Krile v. Lawyer

Filed 7/30/20 by Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2020 ND 176

Robyn Krile, Plaintiff and Appellant

v.

Julie Lawyer, In her official and individual

capacity as Assistant Burleigh County

State’s Attorney, Defendant and Appellee

No. 20190367

Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial

District, the Honorable Troy J. LeFevre, Judge.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Opinion of the Court by VandeWalle, Justice.

Lynn M. Boughey, Mandan, ND, for plaintiff and appellant.

Randall J. Bakke (argued), and Bradley N. Wiederholt (appeared), Special

Assistant State’s Attorneys, Bismarck, ND, for defendant and appellee.

Krile v. Lawyer

No. 20190367

VandeWalle, Justice.

[¶1] Robyn Krile appealed from a district court order granting defendant

Julie Lawyer’s motion to dismiss under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We affirm in

part, reverse in part, and remand.

I

[¶2] On February 8, 2017, Assistant State’s Attorney Julie Lawyer 1 received

an anonymous letter concerning a Bismarck police officer’s destruction of

evidence. The letter prompted Lawyer to review the files of all active, sworn

Bismarck police personnel, which included approximately 100 officers at the

time. Lawyer asserts her decision to review the officer files was to ensure the

state’s attorney’s office was fulfilling its disclosure obligations under Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

“The Brady-Giglio line of cases requires the government to disclose to the

defendant exculpatory material and impeachment evidence.” State v. Russell,

2016 ND 208, ¶ 6, 886 N.W.2d 677.

[¶3] As part of her investigation, Lawyer reviewed the file of Sergeant Robyn

Krile. In Krile’s file, Lawyer discovered two letters of reprimand and several

performance evaluations, which Lawyer believed raised Giglio issues. Lawyer

further investigated the incidents for which the letters of reprimand were

issued, and concluded Krile had made false statements as a Bismarck police

officer.

[¶4] Lawyer shared her belief that the letters of reprimand and performance

evaluations raised Giglio concerns with Bismarck Police Chief Dan Donlin.

Chief Donlin disagreed and advised Lawyer that he did not see the incidents

for which the letters of reprimand were issued as amounting to Giglio issues.

1 Lawyer has since been elected as Burleigh County State’s Attorney.

1

Despite Chief Donlin’s pleas, Lawyer continued to believe Krile’s conduct

amounted to a Giglio issue.

[¶5] On March 22, 2017, Lawyer sent a letter (the “Giglio letter”) to Chief

Donlin summarizing her investigation into Krile’s file and stating her belief

that Krile had made false statements as a Bismarck police officer. Lawyer

informed Chief Donlin that such information would have to be disclosed to the

defense in cases in which Krile was involved pursuant to Giglio and, as a

result, the Burleigh County State’s Attorney’s Office would no longer use Krile

as a witness in its cases. A prosecutor’s decision not to allow a law enforcement

officer to testify in criminal trials because the prosecutor would be required to

disclose to the defense existing information about the officer’s prior misconduct

or other grounds to attack the officer’s credibility is often referred to as “Giglio

impairment” of the officer. Haynes v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 460 P.3d 565, 566

n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Stockdale v. Helper, No. 3:17-cv-241, 2017

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90678, 2017 WL 2546349, at *2 n.3 (M.D. Tenn. June 13,

2017)); see Hogan v. City of Fort Walton Beach, No. 19-12294, 2020 WL

2843469, at *1 n.1 (11th Cir. June 1, 2020).

[¶6] Because the Burleigh County State’s Attorney’s Office was no longer

willing to use Krile as a witness in its cases, the Bismarck Police Department

terminated Krile’s employment. Krile filed a complaint with the Department

of Labor and Human Rights claiming the Bismarck Police Department

discriminated against her based on race and sex. The Department of Labor

commenced an investigation into Krile’s claims. As part of its investigation,

the Department of Labor requested the Bismarck Police Department submit

information regarding the termination of Krile’s employment. In its response,

the Bismarck Police Department submitted two affidavits of Lawyer in which

Lawyer explained the circumstances and her reasoning for issuing the Giglio

letter. After conducting its investigation, the Department of Labor and Human

Rights concluded the Bismarck Police Department did not unlawfully

discriminate against Krile.

