacking

It still remains for me to consider whether the 4 passengers and 36 immediate family

members of passengers who bring this lawsuit have adequately met the statutory

requirement of personal injury in the instant case. § 1605A(a)(1). Having considered the

record evidence, and incorporating my findings of fact in Allan, | find that they do. Like

in Allan, it is clear from plaintiffs’ declarations that they have all established valid theories

of recovery for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. And even more clear is the fact that “plaintiffs’ personal injuries arise from their

having been taken hostage and tortured by agents of the defendant[ J.” Stethem, 201 F.

Supp. 2d at 91 n. 20.

Plaintiffs’ declarations in both Allan and the instant case paint a harrowing tale of

the events that transpired aboard TWA Flight 847, as well as the conditions of captivity for

some passengers for two weeks afterwards in Beirut. Even those only on the aircraft for

the first day of the siege were forced to sit for prolonged periods in a crash-landing position;

refused access to food and water; prevented from using lavatories; and either subjected to

or witness to abuse by their captors. See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. D (Stethem Transcript (Zimmerman

Testimony)), at 127:4-10; id, Ex. B (Pls.’ Decls.). One passenger plaintiff recalled

“los[ing] track of time” in the crash-landing position and being struck repeatedly with a

gun for breaking position. Pls.’ Mot., Ex. B (Pls.’ Decls.) at 72. Some passengers were

also questioned about race, religion, and occupation for the purpose of being singled out

for potential execution. /d., Ex. D (Stethem Transcript, Suggs Testimony), at 88:1-8, 91:4—

6. In many cases, moreover, passengers travelling with family members faced the

additional terror of watching close family be subjected to such abuse. See, e.g., id., Ex. B

(Pls.’ Decls.) at 73-74. And, of course, for about a third of the passengers, the terror did

not end with the plane made its final stop in Beirut. Twenty-three male passengers endured

an additional two weeks of captivity in Beirut, during which they were subjected to mock

executions, threatened, and held under deplorable conditions. Compl. § 27.

As for the family member “spouse[s], parents, siblings, and children,” Heiser, 659

F. Supp. 2d at 28, their declarations “alleging emotional distress arising from a terrorist

attack that killed or injured a family member,” clearly satisfy Section 1605A’s

jurisdictional injury requirement, even though many were not present at the scene. Owens,

864 F.3d at 812 (certifying question of presence requirement for ITED claims to D.C. Court

of Appeals); Republic of Sudan v. Owens, 194 A.3d 38, 45 (D.C. 2018) “We see little need

to enforce the presence requirement in ITED cases where the jurisdictional elements of §

1605A are satisfied and the plaintiff's severe distress arises from a terrorist attack that

killed or injured a member of his or her immediate family.”). Indeed, as I explained in

Allan, the “‘intent to create maximum emotional impact,’ particularly on third parties, is

terrorism’s raison d’étre.” Heiser, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 27 (quoting Eisenfeld v. Islamic

Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2000)); Stansell v. Republic of Cuba, 217

F, Supp. 3d 320, 344 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Claims for solatium under the FSIA are nearly

indistinguishable from claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.’’).

Plaintiffs have therefore established all of the jurisdictional requirements laid out

by Section 1605A(a).4 What remains for me to consider is whether plaintiffs have met

Section 1605A(c)’s requirement to state a “theory of liability” on which defendants can be

held liable for plaintiffs’ injuries. Fortunately for them, they have!

4 The FSIA terrorism exception contains a limitation period, which provides that an action

must be brought not later than the latter of (1) 10 years after April 24, 1996; or (2) 10 years

after the date on which the cause of action arose unless plaintiffs have timely commenced

a “related” or “prior action” under the old § 1605(a)(7). 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(b). Under this

limitations provision, the last day to file a new action under § 1605A was April 24, 2006.

Nevertheless, our Circuit has unequivocally stated that the limitations provision in the

FSIA’s terrorism exception is non-jurisdictional. Owens, 864 F.3d at 802 (“[nJothing in §

1605A(a) ‘conditions its jurisdictional grant on compliance with [the] statute of limitations’

in § 1605A(b)’) (quoting Musacchio v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 709, 717 (2016)).

