Opinion

McCaffery, James v. Cardinal Logistics

  • 2015 TN WC 149
Court
Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
Filed
Oct 28, 2015
Status
Published
On the bench
Amber E. Luttrell
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.4%

The opinion

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT MEMPHIS

JAMES MCCAFFERY, ) Docket No.: 2015-08-0218

Employee, )

v. ) State File No.: 44676-2015

)

CARDINAL LOGISTICS, ) Judge Amber E. Luttrell

Employer, )

And )

)

ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE CO., )

Insurance Carrier. )

)

EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER GRANTING MEDICAL AND TEMPORARY

DISABILITY BENEFITS

THIS CAUSE came before the undersigned Workers' Compensation Judge upon

the Request for Expedited Hearing (REH) filed by the employee, James McCaffery,

pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239 (2014). Mr. McCaffery sought

medical and temporary disability benefits for an injury to his back, right shoulder, and

left knee. The employer, Cardinal Logistics, contended that Mr. McCaffery's injury

resulted from a non-compensable idiopathic condition or act of God barring his claim for

workers' compensation benefits. Cardinal further raised the imported risk doctrine as a

defense to compensability of the claim. The central legal issue for determination is

whether Mr. McCaffery sustained a compensable work injury arising primarily out of his

employment. 1 For the reasons set forth below the Court find Mr. McCaffery carried his

burden of proof establishing a compensable work injury and demonstrated he is entitled

to medical and temporary disability benefits.

History of Claim

Mr. McCaffery is a sixty-three-year-old resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. He

1

Additional information regarding the technical record and exhibits admitted at the Expedited Hearing is attached as

an Appendix.

worked as an over-the-road truck driver for Cardinal.

On May 19, 2015, Mr. McCaffery drove a truck for Cardinal on U.S. Highway 60

traveling from Fort Scott, Kansas to Memphis, Tennessee. Mr. McCaffery testified he

drove into a curve on the highway when he sneezed, causing him to run off the road. Mr.

McCaffery testified he did not drive through a pollen cloud prior to the wreck. He does

not suffer from seasonal allergies. Mr. McCaffery could not explain what caused him to

sneeze. He attempted to direct the truck back onto the highway, but he "oversteered,"

causing the truck to roll over. Mr. McCaffery sustained multiple injuries in the accident.

Mr. McCaffery testified the tow hook stored underneath the sleeper bunk dislodged when

the truck rolled over and struck him in the back. When he unbuckled his seatbelt, he fell

onto his right side injuring his neck and right shoulder. He injured his left knee when it

hit the dashboard. He also sustained glass cuts and bruises to his head, face, and hands.

Mr. McCaffery immediately reported the injury to Cardinal. He called Kerry

Wieden, manager of operations in Memphis, who instructed him to go to the hospital.

Emergency responders transported Mr. McCaffery by ambulance to CoxHealth South

Hospital in Springfield, Missouri.

Dr. Tommy Campbell treated Mr. McCaffery for multiple injuries in the

emergency room and discharged him the same day. (Ex. 1.) He prescribed pain

medication and muscle relaxers. He placed light-duty restrictions on Mr. McCaffery of no

lifting, pushing, or pulling greater than five pounds, no forward bending, no stooping or

kneeling, no power gripping, and no operating heavy equipment. He noted the light-duty

restrictions remained in place until Mr. McCaffery followed up with Occupational

Medicine South or his personal physician. !d.

Subsequently, Mr. McCaffery called Mr. Wieden and asked which doctor he

should see through workers' compensation for follow-up care. Mr. Wieden did not know

where to send him, so they agreed Mr. McCaffery could seek treatment at Concentra?

On May 27, 2015, Mr. McCaffery presented to Dr. John Goodfred at Concentra

for a cervical strain, chest wall contusion, concussion, left-knee contusion, head

contusion, lumbar contusion, and right-shoulder strain. !d. Dr. Goodfred treated him

conservatively with medication and physical therapy. He restricted Mr. McCaffery from

any activity, including driving, until he could return for follow-up treatment. !d. The last

work status note dated June 10, 2015, continued Mr. McCaffery's restriction of no

activity, including driving. !d.

Mr. McCaffery last saw pr. Goodfred on June 18, 2015. Dr. Goodfred did not

2

Mr. McCaffery testified he suggested Concentra because Cardinal sent employees to Concentra for physicals and

drug screens.

