Opinion

Johnson Essie v. First United Methodist Church

  • 2017 TN WC 52
Court
Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
Filed
Mar 10, 2017
Status
Published
On the bench
Amber E. Luttrell
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.5%

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FILED

March 10, 2017

TN COURT OF

WORKERS’

COMPENSATION

CLAIMS

Time 3:05 PM

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT JACKSON

ESSIE JOHNSON, ) Docket No.: 2015-07-0266

Employee, )

v. )

FIRST UNITED METHODIST ) State File No.: 85880-2014

CHURCH, )

Employer, )

And )

TRAVELERS, ) Judge Amber E. Luttrell

Insurance Carrier. )

J

COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER

This matter came before the undersigned Workers’ Compensation Judge on

February 17, 2017, for a Compensation Hearing. The central legal issue is whether Ms.

Johnson established by a preponderance of the evidence that her alleged feet injuries

arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment with First United

Methodist Church (FUMC). For the reasons set forth below, the Court holds Ms. Johnson

did not and thus, the Court denies Ms. Johnson’s claim for workers’ compensation

benefits.

History of Claim

Ms. Johnson worked for FUMC in Jackson, Tennessee as a custodian. Her job

duties included, but were not limited to, emptying trash, vacuuming, dusting, mopping,

cleaning bathrooms, and ironing tablecloths for church functions. Ms. Johnson alleged a

work-related injury to her feet on October 21, 2014, from standing and ironing

tablecloths. She testified she experienced pain over time, which traveled up her body

from “pivoting on her feet.” According to Ms. Johnson, she notified the operations

manager and her supervisor, Tricia Odom, about her pain, and Ms. Odom purchased a

rubber mat for her to stand on, but did not offer to send her to a physician. They also

discussed alternative ways for Ms. Johnson to iron the tablecloths. Ms. Johnson testified

she had no problems with her feet prior to performing this activity.

1

Ms. Johnson testified she sought unauthorized treatment for her injury to her feet

with the following providers: Durham Chiropractic, Dr. Jerome Cawthon, and Dr. Earl

Stewart. Ms. Johnson also saw Dr. Jason Hutchison for a one-time authorized visit. The

parties introduced medical records from these providers into evidence at the hearing.

Medical records from Durham Chiropractic between July 2013 and May 2014

indicated Ms. Johnson sought chiropractic treatment primarily for her cervical, thoracic,

and lumbar spine. (Ex. 1 at 13-39.) There is no mention in Dr. Durham’s records of any

treatment for Ms. Johnson’s feet or of a work injury.

Ms. Johnson next sought treatment with a podiatrist, Dr. Jerome Cawthon, who

diagnosed bilateral tarsal tunnel syndrome. /d. at 40. Dr. Cawthon did not provide a

causation opinion or mention Ms. Johnson’s work activities at FUMC in his record.

After seeing Dr. Cawthon, the parties agreed Ms. Johnson and Ms. Odom

discussed Ms. Johnson’s foot complaints, and Ms. Odom offered a panel of physicians,

which included Dr. Cawthon. (Ex. 4.) Ms. Odom testified Dr. Cawthon refused to see

Ms. Johnson under workers’ compensation; therefore, FUMC contacted other physicians

on the panel until Dr. Jason Hutchison, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, agreed to

see Ms. Johnson.

Ms. Johnson saw Dr. Hutchison and provided a history of pain in her legs and

numbness in her feet after she started ironing tablecloths in 2012. (Ex. 1 at 42.) She did

not describe an acute injury. However, she stated moving from side to side and twisting

caused her pain. Dr. Hutchison reviewed Ms. Johnson’s prior medical records and noted

Dr. Cawthon previously diagnosed bilateral tarsal tunnel syndrome in October 2014.

Following an exam, Dr. Hutchison also diagnosed tarsal tunnel syndrome. Concerning

causation, Dr. Hutchison opined:

While Ms. Johnson’s occupation[al] ironing may exacerbate her underlying

symptomatology, it is not the proximate cause of her problem. Specifically,

the tarsal tunnel syndrome, she has two risk factors independent of her job.

To my knowledge, there is no occupational-related cause of tarsal tunnel.

She has diabetes and pes planus, both of which are known risk factors for

tarsal tunnel. Both of these are pre-existing or non work-related risk factors.

