M. Rokita, and All Others Similarly Situated v. PA DOC

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mark Rokita, and All Others :

Similarly Situated, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 182 M.D. 2020

: SUBMITTED: September 25, 2020

PA Dep’t of Corr., :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: November 20, 2020

Petitioner Mark Rokita (Rokita), an inmate at the State Correctional

Institution at Houtzdale (SCI-Houtzdale), has filed a Petition for Review (Petition)

in our original jurisdiction, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, in

which he alleges that Respondent PA Dep’t of Corr.1 (Department) has violated his

constitutional rights pursuant to the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of

the United States Constitution,2 as well as unspecified provisions of the Pennsylvania

Constitution. Petition, ¶1. Rokita challenges two Department policies on those

constitutional grounds, DC-ADM 801 HOU 2 (HOU 2), which establishes a

“Violence Reduction Strategy” (VRS) at SCI-Houtzdale, as well as DC-ADM 804,

which sets forth the Department’s internal prisoner grievance process. Id., ¶¶10, 21-

24, 34-35.

1

The proper name for this entity is the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of

Corrections.

2

U.S. CONST. amends. I, VIII, and XIV.

The Department has filed Preliminary Objections in response, demurring to

the Petition on the basis that Rokita has failed to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. Upon review, we sustain the Preliminary Objections and dismiss the

Petition with prejudice.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Rokita’s Petition is not a model of clarity, but we understand the operative

facts, as averred by him and established through the exhibits attached to the Petition,

to be as follows.

In 2019, SCI-Houtzdale promulgated HOU 2, which memorialized the

creation at the prison of

a Violence Reduction Committee [(Committee)] for the

purpose of establishing a [VRS] for SCI[-]Houtzdale. This

strategy will be multidimensional to include proactive

planning and response strategies that provide strategic

oversight; assist with risk identification and needs

assessments[;] and implement response strategies to

prohibited violent acts.

Petition, Ex. S. The Committee’s membership contains a broad swath of SCI-

Houtzdale employees, from various deputy superintendents to members of the

maintenance staff. Id. As for the VRS, it identifies classes of various prohibited

violent acts, as well as how the perpetrators of those acts will be handled, and

establishes that “[i]n the event of a prohibited violent act, the units where the

involved offenders are housed will be immediately placed on lockdown or restricted

movement.” Id., Exs. S-Z.

On October 29, 2019, Rokita returned to Unit J-B, where he was housed, and

was informed by prison personnel that the unit had been placed under lockdown

pursuant to the VRS, due to a violent incident that had occurred while Rokita was

elsewhere. Id., ¶2. According to Rokita,

2

[he], along with the entire unit[,] . . . was locked down for

[three] days in their cells with absolutely no movement

beyond their cell doors, . . . followed by [three] days of

res[t]ricted, limited movement. During this [six-]day

duration petitioner and all other inmates on this unit were

denied[] visits, access to the law library, access to any

religious services, access to any recreational passes, and

out[]side recreation.

Id. During the period of restricted movement, Rokita heard that the lockdown had

been caused by a mentally ill inmate, who had gotten into an argument with a prison

guard after refusing to follow the guard’s commands and had then been pepper

sprayed by the guard. Id., ¶3.

On November 3, 2019, Rokita filed an inmate grievance, in which he claimed

that the lockdown was punitive in nature, had stopped him from communicating with

family members, and had prevented him from showering, exercising, accessing the

law library, and going to religious services. Id., Ex. A. Rokita argued that locking

him down without giving him a chance to challenge that action in advance violated

his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In addition, he alleged

violations of his rights secured by the First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment,

and Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. Rokita requested an independent

review of HOU 2 and an investigation of SCI-Houtzdale’s administrative staff, due

to his belief that the policy was unconstitutional and that the staff was either unaware

of or unwilling to treat him in accordance with his legal rights. Id. Rokita’s grievance

was denied, as were his two subsequent internal appeals of that denial. Id., Exs. B(i)-

F.

On December 18, 2019, an inmate beat another prisoner using a makeshift

weapon, prompting a VRS lockdown to be declared again in Unit J-B. Id., ¶¶12-13.

