Craig Geness v. Administrative Office of Penns

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 19-2253

___________

CRAIG A. GENESS

v.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF PENNSYLVANIA COURTS;

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; PENNSYLVANIA

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts,

Appellant

_________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-16-cv-00876)

District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney

____________________________________

Argued May 26, 2020

Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges

(Filed: September 8, 2020)

_____________

William A. Pietragallo, II [ARGUED]

James W. Kraus

Pietragallo Gordon Alfano Bosick & Raspanti

301 Grant Street

One Oxford Centre, 38th Floor

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Robert J. Krandel

Caroline P. Liebenguth

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts

1515 Market Street

Suite 1414

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Appellant

Joel S. Sansone [ARGUED]

Law Offices of Joel Sansone

603 Stanwix Street

Two Gateway Center, Suite 1290

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Counsel for Appellee

2

___________

OPINION OF THE COURT

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.

Mentally disabled and deemed incompetent to stand

trial, Craig Geness was detained for nearly a decade before the

homicide charge against him was ultimately dismissed. His

case exhibits inexcusable failures in Pennsylvania’s criminal

justice and mental health systems. While there is no doubt that

Geness’s case languished for far too long, we are limited here

to the narrow question whether the Administrative Office of

Pennsylvania Courts (AOPC) may plausibly be held liable for

his misfortune.

This appeal arises from AOPC’s motion to dismiss

Geness’s claim under Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, and the Fourteenth

Amendment. The District Court denied AOPC’s motion,

finding that AOPC does not have sovereign immunity. For the

reasons set forth below, we will reverse the District Court’s

judgment and remand for dismissal of Geness’s Title II and

Fourteenth Amendment claim against AOPC.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The events leading up to this case reveal a breakdown

in Pennsylvania’s criminal justice system.1 Geness is a

1

The following facts are taken from Geness’s Second

Amended Complaint except where otherwise noted.

permanently mentally disabled individual in his early fifties.

On November 17, 2006, he was detained after being charged

with aggravated assault. The charge was later amended to

homicide. This stemmed from an incident at Geness’s assisted

living facility, McVey Personal Care Home, in Uniontown,

Pennsylvania. Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 349 (3d Cir.

2018). A resident of the facility fell from the building’s porch

and suffered serious injuries that resulted in his death a few

weeks later. Id. Despite initial reports that the fall was an

accident, the deceased resident’s daughter contacted police to

share her suspicion that he might have been pushed. Id. at 349.

Police then initiated an investigation that led to the charge

against Geness. Id. at 349–50.

On June 18, 2007, a judge for the Court of Common

Pleas of Fayette County deemed Geness incompetent to stand

trial and ordered him transferred to a psychiatric hospital for

no more than sixty days to ascertain his capacity to stand trial

and his potential to regain competency. Despite the judge’s

order, Geness was not immediately transferred because, he

avers, “the waiting list for beds for persons deemed

incompetent to stand trial far exceeded the number of beds that

DHS [the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services] had

made available.” App. 38 ¶ 17. Approximately two months

after the judge’s order was entered, and with no psychiatric

evaluation undertaken, another judge again “deemed [Geness]

incompetent to stand trial and directed that a motion be filed

when Plaintiff was deemed competent to proceed.” App. 38 ¶

19.

Another two months after that (approximately ten

months after his arrest), Geness was finally transferred to a

psychiatric facility where he underwent an evaluation on

September 25, 2007 and was then returned to prison. He was

2

deemed incompetent with a “poor” prognosis for

improvement, yet no action was taken by the court, and he

remained imprisoned for years to come. App. 39 ¶ 21.

Throughout those years, his case was subject to the

court’s monthly “call of the list.” This is when a Court of

Common Pleas judge reviews a list of all pending criminal

matters that are ripe for trial, addressing each case individually

and either continuing it or scheduling the trial. The district

attorney and public defender for each case attend this

proceeding and provide the judge with relevant information.

In Geness’s case, the district attorneys “acquiesced to

the repeated continuance” of his trial—and his public defender

“made no attempt to have [Geness’s] case removed from the

trial list, despite [his] known incompetency to stand trial” and

despite the public defender’s “authority and [] opportunity” to

make an appropriate request. App. 40 ¶¶ 28, 30–31. Nor did

any of the six judges who at one time or another presided over

the “call of the list” intervene throughout three years of

monthly check-ins.

On November 23, 2010, the public defender

representing Geness “filed a motion requesting that [his] trial

be continued until [he] became competent.” App. 41 ¶ 35.

Less than a week later, a judge ordered his transfer from prison

to a psychiatric institution “for a period not to exceed 90 days”

to again evaluate his competency and potential to regain

competency. App. 41 ¶ 37. Geness was never transferred

pursuant to that order and remained in prison. Once again, on

August 17, 2011, a judge ordered a competency determination.

Finally, on September 4, 2011, approximately five years

after Geness’s arrest, a second competency evaluation was

3

conducted, this time at the prison. It was again determined that

Geness was incompetent to stand trial and unlikely to improve.

Later that month, a judge “ordered that [Geness] was not

competent to stand trial and released him to be involuntarily

committed to a Long Term Structured Residence (“LTSR”),

there to remain without contact with the general public and to

be returned to Fayette County Prison upon completion of his

therapeutic program or upon a determination that he is

competent to stand trial.” App. 43 ¶ 48. On September 22,

2011, nearly five years after his arrest, Geness was transferred

to a LTSR.