2

release him at maximum medical improvement (MMI). Dr. Goodfred noted that Mr.

McCaffery's anticipated MMI date was July 31, 2015. Dr. Goodfred's record did not

mention any restrictions. Furthermore, there was no corresponding work status report

admitted into evidence for the June 18, 2015 visit. Mr. McCaffery testified that Dr.

Goodfred never returned him to full-duty work and told him not to drive at his last visit.

Mr. McCaffery contacted Cardinal on several occasions and asked if he could return to

light-duty work. Cardinal informed him there was no light-duty work.

Mr. McCaffery remains off work. He testified credibly that he cannot work at this

time because of continued symptoms in his left knee, low back, and right shoulder. His

low-back pain makes it difficult to walk or sit in a truck for long periods. He used to sit

for eight hours at a time while driving the truck. He currently experiences right-shoulder

pain that travels to his neck. Mr. McCaffery also testified to strength loss in his right arm.

He lacks strength to tum the crank to make the legs on the trailers rise up and down. He

cannot bend over to pull the fifth wheel pin. Although he has not worked since his injury,

he testified he believes he is still a Cardinal employee. Mr. McCaffery desires additional

medical treatment for his injuries, so that he may return to work as an over-the-road truck

driver.

Cardinal filed a Notice of Denial on June 16, 2015, stating, "[I]njury occurred due

to an idiopathic condition (sneeze)." (Ex. 3.) A Wage Statement admitted into evidence

indicates Mr. McCaffery's temporary total disability rate is $932.80 per week. (Ex. 2.)

Mr. McCaffery filed a Petition for Benefit Determination (PBD) on June 24, 2015,

seeking medical and temporary disability benefits. (T.R. 1.) The parties did not resolve

the disputed issues through mediation; therefore, the Mediating Specialist filed the

Dispute Certification Notice on July 28, 2015. (T.R. 2.) At the Expedited Hearing,

counsel for Cardinal advised the Court that Cardinal agrees to pay all of Mr. McCaffery's

3

medical expen es related to the alleged work i.njury through June 16, 2015.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

The Workers' Compensation Law shall not be remedially or liberally construed in

favor of either party but shall be construed fairly, impartially and in accordance with

3

The Court notes on October 21, 2015, Cardinal sent an email directly to the undersigned Judge requesting the

Court consider a new report and affidavit as a late-filed exhibit to the Expedited Hearing. The information presented

by email to the Court was not properly admitted into evidence at the Expedited Hearing in this case. Mr.

McCaffery's counsel also emailed the Court noting his objection to Cardinal's proposed late filing. The Court denies

Cardinal's request. The proper procedure for such a request is filing a motion with the court clerk. No motion was

filed by counsel; therefore, Cardinal's request is not properly before the Court. The request is further denied as

untimely pursuant to the Bureau's Mediation and Procedure Rule 0800-02-21-.14 (2015) and the Court of Workers'

Compensation Claims Practice and Procedure Rule 7.02. Counsel is reminded that informal communication and

submission of information acceptable in the Request for Assistance process for pre-July I, 2014 cases is not

acceptable procedure in post-July I, 2014 cases in the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims.

3

basic principles of statutory construction favoring neither the employee nor employer.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2014). The employee in a workers' compensation claim

has the burden of proof on all essential elements of a claim. Tindall v. Waring Park

Ass'n, 725 S.W.2d 935,937 (Tenn. 1987); Scottv. Integrity Staffing Solutions, No. 2015-

01-0055, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *6 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App.

Bd. Aug. 18, 20 15). An employee need not prove every element of his or her claim by a

preponderance of the evidence in order to obtain relief at an expedited hearing. McCord

v. Advantage Human Resourcing, No. 2014-06-0063, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.

LEXIS 6, at *7-8, 9 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2015). At an expedited

hearing, an employee has the burden to come forward with sufficient evidence from

which the trial court can determine that the employee is likely to prevail at a hearing on

the merits. !d.

Mr. McCaffery's injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his

employment with Cardinal.

To be compensable under the workers' compensation statutes, an injury must arise

primarily out of and occur in the course and scope of the employment. Tenn. Code Ann.

§50-6-102(13) (2014). The term "injury" is defined as "an injury by accident ... arising

primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, that causes death,

disablement or the need for medical treatment of the employee." !d. For an injury to be

accidental, it must be "caused by a specific incident, or set of incidents, arising primarily

out of and in the course and scope of employment, and is identifiable by time and place

of occurrence." Tenn. Code Ann.§ 50-6-102(13)(A) (2014).

