Eric M Hartfiel v. City of Eastpointe

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

ERIC M. HARTFIEL, FOR PUBLICATION

September 3, 2020

Plaintiff-Appellant, 9:00 a.m.

v No. 348642

Macomb Circuit Court

CITY OF EASTPOINTE, LC No. 2018-001610-CH

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and STEPHENS and CAMERON, JJ.

STEPHENS, J.

Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court order granting defendant summary disposition

under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

This matter arises from defendant’s handling of charges incurred for water and sewer

services provided to plaintiff’s rental properties. Plaintiff owned two rental properties in the city

of Eastpointe: 23126 Beechwood (the Beechwood Property) and 22438 Linwood (the Linwood

Property). Defendant’s finance director, Randall Blum, established procedures for transferring

delinquent water charges from a landlord to a tenant. Pursuant to those procedures, a landlord was

required to submit a copy of the lease agreement along with a water affidavit stating that the tenant

was responsible for paying the water charges. Subsequent to a landlord’s filing both the lease and

affidavit, tenants were required to file a security deposit and complete an “ACH Payment

Authorization Agreement” to allow automatic withdrawal of the water payment from the tenant’s

bank account. The written procedures provided that if water service was terminated for

nonpayment, the tenant’s security deposit was forfeited, and the responsibility for all subsequent

water and sewer charges became the responsibility of the landlord. Those subsequent water and

sewer charges then became a lien against the property. The procedures required that each new

leasehold was subject to the same procedures as the first.

Plaintiff initially entered into a one-year lease on the Linwood Property with Francis

Eugene Sauro and Sheri Lou Sauro beginning October 1, 2013, with the tenants assuming

responsibility for water and sewer charges. On October 3, 2013, plaintiff and Francis executed a

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water affidavit indicating that the lease agreement made the Sauros responsible for all charges

incurred for water during the term of the lease which had an expiration date of October 1, 2014.

Plaintiff and the Sauros subsequently renewed their lease agreement twice with one-year leasing

terminating on October 1, 2015, and October 1, 2016. No new water affidavits were filed for the

Linwood Property. The defendant issued several shutoff notices between April 2014 and April

2015 due to non-payment. Defendant’s employee verbally told plaintiff that the water affidavit

had been voided due to a poor payment history by the Sauros sometime between October 2015

and January 2016. On June 2, 2016, delinquent charges for unpaid April and May 2016 bills for

service to the Linwood Property in the amount of $129.11 were added to plaintiff’s tax bill.

Plaintiff leased the Beechwood Property to Tanya Smith and Williams Woodson for a one-

year term beginning April 1, 2015. On March 25, 2015, plaintiff, Smith, and Woodson executed

a water affidavit indicating that their lease agreement made Smith and Woodson responsible for

all charges for water incurred during the term of the lease. The water affidavit indicated that the

lease expired on April 1, 2016. Defendant voided the 2015 water affidavit for Beechwood on

October 21, 2015, after multiple attempts to automatically withdraw water payments failed.

Plaintiff renewed his lease agreement with Smith and Woodson for two additional one-year terms,

the first ending April 1, 2017, and the last ending April 1, 2018. Plaintiff claims to have filed a

copy of the 2016 lease with the defendant. The defendant claims no record of this filing. It is,

however, uncontroverted that when plainitff attempted to file the 2017 lease it was returned to him

via certified mail with a letter indicating that the municipality had no understanding of why it had

been sent to it. The May 1, 2017 unpaid water bill of $77.02 was added to plaintiff’s property tax

bill for the year 2018.

On April 23, 2018, plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against defendant, alleging causes

of action for quiet title, slander of title, and writ of mandamus. In pertinent part, plaintiff alleged

that defendant unlawfully claimed liens against and added to the property tax assessments for his

rental properties the unpaid water charges. Plaintiff asserted that defendant’s liens were prohibited

because he complied with the requirements of MCL 123.165 and MCL 141.121 for both rental

properties.