Approximately four years after that, with Geness’s case

all the while subjected to the monthly “call of the list,” the

Commonwealth “filed a proposed order for nolle prosequi all

charges against the Plaintiff,” stating that he “will never be

competent for trial and that substantive evidentiary issues

existed which would impair the Commonwealth’s ability to

meet its burden of proof.” App. 43 ¶¶ 51, 53–54. On

December 10, 2015, a judge entered the order nolle prosequi

all charges against Geness. After nine years in custody without

a trial, Geness was released. 2

On June 17, 2016, Geness filed his original complaint

against the County of Fayette, City of Uniontown, Jason Cox

(formerly a Uniontown Police Department detective, now chief

of police), and James and Jean McVey (owners of McVey

Personal Care Home). He brought an Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA) and Fourteenth Amendment claim

2

Throughout Geness’s time in custody, his counsel

filed four motions for habeas corpus and/or motions to dismiss

the charge. No hearings were held or rulings made on those

requests.

4

against the county and city, various civil rights claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants, and an intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim against Cox and the

McVeys.

On March 6, 2017, Geness moved for leave to amend

his complaint to add the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a

party based on the same allegations. The District Court denied

his motion for leave to amend, finding it barred by the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine.

After various motions before the District Court, all

defendants were dismissed except Detective Cox. Following

discovery, Cox filed a motion for summary judgment, which

the District Court granted on May 1, 2017. Geness appealed

the summary judgment ruling on his § 1983 claims against Cox

and the denial of his motion to amend his complaint to add the

Commonwealth as a party.

On appeal, this Court affirmed the District Court’s grant

of Cox’s summary judgment motion, reversed its denial of

leave for Geness to amend his complaint to add the

Commonwealth, and remanded for reinstatement of Geness’s

claim under Title II of the ADA and the Fourteenth

Amendment.

Geness subsequently amended his complaint to add a

Title II and Fourteenth Amendment claim against the

Commonwealth. The Commonwealth then filed a motion to

dismiss based on sovereign immunity, which the District Court

denied. The Commonwealth did not appeal the denial. On

March 27, 2019, Geness filed a Second Amended Complaint,

the operative complaint, alleging Title II and Fourteenth

5

Amendment violations against three state defendants—the

Commonwealth, as well as AOPC and DHS.

AOPC moved to dismiss based on sovereign immunity,

and the District Court denied its motion. AOPC timely

appealed, and the District Court’s denial of AOPC’s motion to

dismiss is now before us. This appeal does not involve

Geness’s claims against the Commonwealth or DHS; AOPC is

the only appellant.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 3

We review de novo a motion to dismiss based on

sovereign immunity. Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77

F.3d 690, 694 (3d Cir. 1996).4 At the motion to dismiss stage,

“we accept all well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint as

true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-

moving part[y].” M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist.

of City of Newark, 344 F.3d 335, 340, 342 (3d Cir. 2003). To

survive a motion to dismiss, factual allegations “must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,”

which “requires more than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

III. DISCUSSION

3

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and we exercise

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

4

Geness filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental

appendix that contains materials that were not before the

District Court. At this stage of the litigation, we are

6

The Eleventh Amendment renders States immune from

any lawsuit “commenced or prosecuted against one of the

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or

Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. While

the Amendment’s terms only apply to suits brought by citizens

of another state, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that

this immunity also applies to unconsented suits brought by a

State’s own citizens.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517

(2004). This immunity further extends to “entities that are

considered arms of the state.”5 Bowers v. NCAA, 475 F.3d 524,

545 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe,

519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997)).

Congress has the power to abrogate states’ Eleventh

Amendment immunity, thus permitting suits to proceed for

specific claims, when it “unequivocally” expresses an intent to

do so and validly exercises this power within the bounds of its

authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 550.

“When Congress seeks to remedy or prevent unconstitutional

discrimination, § 5 authorizes it to enact prophylactic

legislation proscribing practices that are discriminatory in

effect, if not in intent, to carry out the basic objectives of the

constrained to “the allegations contained in the complaint,

exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public

record,” and there is presently no reason to depart from this

rule. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus.,

Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). We therefore deny

Geness’s motion, which would improperly expand the record

on appeal.

5

It is undisputed that AOPC is an “arm of the

Commonwealth.” Appellant’s Br. 17.

7

Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 551 (quoting Lane, 541 U.S.

at 520).

Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate

sovereign immunity for claims brought under Title II of the

ADA. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12202, which states that “a State shall not

be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution

of the United States from an action . . . for a violation of this

chapter.”). The Title’s purpose, in part, is “to invoke the sweep

of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the

fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to

address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by

people with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4); see also

Bowers, 475 F.3d at 550 (acknowledging Congress’s clear

intent to abrogate sovereign immunity for Title II claims).

While Congress “must have a wide berth in devising

appropriate remedial and preventative measures” under § 5 of

the Fourteenth Amendment, its power is not “unlimited.”

Lane, 541 U.S. at 519. The Supreme Court in Lane held that

Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity for

claims brought under Title II “as it applies to the class of cases

implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts.” Id.

at 533–34. That claim was brought by paraplegic individuals,

one of whom was required to appear in a second-floor

courtroom in a building with no elevator. Id. at 513. He

crawled up the stairs of the courthouse to attend his first court

appearance. Id. For his second appearance, he refused to crawl

or be carried by officers. Id. He was “consequently arrested

and jailed for failure to appear.” Id. The Court reiterated the

principle that “within the limits of practicability, a State must

afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”

Id. at 532 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379

8

(1971)). But it limited its holding to Title II lawsuits that

implicate “accessibility of judicial services,” deliberately

leaving unanswered whether Congress validly abrogated

sovereign immunity for “Title II’s other applications,” for

example, “failing to provide reasonable access to hockey rinks,

or even to voting booths.” Id. at 530–31.

