Willashia Williams v. City of York

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 18-3682

WILLASHIA WILLIAMS

v.

CITY OF YORK, PENNSYLVANIA; VINCENT MONTE;

TERRY SEITZ; NICHOLAS FIGGE

Vincent Monte; Terry Seitz; Nicholas Figge,

Appellants

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 1-15-cv-00493)

District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo

Argued on October 29, 2019

Before: HARDIMAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit

Judges.

(Filed July 24, 2020)

Frank J. Lavery Jr. [Argued]

Stephen B. Edwards

Lavery Law

225 Market Street

Suite 304, P.O. Box 1245

Harrisburg, PA 17108

Donald B. Hoyt

City of York

101 South George Street

York, PA 17401

Attorneys for Appellants Vincent Monte and

Nicholas Figge

Sean P. McDonough

Dougherty Leventhal & Price

75 Glenmaura National Boulevard

Moosic, PA 18507

Attorney for Appellant Nicholas Terry Seitz

Frank J. Lavery Jr. [Argued]

Stephen B. Edwards

Lavery Law

225 Market Street

Suite 304, P.O. Box 1245

Harrisburg, PA 17108

Attorney for City of York

2

Lisa W. Basial*

[Argued]

Niles Benn

James F. Logue

Benn Law Firm

103 East Market Street

P.O. Box 5185

York, PA 17405

Attorney for Appellee Willashia Williams

OPINION OF THE COURT

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

When a district court denies a public official qualified

immunity at summary judgment and the official appeals, the

scope of our review is limited. We can review “whether the set

of facts identified by the district court is sufficient to establish

a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.”

Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d Cir.

2002). But generally, “we lack jurisdiction to consider whether

the district court correctly identified the set of facts that the

summary judgment record is sufficient to prove.” Id. In

recognition of that limited jurisdiction, we have announced two

supervisory rules that facilitate our review and enhance the

reliability of district courts’ decisionmaking. First, in Forbes v.

Township of Lower Merion, 313 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002), we

Lisa W. Basial withdrew her appearance after the case

*

was argued.

3

required district courts “to specify those material facts that are

and are not subject to genuine dispute and explain their

materiality.” Id. at 146. Second, in Grant v. City of Pittsburgh,

98 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 1996), we required courts to “analyze

separately, and state findings with respect to, the specific

conduct of each [defendant].” Id. at 126.

This appeal provides an occasion for us to stress the

importance of these supervisory rules. Willashia Williams sued

the City of York and three of its police officers under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, claiming excessive force and false arrest. The District

Court rejected the officers’ qualified immunity defense, and

they appealed. In so doing, the Court did not appreciate the

significance of our recent decision in Jutrowski v. Township of

Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2018). As a result, it risked

subjecting the officers to trial regardless of whether Williams

can establish their personal involvement in the constitutional

violations she alleges. Had the District Court followed the two

supervisory rules that we emphasize today, it would have

facilitated appellate review and enhanced the reliability of its

decision.

Because the District Court erred in concluding the

officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for false arrest

and the excessive force Williams alleges, we will reverse.

I

On the evening of March 12, 2013, a police officer in

York, Pennsylvania reported a shooting over the radio and said

the suspects fled in a white vehicle. The suspects’ vehicle

pulled in front of Sergeant Nicholas Figge, who was in uniform

but driving an unmarked police car. Figge saw three people in

the vehicle. He and Officer Jason Jay pursued the vehicle,

4

which crashed outside of their view. When Jay arrived at the

scene of the crash, the driver and other passenger had already

fled from the scene, but he saw one of the passengers flee

southward on foot. Figge arrived moments later but left to

pursue the driver, who was reportedly running northward. After

Figge left, Jay found a spent .38 caliber shell casing inside the

vehicle.

According to Williams, she and her then-boyfriend

Jason Scott were at a park in York shortly before the shooting,

and an unidentified police officer told them to evacuate the

area. To get home more quickly, they decided to run.

While still “within close geographical proximity” to the

crash, Figge observed Williams and Scott running eastbound

on Princess Street toward Pine Street, which goes northward.

Williams v. City of York, 2018 WL 5994603, at *1, *6 n.14

(M.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2018). Figge reported his observations over

the radio, stating, “They’re running. They’re running

eastbound on Princess towards Pine. One of the guys has kind

of a red jacket on, long dreads, blue pants, with a white stripe.