[¶7] In March 2019, Krile filed a complaint in state district court against

Lawyer in her official and individual capacity claiming defamation. The

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complaint alleged Lawyer defamed Krile by publishing the Giglio letter to the

Bismarck Police Department, specifically Chief Donlin, and by publishing her

affidavits to the Department of Labor and Human Rights in the course of its

investigation. The complaint also alleged Lawyer published the Giglio letter to

the Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Board. Finally, the

complaint alleged Lawyer published the Giglio letter and related information

to Krile’s prospective employers. Krile did not attach any exhibits to the

complaint supporting her allegations.

[¶8] In response to the filed complaint, Lawyer filed a motion to dismiss

under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Lawyer argued her publication of the Giglio letter

to Chief Donlin was an absolutely privileged communication made within the

proper discharge of her official duties as an assistant state’s attorney under

N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(1). Lawyer further argued that submission of her

affidavits to the Department of Labor and Human Rights during the course of

its investigation was an absolutely privileged communication under N.D.C.C.

§ 14-02-05(2). Lawyer did not admit that she published the Giglio letter to the

POST Board, but argued that if she had published the letter to the Board, it

also would have been an absolutely privileged communication under N.D.C.C.

§ 14-02-05(2). Lawyer attached sixteen exhibits to her motion including

submissions and communications made during the course of the Department

of Labor’s investigation, the Giglio letter, and Lawyer’s affidavits.

[¶9] Krile responded to Lawyer’s motion arguing that publication of the

Giglio letter and Lawyer’s affidavits were not absolutely privileged

communications. Attached as an exhibit to her response, Krile submitted an

email conversation between Lawyer and Lincoln Police Chief Joe Gibbs. The

email conversation revealed Chief Gibbs had contacted Lawyer regarding

potentially hiring Krile after Krile’s employment with the Bismarck Police

Department had been terminated. In response, Lawyer disclosed the Giglio

letter to Chief Gibbs.

[¶10] After a hearing was held, the district court granted Lawyer’s motion to

dismiss. Relying solely on the Giglio letter and Lawyer’s affidavits submitted

to the Department of Labor and Human rights, the district court determined

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Lawyer’s publication of the Giglio letter and her affidavits were absolutely

privileged communications because Lawyer was acting in her official capacity

as a prosecutor when she disclosed the alleged defamatory materials. The

district court did not explicitly address Lawyer’s disclosure of the Giglio letter

to Lincoln Police Chief Gibbs.

[¶11] On appeal, Krile argues the district court erred in dismissing her

complaint because Lawyer’s disclosure of the alleged defamatory material to

Chief Donlin, the Department of Labor and Human Rights, the POST Board,

and to Lincoln Police Chief Gibbs were not absolutely privileged

communications under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05. Krile further argues the district

court erred in dismissing her complaint because there are disputed material

facts and the district court relied on materials outside the pleadings in

dismissing her complaint. Krile contends that because the district court relied

on materials outside the pleadings in dismissing her complaint, the court

should have converted Lawyer’s Rule 12 motion into a motion for summary

judgment and allowed the parties to submit additional evidence.

II

[¶12] We first address Krile’s argument that the district court considered

matters outside the pleadings and, therefore, should have treated Lawyer’s

motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and allowed the parties

to submit additional evidence.

[¶13] Rule 12(d), N.D.R.Civ.P., states:

If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the

pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the

motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule

56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present

all the material that is pertinent to the motion.

In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), district courts “may consider,

in addition to the pleadings, materials embraced by the pleadings and

materials that are part of the public record, without converting the motion to

a summary judgment under Rule 56.” Nelson v. McAlester Fuel Co., 2017 ND

4

49, ¶ 22, 891 N.W.2d 126 (quoting Riemers v. State, 2007 ND APP 4, ¶ 8, 739

N.W.2d 248). We have recognized the rationale for this rule:

When a plaintiff chooses not to attach to the complaint, or

incorporate by reference, a document upon which the plaintiff

relies, and the document is integral to the complaint, the

defendant may produce the document in support of a motion to

dismiss on the pleadings. Jakobe v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co.,

943 F. Supp. 1143, 1149 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Brogren v. Pohlad, 933

F. Supp. 793, 798 (D. Minn. 1995). In deciding a Rule 12 motion,

the court can consider a document upon which the complaint is

based, without treating the motion as a Rule 56 motion, because a

plaintiff “ought not be permitted to defeat a motion to dismiss

through the artifice of not attaching the critical document to the

complaint.” Brogren, 933 F. Supp. at 798.

Id.

