Opinion

McWherter, Jacquet v. Centurion Stone Products

  • 2017 TN WC 144
Court
Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
Filed
Jul 28, 2017
Status
Published
On the bench
Joshua Davis Baker
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.5%

The opinion

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT NASHVILLE

JACQUET MCWHERTER, )

Employee, ) Docket No. 2015-06-0093

)

v. )

)

CENTURION STONE PRODUCTS, ) State File No. 16559-2015

Employer, )

and )

)

AMERISURE, ) Judge Joshua Davis Baker

Insurance Carrier. )

)

COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER GRANTING

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter came before the Court on July 24, 2017, upon the Motion for

Summary Judgment filed by Centurion Stone Products under Rule 56 of the Tennessee

Rules of Civil Procedure. The determinative legal issue is whether Centurion is entitled

to summary judgment as a matter of law because Mr. McWherter did not suffer an injury

in the course and scope of his employment. Mr. McWherter did not file a response to

Centurion’s Motion and did not attend the hearing. The Court grants the Motion for

Summary Judgment.

History of Claim

Mr. McWherter alleged a tow motor ran over his right foot while working at

Centurion. Centurion initially provided medical treatment but later denied the claim. Mr.

McWherther then requested an expedited hearing seeking medical treatment and

temporary disability benefits. Following an evidentiary hearing, this Court denied Mr.

McWherter’s request for temporary disability and medical benefits upon finding his

testimony lacked credibility:

Here, Mr. McWherter was hesitant, evasive, defensive, and argumentative.

He interrupted both defense counsel and witnesses and continually

mumbled his responses in cross examination, directing defense counsel to

“move on” when he did not want to answer. Other times, his recalcitrant

demeanor and unresponsiveness motivated defense counsel to move on

voluntarily. Many of Mr. McWherter’s answers were unreasonable, such

as claiming to see a tire track on his foot and forgetting facts inconvenient

to his claim.

Mr. McWherter appealed the denial and the Appeals Board upheld this Court’s decision.

Thereafter, Centurion moved for summary judgment citing the following material facts:1

1. Mr. McWherter alleged a tow motor weighing between seven and eight thousand

pounds ran over his right foot while he worked at Centurion on March 25, 2015.

2. Mr. McWherter received treatment from Concentra, which he chose from a panel.

3. Concentra’s examination revealed some pain and mild swelling but no other

apparent injury; x-rays were normal.

4. Despite allegedly having been run over by a tow motor, Mr. McWherter slept in

the exam room and lobby. The medical provider determined he needed no further

testing and no additional treatment.

5. The attending physician diagnosed a minor injury but offered no treatment other

than ibuprofen and a cold pack.

6. After this initial visit with Centurion, providers placed him at maximum medical

improvement, assigned no impairment and recommended no further care for his

alleged work place injury.

7. (Omitted.)

8. Mr. McWherter returned to work for four weeks after March 25, 2015, and

exhibited no signs of injury while doing his job. Centurion terminated Mr.

McWherter.

9. After his termination, Mr. McWherter returned to Centurion on two occasions

requesting that he be allowed to return to work.

10. Mr. McWherter had a foot x-ray on May 11, 2015. The results were normal.

In its motion, Centurion argued Mr. McWherter cannot prove that he suffered an injury

arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment at a compensation

hearing.

Legal Principles and Analysis

Motions for summary judgment are governed by Tennessee Rule of Civil

Procedure 56.04, which provides for entry of summary judgment when “the pleadings,

1

For brevity, the Court summarized the statements and omitted several not pertinent to its ruling on this motion.

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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Further, the Tennessee

General Assembly codified the burden of proof in summary judgment motions as

follows:

In motions for summary judgment in any civil action in Tennessee, the

moving party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial shall prevail on

its motion for summary judgment if it:

(1) Submits affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s claim; or

(2) Demonstrates to the court that the nonmoving party’s evidence is

insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

claim.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101 (2016); Payne v. D and D Elec., 2016 TN Wrk. Comp.

App. Bd. LEXIS 21, at *7-8 (May 4, 2016).

