Opinion

Avery, Shannon v. Jacks Food Store, LLC

  • 2018 TN WC 182
Court
Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
Filed
Nov 5, 2018
Status
Published
On the bench
Allen Phillips
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.5%

The opinion

FILED

Nov 05, 2018

08:26 AM(CT)

TENNESSEE COURT OF

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

CLAIMS

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT JACKSON

SHANNON AVERY, ) Docket No. 2018-07-0320

Employee, )

v. )

JACKS FOOD STORE, LLC, ) State File Nos. 44013-2017

Employer, )

And, )

PLAZA INS. CO., ) Judge Allen Phillips

Carrier. )

EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER FOR MEDICAL BENEFITS

Ms. Avery requested medical benefits for an injury on June 11, 2017.' The

dispositive issue is whether her injury arose out of the employment or was idiopathic.

The Court conducted an Expedited Hearing on November 1, 2018, and holds Ms. Avery

likely would prevail at a hearing on the merits that her injury arose out of the

employment.

History of Claim

Ms. Avery worked as a clerk for Jacks, a convenience store. On June 11, she

stepped down from a step and felt pain in her left knee. She introduced photographs of

the step revealing it was approximately six inches in height and that the floor above it had

loose carpet and protruding nails. The floor below was smooth tile. She pointed to photos

showing her standing at the step and demonstrated how the doorway where the step was

located was so narrow that she had to “twist” through it. Additionally, a surveillance

video from the store recorded images immediately after the incident showing Ms. Avery

appearing in pain and having difficulty walking.

''Ms. Avery marked the Temporary Disability Benefits box on the Petition for Benefit Determination but

claimed only three missed days, a period not compensable under law. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-205(a)

(2018) (no compensation allowed for the first seven days of disability resulting from an injury).

1

Jacks denied the claim on June 16 on grounds that Ms. Avery’s injury was

idiopathic. Specifically, it contended the step was not a hazard peculiar to Ms. Avery’s

work.

Because of Jacks’ denial, Ms. Avery sought medical treatment on her own. On

June 11, a provider at Jackson-Madison County General Hospital diagnosed left-knee

pain and swelling and took her off work for three days. The provider told Ms. Avery to

follow up with an orthopedic specialist.

Ms. Avery saw an orthopedist, Dr. Nicholas Vance, on August 31. Dr. Vance

recorded that Ms. Avery suffered “an acute left knee injury [that] occurred in June after

stepping down off a stair at work.” He suspected a medial meniscal tear and

recommended an MRI. On September 5, he noted the MRI revealed a complex tear of the

left medial meniscus. He believed Ms. Avery needed surgery, but she opted for “a course

of anti-inflammatories due to her financial situation.” Dr. Vance told her to return in four

weeks. Dr. Vance stated Ms. Avery’s “type of meniscal tear is commonly associated with

the type of injury she describes. Her symptoms, exam, and MRI findings are very

consistent with her story of falling due to mis-stepping off of a curb.”” Ms. Avery offered

no other medical records. She produced medical bills from Dr. Vance and the hospital.

Based on the evidence, Ms. Avery requested payment of her medical bills and

continued treatment for her knee injury. Jacks maintained its position and confronted Ms.

Avery regarding the specifics of the incident, namely, whether she tripped, fell or merely

stepped. Ms. Avery could not say for certain whether her foot caught a raised nail or if

she stumbled against the loose carpet. She simply recalled stepping down while twisting

through the narrow opening and feeling her knee pop. Thus, Jacks’ position was that her

exposure to the step was not peculiar to her employment, as she is exposed to steps away

from work just as she is at work.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

To be compensable, Ms. Avery must establish that her injury was caused by a

specific incident, or set of incidents, arising primarily out of and in the course and scope

of employment, and identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-

6-102(14)(A) (2018). At this Expedited Hearing, she must come forward with sufficient

evidence showing she likely would prevail at a hearing on the merits. Tenn. Code Ann. §

50-6-239(d)(1). Because the parties do not contest the incident, the Court turns to

whether her injury arose primarily out of the employment.

Jacks asserted the injury was idiopathic, meaning of “unexplained origin or

cause.” Idiopathic injuries generally do not arise out of the employment unless “some

*Dr. Vance’s mistaken use of the word “curb” rather than “step” does not affect the outcome.

a

condition of the employment presents a peculiar or additional hazard.” Frye v. Vincent

Printing Co., 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 34, at *11 (Aug. 2, 2016). In the

context of a work injury, “cause” means the accident originated in a hazard to which the

employee was exposed as a result of performing her job duties. /d. at *12.

