Opinion

Moss, Michael v. Wood Personnel Services

  • 2016 TN WC 136
Court
Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
Filed
Jun 3, 2016
Status
Published
On the bench
Kenneth M.Switzer
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.5%

The opinion

FILED

JUNE 3, 2016

TN COURT OF

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

CLAIMS

Time: 1:17 PM

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT NASHVILLE

Michael Moss, ) Docket No.: 2015-06-1304

Employee, )

V. ) State File Number: 94542-2015

Wood Personnel Services, )

Employer. ) Judge Kenneth M. Switzer

)

EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER GRANTING MEDICAL BENEFITS

This case came before the undersigned workers’ compensation judge on the

Request for Expedited Hearing filed by the employee, Michael Moss, pursuant to

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239 (2015). The present focus of this case is

whether Mr. Moss is entitled to additional medical benefits and, in particular, a panel of

orthopedic specialists. Mr. Moss additionally seeks reimbursement for past medical

expenses and temporary disability benefits.’ For the reasons set forth below, the Court

finds Mr. Moss is entitled to a panel. However, on the record presently before it, the

Court cannot grant the additional relief Mr. Moss seeks.

History of the Claim

Mr. Moss is a thirty-nine-year-old resident of Davidson County, Tennessee. He

worked for Wood Personnel Services, a staffing company, which assigned him to

Standard Candy Company. Mr. Moss worked as a porterman, with duties similar to those

of a janitor.

Mr. Moss testified that at 8:30 a.m. on November 2, 2015, he bent down to pick up

a tote from the floor and felt a sharp pain in his back as he raised himself up. While Mr.

Moss noticed groin pain the night before, this was the first time he felt pain in his back.

Sherry Mattingly, Mr. Moss’ supervisor, noticed him limping and asked if he was all

right. Mr. Moss told her he was in pain but would try to “walk it off.’ Mr. Moss stated

the pain did not subside. At about 10:30 a.m., he informed Sherry’s supervisor, “Jorge,”

' The Dispute Certification Notice lists additional issues the parties failed to address at the expedited hearing.

Therefore, the Court considers them waived at this time.

he needed to go the emergency room. Jorge gave Mr. Moss his phone number and told

him to keep him informed.

Upon arrival at the St. Thomas Midtown emergency room, Mr. Moss provided a

urine sample, which indicated he was suffering from a kidney stone. Mr. Moss updated

Jorge and “Justin,” his recruiter from Wood Personnel.

On November 4, 2015, Mr. Moss passed the kidney stone but still experienced

back pain. He returned to the emergency room that evening, where he received an

ultrasound, which revealed muscle spasms from passing the stone. He called Jorge once

again, who told him to take time off from work. However, Mr. Moss returned to work

for the next two weeks or so. Mr. Moss attempted to contact Justin over that time to

discuss further medical treatment, but Justin never returned his calls. He finally called

Wood Personnel, which eventually connected him with Todd Drumright. On November

19, 2015, Mr. Moss met with Mr. Drumright to complete the workers’ compensation

documentation, which included selecting a physician from a panel provided by Wood

Personnel. Mr. Moss chose U.S. HealthWorks from the panel. (Ex. 3.)

Mr. Moss saw Dr. Harold Nevels, the authorized treatment provider (ATP), at U.S.

HealthWorks that same day. Dr. Nevels checked a box indicating the injury as work-

related, placed Mr. Moss on light duty, and recommended physical therapy. (Ex. 1 at

31.)

Although Wood Personnel initially covered the cost of medications, Mr. Moss

testified Mr. Drumright declined to pay for prescribed medicine during the week of

Thanksgiving, saying it “wasn’t going to happen; it wasn’t his responsibility,” and,

“something about my story wasn’t adding up.” Mr. Moss paid for the medicine himself,

but he introduced no proof of the expense into evidence at the expedited hearing.

Mr. Moss returned to U.S. HealthWorks on November 25, 2016, at which time Dr.

Nevels recommended an MRI and a referral to an orthopedic specialist. [d. at 36-37. Dr.

Nevels made the same recommendation on December 3, 2015. Jd. at 40-41. Wood

Personnel denied Mr. Moss’s claim on December 4, 2015, due to “no medical evidence to

support work injury.” (Ex. 5.) At some point after the denial, Wood Personnel

terminated Mr. Moss, and he has been unable to work since his injury.