This resulted in a three-day-long state of emergency in Rokita’s unit and ultimately

prevented Rokita from accessing the law library or attending religious services for

3

six days, as well as from going for recreation or using the showers for an unspecified

amount of time. Id., ¶13, Ex. G. Rokita then filed another grievance on December

22, 2019, in which he argued that the state of emergency and the resultant lockdown

were merely pretexts for inflicting punishment without due process and were part of

a broader pattern of such abuses by the Committee. Id. Rokita claimed that such

actions violated his constitutional due process rights, requested “judicial review” of

HOU 2 and the Committee, and “accuse[d] the framers of this policy [of] creating

this sole[l]y to punish innocent individuals because they believe they will get away

with it.” Id. Rokita’s second grievance was denied, as was his subsequent internal

appeal. Id., Exs. H(i)-(J).3

On February 26, 2020, Rokita filed his Petition with our Court. In his Petition,

Rokita discusses the two aforementioned lockdowns and his resultant, unsuccessful

grievances, while also referencing the similar experiences of other inmates at SCI-

Houtzdale. Id., ¶¶2-15, 17-19. Rokita alleges that VRS lockdowns are a constant

occurrence at SCI-Houtzdale and that they actually have the opposite of their

intended effect, stirring up anger and animosity among the inmates who, though they

may not be involved in the violent behavior precipitating the lockdowns, are

nonetheless consequently subject to collective limitations on the handful of freedoms

and comforts still available to them in prison. Id., ¶¶16-19.4 Rokita claims that VRS

3

Nothing in the Petition itself or the attached exhibits shows that Rokita appealed the denial

of this internal appeal.

4

Rokita also alleges that correctional officers will deliberately pair clearly incompatible

inmates with each other as cellmates “for their own entertainment[, such as] an African-American

. . . with an Aryan Brother[.]” Petition, ¶20. According to Rokita, if the true goal is to reduce

violence, “[t]his [type of behavior] calls into question the motives and mental capacity of the staff

and administration of the [Department.]” Id. In addition, Rokita raises questions about the

Committee itself, which he claims is likely a sham organization that never actually meets. Id.

4

lockdowns are an abuse of power and flout the Fourteenth Amendment, as they

impose atypical and significant hardships upon innocent prisoners and punish them

without procedural due process. Id., ¶¶26-31. In addition, he argues that these

lockdowns constitute cruel and unusual punishment, infringing upon the Eighth

Amendment, and also contravene the First Amendment by hampering access to the

courts and interfering with religious activities. Id., ¶¶27, 32. Finally, Rokita

maintains that the Department’s internal grievance system itself did not afford him

the necessary level of procedural due process, in contravention of the Fourteenth

Amendment, as the system allowed members of the Committee to both decide

whether to initiate a lockdown and then rule upon a grievance challenging that

lockdown. Id., ¶¶14-15, 25.5 As relief, Rokita requests that the Department be

hereafter enjoined from violating his constitutional rights, as well as those of all

others similarly situated, that HOU 2 and DC-ADM 804 be “dismantl[ed,]” and that

Department staff be directed to learn about inmates’ constitutional rights before any

replacement policies were drafted or implemented. Id., Wherefore Clause.

The Department responded by filing Preliminary Objections, through which

it demurs to the Petition. Rokita has responded in opposition, and this matter is now

ready for our consideration.

II. Standard of Review

In ruling on preliminary objections, this Court accepts as

true all well-pled allegations of material fact, as well as all

inferences reasonably deducible from those facts. Key v.

Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 185 A.3d 421 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

However, this Court need not accept unwarranted

inferences, conclusions of law, argumentative allegations,

or expressions of opinion. Id. For preliminary objections

to be sustained, it must appear with certainty that the law

5

Rokita also mentions in passing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658

(1978), without articulating how Monell applies to the matter sub judice. See Petition, ¶33.

5

will permit no recovery. Id. Any doubt must be resolved

in favor of the non-moving party. Id.

Dantzler v. Wetzel, 218 A.3d 519, 522 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).

III. Discussion

The Department presents the following arguments in favor of its Preliminary

Objections, which we have summarized and reordered as follows for clarity’s sake.