The other guy’s got a black jacket with an orange stripe.” Id. at

*1. Figge held his firearm outside the window of his vehicle

and ordered Williams and Scott to get on the ground. Scott

complied immediately, but Williams ran to the porch of a house

and started pounding on the door. Figge stayed in his police car

until other officers arrived.

Moments later, Officer Vincent Monte arrived and saw

Williams and Scott face down on the ground. Monte parked his

car and handcuffed Scott. Once other officers arrived,

including Officer Terry Seitz, Figge exited his vehicle and told

them to “grab” Williams. Id. According to Williams, Seitz

“threw her to the ground [and] the officers were ‘really forceful

5

and rough with [her], like [she] was a man.’” Id. Williams

complained and yelled at the officers that she needed to “pick

a wedgie,” but was unable to do so because she was lying on

her stomach. Id. at *2; Monte Exterior Cam 2:24-30.

According to Figge, Monte, and Seitz (collectively, the

Officers), Williams “was kicking, flailing around, being

disorderly, and yelling while she was being handcuffed.” Id. at

*2. And she “refused orders to place her hands behind her back,

was being uncooperative, and swearing at officers.” Id. Seitz

eventually handcuffed Williams, while an unidentified officer

placed a knee on her back. After police took Williams and Scott

into custody, an officer ordered someone to get on the ground,

and Scott yelled at Williams, “Hey babe, calm down man!” Id.

As Seitz was walking Williams to his car, she tripped on

an unidentified officer’s foot. Monte could not have tripped

Williams because his dashcam footage shows him placing

Scott in his police car at the time Williams tripped. But Monte

did see Williams “on the ground kicking and screaming.” Id.

Williams then had the following interaction with officers:

Officer: “If you don’t stop, I am going to tase

you!”

Officer: “Stop or I’ll tase you!”

Officer: “Relax! Relax!”

Williams: “Get off of me!”

Officer: “Stop or I’ll tase you!”

Williams: “Get off of me!”

Officer: “Relax!”

6

Williams: “Get off of me!”

Officer: “There ain’t nothing you’re going to say or do

that is going to get you out of . . .”

Williams: “I’m not doing shit!”

Officer: “Shut your mouth.”

Williams: “. . . my fucking . . .”

Officer: “Now stand up and act like you have some

sense.”

Id.

Figge ordered Seitz to cite Williams for disorderly

conduct. Seitz then placed Williams in his car and transported

her to City Hall. According to the Officers, when Williams was

at City Hall she “was extremely noisy, loudly pounding her free

arm on a metal wall.” Id. Seitz handcuffed Williams’s left arm

to a bench. While handcuffed, her boyfriend (Scott) yelled at

Williams to calm down, and Figge ordered an unidentified

officer to handcuff Williams’s right arm to the bench as well.

Williams claims “her wrist was hurting” and she asked the

unidentified officer to remove the handcuffs. Id. She also

claims that the unidentified officer “approached her, twisted

her arm, threw her against the wall, and threatened if she did

not give him her arm, he would break it.” Id. At some point

while Williams was at City Hall, Figge asked her to calm down

and she complied.

Williams was later found not guilty of disorderly

conduct. She sued the City of York and the Officers in the

District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Against the Officers,

7

she asserted federal claims for excessive force and false arrest

and state law claims for battery and false imprisonment.

Against York, she asserted federal claims for excessive force

and false arrest. The parties cross-moved for summary

judgment, and the Officers claimed qualified immunity. The

District Court granted summary judgment to York on the false

arrest claim and to Officer Monte on the § 1983 false arrest and

state law false imprisonment claims. It denied the motions in

all other respects.

The Court concluded that “disputed issues of fact

prevent[ed] application of qualified immunity to Sergeant

Figge, Officer Monte, and Officer Seitz for [the] excessive

force claim.” Id. at *8. It identified the disputed factual issues

as “whether Officer Seitz threw [Williams] to the ground, and

whether Sergeant Figge, Officer Monte, or Officer Seitz

twisted her arm, threw her against a wall, and handcuffed her

wrists too tightly at City Hall.” Id. The Court also concluded it

could not grant Figge and Seitz summary judgment on

qualified immunity grounds for the false arrest claim “in light

of . . . genuine issues of material fact.” Id. But it did not identify

the factual issues to which it referred. Instead, after concluding

that Figge and Seitz had reasonable suspicion to detain

Williams, it said, “[a]ccording to [Williams’s] account of the

incident . . . a reasonable police officer would [not] believe he

had probable cause to arrest [Williams].” Id. at *8.

