Opinion

Humphrey, Andy v. Lewisburg Rubber and Gasket

  • 2015 TN WC 170
Court
Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
Filed
Nov 17, 2015
Status
Published
On the bench
Joshua Davis Baker
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.4%

The opinion

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT NASHVILLE

ANDY HUMPHREY, )

Employee, ) Docket No. 2015-06-0107

)

v. ) State File No. 2015184197

)

LEWISBURG RUBBER AND ) Judge Joshua Davis Baker

GASKET, )

Employer, )

)

And )

)

ACCIDENT FUND INS. CO., )

Insurer. )

ORDER DENYING TEMPORARY BENEFITS

(RECORD REVIEW ONLY)

This cause came before the undersigned on a Request for Expedited

Hearing filed by the employee, Andy Humphrey, pursuant to Tennessee Code

Annotated § 50-6-239 (2014). Mr. Humphrey seeks accrued and future temporary

disability benefits and requests the Court enter an order based on review of the

case file. The central legal dispute concerns whether Mr. Humphrey’s injury arose

primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment with the employer,

Lewisburg Rubber and Gasket. For the reasons provided below, the Court finds

Mr. Humphrey failed to carry his burden of proving that he is likely to succeed at

a hearing on the merits in proving a causal relationship between his injury and his

work for the employer. The Court denies his claim for temporary disability

benefits.1

1

Additional information regarding the documents the Court considered in this record review is attached to

this Order as an Appendix.

Claim History

Mr. Humphrey is a sixty-three-year-old resident of Marshall County,

Tennessee. On December 23, 2014, a little less than two weeks prior to the date

of the alleged accident, Mr. Humphrey presented at Fast Pace Medical Clinic,

PLLC “with a chief complaint of pain of the left lower extremity.” (R. 4.) Fast

Pace’s providers diagnosed Mr. Humphrey with a sprain or strain and instructed

him to follow up with his primary care physician. Id.

In his Petition for Benefit Determination (PBD), Mr. Humphrey alleged

that, on January 5, 2015, he fell and fractured his femur while walking from his

car to the door of his workplace at Lewisburg Rubber. He wrote, “walking on

crutches, due to sprained mussel [sic], slipped and fell on uneven ground in

parking lot, not handicapped [sic] friendly.” (R. 5.)

That same day, Mr. Humphrey went to Marshall Medical Center where

providers transferred him to Williamson Medical Center upon determining he had

a fractured hip. At Williamson Medical Center, the medical notes indicate Mr.

Humphrey told Dr. Charnes he developed a “twinge in the left hip” while stepping

over his cats as he walked down the stairs to his basement carrying groceries

approximately two weeks before the date of the alleged workplace accident. (R.

9.)

Following the incident at home, Dr. Charnes’ notes indicate Mr. Humphrey

experienced left-sided groin pain over the next several days, and went to a walk-in

clinic where he received medication. Id. His pain, however, continued to worsen

until he “felt kind of a pop in the left hip” while getting into his truck to go to

work the morning of January 5. When he arrived at work, the medical records

indicate that the he felt a similar discomfort in his hip while exiting his truck. He

used crutches to ambulate and received assistance from co-workers. Despite the

crutches and assistance of co-workers, Mr. Humphrey “eventually ended up flat on

his back in the parking lot.” Id. In the medical notes, Dr. Charnes stated the

following:

[T]alking with the patient I feel that he initially injured that hip when

he was walking down the stairs a few weeks back with his groceries,

maybe that was the initial injury and then he had a further break

today. Unclear on that, either way he has a left hip fracture.

Id.

Dr. Perkinson, an orthopedic surgeon, operated on Mr. Humphrey’s hip on

January 6, 2015. (R. 7.) The operation note states, “The patient [is] a 62-year-old

2

male who reports an approximately 2-week history or antecedent left hip pain after

going up stairs. He subsequently had a fall yesterday and was unable to

ambulate[.]” Id.

Lewisburg Rubber filed a First Report of Injury on January 20, 2015. (R.

1.) The report stated it received notice of the injury on January 17, 2015. On

January 28, 2015, Lewisburg Rubber denied Mr. Humphrey’s claim, asserting that

his injury did not occur in the course and scope of his employment. (R. 2.)

On May 13, 2015, Dr. Perkinson wrote a letter stating he believed Mr.

Humphrey’s femur fracture “was caused by his fall and not from a prior injury.”

(R. 3.) Mr. Humphrey filed a PBD seeking temporary disability and medical

benefits. (R. 5.) Mr. Humphrey and Lewisburg Rubber did not settle their dispute

through mediation, and the Mediating Specialist filed a Dispute Certification

Notice (DCN). (R. 14.) The DCN, however, did not list medical benefits as a

disputed issue.