On February 19, 2019, defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7),

(8), and (10). Relevant to this appeal, defendant argued that plaintiff’s quiet title claim was barred

by his failure to comply with applicable statutes or defendant’s procedures. In response to

defendant’s motion, plaintiff asked for summary disposition in his favor under MCR 2.116(I)(2),

and argued that defendant’s procedure for water affidavits included additional requirements to

those set forth in MCL 141.121(3) and MCL 123.165. The plaintiff argued that the municipality

did not have the authority to impose such additional requirements. Therefore, since he was

compliant with state law, the defendant was prohibited from imposing liens on his properties.

Plaintiff asserted that once water affidavits were filed, defendant’s only remedy for nonpayment

was to shut off services.

On April 9, 2019, the trial court issued an opinion and order granting defendant’s motion

for summary disposition. The court opined that plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory

requirements of MCL 123.165 and MCL 141.121(3) that he file both a lease and water affidavit

with the defendant for each leasehold period in order to avoid liability for charges and a lien on

the property. The court further determined that defendant was statutorily required to place liens

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on the Linwood and Beechwood properties as security for the collection of the water arrearages,

and that the placement of the liens on the tax rolls was proper. This appeal followed.

II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition.1

El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). “When

deciding a motion for summary disposition under [MCR 2.116(C)(10)], a court must consider in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions,

and other documentary evidence then filed in the action or submitted by the parties.” Campbell v

Kovich, 273 Mich App 227, 229; 731 NW2d 112 (2006). Summary disposition is appropriate if

there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Lowrey v LMPS & LMPJ, Inc, 500 Mich 1, 5; 890 NW2d 344 (2016). “A genuine issue

of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might

differ.” El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Questions of law, including statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo.” Kuhlgert v

Mich State Univ, 328 Mich App 357, 371; 937 NW2d 716 (2019). This Court’s primary goal in

statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature, as conveyed through the

plain language of the statute. Hegadorn v Dep’t of Human Servs Dir, 503 Mich 231, 245; 931

NW2d 571 (2019). “When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial

construction is not permitted and this Court must give the words their plain and ordinary meaning.”

Buckmaster v Dep’t of State, 327 Mich App 469, 475; 934 NW2d 59 (2019). “This Court must

avoid interpreting a statute in a way that would make any part of it meaningless or nugatory.”

Maples v Michigan, 328 Mich App 209, 218; 936 NW2d 857 (2019). In addition, “[w]hen two

statutes cover the same general subject, they must be construed together to give reasonable effect

to both, if at all possible.” Buckmaster, 327 Mich App at 475 (quotation marks and citation

omitted).

B. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that that trial court erred in its interpretation of MCL 123.165 and MCL

141.121(3). We disagree.

1

The trial court did not identify which subrule or subrules it relied on to grant defendant’s motion.

Nonetheless, the only rule applicable to this appeal is MCR 2.116(C)(10) because plaintiff does

not challenge the trial court’s ruling regarding governmental immunity, and the parties and trial

court relied on evidence outside of the pleadings. See Candler v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich,

321 Mich App 772, 776; 910 NW2d 666 (2017) (reviewing denial of summary disposition under

MCR 2.116(C)(10) where “resolution of the motion required consideration of evidence outside the

pleadings”).

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MCL 123.165 pertains to municipal water and sewage liens. It provides:

The lien created by this act[2] shall, after June 7, 1939, have priority over all

other liens except taxes or special assessments whether or not the other liens

accrued or were recorded before the accrual of the water or sewage system lien

created by this act. However, this act shall not apply if a lease has been legally

executed, containing a provision that the lessor shall not be liable for payment of

water or sewage system bills accruing subsequent to the filing of the affidavit

provided by this section. An affidavit with respect to the execution of a lease

containing this provision shall be filed with the board, commission, or other official

in charge of the water works system or sewage system, or both, and 20 days’ notice

shall be given by the lessor of any cancellation, change in, or termination of the

lease. The affidavit shall contain a notation of the expiration date of the lease.

[Emphasis added.]