Subsequently, in Georgia, the Court made clear that

courts analyzing whether Congress validly abrogated

sovereign immunity for a Title II claim against a state or state

entity must conduct a “claim-by-claim” analysis. 546 U.S. at

159. It accordingly established a three-part test for courts to

determine whether sovereign immunity has been abrogated in

a particular case: “(1) which aspects of the State’s alleged

conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct

also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as

such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the

Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s purported

abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is

nevertheless valid.” Id.

Here, we must apply this three-part test to determine

whether Congress validly abrogated sovereign immunity for

Geness’s claim against AOPC (and thus whether the claim may

proceed). Before we apply Georgia, we will first examine the

extent to which our Court’s prior precedential opinion in this

matter is controlling here, and we will examine the District

Court’s decision on remand. Pursuant to Georgia, we will

reverse the District Court’s judgment and hold that AOPC

retains its sovereign immunity because Geness has not stated a

Title II claim against it.

9

A. Our Court’s Prior Precedential Opinion

On August 28, 2018, our Court, inter alia, reversed the

District Court’s denial of Geness’s motion for leave to amend

his complaint to add the Commonwealth as a defendant. We

remanded the case for amendment of the Complaint and

reinstitution of his Title II and Fourteenth Amendment claim.

In addressing whether the District Court should have

permitted Geness to amend his Complaint, we analyzed

whether his proposed Title II and Fourteenth Amendment

claim against the Commonwealth would be futile, thus

applying the same standard as a motion to dismiss (as we do

here). 6 We held that Geness’s proposed claim was not futile

and should be permitted. In the course of the analysis, we

addressed each requirement of a Title II claim:

To state a claim under Title II of

the ADA, Geness must establish:

“(1) he is a qualified individual; (2)

with a disability; (3) who was

excluded from participation in or

denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public

entity, or was subjected to

6

“The standard for assessing futility is the ‘same

standard of legal sufficiency as applies under [Federal] Rule

[of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6).’” Great W. Mining & Mineral

Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 2010)

(quoting Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.2000)).

10

discrimination by any such entity;

(4) by reason of his disability.”

Geness, 902 F.3d at 361 (quoting Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d

171, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2018) and citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132).

We found that Geness met all four requirements of a

cognizable Title II claim against the Commonwealth.

Specifically, we noted that

[r]egulations promulgated under

the ADA require that the

Commonwealth “shall ensure that

inmates or detainees with

disabilities are housed in the most

integrated setting appropriate to

the needs of the individuals,” 28

C.F.R. § 35.152(b)(2) (emphasis

added), and “[s]hall not place

inmates or detainees with

disabilities in inappropriate

security classifications because no

accessible cells or beds are

available,” id. § 35.152(b)(2)(i).

Id. at 361–62 (discussing several procedural protections

“designed to avoid undue delays and safeguard the fair and

efficient functioning of the criminal justice system,” the denial

of which gives rise to a cognizable ADA claim).

With respect to the Title II claim, we concluded that

“[a]s alleged, these multiple, protracted, and inexcusable

delays in the handling of Geness’s examinations, transfers, and

motions—resulting in nearly a decade of imprisonment and

11

civil commitment before a hearing was finally held on his

habeas petition—are more than sufficient to state a claim under

the ADA.” Id. at 362.

We went on to find that the same circumstances gave

rise to a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment:

[T]he constitutional claims Geness

seeks to bring against the

Commonwealth as to both the

length of his pretrial imprisonment

and the length of his civil

commitment would not be futile.

After his first psychological

evaluation indicated that he

“remain[s] incompetent to stand

trial,” . . . Geness was incarcerated

for an additional three years before

civil commitment proceedings and

a second examination were even

requested. And once

institutionalized, Geness was left

to languish for another four years

before he was granted a hearing on

his habeas petition and the charges

against him were dismissed. There

is no question this exceeded the

“reasonable period of time

necessary” under Jackson to

ascertain whether there was a

substantial probability Geness

would attain competency in the

foreseeable future.

12

Id. at 363–64 (citation omitted).

When we published this opinion, however, AOPC was

neither a party nor a contemplated party. Thus, it is our task to

square our prior holding that Geness stated a Title II and

Fourteenth Amendment claim against the Commonwealth with

Geness’s pleadings against AOPC. 7

B. District Court on Remand

The District Court held that Geness sufficiently pleaded

a Title II and Fourteenth Amendment claim against AOPC and

that AOPC’s sovereign immunity was validly abrogated (i.e.,

that Geness’s claim could proceed). It stated that “[a]t this

preliminary stage and mindful Mr. Geness is not challenging

judicial decision making but rather failures in court

administration practices[,]” it would not dismiss his claim.

Geness v. Commonwealth, 388 F. Supp. 3d 530, 534 (W.D. Pa.

May 28, 2019). And it noted that discovery may help clarify

“the potential liability and damages among allegedly

responsible state actors [AOPC, DHS, and the

Commonwealth].” Id. (“AOPC’s argument of no

involvement, or the more central involvement of the

Department of Human Services, is based on facts requiring

discovery on relative culpability.”).

7

The law of the case doctrine instructs that “one panel

of an appellate court generally will not reconsider questions

that another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the same

case.” In re City of Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d 711, 717 (3d Cir.