Mr. Moss sought additional care over the next few months at Nashville General

Hospital at Meharry. (See generally Ex. 6.) A February 10, 2016 MRI revealed, “[ml]ild

right paracentral and foraminal disc protrusion at L4-L5. Mild right-sided central spinal

canal stenosis and right neuroforaminal narrowing which abuts the exiting right L4 nerve

root.” (Ex. 2 at 5; Ex. 6.) The “clinical history” of the MRI report additionally states,

“degenerative spine disease.” According to Mr. Moss, he inquired about the degenerative

spine problem, and providers at Meharry told him they are required to code procedures in

advance to justify their performance.

After Mr. Moss presented all of his proof at the expedited hearing, Wood

Personnel moved for a directed verdict, which the Court took under advisement but now

denies.”

Wood Personnel offered Mr. Drumright’s testimony in its case-in-chief. Mr.

Drumright, as area manager, is responsible for processing workers’ compensation claims.

He investigated Mr. Moss’ claim and completed a report. (Ex. 7.) He testified he

contacted Standard Candy Company’s safety manager to inquire about any videotape

documenting the injury, but, “there was no, um, ah, video that reflected a time that Mr.

Moss was injured.” Wood Personnel did not introduce any video into evidence. Mr.

Drumright additionally visited the workplace and spoke to Ms. Mattingly, who said Mr.

Moss did not make her aware of an injury, his back hurt due to kidney stones, and there

was no injury reported to her or Jorge. Mr. Drumright further testified he spoke to Dr.

Nevels. Mr. Drumright recounted their conversation as follows:

Dr. Nevels, um, thought that the injury was not matching up with, uh, what

Mr. Moss was telling him. There was also, um, inconsistencies in the times

— in the times and dates that he said he went to the hospital. And then, ah,

as well as, uh, there was some information that Dr. Nevels said that could

be signs of withdrawal for not having certain medications. And Dr. Nevels,

um, resisted giving narcotics, um, for his injury because of that.

Mr. Drumright conveyed this information to the carrier, prompting the denial.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

In order to grant the relief Mr. Moss seeks, the Court must apply the following

legal principles. Mr. Moss bears the burden of proof on all prima facie elements of his

workers’ compensation claim. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(6) (2015); see also

Buchanan v. Carlex Glass Co., No. 2015-01-0012, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.

* In Burchfield v. Renfree, No. E2012-01582-COA-R3-CV, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 18,

2013), the Court of Appeals reiterated the principles regarding directed verdicts:

The rule for determining a motion for directed verdict requires the trial judge and the appellate

courts to look to all of the evidence, take the strongest, legitimate view of the evidence in favor of

the opponent of the motion and allow all reasonable inferences from it in his favor. The court

must disregard all countervailing evidence and if there is then any dispute as to any material,

determinative evidence or any doubt as to the conclusions to be drawn from the whole evidence,

the motion must be denied. The court may grant the motion only if, after assessing the evidence

according to the foregoing standards, it determines that reasonable minds could not differ as to the

conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.

Id. at *86-87 (internal citations omitted). In this case, the Court finds reasonable minds can differ as to the

conclusions to be drawn from the evidence; therefore, a directed verdict was not warranted. Further, Wood

Personnel’s motion should be styled as a motion to dismiss, as directed verdicts are appropriate in the context of jury

trials rather than bench trials.

LEXIS 39, at *5 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 29, 2015). Mr. Moss need not

prove every element of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence in order to obtain

relief at an expedited hearing. McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, No. 2014-06-

0063, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *7-9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App.

Bd. Mar. 27, 2015). At an expedited hearing, Mr. Moss has the burden to come forward

with sufficient evidence from which this Court can determine he is likely to prevail at a

hearing on the merits. Jd.

The Workers’ Compensation Law defines an “injury” as “an injury by accident...

arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, that causes . . . the

need for medical treatment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14) (2015). Further, an injury

is accidental “only if the injury is caused by a specific incident, or set of incidents, arising

primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-

102(14)(A) (2015). Arising out of employment refers to causation. Reeser v. Yellow

Freight Sys., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tenn. 1997). An injury arises out of

employment when there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the

work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Fritts v. Safety Nat’l Cas.

Corp., 163 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tenn. 2005).

Here, Mr. Moss credibly testified regarding a specific incident: On November 2,

2015, at approximately 8:30 a.m., while attempting to lift a tote at work, he experienced

sharp pain in his back. Wood Personnel did not challenge his testimony concerning the

manner in which Mr. Moss became injured. Specifically, it did not introduce videotape

evidence capturing the event, nor did it introduce affidavits or in-person testimony from

Ms. Mattingly or Jorge, who presumably possess personal knowledge of the events of

that day.

