Opinion

State of Maine v. Jessee Mackin

  • 234 A.3d 1232
  • 2020 ME 78
Court
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
Filed
Jun 2, 2020
Status
Published
Cited by
2 cases
Authority
More cited than 55.9%

The opinion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions

Decision: 2020 ME 78

Docket: Pen-19-504

Argued: May 11, 2020

Decided: June 2, 2020

Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE

v.

JESSEE MACKIN

MEAD, J.

[¶1] Jessee Mackin appeals from a judgment of conviction for

manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A) (2020), entered by the trial

court (Penobscot County, Anderson, J.) following a jury-waived trial. Mackin

contends that the evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he caused the child victim’s death.1 We affirm the

judgment.

1 Mackin also asserts that because the evidence indicates that the child’s fatal injuries were

inflicted intentionally, he could not have acted with criminal negligence as the court found. See

17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A) (2020) (“A person is guilty of manslaughter if that person . . . [r]ecklessly, or

with criminal negligence, causes the death of another human being.”). This argument is not

persuasive and we do not discuss it further.

2

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

A. Facts

[¶2] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, see

State v. Brown, 2017 ME 59, ¶ 7, 158 A.3d 501, the trial court’s oral and written

factual findings are well supported by the record.

[¶3] In announcing its verdict, the court found:

On May 5 of 2015, EMTs from Millinocket went to an address

on Katahdin Avenue in Millinocket where Jessee Mackin and [the

child’s mother] resided, as well as [the child], who was about seven

months old at the time. . . . When the EMTs arrived [the child] was

not breathing but . . . did have circulation, his heart was beating, but

he was obviously suffering from a very severe injury. . . . [B]ecause

of the severity of the injuries he was Life Flighted to Bangor to

Eastern Maine Medical Center. . . . [The child] died on May 7.

....

. . . [C]oncerning the cause of death we had an autopsy and

we had . . . Dr. Ricci, and we had a neurologist testify. And what one

has to conclude concerning the cause of death is that [the child]

died from a massive skull fracture. That this is not the type of injury

that . . . your child gets when your child falls down or he falls off a

bassinet or something like that. . . .

. . . Dr. Ricci’s conclusions were rather unequivocal, and he

testified that the child died of this massive skull fracture caused by

a dramatic force to the skull. The child also had retinal

hemorrhaging, and it was Dr. Ricci’s opinion that there was a

rotational force implied with the traumatic injury to the . . . left side

of the head. And he also indicated that the child had a brain stem

injury, that he would have immediately stopped breathing upon

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sustaining this traumatic injury. There would have been an

immediate loss of consciousness.

. . . [T]hat testimony was corroborated by the testimony of a

neurologist. Ultimately, she was no less unequivocal than Dr. Ricci.

. . . [T]he loss of consciousness would have been immediate. So the

two experts who were opining about this aspect of the case were

consistent in their conclusions.

So what this case really narrows down to, and it’s not a

terribly complicated case . . . is if the science, the medical science in

support of the opinion of the two experts, if that has been

proved . . . then Mr. Mackin caused the death of this child. It’s

inescapable. If you accept the science, it’s inescapable, based on the

other evidence in the case, that he caused the death of the child.

And that’s because he said he was with the child . . . since around

two o’clock. The call came in around 3:30. So he’d been with the

child[,] . . . and the child basically died in his arms.

. . . [I]f there were a controversy . . . about . . . how long the

injury could have taken place prior to [the child] going limp . . .

[this] [c]ould be a different case. But that doesn’t seem to be at

issue based on the testimony at trial. It could also be a different

case if there was a controversy about who had control over the

child during that period of time. And there isn’t any controversy

about that. . . . [B]oth [the mother and Mackin] agree that the child

was with Mr. Mackin, [and] was not with [the mother] prior to this.

There was no conflicting evidence concerning [the] medical

aspect of the case. . . . I come away from the testimony of [Dr. Ricci

and the neurologist] finding that the State has proved beyond a

reasonable doubt that whoever was with the child shortly before

the child going limp caused the death of the child. So I’m finding

beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Mackin caused the death of the

child.

. . . [B]ased on the facts that were testified to at trial, this could

not have been an accidental injury. There was no description by

4

any witness of an accidental injury and . . . I think Mr. Mackin was

not telling the truth when he testified about what happened. So

when I combine his lack of being forthright with the testimony

concerning the amount of force necessary, I’m finding that . . . he

inflicted the injury in a criminally negligent fashion. . . . [S]o I’m

finding the defendant guilty of this charge.

[¶4] The court made additional factual findings in its written decision on

the State’s motion for further findings and Mackin’s motion for a new trial:

Earlier [in delivering the verdict], I had stated “(i)t’s inescapable. If

you accept the science, it’s inescapable, based on the other

evidence in the case, that he caused the death of the child.” I made

these statements based on the witnesses’ conclusions that the

injury to [the child] was so traumatic that it would have resulted in

his immediate complete loss of consciousness. . . .

I find the testimony of Dr. Lawrence Ricci and [the

neurologist] to be reliable and accept the testimony as accurately

describing [the child’s] injury as well as its severity. Based on the

testimony . . . I also find beyond a reasonable doubt that there

would have been an immediate loss of consciousness when the

injury was inflicted.

Mr. Mackin was the only person who was in physical contact

with the child immediately before the baby’s loss of consciousness.

There was no dispute about this. . . . The only person who had

physical contact with the child when the fatal injury had to have

been inflicted is Mr. Mackin. No one else had any contact with [the

child] during this critical period of time.

B. Procedure

[¶5] In February 2016, a grand jury indicted Mackin on a charge of

manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A). Following two changes of

5

counsel, Mackin waived a jury trial in March 2019. The court held a bench trial

on April 16-18, 2019, and took the case under advisement. On May 15, 2019,

the court held a hearing and announced its verdict of guilty. The State

subsequently moved for clarification of the verdict and for further findings, in

response to which the court made additional findings. The court denied

Mackin’s M.R.U. Crim. P. 33 motion for a new trial.

[¶6] At the sentencing hearing, the court entered judgment and

sentenced Mackin to eleven years’ imprisonment, with all but five years and

six months suspended, and four years of probation. Mackin timely appealed.

See M.R. App. P. 2B(b).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶7] In making its factual findings, the court was “permitted to draw all

reasonable inferences from the evidence, and decide the weight to be given to

the evidence and the credibility to be afforded to the witnesses.” Brown,

2017 ME 59, ¶ 7, 158 A.3d 501 (quotation marks omitted). On this record, the

court was amply justified in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Mackin,

acting with criminal negligence, caused the child’s death given its supported

findings that (1) the child’s death resulted from an inflicted injury and (2) only

6

Mackin could have inflicted it. See 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A); State v. Scott,

2019 ME 105, ¶¶ 35-37, 211 A.3d 205.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Stephen C. Smith, Esq. (orally), and John E. Baldacci, Jr., Esq., Lipman & Katz, PA,

Augusta, for appellant Jessee Mackin

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Leanne Robbin, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally),

Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2016-648

FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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