Opinion

Griffin, Norman v Coca-Cola Bottling Company

  • 2019 TN WC 163
Court
Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
Filed
Nov 20, 2019
Status
Published
On the bench
Kenneth M. Switzer
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.5%

The opinion

FILED

Nov 20, 2019

02:20 PM(CT)

TENNESSEE COURT OF

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

CLAIMS

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT NASHVILLE

Norman Griffin, ) Docket No. 2018-06-0301

Employee, )

v. )

Coca-Cola Bottling Company, ) State File No. 97328-2016

Employer, )

And )

Agri General Insurance Company, ) Judge Kenneth M. Switzer

Carrier. )

COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER

The Court held a compensation hearing on November 19, 2019. The issues are

Mr. Griffin's entitlement to additional permanent partial disability benefits and in

particular whether he made a meaningful return to work at Coca-Cola. Because Coca-

Cola failed to accommodate Mr. Griffin's work restrictions, the Court holds his later

resignation after a meaningful return to work was reasonable and that he is entitled to an

original award of permanent partial disability benefits, a resulting award and increased

benefits.

History of Claim

Mr. Griffin, age fifty-two, worked as a merchandiser for Coca-Cola, transporting

its product to retail stores and pulling pallets of merchandise into the stores to stock

shelves and build displays. These tasks required pushing heavy pallets on wheels around

the stores. The heaviest items he lifted were 24-packs of soda, which he said weighed

"almost fifty pounds," and some shelves were six feet off the ground or higher, requiring

him to lift overhead.

Mr. Griffin injured his neck on December 15, 2016, and Coca-Cola accepted the

claim.

Mr. Griffin received authorized treatment from Dr. James Fish until August 7,

1

2017, when Dr. Fish placed him at maximum medical improvement and released him to

work with restrictions. Specifically, Dr. Fish restricted Mr. Griffin from lifting more than

twenty pounds overhead or fifty pounds wrist to floor or floor to waist. He also set a

maximum carrying limit of no more than fifty pounds. Under "patient instructions," Dr.

Fish added "no extreme neck or trunk range of motion, no lifting more than 25 pounds

overhead, no continuous work above the shoulder level for more than 1 hour at a time. 1"

The notes further state that Mr. Griffin did not want to undergo surgery at that time. Dr.

Fish testified:

He was pretty adamant early on about not having surgery, and we discussed

it in 20 17 during treatment, but he was kind of improving with conservative

measures, and he just decided, or we decided together, in late 2017, to just

go the conservative route and see how he would do.

After his release, Mr. Griffin contacted Coca-Cola about returning to work. He

testified that he discussed his restrictions with a supervisor named John Messer and a

human resources representative named "Hope." According to Mr. Griffin, Mr. Messer

said they would help him, but Hope insisted he could only return if at full duty. Mr.

Griffin asked if he could work a different position, but the response was no.

Based on Mr. Messer's assurances that he would get assistance, Mr. Griffin

returned to work at Coca-Cola. He said coworkers helped him for "the first couple of

days," but afterward he was on his own. He later started to feel tingling and numbness in

his neck and back. About a week and a half later, Mr. Griffin told his direct supervisor

about his returning symptoms and that he could not continue to work. The supervisor

said he understood and accepted Mr. Griffin's resignation. At that time, Mr. Griffin

earned $26.62 per hour.

After his resignation, Mr. Griffin worked at a gas station for a few months earning

$10 per hour. He then returned to Dr. Fish seven or eight months later seeking the

surgery that the doctor earlier recommended. He said, "I could tell it wasn't going to get

better." He acknowledged on cross-examination that Dr. Fish recommended surgery at

least a year earlier, but he did not want to undergo it at that time. He testified that, after

Dr. Fish explained the risks of surgery, he was scared and did not want to take chances at

that point.

In October 2018, Mr. Griffin underwent a two-level cervical fusion. On February

25, 2019, Dr. Fish assigned a five-percent impairment and a permanent restriction of no

lifting more than fifty pounds overhead. At his deposition, Dr. Fish reviewed Mr.

Griffin's testimony regarding his job requirements at Coca-Cola and stated that, as of his

second release of Mr. Griffin, "it would be a bad idea for him to be doing that job," and

1

The medical records conflict in the limits on overhead lifting.

2

"with his current restrictions as they are, he shouldn't be doing that."

