Opinion

Jones, Betsy A. v. Dollar General

  • 2017 TN WC 149
Court
Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
Filed
Aug 2, 2017
Status
Published
On the bench
Allen Phillips
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.5%

The opinion

FILED

August 2, 27017

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION =—- 7X COURT OF

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS | pps pewsatton

AT JACKSON CLAIMS

BETSY A. JONES, ) Docket No. 2017-07-0074 Time 12:45 PAL

Employee, )

Vv. )

DOLLAR GENERAL, ) State File No. 910-2017

Employer, )

And, )

STATE NATIONAL INS. CO., ) Judge Allen Phillips

Insurance Carrier. )

EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER GRANTING MEDICAL BENEFITS

This case came before the undersigned Workers’ Compensation Judge on July 11,

2017, on Betsy Jones’ Request for Expedited Hearing. Ms. Jones requested medical

benefits for a hernia; Dollar General contended the hernia did not meet the statutory

requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-212. Accordingly, the issue is

whether Ms. Jones satisfied the statutory requirements for a compensable hernia. The

Court holds she did and orders medical benefits.

History of Claim

Ms. Jones is a store manager for Dollar General. On December 17, 2016, she

noticed a painless “knot” in her abdomen after stacking forty-pound bags of dog food.

She indicated the knot was in the right-lower quadrant of her abdomen, just above an

appendectomy scar.

On December 27, Ms. Jones first felt pain in the area of the knot when working

with her supervisor, Gayle Blackburn. Ms. Jones reported the pain to Ms. Blackburn, who

told her to call the injury-reporting “hotline.” Ms. Blackburn also completed a First

Report of Work Injury that stated: “[Employee] alleges almost 2 weeks ago she was...

stacking bags of dog food weighing up to 40 Ibs. and a little later noticed a ‘lump’ about

the size of a ‘baseball’ in her abdomen in the RLQ.”’

Ms. Jones called the “hotline,” and a Dollar General representative referred her for

medical evaluation. On December 30, Ms. Jones described the December 17 incident to

Dr. Lawrence Jackson and told him that the knot in her abdomen “started hurting a few

days later and is getting worse.” Dr. Jackson referred Ms. Jones for an ultrasound of her

abdomen which showed “no evidence of right anterior abdominal wall hernia or other

focal abnormality.” However, Ms. Jones contended the technician did not scan the area of

the knot but instead focused on the midline of her abdomen near the navel.

After the ultrasound, Ms. Jones returned to Dr. Jackson, who palpated an

“incisional” hernia “superior to her old appendectomy scar.” He advised Ms. Jones to see

a surgeon.

On January 9, 2017, Dollar General denied the claim on grounds that “[Ms.

Jones’] injury did not occur in the course and scope of employment.” Specifically, Dollar

General contended Ms. Jones’ hernia did not satisfy the requirements of Tennessee Code

Annotated section 50-6-212. At the hearing, Dollar General particularly contested the

statutory requirement that a hernia must be “accompanied by pain,” arguing Ms. Jones

did not experience pain until “several days” after the hernia’s appearance.

For her part, Ms. Jones argued she never had a hernia before December 17. She

admitted she did not feel pain until December 27 but related the pain to the hernia she

first noticed ten days earlier. She requested medical treatment and payment of two

outstanding medical bills.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Standard applied

Ms. Jones must come forward with sufficient evidence from which the Court can

determine she is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-

239(d)(1) (2016). Because she alleged a hernia injury, she must “definitely prove[] to the

satisfaction of the court” that:

(1) There was an injury resulting in hernia or rupture;

(2) The hernia or rupture appeared suddenly;

(3) It was accompanied by pain;

(4) The hernia or rupture immediately followed the accident; and

' Dollar General did not define “RLQ,” but the Court reads it to mean “right lower quadrant” in context.

2

(5) The hernia or rupture did not exist prior to the accident for which

compensation is claimed.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-212(a) (2016).

Analysis

The reason for the strict requirements of section 50-6-212(a) is “to remove the

issue [of what is a compensable hernia] as far as possible from the field of conjecture and

speculation.” Matthews v. Hardaway Contracting Co., 163 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tenn. 1942)).

Thus, an employee seeking benefits for a hernia must “bring [her] case within the

provisions” of that section. /d. at 62. Guided by this authority, the Court will analyze the

evidence in light of each of the statutory requirements.

(1) Injury resulting in hernia

Ms. Jones testified that she injured herself on December 17 while moving forty-

pound bags of dog food. The Court observed Ms. Jones testify and noted she was self-

assured, confident, and forthcoming. She detailed her injury steadily and without

hesitation. The Court finds her credible. See Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 694-95

(Tenn. 2014). Likewise, the Court finds consistent statements in her affidavit filed with

the hearing request, and in the history she provided Dr. Jackson.

Looking to the medical evidence, the Court notes Dr. Jackson palpated a hernia

and referred Ms. Jones to a surgeon but did not provide a causation opinion. However,

Ms. Jones need not produce a causation opinion at this hearing but must only come

forward with sufficient evidence to show she would likely prevail at a hearing on the

merits. This lessened standard of proof is designed to prevent an injured employee, like

Ms. Jones, from having “to seek out, obtain, and pay for . . . medical evaluation or

treatment before . . . her employer would have any obligation to provide medical

benefits.” McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.

LEXIS 6, at *13-14 (Mar. 27, 2015). “The delays inherent in such an approach, not to

mention the [potential cost barrier for Ms. Jones], would be inconsistent with a fair,

expeditious, and efficient workers' compensation system.” Jd. at *10.

The Court finds Ms. Jones’ testimony and Dr. Jackson’s statements establish that

she would likely prevail at a hearing on the merits regarding the injury requirement.