Id.

Dr. Hutchison further opined, “this is not directly a work-related injury.” He

recommended Ms. Johnson seek further care for her ailments under her private health

insurance. Jd. at 43. Based on Dr. Hutchison’s opinion, FUMC denied Ms. Johnson’s

workers’ compensation claim. (Ex. 3.)

Ms. Johnson subsequently sought treatment from Dr. Earl Stewart, her personal

physician, in 2016. Dr. Stewart’s records revealed Ms. Johnson saw him for a variety of

conditions throughout 2016.' Concerning Ms. Johnson’s feet, Dr. Stewart mentioned

“tarsal tunnel” in two visits in 2016 in the “Review of Systems” section of his report.

However, there is no mention of Ms. Johnson’s alleged work-injury at FUMC or a

causation opinion from Dr. Stewart. Ms. Johnson acknowledged no physician took her

off work for her tarsal tunnel syndrome.

Ms. Odom testified she asked Ms. Johnson to iron tablecloths on occasion for

events in their banquet facility. Ms. Odom stated that ironing was not required on a daily

basis, and there was never a quota or deadline for ironing the tablecloths. Ms. Odom

testified Ms. Johnson complained in 2013 of trouble in her knees while ironing. She

stated Ms. Johnson first complained to her about her feet after Ms. Johnson saw Dr.

Cawthon. FUMC offered Ms. Johnson a panel, and she ultimately saw Dr. Hutchison.

In July 2015, FUMC sent Ms. Johnson to Nova Medical Center in Memphis,

Tennessee, for a fit-for-duty exam. (Ex. I at 45.) Ms. Odom testified FUMC decided it

was in Ms. Johnson’s best interest to have an independent exam to determine if she could

perform the physical duties of her job. Nova indicated Ms. Johnson was disqualified from

performing her essential job duties due to “cardiovascular, blood pressure, and other.”

Following the Nova evaluation, FUMC terminated Ms. Johnson’s employment. Since her

termination from FUMC, Ms. Johnson testified she has not worked anywhere and that

she continues to have pain.

Mr. Glynn Graves also testified on behalf of FUMC. Mr. Graves works in

facilities and maintenance for FUMC. In the course of a workday, Mr. Graves saw Ms.

Johnson five to ten times. He testified they talked regularly and complained to each other

about their arthritic knees. Ms. Johnson never complained to him of any problems with

her feet or a work injury to her feet.

Requested Relief

Ms. Johnson argued she sustained a compensable injury to her feet. She seeks

medical benefits and temporary disability benefits. Ms. Johnson contended Drs. Cawthon

and Stewart diagnosed tarsal tunnel syndrome and argued Dr. Hutchison acknowledged

her ironing activities “may exacerbate her underlying symptomatology.” She did not

present any evidence of temporary total disability or permanent impairment and did not

ask for permanent partial disability benefits.

In response, FUMC argued Ms. Johnson’s claim is not compensable. It contended

there is no medical proof establishing her foot condition arose primarily out of and in the

' The Court notes Dr. Stewart’s records were handwritten, difficult to read, and illegible in parts.

3

course and scope of her employment. To the contrary, FUMC asserted the only medical

opinion in this case is from Dr. Hutchison, who concluded Ms. Johnson’s foot condition

was not work-related. In the event the Court holds otherwise, FUMC additionally argued

Ms. Johnson offered no proof of temporary total disability or permanent partial disability.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Ms. Johnson, as the employee in a workers’ compensation claim, has the burden of

proof on all essential elements of the claim. Scott v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, 2015 TN

Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *6 (Aug. 18, 2015). At a Compensation Hearing,

Ms. Johnson must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to the

requested benefits. Willis v. All Staff; TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 42, at *18 (Nov.

9, 2015); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(6) (2016).

To prove a compensable injury, Ms. Johnson must show that her alleged injury

arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. Jd. at § 50-6-

102(14). To do so, she must show an incident, or specific set of incidents, identifiable by

time and place of occurrence, caused her injury. /d. at § 50-6-102(14)(A). Further, she

must show, “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that [the employment]

contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . disablement or need for

medical treatment, considering all causes.” Jd. at § 50-6-102(14)(C).