Mr. Griffin started working for Frito Lay after the surgery. He testified that his

job duties are similar to those at Coca-Cola, but the items are "a lot lighter," and he never

lifts anything above his chest. Mr. Griffin testified that he earns $16.50 per hour and has

received no raises since starting the job.

The parties agreed that Mr. Griffin's original award is $17,151.98. This is based

on an average weekly wage of$1,143.46 and a compensation rate of$762.31. His initial

compensation period expired on August 8, 2019.

Mr. Griffin argued that Coca Cola did not accommodate his restrictions when he

was first released, so he was forced to quit and work with other employers for lower pay.

Coca-Cola argued that, had Mr. Griffin agreed to the surgery when Dr. Fish first

proposed it, his restrictions would have been less severe and it could have accommodated

him. In the alternative, Coca Cola argued that Mr. Griffin offered no evidence except his

own testimony regarding his earnings at the time of the expiration of the initial

compensation period, August 8, 2019.

Evidentiary Ruling

Coca-Cola filed a motion to compel discovery on October 31 seeking written

discovery responses and sanctions against Mr. Griffin. Specifically, it requested a ruling

that Mr. Griffin be precluded from introducing evidence sought in the written discovery

as well as attorney's fees. The Court deferred ruling on the motion at the pretrial

conference because Mr. Griffin had not responded to the motion and was within his five-

day deadline to do so. He filed a response later that day.

The Court holds that the written discovery sought substantially the same

information that Coca-Cola obtained at Mr. Griffin's deposition on August 12. Mr.

Griffin's untimely response did not prejudice Coca-Cola's ability to participate in

mediation, as shown by the fact that it did not file its motion until afterward, nor did it

hamper Coca-Cola's ability to prepare for or defend the case at the compensation hearing.

Therefore, the Court declines to sanction Mr. Griffin by excluding his evidence.

However, the Court finds it troubling that, despite reminders at court appearances, Mr.

Griffin's attorney failed to respond to the written discovery until approximately four

months after it was due. Therefore, the Court agrees with Coca-Cola that an award of

attorney's fees for the preparation and filing of the motion is appropriate.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

At a compensation hearing, Mr. Griffin must establish by a preponderance of the

evidence that he is entitled to the requested benefits. Willis v. All Staff, 2015 TN Wrk.

3

Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 42, at *18 (Nov. 9, 2015); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-

239(c)(6) (2019).

Mr. Griffin seeks a resulting award and increased benefit under Tennessee Code

Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(B). This provision states that if, at the end of the initial

period of compensation, the employee has not returned to work for any employer at an

equal or greater rate of pay as before the injury, then the employee qualifies for a

resulting award equal to 1.35 times the original award. A trial court can further increase

the resulting award if, among other considerations, the employee is over the age of forty

when the initial period of compensation ended. However, the statute also states that

"under no circumstances shall an employee be entitled to additional benefits" when the

"loss of employment is due to the employee's voluntary resignation" provided that the

resignation "does not result from the work-related disability." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-

207(3)(D)(i).

In examining the circumstances of a resignation, Tennessee case law looks to

whether an employee has made a "meaningful return to work." As the Appeals Board

explained:

There will be a variety of factual situations wherein the courts will be

required to construe the meaning of the words [meaningful return to work].

The ultimate resolution of their meaning will be leavened by an assessment

of the reasonableness of the employer in attempting to return the employee

to work and the reasonableness of the employee in failing to return to work.

Dennis v. Polymer Components, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 4 7, at *11 (Sept.

27, 2016), citing Newton v. Scott Health Care Ctr., 914 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Tenn.

Workers' Comp. Panel 1995). In addition, if an injured worker is unable to continue

working because of the injury, there generally will not have been a meaningful return to

work. However, if the employee returns to work and sometime afterward stops working

due to personal reasons or other reasons not related to the work injury, these

circumstances are considered as making a meaningful return to work. Dennis, at * 11-12.

If the offer from the employer is not reasonable in light of the circumstances of the

employee's physical ability to perform the offered employment, then the offer of

employment is not meaningful. Newton, at *5-6.

Here, Mr. Griffin credibly testified that he received assistance for two days upon

his return to work, but Coca-Cola offered no further accommodations, either by help

from coworkers or changing his job duties. He explicitly stated, without objection, that

Hope insisted he return only if he could work full-duty. Mr. Griffin further testified that,

once he was on his own, he attempted to perform his job duties but felt tingling and

numbness while doing so. Coca-Cola offered no countervailing testimony or

documentary evidence to show it attempted to accommodate Mr. Griffin's restrictions.