Therefore, where defendants do not raise it as an affirmative defense, it is considered

waived unless courts exercise their discretionary authority to raise the limitation as a

defense sua sponte. See Worley v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 75 F. Supp. 3d 311, 331

10

As stated above, plaintiffs here have submitted a voluminous record, including the

entire record in Allan and fulsome declarations by the instant plaintiffs alleging tort claims

for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress,

all “well-established principles of law, such as those found in the Restatement (Second) of

Torts...” Worley, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 335. While the FSIA technically requires plaintiffs “to

prove a theory of liability” separate and apart from establishing the elements of subject

matter jurisdiction, Owens, 864 F.3d at 807, most courts conduct the analysis together,

since evidence sufficient to establish jurisdictional causation will almost always establish

a theory of “personal injury” necessary to prevail under §1605A(c). See, e.g., Foley v.

Syrian Arab Republic, 249 F. Supp. 3d 186, 205 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding that plaintiffs were

entitled to relief under Section 1605A(c) after proving Section 1605A(a)’s Jurisdictional

requirements because of the “the overlap between the elements of this cause of action and

(D.D.C. 2014) (“declin[ing] whatever discretionary authority [the Court] may have to raise

the defense of limitations on Iran’s behalf’); cf Maalouf v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 306

F. Supp. 3d 203, 212 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Considering the timeliness of an FSIA claim sua

sponte is a discretionary determination.”). Recognizing that the FSIA strikes a “careful

balance” between comity and accountability, see Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138

S.Ct. 816, 822 (2018), I decline to exercise my discretion to raise the timeliness defense

here for several reasons. First, defendants have, so far, chosen not to appear in this or

related litigation and raise the limitations defense. There is little argument for comity, as

Iran remains a state sponsor of terrorism, and no friend of the United States. And plaintiffs

raise claims related to the very factual circumstances under which Judge Jackson

previously granted relief to the passenger who was killed during the hijacking. Moreover,

the D.C. Circuit’s overview of the textual history of the limitations provision in Owens

clearly demonstrates that Congress did not intend for courts to consider the limitation as a

bar to jurisdiction, but rather to consider the timeliness issue on a case-by-case basis. 864

F.3d at 802-04.

1]

the terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity”); Kilburn v. Islamic Republic of

Iran, 699 F. Supp. 2d 136, 155 (D.D.C. 2010) (summarily concluding that Section

1605A(c)’s cause of action requirement is satisfied when Section 1605A(a) jurisdiction is

found). Because “plaintiffs’ personal injuries arise from their having been taken hostage

and tortured by agents of the defendants[,]” | need not “belabor the issue of liability by

addressing the independent elements of each separate tort claim advanced by [each of] the

plaintiffs.” Stethem, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 91 n. 20.

II. Compensatory Damages Should be Awarded Consistent with the Allan

Special Master’s Recommendation

Plaintiffs also seek an order awarding compensatory damages. A party seeking

default damages under the FSIA “must prove damages ‘in the same manner and to the same

extent as any other default winner.’” Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 873 F.

Supp. 2d 232, 243 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Wachsman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 603 F.

Supp. 2d 148, 160 (D.D.C. 2009)). Plaintiffs may meet this burden of proof by submitting

“affidavits or declarations rather than through live witnesses testifying in open court,”

Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8, 20 (D.D.C. 2009), which the Court

“may accept...as true.” Lanny J. Davis & Associates LLC v. Republic of Equatorial

Guinea, 962 F. Supp. 2d 152, 163 (D.D.C. 2013).

While putting a price tag on the pain and suffering of passengers and their families

is challenging, Hekmati v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 278 F. Supp. 3d 145, 163 (D.D.C.

2017) (recognizing the “challenge aris[ing] in assigning a dollar value to such pain and

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suffering”), there are, fortunately, a plethora of prior decisions in this Circuit awarding

damages for pain and suffering to victims of terrorist attacks. Indeed, the Special Master

in Allan diligently considered these decisions, and devised a framework by which to group

the Allan plaintiffs’ injuries in a way that is both consistent with prior practice and

internally consistent between plaintiffs. See Pls.’ Mot., Appendix A (Pls.’ Proposed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) at 14-16. Namely, he considered the severity of

the pain immediately following the injury, the lasting and severe psychological problems

resulting from the injuries, and the overall length and severity of captivity. This framework

applies equally to the plaintiffs here, who are situated identically to the plaintiffs in A//an.

Starting with “the baseline assumption that persons suffering [physical] injuries in

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terrorist attacks are entitled to $5 million in compensatory damages,” Davis v. Islamic

Republic of Iran, 882 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2012), and that those who suffer emotional,

but no physical injury are typically awarded $1.5 million in damages, see, e.g., Relvas v.

Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 14-01752, 2018 WL 1092445, *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 28,

2018), the Special Master in Allan divided plaintiffs in that case according to the “gravity

of harm” as revealed by their “shared experiences.” See Allan at 6. Plaintiffs in the instant

case ask that I apply Special Master Balaran’s recommended damages benchmarks to

plaintiffs’ damages evidence here. Pls.” Mot. at 2. In Allan, I fully adopted the damages

framework recommended by Special Master Balaran because, as plaintiffs note, it was both

fair and practical, and was well-supported by decisions in other terrorism cases involving

the same or very similar issues. Because plaintiffs in the instant case are situated identically

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to the plaintiffs in Allan and because the damages benchmarks apply here in full force, I

agree that the most fair and efficient way forward is to apply the Allan damages framework

here.

For passenger plaintiffs, the Special Master recommended relief under three sub-

categories: For the 15 passengers (“Group I) who were “forced to sit for prolonged

periods in cramped and painful positions; refused access to the lavatories; subjected to

unsanitary conditions; denied food and water; and were subjected to or forced to watch

mock executions,” but were ultimately released within the first day of the hijacking, he

awarded $1,000,000. Allan at *7. For the 27 passengers (“Group II”) who were “subjected

to 35 additional hours of the same abuse,” and also “faced a possible crash-landing; heard

the gunshot that killed a fellow passenger; listened while other passengers were brutally

beaten; saw the swollen and bloodied bodies of the terrorists’ victims; capitulated to the

demands of heavily-armed Amal militia; [were] robbed of their valuables; and watched

helplessly as their captors wired the aircraft with plastic explosives,” the Special Master

awarded $2,000,000. Jd. And for the 23 passengers (“Group III”) who were held captive

in Beirut for an extra two weeks and suffered additional abuse, including being “lined up

against a wall—‘execution-style’; repeatedly threatened with death; tormented with false

promises of release; housed in locations surrounded by exploding shells and mortar fire;

confined to rooms with no beds, working toilets or sanitary facilities; supplied with tainted

food and water; and bombarded with anti-American propaganda,” he awarded $5,000,000.

Id.

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Special Master Balaran conducted a separate analysis to determine the appropriate

baseline loss of solatium for family members whose loved ones “survived a terrorist

attack.” Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 768 F. Supp. 2d 16, 26 n. 10 (D.D.C. 2011);

see also Wyatt, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (finding loss of solatium framework applied to

“cases in which the victim survived a terrorist attack or hostage-taking”). Keeping in mind

the principle that family members should not be awarded more than the victim, and

considering analogous cases in our Circuit, the Special Master recommended solatium

awards for family members of victims commensurate with the groups above—for Group

I, $660,000 for spouses, $560,000 for parents, $495,000 for children, and $330,000 for

siblings; for Group II, $1,330,000 for spouses, $1,112,000 for parents, $990,000 for

children, and $660,000 for siblings; and for Group III, $4,000,000 for spouses, $2,500,000

for parents, $1,500,000 for children, and $1,250,000 for siblings. A//an at *7.

Under these circumstances, plaintiffs are thus entitled to compensatory damages in

the amounts listed above.’ I therefore GRANT plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment as

to damages consistent with these amounts, as set forth in detail in the attached Appendix

A-Damages, and totaling approximately $59 million dollars.

> Notably, the Special Master’s recommended awards were within the range granted by

Judge Jackson in Stethem. 201 F. Supp. 2d at 93 (awarding $5,000,000 each to the Stethem

and his wife, and a range of $200,000 to $3,000,000 to other family members).

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion default judgment

and damages [Dkt. # 24]. An Order consistent with this decision accompanies this

“Caused

RICHARD TALES

United BD 1G Sack Judge

Memorandum Opinion.

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APPENDIX A—DAMAGES

Plaintiff Hostage/ Relationship Pain & Solatium Total

Sufferings

FAMILY OF GROUP II HOSTAGE VICTOR AMBURGY

(Received Judgment in Allan, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran)

Amburgy, Donald | Father of Group II] Hostage $0 | $2,500,000 | $2,500,000

(Estate of )

Amburgy, Ethelyn | Mother of Group HI Hostage $0 | $2,500,000 | $2,500,000

(Estate of)

Amburgy, Brother of Group III Hostage $0 | $1,250,000 | $1,250,000

Lawrence

Damrow, Mary Sister of Group IJ] Hostage $0 | $1,250,000 | $1,250,000

Jagla, Linda Sister of Group III Hostage $0 | $1,250,000 | $1,250,000

Kruse, Patricia Sister of Group II] Hostage $0 | $1,250,000 | $1,250,000

McCarty, Jack Group III Hostage; Spouse of Group | $5,000,000 | $4,000,000 | $9,000,000