When neither party requested a hearing, the Court issued a show cause

order. Following a hearing, the Court declined to dismiss the claim but ordered

Mr. Humphrey to request a hearing before October 21, 2015. (R. 13.) Mr.

Humphrey filed a Request for Expedited Hearing and asked the Court to issue a

ruling based on the documents in the claim file. (R. 15.) Mr. Humphrey did not

provide an affidavit with his Request for Expedited Hearing. Lewisburg Rubber

did not file an objection to the Court considering Mr. Humphrey’s Request for

Expedited Hearing despite his failure to file an affidavit.

Application of Law and Conclusion

The Workers’ Compensation Law shall not be remedially or liberally

construed in favor of either party but shall be construed fairly, impartially and in

accordance with basic principles of statutory construction favoring neither the

employee nor employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2014). The employee in a

workers’ compensation claim has the burden of proof on all essential elements of a

claim. Tindall v. Waring Park Ass’n, 725 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tenn. 1987); Scott v.

Integrity Staffing Solutions, No. 2015-01-0055, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.

LEXIS 24, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 18, 2015). An employee

need not prove every element of his or her claim by a preponderance of the

evidence in order to obtain relief at an expedited hearing. McCord v. Advantage

Human Resourcing, No. 2014-06-0063, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6,

at *7-8, 9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2015). At an expedited

hearing, an employee has the burden to come forward with sufficient evidence

from which the trial court can determine that the employee is likely to prevail at a

hearing on the merits. Id.

3

Under the Workers’ Compensation Law, an injury is accidental “only if the

injury is caused by a specific incident, or set of incidents, arising primarily out of

and in the course and scope of employment, and is identifiable by time and place

of occurrence.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13)(A) (2014). “An injury ‘arises

primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment’ only if it has been

shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment contributed more

than fifty percent (50%) in causing the injury, considering all causes[.]” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13)(B) (2014).

The statutory requirements that an injury arise out of and in the course of

the employment are not synonymous “although both elements exist to ensure a

work connection to the injury for which the employee seeks benefits.”

Blankenship v. Am. Ordnance, 164 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tenn. 2005).2 “Arising out

of employment” refers to causation. Reeser v. Yellow Freight Sys., 938 S.W.2d

690, 692 (Tenn. 1997). An injury arises out of employment when there is a causal

connection between the resulting injury and the conditions under which the work

is required to be performed. Fritts v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp., 163 S.W.3d 673,

678 (Tenn. 2005). An injury occurs in the course of employment if it takes place

while the employee performs a duty he or she is employed to perform. Fink v.

Caudle, 856 S.W.2d 952, 958 (Tenn. 1993). Thus, the “course of employment”

requirement focuses on the time, place, and circumstances of the injury. Saylor v.

Lakeway Trucking, Inc., 181 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tenn. 2005).

Here, Dr. Charnes’ records show that Mr. Humphrey told him he felt a

“twinge” in his hip several weeks before January 5, 2015, while carrying groceries

and stepping over his cats as he walked down the basement stairs in his home.

The pain progressively grew worse. On January 5, 2015, he felt a “pop” in his hip

while getting into, or out of, his truck. He described the pop as “very painful,” and

indicated he could no longer bear weight on his leg. He then used crutches to

ambulate towards the office door. Coworkers assisted Mr. Humphrey but he

“eventually ended up flat on his back in the parking lot.” The medical records do

not show that Mr. Humphrey told Dr. Charnes he fell in the parking lot. Instead,

the Court reads the records as showing that Mr. Humphrey was already in

considerable pain before he “ended up on his back” in the parking lot.

2

The Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board allows reliance on precedent from the Tennessee

Supreme Court “unless it is evident that the Supreme Court’s decision or rationale relied on a remedial

interpretation of pre-July 1, 2014 statutes, that it relied on specific statutory language no longer contained

in the Workers’ Compensation Law, and/or that it relied on an analysis that has since been addressed by the

general assembly through statutory amendments.” McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, No. 2014-

06-0063, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *13 n.4 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27,

2015).

4

Additionally, the January 6, 2015 operation note from Dr. Perkison states

that Mr. Humphrey experienced two weeks of left hip pain after going up stairs

and then had a fall “yesterday”—January 5, 2015. The notes state nothing about

the circumstances of the fall including where, or when, it occurred.

Mr. Humphrey maintains in his PBD that he fell in the parking lot. He

attributes his broken femur to the fall. Mr. Humphrey, however, provided no

sworn testimony via affidavit to support his claim. Accordingly, the only credible

evidence before the Court regarding causation comes from the statements

attributed to him through the medical records. The Court finds the contents of

these statements insufficient to establish that Mr. Humphrey suffered an injury by

accident as defined by the Workers’ Compensation Law. Instead, the medical

records present more questions concerning the cause of his injury than answers.