The second statutory provision, MCL 141.121(3), is from the Revenue Bond Act (RBA),

MCL 141.101 et seq., and provides:

Charges for services furnished to a premises may be a lien on the premises,

and those charges delinquent for 6 months or more may be certified annually to the

proper tax assessing officer or agency who shall enter the lien on the next tax roll

against the premises to which the services shall have been rendered, and the charges

shall be collected and the lien shall be enforced in the same manner as provided for

the collection of taxes assessed upon the roll and the enforcement of the lien for the

taxes. The time and manner of certification and other details in respect to the

collection of the charges and the enforcement of the lien shall be prescribed by the

ordinance adopted by the governing body of the public corporation. However, in a

case when a tenant is responsible for the payment of the charges and the governing

body is so notified in writing, the notice to include a copy of the lease of the affected

premises, if there is one, then the charges shall not become a lien against the

premises after the date of the notice. In the event of filing of the notice, the public

corporation shall render no further service to the premises until a cash deposit in a

sum fixed in the ordinance authorizing the issuance of bonds under this act is made

as security for the payment of the charges. In addition to any other lawful

enforcement methods, the payment of charges for water service to any premises

may be enforced by discontinuing the water service to the premises and the payment

of charges for sewage disposal service or storm water disposal service to a premises

may be enforced by discontinuing the water service, the sewage disposal service,

or the storm water disposal service to the premises, or any combination of the

services. The inclusion of these methods of enforcing the payment of charges in an

ordinance adopted before February 26, 1974, is validated. [Emphasis added.]

2

MCL 123.162 grants a municipality operating a water distribution or sewage system a lien on

premises to which services are provided as security for payment of charges.

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In construing statutes that relate to the same subject matter, the terms of the relevant

provisions must be read in pari materia and construed, whenever possible, in a manner that avoids

conflict. Parise v Detroit Entertainment, LLC, 295 Mich App 25, 27; 811 NW2d 98 (2011).

However, “when two applicable statutory provisions conflict, the one that is more specific to the

subject matter prevails over the provision that is only generally applicable.” Pike v Northern Mich

Univ, 327 Mich App 683, 693; 935 NW2d 86 (2019). “[T]he rules of statutory construction also

provide that a more recently enacted law has precedence over the older statute,” particularly when

the more specific statute is also the most recent of the two statutes. Parise, 295 Mich App at 28

(quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).

The RBA “authorized a locality to issue a limited type of bond for public improvements

that would be repaid through revenue generated solely from the public improvement financed by

the bond.” Coal Protecting Auto No-Fault v Michigan Catastrophic Claims Ass’n, 317 Mich App

1, 27–28; 894 NW2d 758 (2016). Water supply and sewer systems are among the public

improvements authorized under the RBA. Sau-Tuk Indus, Inc v Allegan Co, 316 Mich App 122,

125-126; 892 NW2d 33 (2016). A municipality may effectuate a lien on the premises to which the

services have been provided to collect charges for those services. Charges that have been

delinquent for at least six months may be “certified annually to the proper tax assessing officer or

agency who shall enter the lien on the next tax roll against the premises to which the services shall

have been rendered . . . .” MCL 141.121(3). The RBA grants the municipality discretion as to

whether to treat the delinquent charges as liens against the service property except where the tenant

has the responsibility to pay those charges. NL Ventures VI Farmington, LLC v Livonia, 314 Mich

App 222, 234; 886 NW2d 772 (2016). In such cases this discretion is limited as follows:

[I]n a case when a tenant is responsible for the payment of the charges and the

governing body is so notified in writing, the notice to include a copy of the lease of

the affected premises, if there is one, then the charges shall not become a lien

against the premises after the date of the notice. In the event of filing of the notice,

the public corporation shall render no further service to the premises until a cash

deposit in a sum fixed in the ordinance authorizing the issuance of bonds under this

act is made as security for the payment of the charges. [MCL 141.121(3).]