[¶14] Lawyer attached sixteen exhibits to her motion to dismiss including her

affidavits submitted to the Department of Labor and Human Rights and the

Giglio letter provided to Bismarck Police Chief Donlin. The only exhibits the

district court considered in granting Lawyer’s motion were the Giglio letter

and Lawyer’s affidavits to the Department of Labor. Krile’s claims relied on

these exhibits. The Giglio letter and Lawyer’s affidavits were “embraced by the

pleadings,” and Krile cannot defeat Lawyer’s motion to dismiss by neglecting

to attach to the complaint the documents upon which she relies in support of

her claims. Under Rule 12(d), the district court did not consider “matters

outside the pleadings” and did not err by declining to convert Lawyer’s Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.

III

[¶15] Krile contends the district court erred in granting Lawyer’s Rule

12(b)(6), N.D.R.Civ.P., motion to dismiss Krile’s defamation claims. “A motion

to dismiss a complaint under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)[6] tests the legal sufficiency

of the claim presented in the complaint.” In re Estate of Nelson, 2015 ND 122,

¶ 5, 863 N.W.2d 521 (quoting Brandvold v. Lewis & Clark Pub. Sch. Dist. No.

161, 2011 ND 185, ¶ 6, 803 N.W.2d 827). “On appeal from a dismissal under

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N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)[6], we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff and accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint.”

Id. A district court’s decision granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a

complaint will be affirmed “if we cannot ‘discern a potential for proof to support

it.’” Nelson v. McAlester Fuel Co., 2017 ND 49, ¶ 20, 891 N.W.2d 126 (quoting

Kouba v. State, 2004 ND 186, ¶¶ 4-6, 687 N.W.2d 466). We review a district

court’s decision granting a motion to dismiss under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) de

novo on appeal. Estate of Nelson, at ¶ 5.

[¶16] Krile claimed Lawyer defamed her by writing and publishing the Giglio

letter to Bismarck Police Chief Donlin. Krile also claimed Lawyer defamed her

by publishing the Giglio letter and her affidavits to the Department of Labor

and Human Rights and the POST Board.

[¶17] Defamation includes either libel or slander. N.D.C.C. § 14-02-02. “Libel

is a false and unprivileged publication by writing . . . which has a tendency to

injure the person in the person’s occupation.” N.D.C.C. § 14-02-03.

Slander is a false and unprivileged publication other than libel,

which:

....

3. Tends directly to injure the person in respect to the

person’s office, profession, trade, or business, either by

imputing to the person general disqualifications in those

respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly

requires, or by imputing something with reference to the

person’s office, profession, trade, or business that has a

natural tendency to lessen its profits;

....

5. By natural consequence causes actual damage.

N.D.C.C. § 14-02-04.

[¶18] Under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05, certain communications are privileged:

A privileged communication is one made:

1. In the proper discharge of an official duty;

2. In any legislative or judicial proceeding or in any other

proceeding authorized by law;

6

3. In a communication, without malice, to a person

interested therein by one who also is interested, or by one

who stands in such relation to the person interested as to

afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the

communication innocent, or who is requested by the person

interested to give the information; and

4. By a fair and true report, without malice, of a judicial,

legislative, or other public official proceeding, or of anything

said in the course thereof.

In the cases provided for in subsections 3 and 4, malice is not

inferred from the communication or publication.

“Privilege is based upon the sound public policy that some communications are

so socially important that the full and unrestricted exchange of information

requires some latitude for mistake.” Richmond v. Nodland, 552 N.W.2d 586,

588 (N.D. 1996) (quoting Rykowsky v. Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. 1, 508 N.W.2d

348, 351 (N.D. 1993)). “There is no liability for defamatory statements that are

privileged.” Id. (citing Rykowsky, 508 N.W.2d 348; Soentgen v. Quain &

Ramstad Clinic, P.C., 467 N.W.2d 73 (N.D. 1991)).

[¶19] Privileged communications may be either absolute or qualified. Id. “A

privilege is absolute when the free exchange of information is so important that

even evidence of actual malice does not destroy the privilege.” Id. (citing

N.D.C.C. §§ 14-02-05(1)-(2); Soentgen, 467 N.W.2d at 78; Emo v. Milbank Mut.

Ins. Co., 183 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1971); Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY,

Inc., 89 N.W.2d 102 (N.D. 1958)). “A qualified privilege, on the other hand,

‘may be abused and does not provide absolute immunity from liability for

defamation.’” Id. (quoting Soentgen, at 78; and then citing N.D.C.C. § 14-02-

05(3), (4)). “Whether privilege applies is a question of law for the courts.” Id.

(citing Soentgen, at 78).