(Estate of)

Il Hostage

FAMILY OF GROUP II] HOSTAGE JEROME BARCZAK

(Received Judgment in Allan, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran)

Barezak, Alice Sister of Group III Hostage $0 | $1,250,000 | $1,250,000

Barcezak, Carol Sister of Group HI Hostage $0 | $1,250,000 | $1,250,000

Barcezak, David Son of Group III Hostage $0 | $1,500,000 | $1,500,000

Barczak, Edward Brother of Group HI Hostage $0 | $1,250,000 | $1,250,000

Barezak, James Son of Group III Hostage $0 | $1,500,000 | $1,500,000

Barezak, Lenore Sister of Group III Hostage $0 | $1,250,000 | $1,250,000

Barcezak, Michael Brother of Group II $0 | $1,250,000 | $1,250,000

Hostage

Barcezak, Michael Son of Group II Hostage $0 | $1,500,000 | $1,500,000

“Mike”

Day, Marianne Sister of Group III Hostage $0 | $1,250,000 | $1,250,000

Goodmann, Sharon | Sister of Group HI Hostage $0 | $1,250,000 | $1,250,000

Kiepe, Diane Daughter of Group III Hostage $0 | $1,500,000 | $1,500,000

Olson, Susan Sister of Group III Hostage $0 | $1,250,000 | $1,250,000

Thornley, Joan Sister of Group III Hostage $0 | $1,250,000 | $1,250,000

FAMILY OF GROUP I HOSTAGE JUDITH CHUDIGIAN

(Received Judgment in Allan, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran)

Chudigian, Lavom | Husband of Group I Hostage $0 $660,000 $660,000

(Estate of)

Cote, Sue Daughter of Group I Hostage $0 $495,000 $495,000

Rogers, Diane Daughter of Group I Hostage $0 $495,000 $495,000

FAMILY OF GROUP IIIT HOSTAGE GEORGE LAZANSKY & GROUP IT HOSTAGE

JOANNE LAZANSKY*

(Received Judgment in Allan, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran)

*Individuals with multiple family members on board TWA 847 received solatium damages

corresponding to the family member held captive the longest amount of time.

Lazansky, Michael | Son of Group III Hostage $0 | $1,500,000 | $1,500,000

Lazansky, Pete Son of Group HI Hostage $0 | $1,500,000 | $1,500,000

Lazansky, Thomas | Son of Group III Hostage $0 | $1,500,000 | $1,500,000

GROUP I HOSTAGE FRANCES REYNOLDS AND FAMILY

DuCharme, June Daughter of Group I $0 $495,000 $495,000

Hostage

Reynolds, Frances | Group I Hostage $1,000,000 $0 | $1,000,000

(Estate of)

GROUP II HOSTAGE PAULA SUKEFORTH AND FAMILY

Bellino, Catherine | Daughter of Group II $0 $990,000 $990,000

Hostage

Donegan, Lisa Daughter of Group IT $0 $990,000 $990,000

Hostage

Johnson, Leslie Daughter of Group I Hostage $0 $990,000 $990,000

McDonough, Ann | Daughter of Group II $0 $990,000 $990,000

Hostage

Stevens, Frank Father of Group II Hostage $0 | $1,112,000 | $1,112,000

(Estate of)

Sukeforth, Carl Son of Group II Hostage $0 $990,000 $990,000

Sukeforth, Harold Husband of Group IJ Hostage $0 | $1,330,000 | $1,330,000

(Estate of)

Sukeforth, Paul Son of Group II Hostage $0 $990,000 $990,000

Sukeforth, Paula Group II Hostage $2,000,000 $0 | $2,000,000

PLAINTIFFS WITHOUT FAMILY GROUPS IN THIS CASE

Delgado, Jose Group II Hostage; Spouse of Group I | $2,000,000 $660,000 | $2,660,000

(Estate of) Hostage Gisela Delgado (Received

Judgment in Allan, et al. v.

Islamic Republic of Iran)

O’Meara, Kiley Daughter of Group II Hostage Frank $0 $990,000 $990,000

Walsh (Received Judgment in Allan,

etal. v. Islamic

Republic of Iran)

Zinna, Lynette Sister of Group II Hostage Judy Cox $0 $660,000 $660,000

Barkley (Received Judgment in

Allan, et al. vy. Islamic

Republic of Iran)