The Officers timely appealed the District Court’s order

denying them qualified immunity.

8

II

A

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 pursuant

to the collateral order doctrine. Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of

Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 985 (3d Cir. 2014). To the extent we have

jurisdiction, our review is plenary. Id. at 986.

Summary judgment is proper when the record “shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(a). Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v.

Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995), we lack jurisdiction to review the

District Court’s denial of qualified immunity when “the pretrial

record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Id. at 320.

If the District Court did not state the facts it assumed, though,

we may “undertake a cumbersome review of the record to

determine what facts the district court, in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, likely assumed.” Id. at 319.1

1

Williams argues we lack jurisdiction to hear this

appeal under Johnson. We disagree. Johnson does not apply if

a district court’s determination that a fact is subject to

reasonable dispute is “blatantly and demonstrably false.”

Blaylock v. City of Phila., 504 F.3d 405, 414 (3d Cir. 2007).

And even when Johnson applies, it deprives us of jurisdiction

“to consider whether the district court correctly identified the

set of facts that the summary judgment record is sufficient to

prove.” Ziccardi, 288 F.3d at 61 (emphasis added). It does not

affect our jurisdiction to review “whether the set of facts

9

In recognition of our limited jurisdiction under Johnson,

we have announced two supervisory rules that apply whenever

a district court denies a public official qualified immunity at

summary judgment.

First, in Grant, we remanded a case involving multiple

defendants so the district court could “analyze separately, and

state findings with respect to, the specific conduct of each

[defendant].” 98 F.3d at 126. We recognized as “crucial” to the

qualified immunity analysis a “careful examination of the

record . . . to establish . . . a detailed factual description of the

actions of each individual defendant (viewed in a light most

favorable to the plaintiff).” Id. at 122 (citing Johnson, 515 U.S.

at 305). One purpose of the Grant rule is to ensure that district

courts enforce the tenet, “manifest in our excessive force

jurisprudence,” that a “plaintiff alleging that one or more

officers engaged in unconstitutional conduct must establish the

‘personal involvement’ of each named defendant to survive

summary judgment and take that defendant to trial.” Jutrowski,

904 F.3d at 285, 289.

Second, in Forbes, we announced a rule requiring

district courts “to specify those material facts that are and are

not subject to genuine dispute and explain their materiality.”

313 F.3d at 146. This requirement reflects our understanding

that because the “scope of our jurisdiction to review [a district

identified by the district court is sufficient to establish a

violation of a clearly established constitutional right.” Id. Our

analysis adopts the District Court’s factual determinations

except when they are blatantly and demonstrably false. And,

when appropriate, we determine what facts the Court likely

assumed. Thus, we are within our jurisdiction.

10

court’s decision denying summary judgment] depends upon

the precise set of facts that the [d]istrict [c]ourt viewed as

subject to dispute,” we are “hard pressed to carry out our

assigned function” when district courts fail to specify the set of

facts they assumed. Id. at 146, 148. While it is true that Johnson

contemplates that we may review the record ourselves,

Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319, Forbes reduces the frequency with

which we take on this “cumbersome” task and allows us the

alternative of vacating and remanding.

Since announcing these supervisory rules, we have also

recognized a narrow exception to the limits that Johnson places

on our jurisdiction: “where the trial court’s determination that

a fact is subject to reasonable dispute is blatantly and

demonstrably false, a court of appeals may say so, even on

interlocutory review.” Blaylock v. City of Phila., 504 F.3d 405,

414 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).

This exception derives from the Supreme Court’s

decision in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). There, a police

officer (Scott) rammed the vehicle of a fleeing motorist

(Harris), causing Harris to lose control of his vehicle and crash.

See id. at 375. Harris sued for excessive force. See id. at 375–

76. The district court denied Scott qualified immunity, finding

a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Harris

“present[ed] an immediate threat to the safety of others,”

Harris v. Coweta County, Georgia, 2003 WL 25419527, at *5

(N.D. Ga. 2003), and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Scott, 550

U.S. at 376.