A

[¶20] Lawyer argues her statements were privileged under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-

05(1) and (2). “Subsections 14-02-05(1) and (2), N.D.C.C., provide an absolute

privilege for defamatory statements, even if made with malice.” Rykowsky, 508

N.W.2d at 351 (citing Stafney v. Standard Oil Co., 71 N.D. 170, 299 N.W. 582

7

(1941)). “Even in the case of an absolute privilege under § 14-02-05(1) or (2),

N.D.C.C., however, a communication must be pertinent to be free of liability.”

Id.

[¶21] The district court dismissed Krile’s claims after determining Lawyer’s

issuance and publication of the Giglio letter were part of her official duties as

a prosecutor and absolutely privileged under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05. Lawyer’s

publication of the Giglio letter to Chief Donlin and publication of the Giglio

letter and her affidavits to the Department of Labor and POST board raises

issues under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(1) and (2).

1

[¶22] Under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(1), certain communications are absolutely

privileged when made “[i]n the proper discharge of an official duty.” Section

11-16-01, N.D.C.C., provides the official duties of the state’s attorney:

The state’s attorney is the public prosecutor, and shall:

1. Attend the district court and conduct on behalf of the state

all prosecutions for public offenses.

2. Institute proceedings before magistrates for the arrest of

persons charged with or reasonably suspected of public

offenses when the state’s attorney has information that such

offenses have been committed, and for that purpose, when

the state’s attorney is not engaged in criminal proceedings

in the district court, the state’s attorney shall attend upon

the magistrates in cases of arrests when required by them

except in cases of assault and battery and petit larceny.

3. Attend before, and give advice to, the grand jury whenever

cases are presented to it for consideration.

4. Draw all indictments and informations.

5. Defend all suits brought against the state or against the

county.

6. Prosecute all bonds forfeited in the courts of record of the

county and prosecute all actions for the recovery of debts,

fines, penalties, and forfeitures accruing to the state or to

the county.

8

7. Deliver duplicate receipts for money or property received in

the state’s attorney’s official capacity and file copies thereof

with the county auditor.

8. On the first Monday of January, April, July, and October in

each year, file with the county auditor an account, verified

by the state’s attorney’s oath, of all money received by the

state’s attorney in an official capacity in the preceding three

months, and at the same time, pay it over to the county

treasurer.

9. Give, when required and without fee, the state’s attorney’s

opinion in writing to the county, district, township, and

school district officers on matters relating to the duties of

their respective offices.

10. Keep a register of all official business in which must be

entered a note of each action, whether civil or criminal,

prosecuted officially, and of the proceedings therein.

11. Act as legal adviser of the board of county commissioners,

attend the meetings thereof when required, and oppose all

claims and actions presented against the county which are

unjust or illegal.

12. Institute an action in the name of the county to recover any

money paid upon the order of the board of county

commissioners without authority of law as salary, fee, or for

any other purpose, or any money paid on a warrant drawn

by any officer to that officer’s own order or in favor of any

other person without authorization by the board of county

commissioners or by law.

13. Institute an action in the name of the county to restrain the

payment of any money described in any order or warrant of

the kind described in subsection 13 when the state’s attorney

secures knowledge of such order or warrant before the

money is paid thereon.

14. Assist the district court in behalf of the recipient of

payments for child support or spousal support combined

with child support in all proceedings instituted to enforce

compliance with a decree or order of the court requiring such

payments.

15. Institute proceedings under chapter 25-03.1 if there is

probable cause to believe that the subject of a petition for

involuntary commitment is a person requiring treatment.

9

16. Institute and defend proceedings under sections 14-09-

12 and 14-09-19 and chapters 14-15, 27-20, and 50-01 upon

consultation with the human service zone director or the

executive director of the department of human services.

17. Act as the legal advisor and represent a human service zone

as set forth in a plan approved under section 50-01.1-03. The

state’s attorney within the human service zone, by way of

agreement, shall designate a singular state’s attorney’s

office, within or outside the human service zone, to act as

legal advisor of the human service zone. The host county

state’s attorney shall serve as the legal advisor if no

agreement is reached. The agreement may not limit a state’s

attorney’s individual discretion in court filings and

representation.

18. Act as the legal advisor and represent the human service

zone regarding employer actions, including grievances and

appeals, taken against the human service zone team

member. The state’s attorney of the county by which the

human service zone team member is employed shall act as

the legal advisor of the human service zone, unless a

different agreement is established by the affected state's

attorney.