1998). We are thus bound by our prior opinion to the extent it

bears upon the matter before us.

13

In reaching this conclusion, the District Court found

convincing Geness’s general allegation that “AOPC is

responsible for ‘[e]nsuring accessible and safe courts for all

citizens’ by ‘[e]nsuring that the courts of the Commonwealth

comply with Title II.’” Id. at 534 (quoting Second Am. Compl.

¶ 7 (App. 36 ¶ 7)). It also noted the following more specific

allegations from his Second Amended Complaint: Geness

alleged that AOPC “makes regular inquiries of each county’s

ADA coordinator with regard to cases involving criminal

defendants who are pretrial detainees whose cases have not

been called to trial in a timely fashion,” App. 45 ¶ 66, and that

even though “AOPC repeatedly contacted the Fayette County

court administrator directly to inquire about the Plaintiff’s case

and the reasons for [his] extended incarceration without trial,”

App. 45 ¶ 67, AOPC failed to take “any action designed to

provide the Plaintiff with his right to be brought to trial on the

charges that he faced,” App. 45 ¶ 67. Further, Geness alleged

that the Fayette County Court administrator, who serves as the

ADA coordinator for Fayette County, received a daily list of

prisoners that showed their length of incarceration—and that

his name appeared on this list.

The District Court also focused on AOPC’s duties

pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration.

These rules task AOPC with (1) “review[ing] the operation and

efficiency of the system and of all offices related to and serving

the system and, when necessary . . . report[ing] to the Supreme

Court or the Judicial Council with respect thereto,” (2)

“examin[ing] the state of the dockets and practices and

procedures of the courts and of the magisterial district judges

and mak[ing] recommendations for the expedition of

litigation,” and (3) “prepar[ing] educational and training

materials for system and related personnel and to conduct

14

educational and training sessions.” Geness, 388 F. Supp. 3d at

534 (quoting Pa.R.J.A. Nos. 505(1), (6), (12) (alterations in

original)).

Considering all of this, the District Court concluded that

“Mr. Geness plausibly pleads the AOPC could have helped

him by exercising its duty to monitor the status of dockets and

make recommendations to expedite litigation, ensure ADA

compliance at a systemic level in the courts of the

Commonwealth, and reporting to the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court.” Id. The District Court did not, however, explain how

or at what point AOPC could or should have exercised these

duties, given Geness’s acknowledgement that AOPC

“repeatedly contacted the Fayette County Court administrator

directly to inquire about the Plaintiff’s case and the reasons for

the Plaintiff’s extended incarceration without trial,” App. 45 ¶

67, and that Geness “is not challenging judicial decision

making,” Geness, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 532.

In summary, the District Court found that Geness had

stated a viable Title II and Fourteenth Amendment claim

because AOPC allegedly failed to take unspecified action to

expedite his case and failed to take initiative to report the status

of his case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The District

Court thus concluded that it could not rule out AOPC’s Title II

and Fourteenth Amendment liability as a matter of law and that

AOPC therefore was not immune from suit.8

8

The District Court also addressed whether AOPC

possessed quasi-judicial immunity and found that it did not. Id.

at 536–38. AOPC does not appeal this ruling.

15

C. Georgia Analysis

To determine whether Congress validly abrogated

sovereign immunity for Geness’s Title II and Fourteenth

Amendment claim against AOPC, we must apply the three-part

Georgia test.9 The District Court, without explicitly noting

that it was applying Georgia, concluded that the first and

second inquiries were satisfied, thus permitting the claim

against AOPC to proceed. Pursuant to the analysis below, we

disagree with the District Court and conclude that Geness has

failed to satisfy the first requirement of Georgia because he

failed to set forth a plausible claim that AOPC violated Title II.

Because Geness’s allegations fail to satisfy Georgia’s first

requirement, we need not address the second and third

requirements.

To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, in

satisfaction of the first Georgia requirement, a party must

sufficiently plead that “(1) he is a qualified individual; (2) with

a disability; (3) who was excluded from participation in or

denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a

public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such

entity; (4) by reason of his disability.” 10 Geness, 902 F.3d at

9

As noted above, this test requires courts to examine

“(1) which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title

II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the

Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct

violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment,

whether Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign

immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.”

Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159.

10

It is undisputed that AOPC is a “public entity.” See

42 U.S.C. § 1231(1)(B) (stating that public entities include

16

361 (quoting Haberle, 885 F.3d at 178–79); 42 U.S.C. §

12132. 11 In our prior precedential opinion, we concluded that

the first and second requirements were satisfied, as well as the

third and fourth requirements as they relate to the

Commonwealth. Id. at 361–62. We must now determine

whether AOPC denied Geness “the benefits of [its] services,

programs, or activities . . . by reason of his disability.” Id.

The following are Geness’s allegations regarding

AOPC, drawn directly from his Second Amended Complaint: 12

“any department, agency, special purpose district, or other

instrumentality of a State or States or local government”).

11

A plaintiff seeking compensatory damages under the

ADA must also sufficiently allege that the public entity

intentionally discriminated against him or her. Haberle, 885

F.3d at 181. To satisfy this element of intentional

discrimination, a plaintiff must allege at least “deliberate

indifference,” which requires “(1) knowledge that a federally

protected right is substantially likely to be violated . . . and (2)

failure to act despite that knowledge.” Id. (quoting S.H. ex rel.

Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 265 (3d Cir.