4

Thus, the Court finds Mr. Griffin's decision to resign reasonable under these

circumstances and that Coca-Cola's employment offer was not meaningful.

As to Coca-Cola's argument that it would have accommodated the restrictions if

Mr. Griffin had undergone surgery earlier, the Court finds it wholly speculative. Dr. Fish

testified that he was essentially in agreement to delay the surgery when he stated, "[H]he

just decided, or we decided together, in late 2017, to just go the conservative route and

see how he would do." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, and importantly, Dr. Fish testified

that Mr. Griffin could not perform the job duties at Coca-Cola after reaching maximum

medical improvement in February 2019.

The Court further disagrees with Coca-Cola's assertion that Mr. Griffin's

testimony alone regarding his wages is insufficient and that he must provide proof of his

earnings on the date the initial compensation period expired. First, Coca-Cola neither

offered a reason why Mr. Griffin's testimony alone is unreliable, nor did it offer any

contrary proof. Second, as to its argument regarding inadequate proof of his wages on

the date the initial compensation period expired, Mr. Griffin credibly testified that he

earned $16.50 per hour at Frito Lay and that he earned no pay raises since. The Court

makes the reasonable inference that on August 8, 2019, Mr. Griffin earned $16.50 per

hour, so further proof on that specific point is unnecessary. Thus, the Court finds Mr.

Griffin has returned to work at a wage less than one hundred percent of the wages he

received from Coca-Cola on the date of his injury.

In conclusion, Mr. Griffin has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he is

entitled to a resulting award and increased benefits under Tennessee Code Annotated

Section 50-6-207(3)(B). His original permanent partial disability award of$17,151.98 is

increased by multiplying the original award by factors of 1.35 for not returning to work

and 1.2 for his age.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:

1. Mr. Griffin is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits totaling $27,786.21.

2. Mr. Griffin shall receive future medical benefits with Dr. Fish under Tennessee

Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(l)(A).

3. Mr. Griffin's attorney is awarded a twenty-percent fee to be paid from the total

award.

4. Mr. Griffin's attorney shall pay counsel for Coca-Cola $250.00 as a reasonable

attorney's fee for time spent drafting the motion to compel discovery.

5. Costs of $150.00 are taxed to Coca-Cola under Tennessee Compilation Rules and

5

Regulations 0800-02-21-.06, to be paid to the Court Clerk within five days of this

order becoming final.

6. Coca-Cola shall file a statistical data form (SD-2) with the Clerk within ten days

of the date of this order under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-244.

7. Unless this order is appealed, it shall become final thirty days after issuance.

ENTERED November 20, 2019.

Court of Workers' Compensation

6

APPENDIX

Exhibits:

1. Dr. Fish's deposition transcript and exhibits

Technical record:

1. Petition for Benefit Determination

2. Dispute Certification Notice

3. Request for Scheduling Hearing

4. Scheduling Hearing Order

5. Order Setting Compensation Hearing

6. Motion to Compel and Exclude

7. Dispute Certification Notice

8. Employer's Pre-Compensation Hearing Statement and Brief

9. Employer's Exhibit List

10.Employee's Compensation Hearing Exhibit List

11. Response to Employer's Motion to Compel and Exclude

12. Employee' s Pre-Compensation Hearing Statement and Brief

13. Pretrial Order

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the Compensation Hearing Order was sent as indicated on

November 20, 2019.

Name Certified Regular Email Sent to:

Mail Mail

David Goodman, X dgoodman@forthegeog Ie.com

Employee's Attorney treilev@fortheoeoole.com

Alex Morrison, Ryan X amorrison@mijs.com

Edens. Employer's rcedens@mij s.com

attorneys w franklyn@mijs.com

idhaynes@J!li js.com

Penny Shrum, Clerk of Court

Court of Workers' Compensation Claims

WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov

7

II

I 'I

Compensation Hearing Order Right to Appeal:

If you disagree with this Compensation Hearing Order, you may appeal to the Workers'

Compensation Appeals Board or the Tennessee Supreme Court. To appeal to the Workers'

Compensation Appeals Board, you must:

1. Complete the enclosed form entitled: "Compensation Hearing Notice of Appeal," and file

the form with the Clerk of the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims within thirty

calendar days of the date the compensation hearing order was filed. When filing the

Notice of Appeal, you must serve a copy upon the opposing party (or attorney, if

represented).