The statutory requirements that an injury arise out of and in the course of the

employment are not synonymous "although both elements exist to ensure a work

connection to the injury for which the employee seeks benefits." Blankenship v. Am.

Ordnance Sys., 164 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tenn. 2005); Hosford v. Red Rover Preschool, No.

2014-05-0002, 2014 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 1, at *19-20 (Tenn. Workers'

Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 2, 2014).

The phrase "in the course of' refers to time, place, and circumstances, and

"arising out of' refers to cause or origin. "[A]n injury by accident to an

employee is in the course of employment if it occurred while he was

performing a duty he was employed to do; and it is an injury arising out of

employment if caused by a hazard incident to such employment."

Generally, an injury arises out of and is in the course and scope of

employment if it has a rational connection to the work and occurs while the

employee is engaged in the duties of his employment.

Cloyd v. Hartco Flooring Co., 274 S.W.3d 638, 643 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting Orman v.

Williams Sonoma, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tenn. 1991)).

4

In this case, it is undisputed that Mr. McCaffery was where he was expected to be

when working and was engaged in the duties of his employment with Cardinal at the time

of his injury. Thus, the Court finds both the location and activity elements of "in the

course and scope of his employment" are satisfied. The determinative issue in this case

becomes whether Mr. McCaffery's injury arose primarily out of his employment.

Mr. McCaffery argued he sustained a compensable work injury arising primarily

out of his employment when he attempted to negotiate a tum in his truck and had a

wreck. Mr. McCaffery cited the Tennessee Supreme Court case, Phillips v. A&H Constr.

Co., 134 S.W.3d 145, 148 (Tenn. 2004), in support of his position and argued the facts in

Phillips are similar to the facts in this case. 4 The Court agrees.

In Phillips, the employee drove a truck in the course and scope of his employment

on the date of injury. !d. at 148. He hit a tractor-trailer after he lost consciousness due to

unknown causes and suffered multiple injuries to his body as a result of the accident. !d.

The trial court denied benefits holding, "[A]n injury which occurs due to an idiopathic

loss of consciousness is not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act because

a causal relationship cannot be shown between the employment and the loss of

consciousness." On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and

concluded:

A worker need not prove that an idiopathic loss of consciousness was

caused by his employment. An injury which occurs due to an idiopathic

condition is compensable if an employment hazard causes or exacerbates

the injury. The necessary causal link is between the employment and the

accident or injury, r~ther than between the employment and the idiopathic

episode.

!d. at 152.

The Court specifically addressed the hazard incident to the employment in Phillips

and held:

If driving a vehicle is part of an employee's job, then it is certainly a hazard

4

Importantly, in Phillips, the Supreme Court did not base its decision or rationale on a remedial interpretation of the

pre-July l, 2014 reform statute; thus, reliance on Phillips is appropriate in this case. "Reliance on precedent from

the Tennessee Supreme Court is appropriate unless it is evident that the Supreme Court's decision or rationale relied

on a remedial interpretation of pre-July I, 2014 statutes, that it relied on specific statutory language no longer

contained in the Workers' Compensation Law, and/or that it relied on an analysis that has since been addressed by

the general assembly through statutory amendments." McCordv. Advantage Human Resourcing, No. 2014-06-0063,

2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *13 n.4 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2015).

5

incident to employment. To prove that his injuries arose out of his

employment, Phillips must prove that driving his vehicle caused or

exacerbated his injuries, not that any condition of work caused his

idiopathic loss of consciousness.

!d.

Here, Cardinal raised the same or similar argument as the defendant in Phillips.

Cardinal argued Mr. McCaffery's injuries resulted from a non-compensable idiopathic

incident- the sneeze. It argued there was no causal link between Mr. McCaffery's

employment and his sneeze. However, under Phillips, the Court finds the necessary

causal link in this case is not between the employment and the sneeze. Rather, it is

between the employment and Mr. McCaffery's injury. Moreover, just as in Phillips, the

Court finds that Mr. McCaffery's job driving a truck was the hazard incident to his

employment that caused his injuries. Accordingly, the Court finds Mr. McCaffery met his

burden of proving his injury arose primarily out of his employment with Cardinal.

Cardinal raised additional defenses to the compensability of Mr. McCaffery's

claim.