The Supreme Court reversed, concluding there was no

genuine dispute that Harris presented an immediate threat to

others. See id. at 378, 386. In support, it cited a videotape of

the incident that “quite clearly contradict[ed] the version of the

11

story told by [Harris].” Id. at 378. That video, the Court said,

“resemble[d] a Hollywood-style car chase of the most

frightening sort.” Id. at 380. The Court did not resolve the

tension between its decision and Johnson. But in Blaylock, we

explained that Scott “represent[s] the outer limit of the

principle of Johnson.” Blaylock, 504 F.3d at 414.

B

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials

from civil liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “To resolve a claim of qualified

immunity, [we] engage in a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether

the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the violation of a constitutional

right, and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the

time of the official’s conduct.” L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836

F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks

omitted). We perform this inquiry “in the order we deem most

appropriate for the particular case before us.” Santini v.

Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).

A clearly established right must be so clear that every

“reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is

doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 640 (1987). We do not charge officials with such an

understanding unless existing precedent has “placed the

statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v.

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). And we examine an

official’s “particular conduct” id. at 742, in “the specific

context of the case.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)

(overturned on other grounds); see also Mullenix v. Luna, 136

12

S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (noting that specificity is “especially

important” in the Fourth Amendment context, where it is

sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how relevant

legal doctrines will apply to the factual situation before him).

In short, qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley

v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

III

Williams claims excessive force arising out of the

Officers’ conduct at the scene of her arrest and at City Hall. As

we shall explain, the District Court did not comply with our

supervisory rules in conducting its qualified immunity

analysis, and it erred in concluding that the Officers are not

entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. So we will

reverse.

A

A cause of action exists under § 1983 when a law

enforcement officer uses force so excessive that it violates the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. See Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903

F.2d 274, 277 (3d Cir. 1990). To maintain an excessive force

claim, “a plaintiff must show that a seizure occurred and that it

was unreasonable.” Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497,

515 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here,

the parties agree that Williams’s detention and arrest

constituted a seizure, so the District Court had to consider only

whether the force officers used was reasonable.

“The test of reasonableness under the Fourth

Amendment is whether under the totality of the circumstances,

13

‘the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the

facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to

their underlying intent or motivations.” Kopec v. Tate, 361

F.3d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 387 (1989)). The Supreme Court has cautioned that

“[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for

the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-

second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,

and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is

necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–

97.

B

We address separately the excessive force Williams

alleges took place at the scene of the arrest and at City Hall.

1

Relative to the scene of the arrest, Williams claims: (1)

Seitz threw her to the ground; (2) officers failed to loosen her

handcuffs; and (3) officers put a knee to her back, tripped her,

and were “forceful and rough” in handling her.

The District Court found “[t]he undisputed facts

establish that Officer Seitz handcuffed [Williams] at the time

of her arrest and an officer placed his knee on [Williams’s]

back. Williams, 2018 WL 5994603, at *7. The Court also noted

Williams “alleges that during her arrest, Officer Seitz threw her

to the ground and officers were forceful and rough in handling

her.” Id. The Court determined these facts, if true, “would

establish that the officers’ use of force was excessive in

violation of the Fourth Amendment,” but that it could not

14

resolve these factual disputes because “the reasonableness of

the force used should be determined by a jury.” Id.

Accepting the facts the District Court identified, Seitz

did not violate Williams’s constitutional rights by throwing her

to the ground. The parties do not dispute that officers were

responding to a shots-fired call, Williams was running in close

proximity to the shooting, and when Figge ordered her to get

on the ground, she ran to the porch of a house and started

pounding on the door instead of complying with his order.

Given these facts, it was not unreasonable for Seitz to throw

Williams to the ground. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. So

the District Court erred in concluding Seitz was not entitled to

qualified immunity.

Nor can Williams show that Figge, Monte, or Seitz

violated her constitutional rights by failing to loosen her

handcuffs. We have declined to hold officers liable in such

circumstances unless they are notified of an arrestee’s pain. In

Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 2004), for example,

Kopec claimed excessive force when the arresting officer

failed to loosen his handcuffs. Id. at 777. We reversed a

summary judgment in favor of the officer because Kopec’s

pain would have been obvious to the officer. See id. at 774.