We note that additional statutory provisions concerning municipal water and sewage liens

were also enacted by 1939 PA 178, MCL 123.161 et seq. NL Ventures VI Farmington, 314 Mich

App at 228. Under MCL 123.162, “A municipality that has operated or operates a water

distribution system or a sewage system . . . has as security for the collection of water or sewage

system rates . . . a lien upon the house or other building and upon the premises . . . to which the

sewage system service or water was supplied.” Unlike the lien authorized under the RBA, the lien

authorized by MCL 123.162 is mandatory as opposed to the discretionary lien under MCL

141.121(3). NL Ventures VI Farmington, LLC, 314 Mich App at 229-230. “This lien becomes

effective immediately upon the distribution of the water or provision of the sewage system service

to the premises or property supplied, but shall not be enforceable for more than 5 years after it

becomes effective.” MCL 123.162.

Similar to MCL 141.121(3), the later-enacted statutory scheme also provides a mechanism

for lessors to avoid liens for delinquent charges owed by a lessee. NL Ventures VI Farmington,

314 Mich App at 229. In pertinent part, MCL 123.165 provides:

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[T]his act shall not apply if a lease has been legally executed, containing a provision

that the lessor shall not be liable for payment of water or sewage system bills

accruing subsequent to the filing of the affidavit provided by this section. An

affidavit with respect to the execution of a lease containing this provision shall be

filed with the board, commission, or other official in charge of the water works

system or sewage system, or both, and 20 days’ notice shall be given by the lessor

of any cancellation, change in, or termination of the lease. The affidavit shall

contain a notation of the expiration date of the lease.

Because these statutes relate to the same subject matter, they must be read in pari materia

“to effectuate the legislative purpose as found in harmonious statutes.” Parise, 295 Mich App at

27 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Both MCL 123.165 and MCL 141.121(3) clearly permit

a lessor to avoid a lien arising from a tenant’s nonpayment of charges for which the tenant is

responsible. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of MCL 123.165 and

MCL 141.121(3) by requiring a new affidavit for each leasehold period contrary to the explicit

language of the statute. We disagree.

Each municipality issuing revenue bonds or operating a water and sewer system has the

obligation to maintain the integrity of those bonds and secure payments for system services by

complying with state mandates regarding the payments for services rendered. The default security

is a lien against the property to which those services were rendered. A lessor who desires to claim

the statutory exception to this default process set forth in MCL 123.165 must take affirmative

steps. NL Ventures VI Farmington, 314 Mich App at 239. First, the lessor must execute a lease

providing that the lessor is not liable for charges accruing after an affidavit concerning the tenant’s

responsibility for charges is filed. MCL 123.165. Second, the lessor must file an affidavit with

“the board, commission, or other official in charge of the water works system or sewage system,”

and the affidavit must identify the expiration date of the lease. Id. After complying with these

requirements, the lessor’s property is exempt from the mandatory lien that arises by operation of

law under MCL 123.162. See MCL 123.165. The affidavit apprises the municipality of two

things: an agreement between the landlord and tenant regarding the responsibility for water and

sewage service, and the expiration date for that agreement. Once it is in receipt of an affidavit, the

municipality has the obligation to determine the appropriate security to be charged to the lessee

for the leasehold period. The owner’s exemption from lien has a beginning and ending period.

Simply put, when the lease term ends so does the exemption from lien. From the lease expiration

date forward, all charges for water and service are once again a lien against the property. Because

the lien exemption is inextricably tied to the lessor’s lack of direct liability for charges, it can be

reasonably inferred that the exemption set forth in MCL 123.165 and the affidavit establishing

entitlement to the exemption both expire along with the lease.3

3

The portion of MCL 123.165 that requires the lessor to notify the board, commission, or other

applicable official “of any cancellation, change in, or termination of the lease” supports this

interpretation. It again suggests that the Legislature intended the exemption to exist concomitant

with the lease provision relieving the lessor from liability for charges incurred by the tenant.