ActofGod

Cardinal also argued Mr. McCaffery's sneeze, or a possible environmental

condition causing him to sneeze, constituted an act of God that caused the wreck and Mr.

McCaffery's injuries. Cardinal cited the Tennessee Supreme Court case, Jackson v. Clark

and Fay, Inc., 270 S.W.2d 389, 390 (1954), in support of this defense. In Jackson, the

employee died while riding in the employer's truck from his place of employment to the

employer-furnished lodging during a tornado. !d. In denying benefits, the Supreme Court

found the employee's death did not arise out of his employment and held:

This storm was not a danger peculiar to the work in which Jackson was

engaged. It was a danger common to the general public at the time and

place where it occurred. It was not a hazard incident to his employment. It

did not have its origin in a risk connected with that employment. It did not

flow from that source as a rational consequence. The employer by the

exercise of reasonable foresight could not have reasonably contemplated

this hazard as a result of transporting his employees from their place of

employment to their night quarters.

!d. at 392. In the present case, Cardinal suggested an environmental factor, such as a

large pollen storm, caused Mr. McCaffery's sneeze, leading to the accident. It contended

this environmental factor constituted an act of God not unique to Mr. McCaffery, and

under Jackson, would preclude Mr. McCaffery from workers' compensation benefits.

6

The Court respectfully disagrees with Cardinal's reasoning and finds the facts of

this case distinguishable from the facts in Jackson. In Jackson, the act of God was a

tornado. The tornado was not a danger or hazard unique to the employee. In the present

case, there was no proof offered into evidence of any weather or environmental condition

that occurred on the date and time Mr. McCaffery was injured that would constitute an

act of God. Cardinal's argument suggesting Mr. McCaffery sneezed due to a large pollen

storm is speculative and unsupported by the record. Mr. McCaffery disputed that he

drove through a large pollen cloud at the time of his accident. He further testified that he

does not know why he sneezed. He just sneezed. Based upon the proof in evidence, the

Court finds Cardinal's act of God defense unpersuasive.

Imported Risk Doctrine

Alternatively, Cardinal asserted the imported risk doctrine precludes Mr.

McCaffery from entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. In support of its

argument, Cardinal relied upon the Tennessee Supreme Court case, Jones v. Sonoco

Products, Inc., 1992 Tenn. Lexis 144, at *1 (Tenn. 1992). In Jones, the employee died

from asphyxiation due to a piece of chewing gum lodged in his throat while driving a

forklift at work. !d. There was no proof offered at trial that Mr. Jones' driving of the

forklift caused him to choke. !d. at *7. The Court denied benefits, finding Mr. Jones'

death by asphyxiation from swallowing gum did not arise out of his employment. !d. at

*3. Specifically, the Court held no rational connection existed between the duties

required by Mr. Jones' work and his swallowing of gum, which resulted in his accidental

death. !d. at *7. "In other words, the chewing of gum was not a risk incident to Mr.

Jones' employment." !d. The Court further stated, "It is not within the workers'

compensation law if the injury is only coincidental, or contemporaneous, or collateral to

the employment." !d. at *6.

Here, Cardinal argued that Mr. McCaffery could have sneezed anywhere. Cardinal

submitted that Mr. McCaffery's injury was coincidental, contemporaneous, or otherwise

collateral to his job as an over-the-road truck driver, and that his injury did not arise out

of a hazard or danger peculiar to the nature of his work. Again, the Court respectfully

disagrees. In Jones, the employee died from asphyxiation from chewing gum. !d. at *7. It

was coincidental that he was on a forklift at work at the time he choked on the gum. His

death was not caused by the forklift or wrecking the forklift. Thus, there was no rational

connection to Mr. Jones' work.

By contrast, in the present case, the sneeze itself did not injure Mr. McCaffery.

Mr. McCaffery's injuries arose from the truck wreck. His back injury resulted from the

tow hook striking him in the back when the truck flipped. His right shoulder and neck

injuries resulted from his fall onto the right side of his body after unbuckling his seatbelt.

His left knee hit the dashboard causing injury. He also sustained glass cuts and bruises to

his head, face, and hands from the damaged truck. Again, the Court finds the truck was

7

the risk or hazard incident to Mr. McCaffery's employment providing the rational

connection between Mr. McCaffery's job duties and his injury. Thus, the Court finds that

Mr. McCaffery's claim for workers' compensation benefits is not barred by the imported

risk doctrine.