The state’s attorney shall not require any order of the board of

county commissioners to institute an action under subsection 12 or

13. 2

Assistant state’s attorneys have the same powers and perform the same duties

as the state’s attorney. N.D.C.C. § 11-16-02. 3 Any communication made by a

state’s attorney while performing an official duty as prescribed in N.D.C.C. §

11-16-01 is entitled to absolute privilege.

2 Section 11-16-01, N.D.C.C., was amended effective January 1, 2020. The amendments are irrelevant

to this case and have no impact on the outcome of our decision. The most current version of N.D.C.C.

§ 11-16-01 is quoted here.

3 Because the official duties of a state’s attorney and an assistant state’s attorney are the same,

references to the term “state’s attorney” in this opinion include both the state’s attorney and assistant

state’s attorney, and any discussion in this opinion using the term “state’s attorney” applies equally to

state’s attorneys and assistant state’s attorneys.

10

[¶23] The official duty of a state’s attorney implicated in this case is the duty

to “[a]ttend the district court and conduct on behalf of the state all prosecutions

for public offenses,” under N.D.C.C. § 11-16-01(1). Although N.D.C.C. § 11-16-

01(1) provides a general statement that state’s attorneys are to conduct

criminal prosecutions on behalf of the state, the statute is not sufficiently

specific to determine what conduct is within the scope of a state’s attorney’s

official duty to conduct criminal prosecutions so as to afford certain

communications absolutely privileged. To refine which acts are within the

scope of a state’s attorney’s official duty to conduct criminal prosecutions, we

look to the law of prosecutorial immunity. Although the protections afforded to

certain communications arising in the context of defamation have always been

referred to as “privileges,” the protections provide immunity to certain

individuals for certain communications. See Restatement (Second) of Torts ch.

25, topic 2, intro. note. This Court itself has previously referred to the

privileges provided in N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05 as immunities. See Riemers v.

Grand Forks Herald, 2004 ND 192, ¶ 6, 688 N.W.2d 167; Richmond, 552

N.W.2d at 588. Other authorities, including jurisdictions with privilege

statutes similar to North Dakota’s, have done so as well. See Kilgore v.

Younger, 640 P.2d 793, 800 (Cal. 1982); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v.

Dobbs, 94 P.3d 31, 45 (Okla. 2004); Harris v. Riggenbach, 633 N.W.2d 193, 196

(S.D. 2001); 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 269. Given the parallels of the

two doctrines, we see no distinguishable difference between those actions that

entitle a prosecutor to absolute immunity from those actions that constitute

the proper discharge of a prosecutor’s official duties shielding certain

communications with absolute privilege.

[¶24] At the outset, we acknowledge the actions of a prosecutor are not

absolutely immune merely because they are performed by a prosecutor.

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). Prosecuting attorneys are

considered “quasi-judicial officers” entitled to absolute immunity granted

judges when their activities are “intimately associated with the judicial phase

of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); Witzke

v. City of Bismarck, 2006 ND 160, ¶ 16, 718 N.W.2d 586; Perry Center, Inc. v.

Heitkamp, 1998 ND 78, ¶ 45, 576 N.W.2d 505; see 27 C.J.S. District and

Prosecuting Attorneys §§ 56, 59, 61; 8A American Law of Torts § 29:91; 4 Local

11

Government Law § 27:11; 2 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 17:13

(2d ed.); cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 (discussing absolutely

privileged communications made by a prosecuting attorney preliminary to a

proposed judicial proceeding); 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander §§ 280, 282,

290 (discussing privileged communications by a prosecutor). Such

prosecutorial functions entitled to absolute immunity include, for example, the

initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution and the presentation of the

State’s case at trial. Witzke, at ¶ 17. However, when functioning in the role of

an administrator or investigative officer rather than in the role of an advocate,

prosecutors have only the protection of qualified immunity. Id.

[¶25] Guided by the standard applied in cases concerning prosecutorial

immunity, a state’s attorney’s official duties are those activities that are

“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”

Accordingly, a state’s attorney’s communications are absolutely privileged

under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(1) when made in the course of such activities. In at

least three cases, courts have concluded a prosecutor was not entitled to

absolute immunity for issuing a Giglio letter outside of a criminal proceeding.

