Maselli v. Regional School District No. 10

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THERESA MASELLI v. REGIONAL SCHOOL

DISTRICT NUMBER 10 ET AL.

(AC 41809)

Alvord, Elgo and Norcott, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, as next friend of her minor daughter, M, sought to recover

damages from, inter alia, the defendant soccer coach and physical educa-

tion teacher, S, for injuries that M suffered when S kicked a soccer ball

that struck M in the face during a soccer scrimmage at the school M

attended. The plaintiff’s complaint alleged claims against S of assault and

battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction

of emotional distress and negligence, as well as claims of negligence

and recklessness against the other defendants, the regional school dis-

trict, the superintendent of schools and the school’s principal. The trial

court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding

that the plaintiff’s negligence claims against all of the defendants were

barred by governmental immunity pursuant to statute (§ 52-557n (a) (2)

(B)) because the plaintiff failed to establish any of the three prongs

of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental

immunity. The court further concluded that the plaintiff’s claims of

assault and battery and recklessness failed as a matter of law. The court

rendered judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed to this

court. Held that the trial court properly granted the defendants’ motion

for summary judgment and rendered judgment for the defendants, and,

because the court’s memorandum of decision fully addressed the argu-

ments raised in this appeal, this court adopted the trial court’s memoran-

dum of decision as a proper statement of the facts and applicable law

on the issues.

Argued March 10—officially released July 7, 2020

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, assault and

battery, and for other relief, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the

court, Robaina, J., granted the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon,

from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Peter C. White, with whom was A. Paul Spinella, for

the appellant (plaintiff).

Ashley A. Noel, with whom, on the brief, was Kevin

R. Kratzer, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, Theresa Maselli, as next

friend of her minor daughter, Angelina Maselli,1 appeals

from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court

in favor of the defendants, Regional School District

Number 10, which serves the towns of Burlington and

Harwinton; its superintendent, Alan Beitman; the princi-

pal of Har-Bur Middle School (middle school), Kenneth

Smith; and Robert Samudosky, a physical education

teacher at the middle school and the coach of the girls

soccer team. The plaintiff claims that the court improp-

erly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judg-

ment because (1) a jury reasonably could have con-

cluded that Samudosky intended to batter Angelina

when he kicked a ball during soccer practice that struck

her, (2) a jury reasonably could have concluded that

Samudosky is liable for battery for acting wantonly or

recklessly when he kicked the ball, (3) the court improp-

erly concluded that the defendants were entitled to gov-

ernmental immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 52-

557n (a) (2) (B)2 because the defendants had a duty to

act and Angelina was an identifiable person to which the

imminent harm exception to governmental immunity

applied, and (4) the court improperly applied the gov-

ernmental immunity analysis by considering whether

Angelina was a member of an identifiable class of poten-

tial victims.3 We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

The court’s memorandum of decision and the record

reveal the following relevant facts and procedural his-

tory. On October 28, 2013, Angelina, who was twelve

years of age and in the seventh grade, was participating

in a girls soccer practice that was coached by Samu-

dosky at the middle school. During the practice, the

team, which consisted of twenty-four middle school-

aged girls, was split into four smaller teams, each con-

sisting of six players. Samudosky participated as a mem-

ber of one of the teams. Thereafter, the teams engaged

in scrimmages inside the gymnasium of the middle

school.

At some point during the practice, Angelina and

Samudosky were on opposing teams. Angelina was an

offensive player, and Samudosky was playing defense.

During the scrimmage, Samudosky had the ball in his

defensive end while Angelina and her teammates

approached to challenge him from about six feet away.

In an effort to clear the ball from his defensive end,

Samudosky looked down and kicked the dodge ball

that the team was using to play. The ball hit Angelina

in the face, causing her to become ‘‘tingly . . . dizzy

. . . and [fall] to the ground.’’ Angelina also suffered

from a nosebleed as a result of being hit with the ball.

At this time, the scrimmage stopped. Thereafter, Samu-

dosky instructed Angelina to go to the girls locker room

to clean her bloody nose. Angelina returned and partici-

pated in the remainder of practice. Samudosky did not

inform the plaintiff of the incident.