In summary, the Court finds Mr. McCaffery came forward with sufficient

evidence from which this Court can conclude he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the

merits on the issue of compensability.

Temporary Disability Benefits

Turning to temporary disability benefits, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-

207(2) (2014) provides for temporary partial disability (TPD) during the time period in

which the injured employee is able to resume some gainful employment in a disabled

condition, but has not reached maximum recovery. Williams v. Saturn Corp., No. M2004-

01215-WC-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1032, at *6 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Panel Nov.

15, 2005); Jewell v. Cobble Construction and Arcus Restoration, No. 2014-05-0003,

2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 1, at *22 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Jan.

12, 20 15). To establish entitlement to temporary partial disability benefits, the employee

has the burden to show he had been assigned temporary work restrictions that rendered

him partially disabled, and the partial disability resulted in a reduced ability to work

because the employer was unwilling or unable to return the injured worker to work at or

above his average weekly wage. Williams, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1032 at *7-8.

The medical proof indicated CoxHealth South Hospital did not excuse Mr.

McCaffery from work completely, but restricted his work activities until he followed up

with a personal physician. Thus, Mr. McCaffery is not entitled to temporary total

disability benefits between May 19, 2015, and May 27, 2015. However, Mr. McCaffery's

undisputed testimony was that he contacted Cardinal seeking light-duty work and

Cardinal told him it had no light duty. Thus, the Court finds Mr. McCaffery came

forward with sufficient evidence from which the Court concludes he is entitled to

temporary partial disability between May 19, 2015, and May 27, 2015.

The Court further finds Mr. McCaffery is entitled to temporary total disability

(TTD) benefits. The Workers' Compensation Law allows temporary total disability

benefits under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(1) (2014) when the disability

is "total" and the employee is "unable to work as a result of a compensable injury." See

Gray v. Cullom Mach., Tool & Die, Inc., 152 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tenn. 2004); Jewell,

2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 1, at *21.

The work status reports of Dr. Goodfred indicated he restricted Mr. McCaffery

from "any activity, including driving" on May 27, 2015. The last work status report

admitted into evidence dated June 10, 2015, indicated Mr. McCaffery was still restricted

8

to "no activity" and "no driving personal vehicle." Dr. Goodfred's last medical note dated

June 18, 2015, failed to mention any work restrictions. Based upon the medical records,

the Court finds Mr. McCaffery is entitled to temporary total disability between May 27,

2015, and June 18, 2015. Although Dr. Goodfred did not release Mr. McCaffery at MMI

on June 18, 2015, there is no proof before the Court at this time that Dr. Goodfred

restricted Mr. McCaffery from work after June 18, 2015.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:

1. Cardinal or its workers' compensation carrier shall provide Mr. McCaffery with

medical treatment for his injuries as required by Tennessee Code Annotated

section 50-6-204 (2014), to be initiated by Cardinal or its workers' compensation

carrier providing Mr. McCaffery with a panel of physicians as required by statute

to evaluate and treat any injuries causally related to Mr. McCaffery's work injury

ofMay 19, 2015.

2. Cardinal or its workers' compensation carrier shall pay all outstanding bills for

Mr. McCaffery's reasonable and necessary medical treatment for the work injury.

Mr. McCaffery shall promptly furnish Cardinal or its workers' compensation

carrier, through counsel, all medical bills he has received for medical treatment for

the work injury.

3. Cardinal or its workers' compensation carrier shall pay Mr. McCaffery past-due

TTD benefits in the amount of$2,798.40 for a three-week period between May 27,

2015, and June 18, 2015 at the temporary disability rate of$932.80 per week.

4. Cardinal or its workers' compensation carrier shall pay Mr. McCaffery past-due

TPD benefits in the amount of $932.80 for a one-week period beginning May 19,

2015, through May 27, 2015.

5. This matter is set for an Initial (Scheduling) Hearing on December 22, 2015, at 10

a.m. (CDT).

6. Unless interlocutory appeal of the Expedited Hearing Order is filed,

compliance with this Order must occur no later than seven business days

from the date of entry of this Order as required by Tennessee Code

Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(3) (2014). The Insurer or Self-Insured

Employer must submit confirmation of compliance with this Order to the

Bureau by email to \tVCCompliance.Program@tn .gov no later than the

seventh business day after entry of this Order. Failure to submit the

necessary confirmation within the period of compliance may result in a

penalty assessment for non-compliance.