First, Rokita cannot establish that the Department is liable pursuant to Monell for

violations of constitutional rights, as the Department is immune under the Eleventh

Amendment of the United States Constitution6 as an apparatus of our

Commonwealth’s government. Department’s Br. in Support of Preliminary

Objections at 24-26. Moreover, even ignoring such immunity, Rokita has failed to

plead facts sufficient to support his argument that Monell liability attaches to the

Department in this situation. Id. at 26. Second, Rokita’s First Amendment claims are

not legally viable, as he did not identify any specific injury suffered by him as a

result of being unable to access the law library or incur anything more than a de

minimis impact upon his religious rights. Id. at 21-24. Third, Rokita cannot state an

Eighth Amendment-based claim, because the lockdowns he complains of do not

constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 19-21. Finally, Rokita’s claims

rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment fail, as the lockdowns did not impose atypical

and significant hardship upon Rokita when compared to the ordinary incidents of

6

“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in

law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another

State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

6

prison life. Id. at 14-18. As such, he was not entitled to due process in connection

with these lockdowns. Id. We address each of these arguments in turn.7

A. Monell Liability

We agree with the Department that it is immune from Monell liability.8 In

Monell, the United States Supreme Court ruled that local governments could be held

liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving individuals of their constitutional rights,

7

We note that Rokita appears to style his Petition as a class action suit, as evidenced by

his usage of the phrase “and all others similarly situated” in the caption and throughout his Petition.

See Petition at 1, ¶¶26, 32, Wherefore Clause. However, it is well-settled that a pro se inmate is

not allowed to initiate a class action lawsuit, in large part due to the fact that an individual without

the proper level of legal education and experience is singularly ill-equipped to represent the

interests of others in a court of law. See Mobley v. Coleman, 65 A.3d 1048, 1051 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2013). Therefore, we sustain the Department’s Preliminary Objections and dismiss the Petition to

the extent that the claims raised therein sound in class action. The remainder of this opinion will

analyze whether the Department’s demurrers should be sustained as to the claims put forth by

Rokita on his own behalf.

8

Pa. R.C.P. No. 1030(3) provides that immunity from suit is an

affirmative defense that must be raised in a responsive pleading

under the heading of “new matter.” Id. However, this Court has

created limited exceptions to this rule. First, a party may raise the

affirmative defense of immunity as a preliminary objection where it

is clearly applicable on the face of the [petition for review]; that is,

that a cause of action is made against a governmental body and it is

apparent on the face of the pleading that the cause of action does not

fall within any of the exceptions to . . . immunity. Wurth v. City of

Philadelphia, . . . 584 A.2d 403, 407 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1990) (en banc).

Second, where a party erroneously asserts an immunity defense in a

preliminary objection, the failure of the opposing party to file a

preliminary objection to the defective preliminary objection in the

nature of a motion to strike for lack of conformity to law waives the

procedural defect and allows the trial court to rule on the immunity

defense. Id.; see Gallagher v. City of Philadelphia, . . . 597 A.2d

747, 750 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991).

Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 87 A.3d 1014, 1021-22 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). Here, sovereign

immunity’s applicability to this matter is evident on the face of the Petition and Rokita does not

challenge the procedurally premature invocation of this affirmative defense.

7

but only when such deprivations were caused by the enforcement of official policies

or customs. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-95. Independent of the fact that Rokita failed to

clearly articulate how such liability applies in this situation, see Petition, ¶33, the

Department, as an appendage of our Commonwealth’s government, cannot be

subject to Monell liability due to the protections from suit afforded to states by the

Eleventh Amendment. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338-41 (1979); Lavia v. Dep’t

of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000). We therefore sustain the Department’s

Preliminary Objections to Rokita’s assertions of Monell liability and dismiss the

Petition to the extent that the claims therein rest upon this theory.

B. Constitutional Claims

Generally speaking, Rokita is correct that his incarceration does not

completely strip him of his constitutional rights.

[P]risons are not beyond the reach of the Constitution. No

“iron curtain” separates one from the other. . . . Indeed, . .

. prisoners [must] be accorded those rights not

fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or

incompatible with the objectives of incarceration.

