Opinion

Demotte, Julie v. UPS

  • 2018 TN WC 46
Court
Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
Filed
Apr 11, 2018
Status
Published
On the bench
Joshua Davis Baker
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT NASHVILLE

JULIE DEMOTTE, )

Employee, ) Docket No. 2017-06-1778

v. )

UPS, )

Employer, ) State File No. 89793-2016

)

and )

LIBERTY INSURANCE CO., ) Judge Joshua Davis Baker

Carrier. )

COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER AWARDING FUTURE MEDICAL

BENEFITS AND DENYING TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT DISABILITY

BENEFITS

The parties appeared for a compensation hearing on March 14, 2018, to determine

Ms. Demotte’s entitlement to permanent disability, temporary disability, and future

medical benefits for her workplace injury. The Court holds UPS must provide Ms.

Demotte with lifetime medical benefits for her workplace injury but denies her claim for

temporary and permanent disability benefits.

History of Claim

With the exception of Ms. Demotte’s impairment rating, the parties stipulated to

almost all the material facts in this case. On November 11, 2016, Ms. Demotte fell and

broke her hip and leg while retrieving packages from a clogged package-transport

conveyor at a UPS-distribution facility.1 UPS accepted the claim, and Ms. Demotte

chose Dr. Jason Evans as the authorized treating physician. She also, however, received

treatment from Dr. Philip Kregor, Dr. Evans’ partner.

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Only Ms. Demotte testified at trial, and the Court summarized this history from the stipulations and her

testimony.

1

On March 9, 2017, Ms. Demotte saw Dr. Evans and requested he release her to

return to work. However, for reasons unclear, Dr. Kregor, instead of Dr. Evans, signed

her release.

Before her release, UPS paid Ms. Demotte temporary disability benefits at two

different rates. For the first twelve weeks, UPS paid Ms. Demotte at a rate of $186.67

per week. Because of an overpayment, UPS lowered the rate to $134.18 per week on

February 8 and continued payments at that rate until her release.2

Ms. Demotte worked for a few days and then left UPS on March 21. She testified

she left because she could not physically perform the job. On April 10, Dr. Evans placed

Ms. Demotte at maximum medical improvement (MMI). He issued a form C-30A Final

Medical Report assigning Ms. Demotte a three-percent whole-person impairment rating

and releasing her to return to work at full duty.

UPS stipulated to Ms. Demotte’s entitlement to future medical benefits but

objected to admission of the form C-30A to establish Ms. Demotte’s permanent

impairment rating. UPS argued that the medical report was inadmissible to prove

impairment because Ms. Demotte failed to give proper notice of her intent to use it,

which deprived UPS of the opportunity to depose Dr. Evans. Ms. Demotte opposed the

objection, arguing that UPS presented no medical proof rebutting Dr. Evans’ opinion.

She further argued that the Court should admit the form C-30A as a medical record, and

that requiring her to submit a form C-32 contravenes a central goal of the reform by

fomenting unnecessary litigation. The Court admitted the form but sustained UPS’

objection concerning its use to prove Ms. Demotte’s permanent impairment rating.

After the trial, the Court reviewed the scheduling order and noticed it contained no

deadlines regarding expert witnesses. The Court then reviewed the recording from the

hearing to determine why the order omitted these deadlines. At the scheduling hearing,

the following exchange occurred between the Court and defense counsel, David Hooper:

Court: It almost seems to me like ADR might be a good thing for you all?

Hooper: Well, I don’t have any, um, unrealistic expectation about that.

Based on things up to this point, I doubt that that’s helpful in this case. I’ll

go through it if the Court wishes it because I realize that it’s, at least on,

under the rules, it’s mandatory but I don’t know that there’s a reasonable

expectation this will work. Honestly, the issues here, however they’ve

been, and I think they’ve been skewed a bit by Zach [Wiley], but I think the

issue here is what she’s entitled to receive in terms of permanency.

2

The parties stipulated to a compensation rate of $141.96 per week.

2

Court: So there is a dispute over that? There’s a three-percent and a one—

is there an agreement on the rating?

Hooper: There is.

Court: Okay, okay, so then the issue is whether there’s additional benefits

that she’s entitled to?

Hooper: Right, well there’s a, well it actually is skewed a bit because of

the, of um, of the overpayment of temporary disability benefits.

Court: Okay, okay. I’ve gotcha, I’ve gotcha.

Hooper: But there is no dispute about the three-percent rating.

Later in the hearing, the Court questioned the parties about discovery needed before the

compensation hearing:3

Court: Do we need to take any expert witness depositions?

Mr. Goodman: No your honor.