2013)) (alteration in original); see also Geness, 902 F.3d at 362

n.13. We will not address deliberate indifference here because

we hold that Geness’s allegations fail to satisfy Title II’s other

requirements.

12

Geness’s Second Amended Complaint also links

AOPC’s alleged wrongdoing to the conduct of judges in their

disposition of his case. See, e.g., App. 43 ¶ 52 (“The above-

described Judges continued to permit Plaintiff’s case to be

listed for trial, despite their actual knowledge of his

17

• “Defendant AOPC is a subsidiary unit of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and as such acts as an

agent of the Commonwealth in various matters related

to supervision and administration of the Pennsylvania

Unified Judicial System. The Pennsylvania Unified

Judicial System includes judges of the Court of

Common Pleas of the various Pennsylvania counties,

including Fayette County. In its capacity as a subsidiary

unit of the Commonwealth, AOPC administers the

Pennsylvania Unified Judicial System and is

responsible for the prompt and proper disposition of all

business of the courts of the Commonwealth of

incompetency.”). Allegations of wrongdoing based on judicial

conduct are omitted here because AOPC’s administrative

functions and the independent role of the judiciary must not be

conflated. See Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d

Cir. 2000) (“The doctrine of judicial immunity is founded upon

the premise that a judge, in performing his or her judicial

duties, should be free to act upon his or her convictions without

threat of suit for damages.”). The parties do not present and

we are not aware of any legal authority that would permit

AOPC to be found liable based on judicial conduct. Further,

Geness acknowledges that AOPC cannot be held liable based

on judges’ decision-making. Appellee’s Br. 25 (“The AOPC

does not have oversight over criminal cases and the decisions

that are required in each such case to the extent that those are

duties to be performed by the Judges of the Common Pleas

Court. . . . AOPC does in fact have the duty to oversee the

actions of those Judges to ensure that, among other things, the

courts comply with the rights of disabled individuals.”).

18

Pennsylvania. Among the duties and responsibilities of

the AOPC is insuring accessible and safe courts for all

citizens. The duties of the AOPC include insuring that

the courts of the Commonwealth comply with Title II of

the [ADA]. The AOPC attempts to insure compliance

with the ADA through interaction with ADA

coordinators in each county of the Commonwealth. For

Fayette County, Pennsylvania, the role of AOPC ADA

coordinator is filled by the deputy court administrator,

who reports directly to the court administrator.” App.

36 ¶ 7.

• “AOPC, through the Fayette County Court of Common

Pleas . . . discriminated against [him] because of his

disability by depriving him of the administration of

judicial services and the normal benefits of criminal

procedure and due process of the law.” App. 44 ¶ 61.

• “As part of its effort to fulfill its responsibility to insure

the Commonwealth’s compliance with the ADA,

Defendant AOPC makes regular inquires of each

county’s ADA coordinator with regard to cases

involving criminal defendants who are pretrial

detainees whose cases have not been called to trial in a

timely fashion according to Pennsylvania law.” App.

45 ¶ 66.

• “Defendant AOPC repeatedly contacted the Fayette

County court administrator directly to inquire about the

Plaintiff’s case and the reasons for the Plaintiff’s

extended incarceration without trial. Notwithstanding

that those inquiries were made by Defendant AOPC,

neither the AOPC, nor any other agent of AOPC,

19

including the AOPC’s local ADA coordinator in Fayette

County, took any action designed to provide the

Plaintiff with his right to be brought to trial on the

charges he faced.” App. 45 ¶ 67.

• “During the period of Plaintiff’s incarceration, the

Fayette County ADA coordinator was the assistant

court administrator. At all times relevant to this case,

the assistant court administrator reported directly to the

court administrator.” App. 45 ¶ 68.

• “During the period of Plaintiff’s incarceration . . . , the

Fayette County court administrator received from the

Fayette County Prison a daily list of prisoners

incarcerated in the Fayette County Prison. This list

included various information about each incarcerated

individual, including the date that the individual was

incarcerated, as well as the minimum and maximum

incarceration dates for each prisoner.” App. 45–46 ¶ 69.

• “On each of the daily lists sent from the prison to the

court administrator, Plaintiff Craig Geness appeared

together with information about his incarceration

described above.” App. 46 ¶ 70.

• The AOPC’s conduct, described above, “deprived

[Geness] of his right to the justice system, which is

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution.” App. 47 ¶ 82.

Identifying AOPC’s “services, programs, or activities”

at the foundation of Geness’s Title II claim is a necessary first

step to determining whether his claim is cognizable. See

20

Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r, N.J. Dep’t of Human

Servs., 796 F.3d 293, 301–03 (3d Cir. 2015). “[T]he phrase

‘service, program, or activity’ under Title II . . . is ‘extremely

broad in scope and includes anything a public entity does.’”

Furgess v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2019)

(quoting Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 301).

In Disability Rights, this Court identified the alleged

“service, program, or activity” as a judicial hearing before a

mentally ill person can be forcibly medicated in a nonemergent

situation. Id. at 303–04, 307 (holding that “judicial process

before the nonemergent administration of psychotropic drugs

is not a ‘service, program, or activity’ of New Jersey from

which the civilly committed are excluded). In Furgess, this

Court concluded that a prison’s “provision of a shower is a

service, program, or activity.” 933 F.3d at 291 (holding that

Furgess adequately alleged a Title II claim based on the

prison’s failure to accommodate his need for a shower). In

Bowers, the University of Iowa’s program was its provision of

athletic scholarships. 475 F.3d at 553 (holding that Bowers

stated a claim under Title II).