[¶26] In Beck v. Phillips, 685 N.W.2d 637 (Iowa 2004), a case with facts nearly

identical to the present case, the Iowa Supreme Court decided a county

attorney was not entitled to absolute immunity for sending a Giglio letter

concerning a local police officer to the police chief. The prosecutor concluded,

after reviewing the Iowa Department of Criminal Investigation’s (DCI)

investigative files, the police officer had lied to the DCI during the

investigation of the officer’s wife’s death. Id. at 641. The prosecutor wrote a

letter to the police chief informing him the prosecutor’s office would not

prosecute any case in which the officer was involved due to Brady-Giglio

concerns. Id. Because of the letter, the officer’s employment was terminated.

Id. The officer sued the prosecutor for defamation and other state law claims.

Id.

[¶27] Applying the “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the

criminal process” standard set forth in Imbler, the Iowa Supreme Court

concluded the prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute cases involving the officer

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was entitled to absolute immunity, but the prosecutor’s writing of the letter to

the police chief was not entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 644-45. The court

stated, “it strains reason too far to characterize [the prosecutor’s] writing of

[the] letter[ ] as an activity ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the

criminal process’” because, in writing the letter, the prosecutor “was not

deciding [whether] to prosecute a case, but instead merely advising local law

enforcement authorities on . . . how his office would deal with [future criminal

prosecutions].” Id. at 645. The court further stated that even though a

prosecutor’s duty to make Giglio determinations are “an integral part of a

prosecutor’s job” and “serve[ ] a vital public function,” the prosecutor’s letter to

the police chief was an administrative function entitled to only qualified

immunity because the letter did not “involve the initiation of a prosecution, the

presentation of the state’s case in court, or actions preparatory for these

functions.” Id.

[¶28] Most recently, the United States District Court for the Middle District of

Tennessee issued a memorandum opinion determining a prosecutor was not

entitled to absolute immunity for publishing an email to the city manager

“Giglio impairing” 4 a local police officer. Stockdale v. Helper, No. 3:17-cv-00241,

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31051, 2020 WL 887593 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 24, 2020),

appeal docketed, No. 20-5269 (6th Cir. Mar. 11, 2020). The court determined

the prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity for her decision to “Giglio

impair” the officer, but she was not entitled to absolute immunity for sending

the Giglio email to the city manager. Id., 2020 WL 887593, at *10. Reasoning

that the prosecutor’s Giglio email to the city manager related to staffing and

was not an activity intimately associated with her role as an advocate, the

court concluded the prosecutor’s communication of the Giglio impairment was

administrative rather than prosecutorial in nature. Id.

[¶29] The Stockdale court cited Beck and Singer v. Steidley, No. 13-CV-72-

GKF-TLW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204839 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 30, 2013), in

13

support of its decision. In Singer, a district attorney presented Giglio material

concerning a local police officer to the supervising police chief. 2013 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 204839, at *7. The district attorney also signaled her intention to

disclose the material to criminal defense counsel in cases in which the officer

was involved. Id. The officer was notified that his employment would be

terminated if the material in question was in fact Giglio material. Id. at *9.

The officer filed suit against the prosecutor, and the prosecutor filed a motion

to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Id. at *2-3. In deciding the

prosecutor’s motion, the court determined the prosecutor was entitled to

absolute immunity for disclosing the Giglio material to defense counsel in

criminal cases, but disclosure of the Giglio material to the supervising police

chief was “conceivably administrative and/or investigative rather than

prosecutorial in nature.” Id. at *20. Accordingly, the court denied the

prosecutor’s motion to dismiss on grounds of absolute prosecutorial immunity.

Id. at *20-21, *29.

[¶30] The cases discussed above raise two issues. The first issue is whether

Lawyer’s compilation of the Giglio letter and her decision to no longer use Krile

as a witness in criminal prosecutions was entitled to absolute immunity.

Courts have consistently held a prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute cases

involving certain police officers or use a certain officer’s testimony due to

Brady/Giglio concerns is an activity “intimately associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process” entitled to absolute immunity. See, e.g., Savage

v. Maryland, 896 F.3d 260, 271-72 (4th Cir. 2018); Roe v. City & Cty. of San

Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1997); Barnett v. Marquis, 16 F. Supp.

3d 1218, 1222-23 (D. Or. 2014). Thus, Lawyer’s decision to Giglio impair Krile

and no longer use Krile as a witness in criminal proceedings was an activity

“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” entitled

to absolute privilege or immunity.