(2) Sudden appearance

39

When our Legislature used the word “suddenly,” it meant that the hernia must

have developed without warning or “without previous notice.” Etter v. Blue Diamond

Coal Co., 215 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tenn. 1948). Here, Dollar General did not refute that

Ms. Jones first noticed a “knot” in her abdomen after moving bags of dog food. Hence,

the Court finds Ms. Jones satisfied the sudden-appearance requirement.

(3) Accompanied by pain

Ms. Jones testified she felt a sharp pain in the knot on her abdomen on December

27, ten days after she first noticed it. The Court finds this onset of pain satisfies the

statutory requirement.

The Court notes the statute does not attach a time limitation to the “accompanied

by pain” requirement. This absence of a time limitation is unlike other provisions of the

statute that require a “sudden appearance” of a hernia and that it “immediately follow” an

accident. Instead, section 50-6-212(a)(3) simply says a hernia must be “accompanied by

pain,” without providing when an employee must feel the pain. For example, the Appeals

Board explained that an employee who felt pain two days after an incident allegedly

causing a hernia satisfied the pain requirement. Long v. Hamilton-Ryker, 2015 TN Wrk.

Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 23, at *10 (July 31, 2015). There, the employee had only a

“funny feeling” on the day he lifted heavy objects but then felt a “tweak” of pain over the

next two days. /d. Based on those facts, the Board affirmed an award of benefits.

In this case, Dollar General argued the onset of pain “a day or two” later satisfies

the requirement but that an onset ten days later does not. The Court disagrees. To dictate

when the pain from a hernia must appear grafts onto the statute a requirement that does

not exist. Instead, as our Supreme Court has explained, even the word “immediately”

does not mean “instantaneous;” it means only that a hernia “appears so soon after the

injury that it would not be possible to attribute it to any other cause.” Etter, at 806. Logic

dictates the same regarding the onset of pain here. The Court cannot attribute Ms. Jones’

pain to any cause other than the knot in her abdomen. Accordingly, the Court finds Ms.

Jones satisfied the requirement that her hernia “was accompanied by pain.”

(4) Immediately following the accident

In Etter, the Supreme Court also explained that the meaning of the word

“immediately” depends upon the circumstances and events in connection with which the

word is used. /d. Here, Ms. Jones testified credibly that she felt a defect in her abdomen

after moving merchandise, and the Court finds she satisfied the requirement that her

hernia immediately followed the accident.

(5) The hernia was not pre-existing

The criteria of section 50-6-212 are intended to insure that a hernia “result[ed]

from ‘the accident for which compensation is claimed,’ and not [from] a past condition

[.|” Capps v. Goodlark Med. Ctr., Inc., 804 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tenn. 1991). Here, Ms.

Jones testified the knot appeared on her abdomen on December 17, and the Court

believes her. Further, she explained the knot was above her thirty-seven-year-old

appendectomy scar. Merely because Dr. Jackson called the hernia “incisional” does not

mean the hernia was preexisting; he too noted it was “superior to her old appendectomy

scar.” Thus, the Court finds Ms. Jones established the requirement that her hernia was not

preexisting.

Conclusion

The Court holds the evidence shows Ms. Jones would likely prevail at a hearing

on the merits in proving she suffered a compensable hernia. Accordingly, Dollar General

“shall furnish [Ms. Jones] . . . such medical and surgical treatment . . . made reasonably

necessary by [her] accident].]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(1)(A) (2016). Namely,

Dollar General shall provide a panel of surgeons to evaluate and treat Ms. Jones.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:

1. Dollar General shall provide a panel of surgeons under Tennessee Code

Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(3) for evaluation and/or treatment, including

surgery, of Ms. Jones’ hernia injury of December 17, 2016. Ms. Jones or the

providers shall provide their billing to Dollar General.

2. Dollar General shall pay Ms. Jones’ bills for medical treatment in the following

amounts:

e Three Rivers Hospital-$40.41

e Radiology Alliance-$22.06.

3. This matter is set for a Scheduling (Status) Hearing on Thursday, October 26,

2017, at 10:30 a.m. Central time. You must call 731-422-5263 or toll-free 855-

543-5038 to participate in the Hearing.

4. Unless interlocutory appeal of the Expedited Hearing Order is filed, compliance

with this Order must occur no later than seven business days from the date of entry

of this Order as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(3)

(2016). The Insurer or Self-Insured Employer must submit confirmation of

compliance with this Order to the Bureau. by~ email to

WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov no later than the seventh business day after

ENTERED this the 2nd day of August, 2017. ip

entry of this Order. Failure to submit the necessary confirmation within the period

of compliance may result in a penalty assessment for non-compliance. For

questions regarding compliance, please contact the Workers’ Compensation

Compliance Unit via email WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov.

I lL Lh ‘ I} aw

Allen Phillips, Judg

Court $f Workefs’ ompensation Claims

APPENDIX

Exhibits:

1. Affidavit of Betsy Jones

2. First Report of Injury

3. Notice of Denial of Claim for Compensation

4. Medical Records of Waverly Family Medicine (Dr. Lawrence Jackson)

5. Collective Medical Bills

Technical record:

AYN

Petition for Benefit Determination

Dispute Certification Notice

Request for Expedited Hearing

Order Denying File Review Expedited Hearing

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this Expedited Hearing Order was sent

to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 2" day of

August, 2017.

| Name Via Email Service Sent To:

Betsy A. Jones, xX Betsiboo2000(@yahoo.com

Self-Represented Employee

Travis Ledgerwood, Esq., Xx tledgerwood@manierherod.com

Attorney for Employer

7

/ Loe em

Penny Shrum, Clerk of Court

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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