Specifically, Kopec complained repeatedly about the pain and

“began to faint.” Id. We cautioned that our opinion “should not

be overread as we do not intend to open the floodgates to a

torrent of handcuff claims.” Id. at 777. Consistent with that

admonition, we later held, in Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 208

(3d Cir. 2005), that a plaintiff’s mere “complain[t] of pain to

unidentified officers who allegedly passed the information” on

to the handcuffing officer was insufficient for an excessive

force claim.

15

In this appeal, the District Court did not state whether it

assumed Williams notified her arresting officers of her pain.

Because this fact is plainly material, the Court’s failure to state

it violated the Forbes rule. Instead of remanding, though, we

will exercise our authority under Johnson to “undertake a . . .

review of the record to determine what facts the district court,

in the light most favorable to [Williams], likely assumed.”

Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319.

On this record, Williams cannot show her arresting

officers received notice of her pain. It’s true that Williams

denied the Officers’ statement that she “never complained at

the scene of her arrest about being in pain from handcuffs or

otherwise.” App. 92a. But her only support for that denial was

the dashcam footage, which she said shows she “complain[ed]

vociferously about her abuse at the hands of the police.” App.

435a. We have reviewed the video footage. See Scott, 550 U.S.

at 378–81; Blaylock, 504 F.3d at 414. It shows Williams

complained only about her “wedgie.” She said nothing about

pain from her handcuffs. Because this evidence is insufficient

for a reasonable jury to conclude that the Officers received

notice of Williams’s pain, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), the District Court erred in denying

them qualified immunity for failing to loosen Williams’s

handcuffs, see Kopec, 361 F.3d at 774.

Finally, Williams’s allegations that certain unidentified

officers put a knee to her back, tripped her, and were “forceful

and rough” in handling her cannot survive summary judgment.

We reiterate that a “plaintiff alleging that one or more officers

engaged in unconstitutional conduct must establish the

‘personal involvement’ of each named defendant to survive

summary judgment and take that defendant to trial.” Jutrowski,

904 F.3d at 285. In Jutrowski, a police officer kicked Jutrowski

16

in the face, breaking his nose and his eye socket. Id. at 286.

Because Jutrowski was “pinned to the pavement when the

excessive force occurred” and was “unable to identify his

assailant,” he brought excessive force claims against four

police officers. Id. at 284. Each officer “assert[ed] he neither

inflicted the blow himself nor saw anyone else do so.” Id. And

the dashcam footage did not capture the incident. See id. at 287.

The district court granted summary judgment to all four

officers, explaining that because Jutrowski could not “identify

which Defendant kicked him,” he was asking “the Court to

guess which individual Officer Defendant committed the

alleged wrong.” Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 2017 WL

1395484, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2017).

On appeal, we rejected Jutrowski’s argument that “so

long as a plaintiff can show that some officer used excessive

force, he may haul before a jury all officers who were ‘in the

immediate vicinity of where excessive force occurred’ without

any proof of their personal involvement.” Jutrowski, 904 F.3d

at 289 (citation omitted). After discovery, Jutrowski “still

[could not] ‘identify the actor that kicked him.’” Id. at 292. So

we refused to subject to trial “at least three defendants who are

‘free of liability.’” Id. (quoting Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d

272, 283 (3d Cir. 1972)).

Jutrowski’s central tenet—that “a defendant’s § 1983

liability must be predicated on his direct and personal

involvement in the alleged violation”—is “manifest in our

excessive force jurisprudence.” 904 F.3d at 289. Yet the

District Court did not state whether Figge, Monte, or Seitz

could have been one of the unidentified officers that allegedly

put a knee to Williams’s back, tripped her, and were “forceful

and rough” in handling her. The Court’s failure to address these

factual disputes violated the Forbes rule, but we will once

17

again “undertake a . . . review of the record to determine what

facts the district court, in the light most favorable to

[Williams], likely assumed.” Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319.

The record shows Williams cannot establish the

personal involvement of any of the Officers. At summary

judgment, Williams conceded she “cannot specifically

describe what each officer at the scene of her arrest did.” App.

439a, 443a–44a. So the District Court erred in concluding that

the Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for allegedly

putting a knee to Williams’s back, tripping her, and being

“forceful and rough” in handling her. See Jutrowski, 904 F.3d

at 292.