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the Court holds Ms. Johnson

failed to satisfy her burden of proving her tarsal tunnel condition arose primarily out of

and in the course and scope of her employment. Specifically, there is no medical proof to

establish that Ms. Johnson’s ironing duties contributed more than fifty percent in causing

her tarsal tunnel condition considering all causes.

While the medical record from Dr. Cawthon supports a diagnosis of bilateral tarsal

tunnel, he gave no opinion on medical causation for that condition. The records in

evidence from Durham Chiropractic do not mention tarsal tunnel syndrome. Dr.

Stewart’s handwritten notes appear to mention tarsal tunnel in the history section on two

visits; however, there is no evidence Dr. Stewart diagnosed the condition or causally

related it to Ms. Johnson’s employment at FUMC. The Court finds the only medical

proof in evidence addressing medical causation is from Dr. Hutchison. Upon taking a

history from Ms. Johnson, reviewing her prior medical records, and examining her, Dr.

Hutchison opined her tarsal tunnel was not caused by a work-related injury. Rather, he

opined her condition was causally related to her pre-existing diabetes and pes plenus.

The Court recognizes Ms. Johnson disputes Dr. Hutchison’s conclusions;

however, Ms. Johnson’s disagreement with the physician’s opinion, while genuine, is

legally insufficient to refute his conclusions. Neither Ms. Johnson nor the Court has the

medical qualifications to revise the doctor’s medical opinion. As our Appeals Board

4

observed, “Judges are not well-suited to second guess a medical expert’s treatment,

recommendations, and or diagnoses absent some conflicting medical evidence or some

other countervailing evidence properly admitted into the record.” Scott v. Integrity

Staffing Solutions, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *8 (Aug. 18, 2015).

Accordingly, this Court holds, as a matter of law, Ms. Johnson failed to establish

by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained an injury primarily arising out of

and in the course and scope of employment. Her claim for workers’ compensation

benefits is denied.

Alternative Findings

Solely in the event that an appellate body finds error in the compensability

holding, the Court makes the following alternative findings for the sake of judicial

economy. See Cunningham v. Shelton Sec. Serv., 46 S.W.3d 131, 137-138 (Tenn. 2001).

(“The trial court should ... hear the entire case and make appropriate findings of fact,

and alternative findings when necessary, for appellate review.”’)

The Court holds in the alternative that Ms. Johnson is entitled to medical benefits

pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204. Ms. Johnson did not introduce

any medical bills into evidence; thus, she is not entitled to payment of past medicals.

Finally, the Court holds Ms. Johnson did not introduce any evidence of temporary

disability or permanent partial disability; thus, she is not entitled to these.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:

1. Ms. Johnson’s claim is denied on the ground of compensability.

2. FUMC shall pay the $150.00 filing fee under Tennessee Compilation Rules and

Regulations 0800-02-21-.07 (2016) within five days of entry of this order, for

execution may issue as necessary.

3. FUMC shall file an SD-1 within ten days of entry of this Judgment. ‘

ENTERED this the _/oth day of March, 2017.

Judge Amber E. Luttrell

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

APPENDIX

EVIDENCE

1.

Sia we

Medical Records (collective exhibit)

Separation Notice

Notice of Denial

Panel of Physicians

Denial Letter

Job Description

Dr. Stewart letter

TECHNICAL RECORD

OP AAWRWN A

Petition for Benefit Determination

Dispute Certification Notice

Petition for Benefit Determination (post-discovery)

Dispute Certification Notice (post-discovery)

Employer’s witness list

Employer’s pre-trial brief

Expedited Hearing Order Denying Benefits

Order Denying Employer’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Order Denying Employer’s Motion to Compel Discovery

10. Order on Employer’s Discovery Motions

11. Order Denying Employer’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute

12. Request for Expedited Hearing

13.Employer’s Position Statement

14.Employer’s Witness List

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Compensation Hearing Order

was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 10th

day of March, 2017.

Name Certified | Via Via Service sent to:

Mail Fax Email

Essie Johnson, x 33 Denmark Jackson Road

Self-Represented Denmark, Tennessee 38391

Employee

Paul T. Nicks, X nicks@travelers.com

Employer’s Counsel

Joey Ha

fone

Penny Shrum, Clerk of Court

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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