....

The continuing guarantee of these substantial rights to

prison inmates is testimony to a belief that the way a

society treats those who have transgressed against it is

evidence of the essential character of that society.

However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many

protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that

imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of

many significant rights. . . . These constraints on inmates,

and in some cases the complete withdrawal of certain

rights, are justified by the considerations underlying our

penal system. . . . The curtailment of certain rights is

necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad

of institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities. . .

. Of course, these restrictions or retractions also serve,

incidentally, as reminders that, under our system of justice,

8

deterrence and retribution are factors in addition to

correction.

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1984) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted). With these points in mind, we turn to Rokita’s specific constitutional

claims, in order to determine whether any of them pass legal muster at this stage in

the proceedings.

1. First Amendment

a. Access to the Courts

Rokita does not articulate an actionable First Amendment claim regarding the

lockdowns’ effect upon his ability to use SCI-Houtzdale’s law library. In order to

state such a claim, Rokita was required to “allege[] an ‘actual injury’ in the nature

of a loss or rejection of a legal claim regarding sentencing or the conditions of

confinement.” Hackett v. Horn, 751 A.2d 272, 276 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (emphasis in

original). Rokita has failed to do this, instead merely speaking in general terms about

how he was barred from accessing the law library during the two aforementioned

lockdowns. See Petition, ¶¶2, 4, 13, 15, 30, 32, Exs. A, G.

b. Ability to Exercise Religious Beliefs

The same is true for Rokita’s assertion that the Department, through the

imposition of lockdowns, violated his First Amendment right to religious freedom.

“Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First

Amendment, . . . including its directive that no law shall

prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of

Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 . . . (1987) (citations omitted).

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment

prohibits prison officials from denying an inmate “a

reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith.” Cruz v.

Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 & n.2 . . . (1972). However,

“[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary

withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, ...

aris[ing] both from the fact of incarceration and from valid

penological objectives—including deterrence of crime,

9

rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security.”

O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348 . . . (citation omitted).

Rivera v. Silbaugh, __ A.3d __, __ (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1708 C.D. 2018, filed Sept. 21,

2020), slip op. at 14-15, 2020 WL 5624151, at *7. Here, Rokita complains in general

terms that he was unable to attend “religious services” during the lockdowns,

Petition, ¶¶2, 4, 1332, Exs. A, G, but does not explain how the lockdowns’

temporarily restrictive conditions deprived him of “a reasonable opportunity of

pursuing his faith.” Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322. In light of this, we fail to see how his

constitutional right to free exercise of religion was impinged upon, given that, when

it comes to this right in the context of a carceral environment, “[t]here may be

inconveniences so trivial that they are most properly ignored. In this respect, this

area of the law is no different from many others in which the time-honored maxim

‘de minimis non curat lex’ applies.” McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 203 n.6

(2d Cir. 2004). Furthermore, we are skeptical that, in the absence of unique and

compelling circumstances of the type not averred to in the Petition, the First

Amendment requires the Department to permit inmates to attend group prayers in

the midst of a lockdown imposed due to concerns about institutional safety. See

Booker v. Graham, 974 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2020); cf. Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d

174, 187-89 (4th Cir. 2006) (prison’s refusal, for disciplinary purposes, to permit a

Muslim inmate to join in nearly any special meals or group prayers during Ramadan

imposed a substantial burden upon his religious practices).

2. Eighth Amendment

Rokita’s Eighth Amendment claim also fails to establish any basis for relief

in his favor.

In order to maintain a claim under the Eighth Amendment

based upon prison conditions, an inmate “must satisfy both

an objective and subjective test.” Allah v. Ricci, 532 [F.

App’x] 48[, 51] (3d Cir. 2013). Under these requirements,

10

an inmate must demonstrate that the deprivation he alleges

is “sufficiently serious” and that the correctional

institution has deprived him of “minimal civilized measure

of life’s necessities.” Id. . . . . Furthermore, an inmate must

also demonstrate that the conditions under which he is

confined pose a substantial risk of harm and that the

officials who have allegedly deprived the inmate of such

necessities did so with a sufficiently culpable state of mind

and acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate's

health or safety.[] Id.