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MCL 141.121(3) only states that charges “shall not become a lien against the premises”

when the governing body “is notified in writing” that the tenant is responsible for payment of the

charges. MCL 141.121(3). The written notice must “include a copy of the lease of the affected

premises, if there is one . . . .” Id. Although MCL 141.121(3) places less emphasis on the

expiration of the lease agreement, it still requires that “a tenant is responsible for the payment of

the charges . . . .” Id. Again, a tenant’s responsibility and the corresponding owner’s exemption

from lien for such charges arise by virtue of a contractual agreement. When the agreement expires,

the tenant’s responsibility ends and the owner/landlord’s exemption from a lien against the

property also ends. Reading MCL 141.121(3) and MCL 123.165 in pari materia, it can reasonably

be inferred that the lien exemption in MCL 141.121(3) was intended to apply only during the term

of the lease under which the tenant assumed responsibility for the charges. Furthermore, to the

extent that a conflict exists between MCL 141.121(3) and MCL 123.165 concerning the effect of

the expiration of the lease, MCL 123.165 controls because it was enacted more recently and more

specifically addresses municipal water and sewer liens, while the RBA applies to a variety of

public improvements. Parise, 295 Mich App at 27-28.

This Court must construe statutes reasonably, “keeping in mind the purpose of the act, and

to avoid absurd results.” Rogers v Wcisel, 312 Mich App 79, 87; 877 NW2d 169 (2015). MCL

123.161 et seq., was enacted “ ‘to provide for the collection of water or sewage system rates,

assessments, charges, or rentals; and to provide a lien for water or sewage system services

furnished by municipalities . . . .’ ” NL Ventures VI Farmington, 314 Mich App at 228 (citation

omitted). The RBA was enacted for the purpose of creating “ ‘full and complete additional and

alternate methods’ ” for public corporations to exercise the powers authorized by the RBA,

including the powers to operate and finance public improvements. Id. at 231-232, citing MCL

141.102 and MCL 141.106. Under plaintiff’s interpretation of these statutes, a landowner could

lease a property to a tenant for a short period of time pursuant to an agreement requiring the tenant

to pay charges and continue to receive the benefit of exemption from liens under MCL 123.165

and MCL 141.121(3) in perpetuity as long as the property owner filed an initial affidavit with the

appropriate governmental official. This result would frustrate the purpose of these legislative

enactments by interfering with a municipality’s ability to secure payment for services furnished to

properties that were once exempt from liens even after those properties no longer meet the

requirements for exemption. To be entitled to protection from liens beyond the date the subject

lease expires, the lessor must provide the applicable governmental official with a new notice

regarding the terms of subsequent leases and, under MCL 123.165, that notice must be in the form

of an affidavit that identifies the expiration date of the lease.

Plaintiff admitted that he filed only one water affidavit for each of his rental properties.

The affidavit for the Linwood Property indicated that plaintiff’s lease with the Sauros ended on

October 1, 2014, and the affidavit for the Beechwood Property indicated that plaintiff’s lease with

Smith and Woodson expired on April 1, 2016. The delinquent charges at issue for the Linwood

Property accrued in April and May 2016, after the initial lease and affidavit expired. The

delinquent charges at issue for the Beechwood Property accrued in May 2017, again after the initial

lease and affidavit expired. Because the relevant charges were incurred after the respective leases

and affidavits expired, defendant was not prohibited from imposing a lien for those charges. The

fact that plaintiff may have filed, or attempted to file, subsequent leases with defendant is of no

consequence because MCL 123.165 explicitly requires the lessor who wishes to avoid a lien for a

tenant’s charges to file an affidavit, which plaintiff did not do.

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Plaintiff also argues that, regardless of whether he complied with the statutory filing

requirements, defendant could not lawfully transfer the charges to the tax roll because the charges

involved in this case had been delinquent for less than six months. We agree.

This issue was raised below, but not addressed by the trial court. “Generally, an issue must

have been raised before, and addressed and decided by, the trial court to be preserved for appellate

review.” King v Oakland Co Prosecutor, 303 Mich App 222, 239; 842 NW2d 403 (2013).

However, “this Court may overlook preservation requirements where failure to consider the issue

would result in manifest injustice, if consideration of the issue is necessary to a proper

determination of the case, or if the issue involves a question of law and the facts necessary for its

resolution have been presented.” Steward v Panek, 251 Mich App 546, 554; 652 NW2d 232 (2002)

(internal citations omitted). The last of these considerations applies here.

