in the employment termination context, a liberty interest is implicated if the charge impairs a reputation for honesty or morality
How later courts described this case
- in the employment termination context, a liberty interest is implicated if the charge impairs a reputation for honesty or morality
- “The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.”
- in determining what procedures are sufficient to comport with due process, court must weigh private interest at stake, risk of erroneous deprivation, and government interest
- government employee has protected property interest in employment if he has a legitimate claim to tenure or can be fired only for cause
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 23 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LORCAN KILROY, an individual, No. 19-55357
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:16-cv-09068-DMG-JDE
v.
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL MEMORANDUM*
DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 19, 2020**
Before: SCHROEDER, CANBY, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
Lorcan Kilroy appeals pro se the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Los Angeles School District Board of
Education and individual defendants, arising from his termination from his
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
employment as a teacher. We review the district court’s summary judgment de
novo. Roybal v. Toppenish Sch. Dist., 871 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir. 2017). We
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants
on Counts 9 and 10, alleging denial of due process. We assume that Kilroy had
both a protected property interest in his continued employment as well as a
protected liberty interest because the misconduct charge at issue implicated his
reputation. See Blantz v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 727 F.3d 917, 922 (9th Cir.
2013) (government employee has protected property interest in employment if he
has a legitimate claim to tenure or can be fired only for cause); Tibbetts v.
Kulongoski, 567 F.3d 529, 535-36 (9th Cir. 2009) (in the employment termination
context, a liberty interest is implicated if the charge impairs a reputation for
honesty or morality). The required notice provided to Kilroy satisfied the
requirements of due process because it included (1) a statement of charges, (2)
identified all of the grounds for termination, and (3) informed him he would be
dismissed in thirty days if he did not request a hearing. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (“The tenured public employee is entitled
to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the
employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.”); Roybal,
871 F.3d at 933. As noted by the district court, “Plaintiff does not dispute that he
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received these notices and did not request a hearing.” He was not terminated until
approximately one month after the expiration of the period to request a hearing.
Kilroy also received sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard prior to his
suspension. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (in determining
what procedures are sufficient to comport with due process, court must weigh
private interest at stake, risk of erroneous deprivation, and government interest).
AFFIRMED.
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