If the moving party meets its burden of negating an essential element or

demonstrating evidence is insufficient, then the injured employee, as the nonmoving

party, must “demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record which could lead a

rational trier of fact to find in [his or her] favor[.]” Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of

Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 265 (Tenn. 2015). Thus, if Centurion meets its

burden of proof, Mr. McWherter must do more than simply show some “metaphysical

doubt” as to the material facts. In other words, the Court must focus on any evidence Mr.

McWherter presents at the summary judgment stage, “not on hypothetical evidence that

theoretically could be adduced [by him] . . . at a future trial.” Id. The Court holds that

Centurion met its burden of proving Mr. McWherter cannot establish an essential element

of his case—the occurrence of an injury arising primarily out of and in the course and

scope of his employment. The Court further holds that Mr. McWherter failed to present

evidence sufficient to support rebut this holding.

Under the Workers’ Compensation Law, an “injury” means “an injury by accident

. . . arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, that causes death,

disablement, or the need for medical treatment of the employee[.]” To constitute a viable

claim for workers’ compensation benefits the injury must be “by a specific incident, or

set of incidents, arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.”

Further, “[a]n injury arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment

only if it has been shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment

contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the injury, considering all causes[.]”

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See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14) (2016). The material facts cited by Centurion show

that Mr. McWherter did not suffer a workplace injury.

In its statement of material facts, Centurion noted that Mr. McWherter claimed

that a tow motor, a machine weighing between seven and eight thousand pounds, ran over

his foot. Despite this extremely heavy machine having run over his foot, Mr. McWherter

showed no signs of distress while being transported for medical attention at Concentra

and even fell asleep in the waiting room. When Concentra providers examined Mr.

McWherter, they found no signs of physical injury other than mild swelling of the right

forefoot. All x-rays were normal, and the medical staff determined Mr. McWherter

needed no further treatment. As the Court stated in its expedited hearing order denying

benefits, “the Court finds it difficult to believe that a machine estimated to weigh more

than seven thousand pounds caused only mild swelling upon running over Mr.

McWherter’s foot.” Based on these material facts, which are undisputed, the Court finds

that Centurion carried its burden of negating an essential element of Mr. McWherter’s

claim. In this Court’s opinion, the facts show that Mr. McWherter did not suffer an

injury arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment. In order to

avoid summary judgment, Mr. McWherter now must provide some evidence to rebut this

finding.

Mr. McWherter, however, failed to respond to Centurion’s motion. In fact, the

only evidence the Court has seen tending to prove that Mr. McWherter suffered an injury

came from his own testimony at the expedited hearing. For completeness, the Court

refers to its original order cited above for its impression of Mr. McWherter’s testimony.

Accordingly, the Court did not place any weight on his testimony from the expedited

hearing and declines to give that testimony any weight in this motion hearing.

Centurion complied with Rule 56’s requirements. It also complied with this

Court’s rule by providing a copy of Rule 56 to Mr. McWherter. He failed to respond and

failed to provide any evidence that he suffered an injury that arose primarily out of and in

the course and scope of his employment. As noted in Rye, “[t]he focus is on the evidence

the nonmoving party comes forward with at the summary judgment stage, not on

hypothetical evidence that theoretically could be adduced…at a future trial.” Id. at 265

(emphasis added). Therefore, the Court holds Mr. McWherter failed to “demonstrate the

existence of specific facts in the record which could lead a rational trier of fact to find in

[his] favor.” Id. Accordingly, the Court grants Centurion’s Motion.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:

1. Centurion’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

2. Mr. McWherter’s claim is dismissed with prejudice.

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3. The Court assesses the $150 filing fee to Centurion pursuant to Tennessee

Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800-02-21-.07 (2017), for which

execution may issue as necessary.

4. Absent an appeal of this order by either party, the order shall become final

thirty days after its issuance.

ENTERED ON THIS THE 28TH DAY OF JULY, 2017.

____________________________________

Judge Joshua Davis Baker

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was sent to the

following recipients by the following methods of service on this the ___ 28th day of July,

2017.

Name Certified Via Via Addresses

Mail Fax Email

Jacquet X 215 Tanglewood Ct.

McWherter Nashville, TN 37211

Fredjones182@gmail.com

Stephen Morton, X Stephen.morton@mgclaw.com

Attorney for

Employer

_____________________________________

Penny Shrum, Clerk

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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