Instead, Wood Personnel focused on the lack of medical causation as its principal

defense. On this point, the Workers’ Compensation Law provides, “[a]n injury causes

death, disablement or the need for medical treatment only if it has been shown to a

reasonable degree of medical certainty that it contributed more than fifty percent (50%)

in causing the death, disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes.”

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(C) (2015). Shown to a reasonable degree of medical

certainty means that, in the opinion of the physician, it is more likely than not considering

all causes, as opposed to speculation or possibility. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(D)

(2015). Thus, causation must be established by expert medical testimony, and an

employee’s lay testimony, without corroborative expert testimony, does not constitute

adequate evidence of medical causation. Scott v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, No. 2015-

01-0055, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *12 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App.

Bd. Aug. 18, 2015).

Wood Personnel’s argument regarding medical causation at this stage of the

proceedings is incorrect. Dr. Nevels checked Mr. Moss’ injury as work-related after his

very first visit on November 19, 2015. This statement does not conform to the statute’s

4

requirement that causation be shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the

injury contributed more than fifty percent in causing the need for medical treatment.

However, at an expedited hearing, an employee need not establish the compensability of

his or her claim by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lewis v. Molly Maid, et al., No.

2015-06-0456, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 19, at *8-9 (Tenn. Workers’

Comp. App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016). Rather, where the employee comes forward with

sufficient evidence to support that a work event resulted in injury, it may also be

sufficient to support an order compelling an employer to provide a panel. Jd.

In the instant case, Mr. Moss credibly testified he injured his back while picking

up a tote. He explained specifically the difference in this pain and his kidney stone pain

in his testimony. Wood Personnel correctly offered him a panel of physicians. The

medical records submitted characterized the event as work-related. The history in those

medical records proved consistent with the history Mr. Moss gave at the expedited

hearing. The ATP twice recommended a referral to an orthopedic physician and

documented the need for an MRI. In the November 25, 2015 office notes, the ATP called

for the referral and MRI “ASAP;” yet, for reasons unsupported by any medical

documentation, Wood Personnel denied the claim and ended treatment on December 4,

2015.

Wood Personnel’s evidence in this regard is Mr. Drumright’s testimony and its

internal report, which he created and the Court admitted into evidence without objection.

Upon closer examination, however, the Court finds the report rife with hearsay and

unsubstantiated allegations, and places little weight upon both it and Mr. Drumright’s

testimony. While Mr. Moss has yet to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he

suffered an injury arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, the

Court concludes he has shown he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits on this

issue.

Turning to the requested relief, Wood Personnel provided a panel, but it failed to

abide by the referral of the ATP to an orthopedist and to authorize an MRI, twice. The

Court finds Mr. Moss is entitled to continued medical treatment in accordance with the

referral of the ATP. Accordingly, Mr. Moss is entitled to a panel of orthopedic doctors

from which to select a physician. It shall then become the responsibility of the parties to

determine whether the physician believes Mr. Moss suffered an injury arising primarily

out of and in the course and scope of employment.

Mr. Moss additionally seeks reimbursement for past medical expenses. The

Workers’ Compensation Law provides that employers must furnish, free of charge to the

employee, medical treatment made reasonably necessary by the work-related accident.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(1)(A) (2015). Mr. Moss testified regarding

prescription medicine he purchased, but he failed to introduce the receipt into evidence.

On the present record, the Court cannot order reimbursement. However, Mr. Moss may

seek reimbursement at the compensation hearing.

Finally, Mr. Moss seeks past temporary disability benefits. In Jones v. Crencor,

No. 2015-06-0332, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 48, at *7 (Tenn. Workers’

Comp. App. Bd. Dec. 11, 2015), the Appeals Board held:

An injured worker is eligible for temporary disability benefits if: (1) the

worker became disabled from working due to a compensable injury; (2)

there is a causal connection between the injury and the inability to work;

and (3) the worker established the duration of the period of disability.

Simpson v. Satterfield, 564 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tenn. 1978).

Until these criteria are established, the Court is unable to grant such benefits.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:

1.

Wood Personnel shall provide Mr. Moss with additional medical treatment by

provision of a panel of orthopedic specialists as required by Tennessee Code

Annotated section 50-6-204 (2015). The chosen orthopedic specialist or Mr. Moss

shall furnish Wood Personnel or its carrier with the medical bills for prompt

payment.

. Mr. Moss’ requests for reimbursement of past medical expenses and past

temporary disability benefits are denied at this time.

. This matter is set for an Initial (Scheduling) Hearing on July 18, 2016, at 9:45 a.m.

Central Time.