In Bullard v. Facilities Performance Grp., 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS

37 (Aug. 7, 2018), the Appeals Board noted, “Tennessee courts have consistently held

that an employee may not recover for an injury occurring while walking unless there is an

employment hazard, such as a puddle of water or a step, in addition to the injured

employee’s ambulation.” Jd. at *11 citing Wilhelm v. Kroger, 235 S.W.3d 122, 128-29

(Tenn. 2007) (emphasis added). Here, Ms. Avery was exposed to the step because of her

work. Contrary to Jacks’ argument, she need not establish anything more than that; her

job required her to step down from one level to another, and in so doing she injured her

knee. Further, in Bullard, the Appeals Board rejected an argument that a single step 1s not

an employment hazard. Jd. Moreover, even if Ms. Avery did catch her foot on loose

carpet or raised nails, she did so because those hazards attended her work. Based on the

evidence, the Court holds Ms. Avery likely would prevail at a hearing on the merits that

her injury arose out of her employment.

Turning to medical benefits, Ms. Avery must prove “to a reasonable degree of

medical certainty that [her injury] contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing

[her] disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes.” Tenn. Code

Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(B). The term “reasonable degree of medical certainty” means that

“in the opinion of the physician, it is more likely than not considering all causes, as

opposed to speculation or possibility.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(D). Again, at

this interlocutory proceeding, Ms. Avery need only come forward with evidence showing

a likelihood of prevailing at a hearing on the merits. The Court finds she did.

Dr. Vance stated Ms. Avery’s condition “is commonly associated with the type of

injury she describe[d],” and her examination and MRI were “very consistent” with

stepping down from a step. In Lewis v. Molly Maid, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.

LEXIS 19 (Apr. 20, 2016), the Appeals Board affirmed an award of medical benefits

where the employee reported a specific incident unrefuted by the employer. Further, the

medical evidence supported the employee’s allegations that she suffered pain when

performing a specific task when there was no medical evidence to the contrary. Jd. at *7-

8. The same is true here, and the Court holds Ms. Avery is entitled to medical treatment

“made reasonably necessary” by her injury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(1)(A).

Because Jacks did not provide medical benefits, Ms. Avery justifiably sought

treatment on her own. She established a relationship with Dr. Vance, and any belated

attempt by Jacks to force Ms. Avery to treat with a panel physician after establishing that

relationship cannot succeed. Burnette v. WestRock, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.

LEXIS 66, at *12 (Oct. 31, 2017). In that case, the employee asked for medical care, did

3

not receive it, and the employer knew the employee sought care on his own. Jd. at *13.

Likewise, there was an “absence of information supporting a compensability defense as

to the occurrence of the accident.” /d. The facts here fit squarely within Burnette, and the

Court designates Dr. Vance the treating physician.

Finally, the Court holds Ms. Avery is entitled to payment of some medical bills.

“[A]n employer who elects to deny a claim runs the risk that it will be held responsible

for medical benefits obtained from a medical provider of the employee’s choice.” Young

v. Young Elec. Co., 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *16 (May 25, 2016).

Ms. Avery incurred bills from Jackson-Madison County General Hospital and Dr. Vance.

She testified without contravention regarding the amount she paid Dr. Vance but said the

hospital bill had “been discharged in bankruptcy.” Because of this testimony, the Court

reserves any decision on recovery of the hospital bill pending further proof of any

discharge. Conversely, it orders payment of Dr. Vance’s bills based on Ms. Avery’s proof

that she paid them.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:

1. Jacks shall reimburse Ms. Avery for the medical bills of Dr. Vance (Sports

Orthopedic and Spine) in the amount of $880.60.

2. Jacks shall provide Ms. Avery with reasonable and necessary medical treatment

under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i). Dr. Vance is

designated the authorized physician.

G2

. This matter is set for a Status Hearing on Tuesday, January 29, 2019 at 9:30

a.m. Central time. The parties must call 731-422-5263 or toll-free 855-543-

5038 to participate in the Hearing.

4. Unless interlocutory appeal of the Expedited Hearing Order is filed, compliance

with this Order must occur no later than seven business days from the date of entry

of this Order as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(3).

The Insurer or Self-Insured Employer must submit confirmation of compliance

with this Order to the Bureau by email to WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov no

later than the seventh business day after entry of this Order. Failure to submit the

necessary confirmation within the period of compliance may result in a penalty

assessment for non-compliance. For questions regarding compliance, please

contact the Workers’ Compensation Compliance Unit via email

WCCompliance.Program@tn. gov.

ENTERED this the 5" day of November 2018.

Judge Alten Phillips\

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

APPENDIX

Exhibits:

Medical records of Dr. Nicholas Vance

Medical records of Jackson Madison County General Hospital

Medical bills of Dr. Vance and hospital

Collective photos of the step and surrounding area

USB drive depicting surveillance video of accident

Additional collective photos of step and surrounding area

oo Ve a he

Technical record:

Petition for Benefit Determination

Dispute Certification Notice

Request for Expedited Hearing

Employer’s Response to Employee’s Request for Expedited Hearing

WN

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of this Expedited Hearing Order was sent to

the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 5" day of

November, 2018.

Name Email | Service sent to:

Shannon Avery, Employee xX shannonbabygirl72@yahoo.com

John P. Wade, Attorney for Employer xX jwade@mbbslaw.com

Penny Shrum, Clerk of Court

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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