At the conclusion of practice, Angelina was taken

home by a friend. Before Angelina could tell the plaintiff

what happened, the plaintiff ‘‘took one look at her and

asked her . . . ‘[w]hat the hell happened to you?’ ’’

Thereafter, Angelina informed the plaintiff of the events

that had occurred at practice that day. Two days later,

the plaintiff took Angelina to Unionville Pediatrics,

which referred Angelina to Elite Sports Medicine, where

she saw a physician. Subsequently, Angelina was diag-

nosed with a concussion. Due to the severity of her

symptoms related to the concussion, she did not attend

school full-time until January, 2014.

On November 8, 2013, the plaintiff called the middle

school, spoke to the principal, Smith, and requested

that Smith investigate the cause of Angelina’s injury.

On November 15, 2013, when no investigation had been

conducted, the plaintiff called Beitman, the superinten-

dent of schools. Beitman, along with Smith, interviewed

each member of the girls soccer team and confirmed

the events of the incident. As a result of this incident,

Angelina transferred to Kingswood Oxford School in

West Hartford at the start of the next school year, where

she repeated the seventh grade. Angelina continues to

have nosebleeds and headaches on a regular basis,

which the plaintiff described as ‘‘humiliating.’’

The plaintiff commenced this action by way of a writ

of summons and complaint on September 8, 2015. On

July 13, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint,

asserting six claims against the defendants. Counts one

through four, alleging assault and battery, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of

emotional distress, and negligence, are against only

Samudosky. Counts five and six, which allege negli-

gence and recklessness, respectively, are against all of

the defendants. The plaintiff sought monetary damages,

punitive damages, attorney’s fees and costs, and such

other legal and equitable relief as the court deemed just

and proper.

On August 25, 2017, the defendants moved for sum-

mary judgment as to all counts of the plaintiff’s com-

plaint. The memorandum of law in support of the defen-

dants’ motion sets forth that (1) the plaintiff’s claims

of negligent assault and battery, negligent infliction of

emotional distress, and negligence are barred by the

doctrine of governmental qualified immunity, (2) to the

extent that the doctrine of governmental qualified

immunity did not apply to Samudosky, the claims of

negligent assault and battery, negligent infliction of

emotional distress, and negligence fail as a matter of

law, (3) Samudosky’s conduct was not extreme and

outrageous, (4) the claim as to assault and battery fails

as a matter of law, and (5) the plaintiff’s claim of reck-

lessness fails as a matter of law, and the defendants’

allegedly reckless conduct was not the cause of

Angelina’s injuries.

On January 29, 2018, the court, Robaina, J., heard

oral argument concerning the defendants’ motion. On

June 11, 2018, the court issued a memorandum of deci-

sion granting the defendants’ motion for summary judg-

ment. The court held that the plaintiff’s negligence

claims against all the defendants are barred by govern-

mental immunity because the plaintiff failed to establish

any of the three prongs of the identifiable person-immi-

nent harm exception set forth in St. Pierre v. Plainfield,

326 Conn. 420, 435, 165 A.3d 148 (2017). The court also

held that the plaintiff’s claims of negligent assault and

battery and recklessness fail as a matter of law. This

appeal followed.

Our examination of the record on appeal, and the

briefs and arguments of the parties, persuades us that

the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Because the court’s memorandum of decision fully

addresses the arguments raised in the present appeal,

we adopt its thorough and well reasoned decision as a

proper statement of the facts and applicable law on

these issues. See Maselli v. Regional School District

No. 10, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford,

Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (June 11, 2018) (reprinted

at 198 Conn. App. , A.3d ). It would serve no

useful purpose for us to repeat the discussion contained

therein. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Hemingway, 297 Conn.

317, 321, 2 A.3d 857 (2010); Royal Indemnity Co. v.

Terra Firma, Inc., 287 Conn. 183, 189, 947 A.2d 913

(2008); Lachowicz v. Rugens, 119 Conn. App. 866, 870,

989 A.2d 651, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 901, 994 A.2d

1287 (2010).

The judgment is affirmed.

1

We refer in this opinion to Theresa Maselli as the plaintiff and to her

minor child as Angelina.

2

General Statutes § 52-557n (a) (2) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Except as

otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be

liable for damages to person or property caused by . . . (B) negligent acts

or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an

official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.’’

3

At oral argument before this court, the plaintiff abandoned her claim

that a reasonable juror could conclude that Samudosky’s conduct rose to

the level of being extreme and outrageous, which is necessary to establish

the plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.