Based on Geness’s Second Amended Complaint and his

arguments before this Court, and because Geness concedes that

AOPC’s liability cannot be premised on judicial decision-

making, see supra note 12, the only “services, programs, or

activities” at issue are AOPC’s administrative duties to (1)

“intervene directly with the Fayette County Court to ensure

that the Plaintiff’s case moved forward,” and (2) “seek

intervention for such result by the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court.” Appellee’s Br. 22. Geness argues that Title II requires

AOPC to provide him these two services from which he was

21

excluded based on his disability. 13 AOPC counters that its

“enumerated powers” do not authorize it to meddle in “specific

litigation.” Appellant’s Br. 33.

First, regarding AOPC’s alleged failure to directly

intervene with the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas,

Geness acknowledged in his Second Amended Complaint that

AOPC “repeatedly” made inquiries about the length of his

detention to the court administrator. App. 45 ¶¶ 66–67. But,

he alleged, AOPC failed to take “any action” beyond those

inquiries that would “provide [him] with his right to be brought

to trial.” App. 45 ¶ 67. He neither identifies in his Complaint

nor argues before us what further action AOPC should have or

could have taken. And it is difficult to imagine what action it

could have taken in light of Geness’s concession that AOPC is

not liable for judges’ decision-making in individual cases. See

supra note 12. Thus, Geness’s allegation of AOPC’s failure to

directly intervene with the county court in some unspecified

manner, beyond its repeated inquiries to the court

administrator, cannot sustain his claim under Title II of the

ADA. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (stating that allegations

must be more than “speculative” or “conclusory”).

13

To the extent Geness additionally alleges that AOPC

had a duty to ensure his motions for habeas corpus relief and

motions to dismiss the charge against him were heard and ruled

upon in a timely manner, we conclude that these allegations are

both dependent on judicial conduct and too speculative to

sustain his claim because they are not linked to any alleged

service, program, or activity of AOPC under Pennsylvania

Rule of Judicial Administration 505 or otherwise. See supra

note 12; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

22

This leaves only Geness’s argument that AOPC failed

to seek intervention from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. He

does not make this allegation anywhere in his Second

Amended Complaint. It stems from AOPC’s “powers and

duties” enumerated in the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial

Administration. Pa.R.J.A. No. 505. We will take judicial

notice of the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration, as

they are “matters of public record,” which the District Court

considered as well. Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d

256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 5B Charles A. Wright &

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (3d ed.

2004)). AOPC’s duties include, in relevant part:

(1) To review the operation and

efficiency of the system and of all

offices related to and serving the

system and, when necessary, to

report to the Supreme Court or the

Judicial Council with respect

thereto. . . .

(6) To examine the state of the

dockets and practices and

procedures of the courts and of the

district justices of the peace and

make recommendations for the

expedition of litigation.

Pa.R.J.A. No. 505(1), (6).

The “service, program, or activity” requirement under

Title II is “extremely broad in scope and includes anything a

public entity does.” Furgess, 933 F.3d at 289 (finding that “a

prison’s provision of showers to inmates fits within this

23

expansive definition”). Nonetheless, the “service, program, or

activity” must be one that the entity actually provides. See,

e.g., Lane, 541 U.S. at 531 (holding that access to court

proceedings is a service provided by the state). This is an

obvious but important limitation. For example, in Disability

Rights, we held that “the provision of judicial process before

the [forcible] nonemergent administration of psychotropic

drugs is not a ‘service, program, or activity’ of New Jersey

from which the civilly committed are excluded.” 796 F.3d at

305, 307 (stating that this was not a “public service, program,

or activity to which nondisabled individuals have access”).

Our dissenting colleague cites Pa.R.J.A. No. 505(1), (6)

as the basis of his opinion that Geness has stated a viable Title

II claim against AOPC. These provisions, however, do not

suffice to establish a Title II claim against AOPC. They charge

AOPC with “review[ing] the operation and efficiency of the

system” and reporting to the Supreme Court “when

necessary”—and with “examin[ing] the state of the dockets

and practices and procedures of the courts . . . and mak[ing]

recommendations for the expedition of litigation.” Pa.R.J.A.

No. 505(1), (6). These rules unambiguously require AOPC to

facilitate an “efficien[t]” and “expeditio[us]” system, in line

with its role as an administrative body. They do not task AOPC

with policing potential civil rights violations in particular

cases—to do so would task the AOPC with making legal

determinations and recommendations. The AOPC is not, and

should not be, a judicial back-seat driver. See supra note 12.

Geness argues that AOPC’s failure to “seek intervention

by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court” impacted his ability to be

“timely [tried] on the charges that he faced.” Appellee’s Br.

11. This argument requires some unpacking. First, he was

never competent to stand trial throughout his years of

24

detainment—and subjecting him to trial would have violated

his due process rights. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348,

354 (1996) (“We have repeatedly and consistently recognized

that the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due

process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Secondly,

Geness neither alleges nor attempts to argue that AOPC had

any control over whether he was housed in a prison versus a

long-term care facility while deemed incompetent. Thus, with

his argument properly distilled, Geness is effectively urging

this Court to hold that AOPC had a duty to seek intervention

of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to have his case dismissed

before it languished for nine years while he remained

incompetent and—for reasons both unclear and inexcusable—

remained imprisoned for much of that time. He makes this

argument despite acknowledging that he had representation

and access to the court throughout the years he was imprisoned

and civilly committed. See App. 40 ¶¶ 30–31 (stating that

Geness’s public defender “made no attempt to have [his] case

removed from the trial list, despite [his] known incompetency

to stand trial” and despite having “the authority and the

opportunity to intervene with the Court”); App. 40 ¶¶ 26–27

(stating that Geness’s case was subject to the court’s “call of

the list,” whereby his counsel, a district attorney, and a judge

evaluated the status of his case on a monthly basis).