9

7. For questions regarding compliance, please contact the Workers' Compensation

Compliance Unit via email WCComplian e.Program@tn.gov or by calling (615)

253-1471 or (615) 532-1309.

ENTERED this the 28th day of -

Ju ge Amber E. Luttrell

Court of Workers' Compensation Claims

Initial (Scheduling) Hearing:

An Initial (Scheduling) Hearing has been set with Judge Amber E. Luttrell,

Court of Workers' Compensation Claims. You must call 901-543-2668 or toll-free at

855-543-5046 to participate.

Please Note: You must call in on the scheduled date/time to

participate. Failure to call in may result in a determination of the issues without

your further participation. All conferences are set using Central Time (CT).

Right to Appeal.:

Tennessee Law allows any party who disagrees with this Expedited Hearing Order

to appeal the decision to the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. To file a Notice of

Appeal, you must:

1. Complete the enclosed form entitled: "Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal."

2. File the completed form with the Court Clerk within seven business days of the

date the Workers' Compensation Judge entered the Expedited Hearing Order.

3. Serve a copy of the Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal upon the opposing party.

4. The appealing party is responsible for payment of a filing fee in the amount of

$75.00. Within ten calendar days after the filing of a notice of appeal, payment

must be received by check, money order, or credit card payment. Payments can be

made in person at any Bureau office or by United States mail, hand-delivery, or

other delivery service. In the alternative, the appealing party may file an Affidavit

of Indigency, on a form prescribed by the Bureau, seeking a waiver of the filing

fee. The Affidavit of Indigency may be filed contemporaneously with the Notice

10

of Appeal or must be filed within ten calendar days thereafter. The Appeals Board

will consider the Affidavit of Indigency and issue an Order granting or denying

the request for a waiver of the filing fee as soon thereafter as is

practicable. Failure to timely pay the filing fee or fLie the Affidavit of

lndigency in accordance with this section shall result in dismissal of the

appeal.

5. The parties, having the responsibility of ensuring a complete record on appeal,

may request, from the Court Clerk, the audio recording of the hearing for the

purpose of having a transcript prepared by a licensed court reporter and filing it

with the Court Clerk within ten calendar days of the filing of the Expedited

Hearing Notice of Appeal. Alternatively, the parties may file a joint statement of

the evidence within ten calendar days of the filing of the Expedited Hearing

Notice of Appeal. The statement of the evidence must convey a complete and

accurate account of what transpired in the Court of Workers' Compensation

Claims and must be approved by the workers' compensation judge before the

record is submitted to the Clerk of the Appeals Board.

6. If the appellant elects to file a position statement in support of the interlocutory

appeal, the appellant shall file such position statement with the Court Clerk within

three business days of the expiration of the time to file a transcript or statement of

the evidence, specifying the issues presented for review and including any

argument in support thereof. A party opposing the appeal shall file a response, if

any, with the Court Clerk within three business days of the filing ofthe appellant's

position statement. All position statements pertaining to an appeal of an

interlocutory order should include: (1) a statement summarizing the facts of the

case from the evidence admitted during the expedited hearing; (2) a statement

summarizing the disposition of the case as a result of the expedited hearing; (3) a

statement of the issue( s) presented for review; and (4) an argument, citing

appropriate statutes, case law, or other authority.

11

APPENDIX

Exhibits:

1. Medical Records of:

• CoxHealth South Emergency Department

• · Concentra Medical Center

2. Wage Statement

3. Employer First Report of Work Injury and Notice of Denial of Claim

Technical Record: 5

1. Petition for Benefit Determination (PBD), filed June 24, 2015

2. Dispute Certification Notice (DCN), filed July 28,2015

3. Request for Expedited Hearing (REH), filed August 26, 2015

5

The Court did not consider attachments to the above filings unless admitted into evidence during the Expedited

Hearing. The Court considered factual statements in the above filings or any attachments to them as allegations

unless established by the evidence.

12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Expedited Hearing Order

Granting Medical and Temporary Disability Benefits was sent to the following recipients

by the following methods of service on this the 28th day of October, 2015.

Name Certified Via Via Service sent to:

Mail Fax Email

Jimmy Blount, Esq. X jimmy@bountfirm.com

Employee's Attorney

Prairie Arnold, Esq. X parnold@arnold-lawyers.com

Employer's Attorney

P nny Sh . , Clerk of Court

Court of "/ orkers' Compensation Claims

WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov

13

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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