[¶31] The second issue is whether Lawyer’s publication of the Giglio letter to

Chief Donlin was a communication made within the proper discharge of

Lawyer’s official duties as an assistant state’s attorney entitled to absolute

privilege. After considering the foregoing authority, we conclude Lawyer’s

publication of the Giglio letter to Police Chief Donlin was not made within the

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proper discharge of Lawyer’s official duties as an assistant state’s attorney. We

recognize prosecutors are required to disclose certain information to the

defense in a criminal proceeding under Brady and Giglio, and that the

diminished credibility of a police officer hindered by Brady and Giglio may

raise challenges for the prosecution. However, not every activity of a prosecutor

is within a prosecutor’s official duties simply because it is performed by a

prosecutor. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33. In this

instance, Lawyer was acting in an administrative capacity by informing Chief

Donlin of her opinion that Krile was Giglio impaired and of how her office

would proceed with cases in which Krile was involved. Lawyer’s publication of

the Giglio letter to Chief Donlin was not an absolutely privileged

communication under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(1).

2

[¶32] The district court determined “Lawyer also ha[d] absolute immunity in

regard to the POST Board and the Department of Labor as she was acting in

her capacity as a prosecutor.” We disagree with the district court that Lawyer’s

publication of the Giglio letter and her affidavits to the POST Board and

Department of Labor were absolutely privileged communications made within

the proper scope of her official duties as an assistant state’s attorney. Lawyer’s

communications in these instances were, however, absolutely privileged

communications made in a “proceeding authorized by law.”

[¶33] Under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(2) certain communications are absolutely

privileged when made “[i]n any legislative or judicial proceeding or in any other

proceeding authorized by law.” A “proceeding” under subsection (2) includes

“some form of governmental process.” Emo, 183 N.W.2d at 514. We have held

federal administrative proceedings, see Fish v. Dockter, 2003 ND 185, ¶ 14, 671

N.W.2d 819, Parole Board meetings, see Pulkrabek v. Sletten, 557 N.W.2d 225,

228 (N.D. 1996), and school board meetings, see Rykowsky, 508 N.W.2d at 351,

are all proceedings authorized by law under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(2). See also,

Humann v. KEM Elec. Coop., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1017 (D.N.D. 2006)

(holding unemployment compensation hearing conducted by Job Service North

Dakota was “proceeding authorized by law”); Stafney, 71 N.D. 170, 299 N.W.

15

at 589 (stating communication required by the Workmen’s Compensation

Bureau and the Social Security Act pursuant to statute was made in a

“proceeding authorized by law”).

[¶34] Under N.D.C.C. §§ 14-02.4-22, 23, the Department of Labor and Human

Rights has the authority to investigate claims of discrimination. This authority

includes requesting documents and holding a hearing. Id. The investigation

conducted by the Department of Labor into Krile’s discrimination claims was

a formal government process authorized by statute. During its investigation,

the Department of Labor requested certain materials regarding Krile’s

employment termination. The submission of Lawyer’s affidavits and the Giglio

letter were in response to the Department of Labor’s request. The disclosure of

the Giglio letter and Lawyer’s affidavits during the course of the Department

of Labor’s investigation were absolutely privileged communications made

during a “proceeding authorized by law” under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(2).

[¶35] Lawyer’s disclosure of the Giglio letter to the POST Board may have also

been an absolutely privileged communication under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(2).

Section 12-63-01.1, N.D.C.C., establishes the POST Board. Under N.D.C.C. §

12-63-04(2)(a), the Board may “[i]ssue subpoenas, examine witnesses,

administer oaths, and investigate allegations of practices violating the

provisions of this chapter or rules adopted by the board.” Consistent with our

past precedent, POST Board investigations are “proceeding[s] authorized by

law” conducted by a statutorily created entity. We are unable to determine

whether Lawyer’s alleged disclosure of the Giglio letter to the POST Board was

an absolutely privileged communication because the evidence in the record is

insufficient to determine whether Lawyer disclosed the Giglio letter to the

POST Board or whether the Giglio letter was disclosed as part of a Board

investigation. But as a matter of law, if Lawyer did in fact disclose the Giglio

letter to the POST Board as part of a Board investigation, Lawyer’s disclosure

was an absolutely privileged communication under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(2).

B

[¶36] Communications under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(3) and (4) are not absolutely

privileged. See Soentgen, 467 N.W.2d at 78. Rather, the privilege afforded

16

under subsections (3) and (4) “is a qualified privilege to prevent abuse.”

Riemers, 2004 ND 192, ¶ 6, 688 N.W.2d 167 (citing Richmond, 552 N.W.2d at

588; Soentgen, at 78). “The analysis of a qualified privilege requires a two-step

process to determine: (1) if a communication’s attending circumstances

necessitate a qualified privilege; and (2) if so, whether the privilege was

abused.” Khokha v. Shahin, 2009 ND 110, ¶ 26, 767 N.W.2d 159 (citing

Soentgen, at 78). “If the circumstances for a communication are not in dispute,

the determination of whether there is a qualified privilege is a question of law

for the court.” Id.