By Geness’s argument, in order for AOPC to comply

with Title II, it had to suggest to the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court that his case be dismissed because he was not competent

to stand trial. AOPC would “in effect . . . be required to closely

monitor, deeply evaluate, and consider intervening in every

criminal case pending in the Commonwealth.” Appellant’s

Reply 1. In a case such as this, AOPC argues, “even if aware

of the procedural status,” it “would not have known whether

25

the extended delay was part of a strategic course by defense

counsel, the thoughtful deliberative process of the judge, or

some other factor peculiar to that specific case.” Appellant’s

Br. 41. We find AOPC’s arguments persuasive.

Further, AOPC’s powers do not allow it to actually hold

a criminal trial, which Geness alleges it denied him.

Appellee’s Br. 15, 25, 26 n.22. Even had AOPC reported to

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or the Fayette County Court

of Common Pleas about the delay in Geness’s case, it remained

the exclusive power of the courts to actually do something

about it.

Relatedly, since Geness was not competent to stand

trial, a court’s decision regarding whether a case should be

dismissed depends on the evidence and law underlying the

charge and the basis for dismissal. Weighing such matters is

indisputably a judicial function. This brings us full circle to

Geness’s acknowledgement that AOPC does not have a duty

to meddle with judicial decision-making. See supra note 12.

Because judicial decision-making is not a service AOPC

provides to either disabled or nondisabled individuals, Geness

was not excluded from this service based on his disability. See

Disability Rights, 769 F.3d at 305.

Further, Title II requires not only that a public entity

“excluded” a disabled individual from a service it provides but

also that such an exclusion was “by reason of his disability.”

Geness, 902 F.3d at 361 (quoting Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d

171, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2018) and citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132).

Neither Geness nor the dissent sets forth a plausible allegation

or argument regarding how AOPC neglected to report the delay

in his case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “by reason of

his disability.” Id. While his case appears to have languished

26

due to his disability (i.e., while he was incompetent to stand

trial), AOPC had no power over the disposition of his case,

and there is simply no allegation or argument before us

regarding how AOPC’s alleged failure to contact the Supreme

Court connects to Geness’s disability.

For the reasons set forth above, Geness’s allegations

against AOPC fail to satisfy the first requirement of Georgia—

setting forth a plausible Title II claim. We therefore hold that

Congress has not validly abrogated AOPC’s sovereign

immunity regarding this particular claim. In conclusion, we

will reverse the District Court’s judgment and remand this case

for dismissal of the claim against AOPC. Though we exclude

AOPC as a potentially responsible party, the human suffering

endured by Geness due to the mishandling of his case cannot

be overstated. This opinion does not impact Geness’s claims

against the Commonwealth and DHS, which are not currently

before us.

27

Craig Geness v. Administrative Office of Pa., et al

No. 19-2253

AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting

The blink response to a suit against a clerk’s office is

that this cannot be. It is simply counterintuitive. Thus I easily

understand why my colleagues believe it correct to reverse

Judge Kearney’s decision. See Geness v. Pennsylvania, 388 F.

Supp. 3d 530 (W.D. Pa. 2019) (emphasis omitted). But at the

motion-to-dismiss stage in this Les Misérables scenario, I am

persuaded by his well-reasoned analysis. Thus I would affirm

and hold that Craig Geness has pled facts sufficient to abrogate

the sovereign immunity of the Administrative Office of

Pennsylvania Courts (“AOPC”) for purposes of his claims

under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),

42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment.

The majority opinion recites well the tragic facts in this

case. Mr. Geness languished in custody without a trial for over

nine years before the case against him was dropped because he

would never be competent to stand trial and substantial

evidentiary issues impaired the Commonwealth’s prosecution.

This came after it was determined early on that he was

incompetent and unlikely to improve, and while four separate

motions for habeas corpus relief and motions to dismiss were

pending (without a hearing or ruling on any of them). To say

that Mr. Geness suffered a grave injustice at the hands of the

system for justice is inadequate. There are no words.

My colleagues in the majority conclude that Mr. Geness

has failed to satisfy the first requirement of the three-prong test

outlined in United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006).

They hold that he did not state a plausible Title II claim because

he did not allege that the AOPC denied him “the benefits of

[its] services, programs, or activities . . . by reason of his

disability.” Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 361 (3d Cir. 2018)

(quoting Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178–79 (3d Cir.

2018), and citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132).

In my view, Mr. Geness clearly identifies the provisions

of Pennsylvania law that tasked the AOPC with monitoring the

criminal docket and reporting failures directly to the

Commonwealth’s Supreme Court. And he alleges that the

AOPC’s failure to perform those tasks substantially, if not

exclusively, led to his unconscionable and lengthy pretrial

detention. I rely on the same law and portions of Mr. Geness’s

Second Amended Complaint as my colleagues to reach this

opposite conclusion.

Sections (1) and (6) of Rule 505 of the Pennsylvania

Rules of Judicial Administration (“Pa. R.J.A.”) charge the

AOPC with “review[ing] the operation and efficiency of the

system and of all offices related to and serving the system and,

when necessary . . . [,] report[ing] to the [Commonwealth]

Supreme Court or the Judicial Council with respect thereto,”

Pa. R.J.A. No. 505(1), and “examin[ing] the state of the

dockets and practices and procedures of the courts and of the

magisterial district judges and mak[ing] recommendations for

the expedition of litigation,” id. No. 505(6).