For all the reasons stated, we will reverse the District

Court’s denial of summary judgment as to Williams’s

excessive force claim insofar as it relates to the officers’

conduct at the scene of her arrest.

2

At City Hall, Williams claims excessive force because:

(1) officers failed to loosen her handcuffs; and (2) an officer

twisted her arm, threw her against the wall, and threatened to

break her arm.

The District Court identified a genuine dispute of

material fact about “whether Sergeant Figge, Officer Monte, or

Officer Seitz twisted [Williams’s] arm, threw her against a

wall, and handcuffed her wrists too tightly at City Hall.”

Williams, 2018 WL 5994603, at *8.

Under Johnson, we generally lack jurisdiction to review

the genuineness of this kind of dispute. See 515 U.S. at 319–

18

20. But having scrutinized the record in this appeal, we

conclude the District Court’s determination is “blatantly and

demonstrably false.” Thus, this case—like Scott—falls outside

Johnson’s “outer limit,” Blaylock, 504 F.3d at 414, and we will

exercise jurisdiction to review the genuineness of the factual

dispute the District Court identified.

Before discussing the record, we pause to observe that

the District Court failed to undertake the kind of “detailed

factual description of the actions of each individual defendant”

that the Grant rule requires. 98 F.3d at 122 (citing Johnson,

515 U.S. at 305). The Court determined there is a genuine

dispute of material fact about whether Figge, Monte, or Seitz

twisted Williams’s arm, threw her against a wall, and

handcuffed her wrists too tightly at City Hall. But the facts

apparently underlying its determination are not specific to any

of these officers. Elsewhere in its opinion, the Court says

Williams “contends that officers twisted her arm, threw her

against the wall, and threatened to break her arm if she did not

provide it to the officer.” Williams, 2018 WL 5994603, at *7

(emphasis added). And it says the parties “dispute whether

[Williams] notified other officers [besides Figge] of her

discomfort” in handcuffs. Id. at *2, *7 (emphasis added). But

facts about what unidentified officers did at City Hall shed no

light on what Figge, Monte, or Seitz did there.

Because of this flaw in the District Court’s

decisionmaking process, the record “quite clearly

contradict[s]” its determination that a genuine dispute of

material fact exists about whether the Officers twisted

Williams’s arm, threw her against the wall, or handcuffed her

too tightly. Scott, 550 U.S. at 378. First and most importantly,

in Williams’s summary judgment briefing, she conceded she

cannot establish that any of the Officers were personally

19

involved in the violations she alleges. There she stated: “While

[the Officers] are correct that [she] cannot specifically describe

what each officer at City Hall did, she does describe the

physical interactions she had with multiple officers at City

Hall.” App. 455a.

Moreover, Williams’s deposition testimony precludes

the possibility that any of the Officers are the unidentified

officer who allegedly twisted her arm and threw her against a

wall. Williams testified that the unidentified officer was not

present at her conduct hearing, but both Figge and Monte were

there, so that excludes them. And the undisputed record rules

out Seitz. Williams testified that the unidentified officer

handcuffed her right arm to the bench—not her left arm. But

Seitz testified—and Williams confirmed—that he handcuffed

Williams’s left arm to the bench. In fact, Williams positively

identified the unidentified officer as someone other than the

Officers she sued here. When Williams was at her mother’s

house, she saw a picture of the unidentified officer, learned that

he goes by the name “Terminator,” and later identified him as

one Officer Hansel. App. 271a–72a, 290a–91a.

As for the circumstances surrounding Williams’s

handcuffing, the record shows that Figge could not have

handcuffed Williams at City Hall because Seitz handcuffed

Williams’s left arm, and Figge ordered another officer to

handcuff her right arm.

Finally, at oral argument before this Court, Williams’s

attorney conceded “the basis of any claim against th[e]

Officers” for excessive force at City Hall “would be a failure-

to-intervene claim.” Oral Arg. 38:50 (emphasis added). So

even Williams’s counsel could not defend the genuineness of

the factual dispute the District Court identified.

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For all these reasons, no reasonable juror could find the

Officers failed to loosen Williams’s handcuffs or twisted her

arm, threw her against the wall, and threatened to break her

arm. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The District Court’s contrary

determination is unfounded. And because the record shows

Williams cannot establish the personal involvement of any of

the Officers, the Court erred in concluding they are not entitled

to qualified immunity. See Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 292.

Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s order

to the extent it denied summary judgment as to Williams’s

excessive force claim relative to the officers’ conduct at City

Hall.

IV

We next consider Williams’s claim for false arrest. The

District Court erred in concluding that Figge and Seitz are not

entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. So we will reverse

the Court’s denial of summary judgment in relevant part.

On appeal, Figge and Seitz claim they had probable

cause to arrest Williams for disorderly conduct and escape. In

the alternative, they argue they did not violate clearly

established law in arresting Williams. As relevant here, the

Court concluded that because “there is a factual dispute

regarding exactly when [Williams] stopped at Sergeant Figge’s

command,” it “could not determine if there was sufficient

probable cause for criminal escape.” Williams, 2018 WL

5994603, at *6.

“To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth

Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an

arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable

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cause.” James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d

Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). “[P]robable cause exists if there

is a fair probability that the person committed the crime at

issue.” Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 467 (3d Cir.

2016) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations

omitted). “While probable cause to arrest requires more than

mere suspicion, the law recognizes that probable cause

determinations have to be made on the spot under pressure and

do not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence.” Paff

v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Accepting as true the facts the District Court identified,

Figge and Seitz did not violate clearly established law in

arresting Williams. Under Pennsylvania law, a person is guilty

of escape “if he unlawfully removes himself from official

detention,” which includes “any . . . detention for law

enforcement purposes.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5121 (a), (e).

And while Figge and Seitz did not cite Williams for escape,

“an arrest is lawful if the officer had probable cause to arrest

for any offense, not just the offense cited at the time of arrest

or booking.” Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 584

n.2 (2018) (citations omitted). The determination of whether a

person criminally escapes depends on “an evaluation of the

specific circumstances” of an individual case. Com. v. Woody,

939 A.2d 359, 362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), aff’d through order

974 A.2d 1163 (Pa. 2009). And for the specific facts of this

case, Pennsylvania law does not clearly establish that Figge

and Seitz lacked probable cause to arrest Williams for criminal

escape.

On the one hand, in Commonwealth v. Stewart, 648

A.2d 797 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), a uniformed police officer

received a dispatch about a domestic disturbance involving

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Stewart. See id. The officer pulled Stewart over, approached

Stewart’s vehicle with his gun drawn, and ordered Stewart to

put his hands on the dashboard. See id. Stewart drove off and

was charged and convicted of escape. See id. On appeal,

Stewart argued that he was not under “detention” within the

meaning of the escape statute. Id. at 798. The Superior Court

of Pennsylvania rejected this argument, holding that because it

was “clear that [the officer] exhibited a show of authority,” it

was “inconceivable that a reasonable person would believe he

or she is free to leave.” Id.; see also, e.g., Com. v. Fountain,

811 A.2d 24, 25, 27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (holding

Commonwealth made a prima facie case as to escape charge

where police officer approached defendant with her canine,

told defendant not to run and that she had a warrant for his

arrest, and defendant “ran into a residence, and locked the

door”).

On the other hand, in Commonwealth v. Woody, a

uniformed police officer in a marked police car instructed

Woody, who was fleeing on foot after a traffic stop, to “stop

and get on the ground.” 939 A.2d at 363. The Superior Court

of Pennsylvania determined that Woody was “never officially

detained,” and vacated his conviction for criminal escape. Id.

This case falls in an uncertain space between Stewart

and Woody. Like the officer in Stewart, Figge was in uniform

and exhibited a show of authority by drawing his gun. And just

as Stewart did not comply with the officer’s order to put his

hands on the dashboard, Williams did not comply with Figge’s

order to get on the ground. In fact, the parties do not dispute

that she ran to the porch of a house and started pounding on the

door. But if on-foot flight from a uniformed officer in a marked

police vehicle was insufficient for a criminal escape conviction

in Woody, it may be that probable cause did not exist here. That

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uncertainty in the law does not strip the officers here of

qualified immunity; rather it insulates them from liability for

their determination that a “fair probability” existed that

Williams committed escape. Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 467.

Accordingly, Figge and Monte are entitled to qualified

immunity on Williams’s claim for false arrest.

* * *

For the reasons stated, we will reverse the Court’s order

denying the Officers summary judgment.

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