[¶37] “A qualified privilege is abused if statements are made with actual

malice, without reasonable grounds for believing them to be true, on a subject

matter irrelevant to the common interest or duty.” Fish, 2003 ND 185, ¶ 13,

671 N.W.2d 819 (citing Richmond, 552 N.W.2d at 589). “Actual malice is

required in order to defeat a qualified privilege.” Soentgen, 467 N.W.2d at 79

(citing WDAY, 89 N.W.2d 102; Haldeman v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 376 N.W.2d

98 (Iowa 1985); Frankson v. Design Space Int’l, 394 N.W.2d 140 (Minn. 1986);

50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 199; Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 115;

Restatement (Second) Torts § 600). “Actual malice depends on scienter and

requires proof that a statement was made with malice in fact, ill-will, or

wrongful motive.” Id. (citing Sibley v. Lutheran Hosp. of Md., Inc., 709 F. Supp.

657 (D. Md. 1989); De Leon v. St. Joseph Hosp., Inc., 871 F.2d 1229 (4th Cir.

1989); Haldeman, 376 N.W.2d 98; Frankson, 394 N.W.2d 140). Actual malice

is not inferred from the communication itself; the plaintiff must prove actual

malice and abuse of the privilege. Id. “Generally, actual malice and abuse of a

qualified privilege are questions of fact.” Fish, at ¶ 13 (citing Soentgen, at 79).

“However, where the facts and inferences are such that reasonable minds could

not differ, factual issues are questions of law.” Id.

[¶38] Although Lawyer’s publication of the Giglio letter to Chief Donlin was

not absolutely privileged, Lawyer’s publication of the letter to Chief Donlin

may be entitled to a qualified privilege under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(3). Lawyer’s

disclosure of the Giglio letter to the POST Board may also be entitled to a

qualified privilege under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(3). But determining whether

17

these communications are entitled to a qualified privilege is not appropriate in

this appeal when the issue was not addressed in the proceedings below.

C

[¶39] The district court did not address whether Lawyer’s disclosure of the

Giglio letter to Lincoln Police Chief Gibbs was a privileged communication

under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05. Krile claimed defamation for Lawyer’s disclosure

of the Giglio letter to Lincoln Police Chief Gibbs in her complaint and has

preserved the claim by raising it in her response to Lawyer’s motion to dismiss

and on appeal. Krile’s claim must be addressed on remand.

D

[¶40] To summarize our determination of whether Lawyer’s communications

were privileged, Lawyer’s publication of the Giglio letter to Chief Donlin was

not an absolutely privileged communication under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(1).

Although there may be little evidence to support Krile’s claims, we construe

the complaint in the light most favorable to Krile. We reverse the district

court’s dismissal of Krile’s defamation claims against Lawyer for Lawyer’s

disclosure of the Giglio letter to Chief Donlin. We affirm the district court’s

dismissal of Krile’s defamation claims for Lawyer’s disclosure of the Giglio

letter and her affidavits to the Department of Labor and Human Rights

because the communications were absolutely privileged under N.D.C.C. § 14-

02-05(2). We reverse the district court’s dismissal of Krile’s defamation claims

against Lawyer for Lawyer’s alleged publication of the Giglio letter to the

POST Board because we are unable to determine from the existing record

whether Lawyer’s alleged disclosure of the Giglio letter to the POST Board was

a privileged communication. If Lawyer did in fact disclose the Giglio letter to

the POST Board as part of a Board investigation, Lawyer’s disclosure was an

absolutely privileged communication under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(2), and Krile’s

defamation claims for publication of the Giglio letter to the POST Board should

be dismissed. On remand, the district court may decide whether Lawyer’s

communications to Chief Donlin and the POST Board are entitled to a qualified

privilege. Krile’s defamation claims for Lawyer’s disclosure of the Giglio letter

18

to Lincoln Police Chief Gibbs were not previously addressed by the district

court, and must also be addressed on remand.

IV

[¶41] The district court order is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and

remanded.

[¶42] Gerald W. VandeWalle

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte

Steven L. Marquart, D.J.

Daniel J. Crothers acting C.J.

[¶42] The Honorable Steven L. Marquart, D.J., sitting in place of Jensen, C.J.,

disqualified.

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