2. You must pay, via check, money order, or credit card, a $75.00 filing fee within ten

calendar days after filing of the Notice of Appeal. Payments can be made in-person at

any Bureau office or by U.S. mail, hand-delivery, or other delivery service. In the

alternative, you may file an Affidavit of Indigency (form available on the Bureau's

website or any Bureau office) seeking a waiver ofthe filing fee. You must file the fully-

completed Affidavit of Indigency within ten calendar days of filing the Notice of

Appeal. Failure to timely pay the filing fee or file the Affidavit of lndigency will

result in dismissal of your appeal.

3~ You bear the responsibility of ensuring a complete record on appeal. You may request

from the court clerk the audio recording of the hearing for a $25.00 fee. A licensed court

reporter must prepare a transcript and file it with the court clerk within fifteen calendar

days of the filing the Notice of Appeal. Alternatively, you may file a statement of the

evidence prepared jointly by both parties within fifteen calendar days of the filing of the

Notice of Appeal. The statement of the evidence must convey a complete and accurate

account of the hearing. The Workers' Compensation Judge must approve the statement

of the evidence before -the record is submitted to the Appeals Board. If the Appeals

Board is called upon to review testimony or other proof concerning factual matters, the

absence of a transcript or statement of the evidence can be a significant obstacle to

meaningful appellate review.

4. After the Workers' Compensation Judge approves the record and the court clerk transmits

it to the Appeals Board, a docketing notice will be sent to the parties. The appealing

party has fifteen calendar days after the date of that notice to submit a brief to the

Appeals Board. See the Practices and Procedures of the Workers' Compensation

Appeals Board.

To appeal your case directly to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the Compensation Hearing

Order must be final and you must comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate

Procedure. If neither party timely files an appeal with the Appeals Board, the trial court's

Order will become final by operation of law thirty calendar days after entry. See Tenn.

Code Ann.§ 50-6-239(c)(7).

For self-represented litigants: Help from an Ombudsman is available at 800-332-2667.

II I.

' I

Tennessee Bureau of Workers' Compensation

220 French Landing Drive, 1-B

Nashville, TN 37243-1002

800-332-2667

AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY

I, , having been duly sworn according to law, make oath that

because of my poverty, I am unable to bear the costs of this appeal and request that the filing fee to appeal be

waived. The following facts support my poverty.

1. Full Name:_ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ 2. Address: - - - - - - - -- - - --

3. Telephone Number: - - - - - - - - - 4. Date of Birth: - - - - -- - - -- -

5. Names and Ages of All Dependents:

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - Relationship: - - - - - - -- - - -- -

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -- Relationship: - - - - - -- - - -- - -

- - - - - - - - - - -- - -- - - Relationship: - - - -- - -- - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - Relationship: - - - - - - -- - - -- -

6. I am employed by: - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - -- - - -- - -

My employer's address is: - - - - -- - - - -- - - - - - -- - -- - - - -

My employer's phone number is: - - - -- - - - -- - - - - - -- - - -- - -

7. My present monthly household income, after federal income and social security taxes are deducted, is:

$ _ _ _ _ _ __

8. I receive or expect to receive money from the following sources:

AFDC $ per month beginning

SSI $ per month beginning

Retirement $ per month beginning

Disability $ per month beginning

Unemployment $ per month beginning

Worker's Camp.$ per month beginning

Other $ per month beginning

LB-1108 (REV 11/15) RDA 11082

9. My expenses are: ! ~ li

I

'

Rent/House Payment $ per month Med icai/Dental $ _ _ ___ per month

Groceries $ per month Telephone $ _ __ _ _ per month

Electricity $ per month School Supplies $ _ _ _ _ _ per month

Water $ per month Clothing $ _ _ _ _ _ per month

Gas $ per month Child Care $ _ _ _ _ _ per month

Transportation $ per month Child Support $ _ _ _ _ _ per month

Car $ per month

Other $ per month (describe:

10. Assets:

Automobile $ _ _ _ __

(FMV) - - - - - - - - - -

Checking/Savings Acct. $ _ _ _ __

House $ _ _ __

(FMV) - - - - - - - - - -

Other $ _ _ _ __ Describe:_ _ _ _ __ _ __ __

11. My debts are:

Amount Owed To Whom

I hereby declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing answers are true, correct, and complete

and that I am financially unable to pay the costs of this appeal.

APPELLANT

Sworn and subscribed before me, a notary public, this

____ dayof _____________________ , 20_ __

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission Expires:_ _ _ _ _ _ __

LB-1108 (REV 11/15) RDA 11082

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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