Court: Mr. Hooper?

Mr. Hooper: I don’t think so.

The scheduling order identified permanent disability benefits and temporary disability

benefits as disputed issues for trial. Additionally, the pretrial statement contained no

stipulation as to the impairment rating.

Legal Principles and Analysis

At a compensation hearing, Ms. Demotte must establish by a preponderance of the

evidence that she is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Willis v. All Staff, 2015

TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 42, at *18 (Nov. 9, 2015); see also Tenn. Code Ann. §

50-6-239(c)(6) (2017). She has the burden of proof on all essential elements of her

claim. Scott v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at

*6 (Aug. 18, 2015).

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Attorney David Goodman appeared at the scheduling hearing in place of counsel of record, Zachary

Wiley.

3

At the outset of the hearing, the parties stipulated to most of the essential elements

of the claim. They agreed Ms. Demotte suffered a compensable injury, and UPS paid for

all treatment to date. They also agreed Ms. Demotte is entitled to continuing medical

benefits with Dr. Evans. In the end, the only disputed issues concerned Ms. Demotte’s

entitlement to permanent disability benefits and additional temporary disability benefits.

The dispute concerning permanent disability benefits centered on the admissibility

of form C-30A as proof of Ms. Demotte’s impairment rating. UPS objected to

admissibility of the rating, and the Court sustained the objection. The Court provides the

following analysis to address the admissibility of medical reports at a compensation

hearing. To that end, the analysis focuses on three legal pronouncements: statutory law,

regulatory law, and evidentiary rules.

Admissibility of Medical Reports Under Statute

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-235(c)(1) allows for introduction of

direct testimony “through a written medical report on a form established by the

administrator.” The administrator adopted form C-32 for this purpose. See Tenn. Comp.

R. & Regs. 0800-02-01-.16(2). When completed by a physician, form C-32 satisfies the

requirements for a signed medical report contained in section 50-6-235(c)(1). A party

may introduce a form C-32, in lieu of deposition testimony, at any stage of litigation

upon giving the opposing party at least twenty days’ notice of its intent to rely on it. The

opposing party may object to the report’s introduction but must depose the physician

within a “reasonable period of time,” or the objection is waived. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-

6-235(c)(2).

Ms. Demotte attempted to introduce form C-30A instead of form C-32. While

both are technically medical reports, the difference in the amount of information

contained in form C-32 as opposed to form C-30A is overwhelming. Form C-32 is

several pages in length and contains more detailed information concerning an employee’s

physical condition. It also includes a causation opinion and physician certification. Form

C-30A, on the other hand, provides limited information and does not require certification.

The Court finds that it is for this reason that the administrator provided form C-32 for

admissibility in lieu of deposition testimony. Additionally, filing a C-32 signals an

intention to rely on the report in lieu of deposition testimony, which triggers the opposing

party’s right to demand a deposition. Because Ms. Demotte failed to file form C-32,

UPS’ right to demand a deposition never arose.

While UPS had the right to object to the admissibility of form C-30A to prove Ms.

Demotte’s impairment rating, the Court found the objection puzzling. UPS voiced no

objection to the three-percent impairment rating at the scheduling hearing. In fact, when

the Court asked whether there was an agreement to the impairment rating, Mr. Hooper

responded, “There is.” Additionally, when the Court asked the parties whether they

4

needed to take expert witness depositions, Mr. Goodman said no, and Mr. Hooper said, “I

don’t think so.”

At the compensation hearing, the parties stipulated to all material aspects of the

case including compensability of the injury. With these stipulations and Mr. Hooper’s

previous statement of agreement to the impairment rating, the Court fails to see what

would be accomplished if UPS chose to take Dr. Evans’ deposition. Ms. Demotte,

however, had the burden to prove her permanent impairment and needed to provide either

expert witness testimony via a deposition transcript or through form C-32. Ms. Demotte

attempted to rely on form C-30A instead, which is not admissible to prove permanent

medical impairment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-235(c)(1). In short,

Ms. Demotte had the duty to present her case through admissible evidence and failed to

do so

Medical Reports Under Regulatory Law

Ms. Demotte argued that despite the statutory law concerning admissibility of

medical reports, the Court’s rules and regulations allow for admissibility of the

completed form C-30A as a medical record. She cited Tennessee Compilation Rules and

Regulations 0800-02-21-.16(6)(B) in support of this argument. The rule provides in

pertinent part: “All medical records signed by a physician, including via electronic

signature, or accompanied by a certification that the records are true and accurate which

has been signed by the medical provider shall be admissible.” The Court disagrees with

Ms. Demotte’s position.