Mr. Geness alleges that the AOPC “makes regular

inquiries of each county’s ADA coordinator with regard to

cases involving criminal defendants who are pretrial detainees

whose cases have not been called to trial in a timely fashion,”

2

App. 45 ¶ 66, and that it in fact “repeatedly contacted the

Fayette County court administrator directly to inquire about

[Mr. Geness’s] case and the reasons for the . . . extended

incarceration without trial,” App. 45 ¶ 67. It, however, took no

further action “designed to provide [him] with his right to be

brought to trial on the charges that he faced.” Id. Additionally,

he alleges that during his incarceration “the Fayette County

court administrator received . . . a daily list of prisoners

incarcerated in the Fayette County Prison . . . , including the

date that [each] individual was incarcerated, as well as the

minimum and maximum incarceration dates for each . . . .”

App. 45–46 ¶ 69. Mr. Geness appeared on each list. App. 46

¶ 70.

Based on the directives in the Pennsylvania Rules of

Judicial Administration and Mr. Geness’s allegations that the

AOPC failed to provide him the services of monitoring the

docket and reporting the delay in his case to the

Commonwealth Supreme Court directly, he has plausibly pled

a claim based on Title II of the ADA. “[T]he phrase service,

program, or activity under Title II . . . is extremely broad in

scope and includes anything a public entity does.” Furgess v.

Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2019) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). My colleagues do not

explain why monitoring the criminal dockets and reporting

issues up to the Supreme Court does not satisfy this definition

of “service,” nor why they discount Mr. Geness’s allegations

that he was denied the service of having the AOPC flag the

extreme delay in his case directly to that Supreme Court.

Mr. Geness does not propose that the AOPC had to

guarantee specific results, or dictate to Commonwealth judges

how to rule in any particular case, or grant him any form of

3

judicial relief. He asserts that the AOPC had the duty to

monitor the state of the dockets, which it did, and seek

intervention by the Supreme Court, which it failed to do.

Neither the AOPC nor my colleagues cite to any case or

provision of law that would have barred the AOPC from

fulfilling its obligations under the Pennsylvania Rules of

Judicial Administration. Rule 505 provides the basis for the

AOPC to ring the alarm in cases like the one before us. And

to say that it had an obligation to make a recommendation to

expedite litigation where there was a nearly decade delay is not

the same as arguing that the AOPC has an obligation to

intervene in every pending criminal case. There was nothing

ordinary about the procedural posture of this case. 1

1

My colleagues also conclude that Mr. Geness failed to

allege that the AOPC intentionally discriminated against him

“by reason of his disability,” as is required to state an ADA

claim. Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 361 (3d Cir. 2018)

(quoting Haberle, 885 F.3d at 178–79 and citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 12132). They acknowledge that the element of intentional

discrimination is met when a plaintiff alleges “deliberate

indifference,” which requires “(1) knowledge that a federally

protected right is substantially likely to be violated . . . and (2)

failure to act despite that knowledge.” Haberle, 885 F.3d at

181 (citation omitted). But they do not explain how it is that

Mr. Geness did not sufficiently plead knowledge by the AOPC

that his rights were being violated when he in fact alleges that

during the period of his incarceration the court administrator

received a daily list of prisoners that included his name, the

duration of his incarceration, and the status of his case, App.

45–46, and that the AOPC repeatedly inquired about the status

of his case, App. 45. Nor do they explain why Mr. Geness did

not sufficiently plead failure to act when he does allege that the

4

Any concern about whether the AOPC actually had the

ability to take further action on behalf of Mr. Geness is a matter

for discovery. As the District Court pointed out, “a developed

factual record may show, as a matter of fact, the AOPC could

not have done more.” Geness, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 535. But

how can we say at this stage that the AOPC does not in fact

have mechanisms and procedures in place to ensure that cases

like the one before us do not slip through the cracks? How can

we say that it did not, in the past, alert up the chain on behalf

of other criminal defendants but failed to do so in Mr. Geness’s

case?

AOPC, despite knowledge of the delay in his case, failed to

intervene with the Supreme Court on his behalf as it was

authorized to do under Pennsylvania’s Rules of Judicial

Administration. Id.

The argument that the AOPC had no power over the

disposition of Mr. Geness’s case, and thus did not cause the

delay, misses the point. Under our case law, a successful ADA

claim only requires the plaintiff to show but-for causation. CG

v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 236 n.11 (3d Cir.

2013). Mr. Geness does not have to allege or ultimately prove

that the AOPC alone caused the rights violation he

suffered. See Furgess v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 291

n.25 (3d Cir. 2019). At the pleading stage, he has more than

sufficiently alleged that the AOPC’s failure to act on his behalf

substantially caused and contributed to the delay in his

case. And what ultimately transpired internally at the AOPC

with respect to Mr. Geness’s case is something he should have

the opportunity to determine through discovery. That,

however, remains a mystery, as we now cut short his case

against that agency.

5

We are to construe complaints so “as to do substantial

justice.” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f)). Mr. Geness’s allegations more

than suffice at this stage, and given the harrowing ordeal he

endured at the hands of the judicial system, it would be a

further injustice not to allow his suit against the AOPC (the

very agency with the duty to monitor the dockets and report up

any issues) to continue. To do otherwise is to define adequacy

down. I respectfully dissent.

6