Unless interlocutory appeal of the Expedited Hearing Order is filed, compliance

with this Order must occur no later than seven business days from the date of entry

of this Order as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(3)

(2015). The Insurer or Self-Insured Employer must submit confirmation of

compliance with this Order to the Bureau by~ email to

WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov no later than the seventh business day after

entry of this Order. Failure to submit the necessary confirmation within the period

of compliance may result in a penalty assessment for non-compliance. For

questions regarding compliance, please contact the Workers’ Compensation

Compliance Unit via email WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov or by calling (615)

253-1471 or (615) 532-1309.

ENTERED this the 3rd day of June, 2016.

dge Kenneth M. Switzer

Court of Workers’ Compensatién Claims

Initial (Scheduling) Hearing:

An Initial (Scheduling) Hearing has been set with Judge Kenneth M. Switzer,

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims. You must call 615-532-9552 or toll-free

at 866-943-0025 to participate in the Initial Hearing.

Please Note: You must call in on the scheduled date/time to

participate. Failure to call in may result in a determination of the issues without

your further participation.

Right to Appeal:

Tennessee Law allows any party who disagrees with this Expedited Hearing Order

to appeal the decision to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. To file a Notice of

Appeal, you must:

1. Complete the enclosed form entitled: “Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal.”

2. File the completed form with the Court Clerk within seven business days of the

date the Workers’ Compensation Judge entered the Expedited Hearing Order.

3. Serve a copy of the Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal upon the opposing party.

4. The appealing party is responsible for payment of a filing fee in the amount of

$75.00. Within ten calendar days after the filing of a notice of appeal, payment

must be received by check, money order, or credit card payment. Payments can be

made in person at any Bureau office or by United States mail, hand-delivery, or

other delivery service. In the alternative, the appealing party may file an Affidavit

of Indigency, on a form prescribed by the Bureau, seeking a waiver of the filing

fee. The Affidavit of Indigency may be filed contemporaneously with the Notice

of Appeal or must be filed within ten calendar days thereafter. The Appeals Board

will consider the Affidavit of Indigency and issue an Order granting or denying

the request for a waiver of the filing fee as soon thereafter as is

practicable. Failure to timely pay the filing fee or file the Affidavit of

Indigency in accordance with this section shall result in dismissal of the

7

appeal.

. The parties, having the responsibility of ensuring a complete record on appeal,

may request, from the Court Clerk, the audio recording of the hearing for the

purpose of having a transcript prepared by a licensed court reporter and filing it

with the Court Clerk within ten calendar days of the filing of the Expedited

Hearing Notice of Appeal. Alternatively, the parties may file a joint statement of

the evidence within ten calendar days of the filing of the Expedited Hearing

Notice of Appeal. The statement of the evidence must convey a complete and

accurate account of what transpired in the Court of Workers’ Compensation

Claims and must be approved by the workers’ compensation judge before the

record is submitted to the Clerk of the Appeals Board.

. If the appellant elects to file a position statement in support of the interlocutory

appeal, the appellant shall file such position statement with the Court Clerk within

five business days of the expiration of the time to file a transcript or statement of

the evidence, specifying the issues presented for review and including any

argument in support thereof. A party opposing the appeal shall file a response, if

any, with the Court Clerk within five business days of the filing of the appellant’s

position statement. All position statements pertaining to an appeal of an

interlocutory order should include: (1) a statement summarizing the facts of the

case from the evidence admitted during the expedited hearing; (2) a statement

summarizing the disposition of the case as a result of the expedited hearing; (3) a

statement of the issue(s) presented for review; and (4) an argument, citing

appropriate statutes, case law, or other authority.

APPENDIX

Exhibits:

Medical Records of Michael Moss

Mr. Moss’ Affidavit

Employee’s Choice of Physician form

Wage statement

Notice of Denial

Supplemental medical records, Nashville General Hospital at Meharry

Wood Personnel workers’ compensation report

eee Ye

Technical record:

1. Petition for Benefit Determination

2. Dispute Certification Notice

3. Request for Expedited Hearing

4. Witnesses & Exhibit List

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Expedited Hearing Order

Granting Medical Benefits was sent to the following recipients by the following methods

of service on this the 3rd day of June, 2016.

Employer’s Counsel

Name Certified | Via Via Service sent to:

Mail Fax Email

Michael Moss, xX x madmosster(@gmail.com; 723

Self-represented S. 13" St., Nashville TN 37206

Employee

Michael W. Jones, xX mjones(@wimberlylawson.com

Hiner Mier

Penny Shr

Court of

WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov

, Clerk of Court

kers’ Compensation Claims

10

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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