The Court sees a distinction between a medical record and a medical report for

two reasons. First, the Bureau’s rules and regulations identify forms C-30 and C-32 as

medical reports. Second, physicians complete medical reports to support litigation in a

workers’ compensation claim, while physicians dictate or prepare medical records to

track the course of treatment and determine appropriate next steps for care. In this

Court’s view, the distinction between a report prepared for litigation and medical records

used to document and support treatment make the records more reliable. The Court,

therefore, holds that a medical record as provided in Rule 0800-02-21-.16(6)(B) does not

include form C-30A.

Medical Reports Under the Rules of Evidence

UPS objected to admission of the impairment rating in form C-30A because it

constitutes hearsay. The Tennessee Rules of Evidence define hearsay as “a statement,

other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c). “Hearsay is

not admissible except as provided for these rules or otherwise by law.” Id. at 802.

5

The Court agrees that the impairment rating Dr. Evans provided on form C-30A

constitutes hearsay. Dr. Evans completed the form outside of Court, so it qualifies as an

out-of-court statement. Additionally, Ms. Demotte attempted to introduce the form to

prove the three-percent rating contained within it. Accordingly, the form C-30A

constitutes hearsay. Further, it does not fall within any of the exceptions to hearsay. See

id. at 803. Thus the impairment rating in form C-30A is not admissible under the Rules

of Evidence.

Ms. Demotte Failed to Prove Entitlement to

Additional Temporary Disability Payments

Ms. Demotte also seeks additional temporary total disability benefits. The Court

denies her request.

UPS paid Ms. Demotte temporary disability benefits from the date of her injury

until March 9, 2017. On March 9, Ms. Demotte saw Dr. Evans and asked him to release

her to return to full-duty work. Dr. Evans agreed. For an unexplained reason, Dr. Kregor

issued the release. Ms. Demotte then returned to work, and UPS terminated her

temporary disability benefits.

Ms. Demotte worked for a few days and then left employment with UPS on March

21. She testified she could not physically perform her job. On April 10, Dr. Evans

released her to return to work at full duty and noted that Ms. Demotte’s work disability

began on the date of injury and ended on April 10.

For the first twelve weeks she missed work, UPS overpaid temporary disability

benefits to Ms. Demotte by $44.71 per week, or a total of $536.52 (($186.67 - $141.96) x

12 weeks). UPS then lowered the rate to $134.18 per week on February 8 and continued

payments at that rate until her release to return to work—four weeks and two days later.

This allowed UPS to recoup $33.34 (($141.96 - $134.18) x 4 weeks) + (($7.78/7) x 2

days)) of the overpayment, and left the overpayment balance at $503.18.

After Ms. Demotte left work on March 21, two weeks and six days passed before

Dr. Evans placed her at maximum medical improvement and set her last date of disability

at April 10. For that period, Ms. Demotte would have been due $405.60. Because this

amount is less than the outstanding overpayment balance, Ms. Demotte cannot recover

any additional temporary disability benefits.

IT IS, THERFORE, ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

1. UPS shall continue to provide Ms. Demotte with ongoing future medical benefits,

with Dr. Evans acting as the authorized treating physician.

6

2. Ms. Demotte’s claim for permanent disability benefits and additional temporary

disability benefits is denied.

3. Absent an appeal to the Appeals Board, this order shall become final in thirty

days.

4. The Court taxes the $150.00 filing fee to UPS under Tennessee Compilation Rules

and Regulations 0800-02-21-.07, for which execution may issue as necessary.

UPS shall pay this fee within five business days of this ordering becoming final.

5. UPS shall file form SD-1 within ten business days of this order becoming final.

ENTERED ON APRIL 11, 2018.

_____________________________________

Joshua Davis Baker

Workers’ Compensation Judge

7

APPENDIX

Exhibits:

1. Medical Records

2. Choice of Physician Form

Technical Record:

1. Petition for Benefit Determination

2. Dispute Certification Notice

3. UPS Compensation Hearing Brief

4. UPS Prehearing Statement

5. UPS Motion in Limine

6. UPS Exhibit List

7. Demotte Prehearing Statement

8. Demotte Witness and Exhibit List

9. Scheduling Order

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent to the following

recipients by the following methods of service on April__2018.

11,

Name Certified First Via Service sent to:

Mail Class Email

Mail

Zachary Wiley X zwiley@forthepeople.com

David Goodman dgoodman@forthepeople.com

David Hooper X dhooper@hooperzinn.com

______________________________________

PENNY SHRUM, COURT CLERK

wc.courtclerk@tn.gov

9

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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