Both statutory schemes at issue in this case authorize a lien in favor of the municipality for

unpaid charges unless the landlord exemption applies. MCL 123.162; MCL 123.165; MCL

141.121(3). See also NL Ventures VI Farmington, 314 Mich App at 230, 233 (discussing

mandatory lien under MCL 123.162 and permissive lien under MCL 141.121(3)). Both statutory

schemes also address methods by which the municipality can enforce its lien. However, neither

include any language “mandating immediate placement on the tax rolls.” To the contrary, the

plain language of MCL 141.121(3) refers to a minimum delinquency criteria—delinquency for “6

months or more”—before that enforcement mechanism can be used. MCL 123.161 et seq., does

not directly address the placement of past-due charges on the tax roll and, instead, broadly permits

the statutory lien to be “enforced by a municipality in the manner prescribed in the charter of the

municipality, by the general laws of the state providing for the enforcement of tax liens, or by an

ordinance duly passed by the governing body of the municipality.” MCL 123.163. The parties

have not identified any charter provision, ordinance, or general law of the state—outside of the

RBA and MCL 123.161 et seq.—that are relevant to defendant’s enforcement of its lien.

According to defendant’s payment registers, $129.11 in delinquent charges were

transferred to plaintiff’s tax bill for the Linwood Property on June 2, 2016, and $77.02 was

transferred to plaintiff’s tax bill for the Beechwood Property on May 30, 2017, or May 31, 2017.

Although defendant may have been entitled to immediate liens against the respective properties as

security for the payment of these charges, MCL 141.121(3) barred defendant from certifying past-

due charges for placement on the tax roll until the charges had been delinquent for at least 6

months. Defendant violated this restriction by transferring the charges to plaintiff’s tax bills less

than 60 days after the charges accrued. Consequently, the trial court erred by granting summary

disposition in favor of defendant on plaintiff’s quiet title and writ of mandamus claims as it relates

to defendant’s procedure for placement of the arrears on the tax rolls.4

Plaintiff additionally argues that defendant’s actions of placing the water liens on the tax

roll were preempted by state law because MCL 141.121(3) prohibits the charges from becoming a

lien against the premises when the governmental unit is notified of the tenant’s responsibility for

4

We note that this conclusion does not apply to plaintiff’s slander of title claim, which was

dismissed on the basis of governmental immunity, rather than the parties’ respective compliance

with the statutory provisions, and was not appealed to this Court.

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the charges. Plaintiff waived appellate review of this issue by arguing before the trial court that

preemption principles were inapplicable. “A party who expressly agrees with an issue in the trial

court cannot then take a contrary position on appeal.” Grant v AAA Mich/Wisconsin, Inc (On

Remand), 272 Mich App 142, 148; 724 NW2d 498 (2006). By concluding that preemption was

not an issue in this case, plaintiff waived review of this issue. Id. at 148-189. Regardless,

plaintiff’s preemption claim does not affect the disposition of this appeal. Although the trial court

made passing reference to the fact that defendant cancelled or voided the plaintiff’s water

affidavits, the fact remains that the only affidavits plaintiff filed referred to leases that expired

before the relevant charges accrued.

In sum, MCL 123.165 and MCL 141.121 require a landlord to file a new water affidavit

with each lease in order to prevent charges for water arrears from becoming the responsibility of

the landlord and a lien against the property. In this case, there is no genuine issue of material fact

that defendant had statutory authority to place the liens against plaintiff’s rental properties because

for both properties, plaintiff failed to file a new water affidavit with each subsequent lease.

However, defendant was without authority to transfer outstanding water charges to the tax rolls

before the expiration of the statutory six-month period. Thus, defendant’s procedure for entering

the lien on the tax roll was unlawful. Accordingly, this matter is remanded to the trial court for

the limited task of refunding plaintiff for charges paid as a result of the liens being unlawfully

placed on the tax rolls before the expiration of the statutory six-month period.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron

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