Thomas v. Corbett, 90 A.3d 789, 797 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (internal footnote omitted).

Here, Rokita asserts that, during the lockdowns, he was denied the ability to receive

visitors, communicate with family members, attend religious services, participate in

recreational activities, use the showers, or visit the law library. Petition, ¶¶ 2, 13, 15,

32. Even assuming that these allegations are true, which we must at this stage, such

restrictions imposed over the brief time period claimed by Rokita cannot support the

conclusion that “he was deprived of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities,’ . . . or that his health and safety were at risk.” Allah, 532 F. App’x at 51

(internal citations omitted).

3. Fourteenth Amendment

a. Procedural Due Process in the Context of Prison Lockdowns

Furthermore, Rokita’s argument that he was entitled to procedural due

process, in the form of the ability to challenge the lockdowns’ imposition, is

misplaced. It is well-settled that inmates retain

liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process

Clause. . . . But these interests will be generally limited to

freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the

sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to

protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, . . .

nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.

11

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (internal citations omitted).

Such constraints on due process rights reflect the reality that “[t]he operation

of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff

v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). This undertaking is impossible without

adequate deterrence of and control over violence inside a prison’s walls; as such, we

must recognize that “central to all other corrections goals is the institutional

consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities themselves.” Pell

v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974). “Within this volatile ‘community,’ prison

administrators are to take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of not only the

prison staffs and administrative personnel, but also visitors. They are under an

obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates

themselves.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526-27; accord Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

833 (1994) (“Having incarcerated ‘persons [with] demonstrated proclivit[ies] for

antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct,’ Hudson . . . , 468 U.S. at 526, . . .

having stripped them of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their

access to outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state of

nature take its course.”).

In light of the standard set forth in Sandin, as well as the inherently perilous

security conditions found in prisons and the paramount interest in assuring internal

institutional safety, we cannot deem the two lockdowns complained of by Rokita to

have “impose[d an] atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” 515 U.S. at 484. Both lockdowns were

implemented in response to violent altercations involving inmates, incidents that

self-evidently required responses from SCI-Houtzdale’s staff members to ensure

they maintained control over both the prison itself and the inmates housed there.

12

Indeed, Rokita himself essentially admits to how generally precarious the situation

is at SCI-Houtzdale, writing that “[i]t has become common that at any given time at

least one unit at SCI[-]Houtzdale is on VRS lockdown.” Petition, ¶16. In Rokita’s

own estimation, lockdowns are not “atypical” at SCI-Houtzdale; instead, they are

essentially to be expected as a matter of course, even if they do not occur on a

predictable schedule. See id., ¶19 (“A VRS lock-down comes without warning . . .

at any time. [Rokita] admits to monitoring [his] housing unit as [he] await[s] . . .

visit[ors] to make sure no incidents occur.”). While this reality certainly may speak

to systemic problems regarding institutional control at SCI-Houtzdale, it does not

follow that Rokita is consequently imbued with the constitutional right to procedural

due process regarding imposition of the lockdowns themselves, especially given that

the duration of each lockdown was so brief. Cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,

225 (1976) (courts are loath to second-guess or apply procedural due process

protections to “a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been

the business of prison administrators”).9

b. Procedural Due Process in the Context of Rokita’s Administrative Grievances

Finally, Rokita’s assertion that his procedural due process rights were violated

via the manner in which the Department handled his grievances is legally infirm.

Rokita sought to challenge the lockdowns through these grievances. However, as

9

We also must point out that, despite Rokita’s belief to the contrary, the lockdowns did

not punish him, in the sense that they were not imposed as a penalty in response to some prohibited

act he had perpetrated. “Loss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of

confinement in [a prison]. And the fact that such detention interferes with [an inmate’s]

understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible

during confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into ‘punishment.’”

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979). Of course, we recognize that this does not change the

fact that Rokita was unable to conduct certain activities during the course of the lockdowns; to

him, there is no real-world difference between particularized punishment and non-punitive

deprivations caused by the lockdowns.

13

already noted, the lockdowns did not “impose[] atypical and significant hardship[s]

. . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.