Some of these questions might have been answered if Mr. Humphrey had filed an

affidavit supporting his Request for Expedited Hearing.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Mr. Humphrey is not likely to

succeed at a hearing on the merits based on the documentation contained in the

claim file. Accordingly, Mr. Humphrey’s claim for temporary disability benefits

is denied at this time.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:

1. Mr. Humphrey’s claim for temporary disability benefits is denied at this

time.

2. This matter is set for a Scheduling Hearing on December 1, 2015, at 9:30

a.m. (CST).

ENTERED ON THIS THE 17th DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2015.

____________________________________

Joshua Davis Baker, Judge

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

Scheduling Hearing:

A Scheduling Hearing has been set with Judge Joshua Davis Baker,

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims. You must call 615-741-2113 or toll

free at 855-874-0474 to participate in the Hearing.

5

Please Note: You must call in on the scheduled date/time to

participate. Failure to call in may result in a determination of the issues

without your further participation. All conferences are set using Central

Time (CT).

Right to Appeal:

Tennessee Law allows any party who disagrees with this Expedited

Hearing Order to appeal the decision to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals

Board. To file a Notice of Appeal, you must:

1. Complete the enclosed form entitled: “Expedited Hearing Notice of

Appeal.”

2. File the completed form with the Court Clerk within seven business

days of the date the Workers’ Compensation Judge entered the

Expedited Hearing Order.

3. Serve a copy of the Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal upon the

opposing party.

4. The appealing party is responsible for payment of a filing fee in the

amount of $75.00. Within ten calendar days after the filing of a

notice of appeal, payment must be received by check, money order,

or credit card payment. Payments can be made in person at any

Bureau office or by United States mail, hand-delivery, or other

delivery service. In the alternative, the appealing party may file an

Affidavit of Indigency, on a form prescribed by the Bureau, seeking

a waiver of the filing fee. The Affidavit of Indigency may be filed

contemporaneously with the Notice of Appeal or must be filed

within ten calendar days thereafter. The Appeals Board will

consider the Affidavit of Indigency and issue an Order granting or

denying the request for a waiver of the filing fee as soon thereafter

as is practicable. Failure to timely pay the filing fee or file the

Affidavit of Indigency in accordance with this section shall result

in dismissal of the appeal.

5. The parties, having the responsibility of ensuring a complete record

on appeal, may request, from the Court Clerk, the audio recording of

the hearing for the purpose of having a transcript prepared by a

licensed court reporter and filing it with the Court Clerk within ten

calendar days of the filing of the Expedited Hearing Notice of

Appeal. Alternatively, the parties may file a joint statement of the

6

evidence within ten calendar days of the filing of the Expedited

Hearing Notice of Appeal. The statement of the evidence must

convey a complete and accurate account of what transpired in the

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims and must be approved by

the workers’ compensation judge before the record is submitted to

the Clerk of the Appeals Board.

6. If the appellant elects to file a position statement in support of the

interlocutory appeal, the appellant shall file such position statement

with the Court Clerk within three business days of the expiration of

the time to file a transcript or statement of the evidence, specifying

the issues presented for review and including any argument in

support thereof. A party opposing the appeal shall file a response, if

any, with the Court Clerk within three business days of the filing of

the appellant’s position statement. All position statements pertaining

to an appeal of an interlocutory order should include: (1) a statement

summarizing the facts of the case from the evidence admitted during

the expedited hearing; (2) a statement summarizing the disposition

of the case as a result of the expedited hearing; (3) a statement of the

issue(s) presented for review; and (4) an argument, citing

appropriate statutes, case law, or other authority.

7

APPENDIX

1. First Report of Injury, filed January 20, 2015

2. Notice of Denial of Claim for Compensation, dated January 28, 2015

3. May 13, 2015 letter from Dr. Brian T. Perkinson

4. Medical records of Fast Pace Medical Clinic, PLLC

5. Petition for Benefit Determination

6. Medical records of Williamson Medical Center

7. Medical records of Dr. Perkinson

8. Medical records of Dr. Calendine

9. Medical records of Dr. Charnes

10. X-ray

11. Lab result

12. Pay checks

13. Show Cause Hearing Order

14. Dispute Certification Notice

15. Request for Expedited Hearing

16. Lewisburg Rubber and Gasket’s letter to the Mediating Specialist

8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent to the

following recipients by the following methods of service on this the ___day

17th of

November, 2015.

Name Certified Via Via Email Address

Mail Fax Email

Andy Humphrey x Andh1@bellsouth.net

Gordon Aulgur x Gordon.aulgur@accidentfund.com

_____________________________________

Penny Shrum, Clerk

Tennessee Court of Workers’ Compensation

Claims

WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov

9

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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