Therefore, the Department was not required to provide Rokita with procedural due

process when considering and ruling upon his grievances.10

10

It also bears mentioning that we have previously “recognize[d] that [the Department’s]

grievance process is constitutionally adequate.” Brown v. Wetzel (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 318 M.D.

2015, Sept. 9, 2016), slip op. at 8, 2016 WL 4709887, at *4. See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a) (Section

414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures authorizes the citation of unreported panel

decisions issued after January 15, 2008, for their persuasive value, but not as binding precedent).

That having been said, we would be remiss to ignore Rokita’s assertion that Department

employees who were involved in deciding whether to impose the aforementioned lockdowns also

ruled upon Rokita’s grievances challenging the lockdowns. See Petition, ¶¶14-15, 25. If true, the

fact that the authors of challenged decisions got to decide whether these decisions were proper

clearly makes a mockery of the idea that Rokita’s grievances were handled in a fair and impartial

manner and stands to undermine confidence in the Department’s grievance process as a whole. As

Justice Wecht has written,

[i]nternal prison grievance processes and the manner of their

operation raise substantial concerns about the adequacy and fairness

of adjudications taking place therein. Several intrinsic deficiencies

define the process, which have not gone unnoticed in the legal and

academic community.[] Some commentators have questioned the

fundamental fairness of allowing a governmental entity to police its

own actions and to serve as an arbiter in disputes concerning those

actions, in which it always is an interested party. See Van

Swearingen, Comment, Imprisoning Rights: The Failure of

Negotiated Governance in the Prison Inmate Grievance Process, 96

CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1378 (2008) (“A dispute resolution process in

which the State defines the rules of the process and then becomes

both a party in the dispute and adjudicator violates basic notions of

procedural fairness.”). Absent any type of oversight from a neutral

arbiter, which may provide unbiased consideration of potentially

viable legal claims, may require the observance of fundamental

procedural protections, and may fashion appropriate legal remedies,

an internal dispute resolution process in which the same entity is

both a litigant and the judge allows for the resolution of claims in a

manner that elevates institutional priorities over the rights of a

claimant. Id. at 1377-78 (arguing that grievance processes can “alter

the focus of the complaint process from one concerned primarily

(Footnote continued on next page…)

14

IV. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing analysis, we conclude that all of Rokita’s claims are

without legal merit. Therefore, we sustain the Department’s Preliminary Objections

and dismiss the Petition with prejudice.11

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

with the declaration of rights and wrongdoings to one focused on a

prison’s organizational goal of resolving disputes quickly and to its

own advantage,” potentially failing “to deter particular forms of

constitutionally unlawful conduct within the prison walls” while

simultaneously providing “a sense of legal legitimacy that may limit

court-imposed liability”).

Brown v. Wetzel, 177 A.3d 200, 210 (Pa. 2018) (Wecht, J., dissenting) (internal footnote omitted).

Unfortunately, as Rokita was not entitled to due process in the context of his grievances,

we are unable to provide him with relief for the reasons previously articulated in this opinion. “In

so deciding we do not minimize the seriousness of a lockdown nor do we deny that [proper]

administrative review of a lockdown decision might be desirable. . . . We are simply unable to say

that the Constitution dictates such a procedure.” Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599, 603 (9th

Cir. 1980) (internal citation omitted).

11

As noted supra, Rokita mentions that the Department has also violated “several [of his]

Pennsylvania constitutional rights,” but does not specifically identify what those rights are or the

provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution he seeks to invoke. See Petition, ¶1. Therefore, we

interpret his Pennsylvania Constitution-based claims as having no separate identity from his claims

rooted in the United States Constitution and dismiss his Pennsylvania Constitution-based claims

as well.

15

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mark Rokita, and All Others :

Similarly Situated, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 182 M.D. 2020

:

PA Dep’t of Corr., :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 20th day of November, 2020, upon consideration of

Respondent PA Dep’t of Corr.’s Preliminary Objections to the Petition for Review

filed by Petitioner Mark Rokita, and All Others Similarly Situated, and the response

thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that the Preliminary Objections are SUSTAINED

and that the Petition for Review is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge