In re A.N.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

In re A.N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.N.,

Defendant and Appellant.

S242494

Second Appellate District, Division Six

B275914

Ventura County Superior Court

2015040294

May 4, 2020

Justice Chin authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief

Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar,

Kruger, and Groban concurred.

Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice

Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Cuéllar, Kruger, and Groban

concurred.

In re A.N.

S242494

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

The Legislature has established a detailed statutory

scheme to govern juvenile truancy. (See e.g., Ed. Code,

§§ 48260–48265; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 601.) We granted review

to determine whether this scheme requires (1) the use of a school

attendance review board (SARB) or a similar truancy mediation

program, or (2) the issuance of a fourth truancy report, before

the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a minor on the

basis of truancy. We hold that the juvenile court may exercise

jurisdiction in a formal wardship proceeding on the basis of the

minor having “four or more truancies within one school year”

under Welfare and Institutions Code section 601, subdivision (b)

if a fourth truancy report has been issued to the attendance

supervisor or the superintendent of the school district, even if

the minor has not been previously referred to a SARB or a

similar truancy mediation program.1 Because A.N.’s school had

sent at least four truancy reports to the superintendent of the

school district before the wardship petition was filed against

A.N., we affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment that the juvenile

court possessed jurisdiction over A.N.

1

Our holding is limited to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction

in a formal wardship proceeding initiated by the filing of a

petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 650. We

do not consider the informal juvenile and traffic court’s

jurisdiction in a hearing conducted in accordance with Welfare

and Institutions Code sections 255 through 258.

1

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

By the time A.N. entered high school, she was struggling

with difficult circumstances at home and in her personal life.

Beginning in eighth grade, she developed school attendance

problems that continued throughout her ninth grade year.

On October 6, 2015, the principal of A.N.’s school mailed a

truancy notice to her parents. In the letter, the principal

explained that A.N. had accumulated four unexcused absences

or tardies, and he invited her parents to contact the school’s

attendance supervisor to “discuss solutions that will improve

[A.N.’s] attendance.” A week later, on October 13, the principal

sent a second truancy notice listing another five unexcused

absences or tardies. In this letter, the principal warned A.N.’s

parents that their daughter was “at risk of being classified as a

habitual truant,” and he urged them to contact the attendance

supervisor “as soon as possible.” On December 15, the principal

sent a third truancy notice documenting another 10 unexcused

absences or tardies. In it, he stated that A.N. was a habitual

truant, and he again requested that her parents contact the

attendance supervisor “as soon as possible.”2

Three days earlier, on December 12, a police officer had

issued A.N. a citation for habitual truancy under Education

Code section 48262.3 Under that section, a pupil is classified as

a “habitual truant” if he or she “has been reported as a truant

three or more times per school year” and a school official has

2

A.N.’s principal mailed both English and Spanish copies of

each of his letters to A.N.’s parents.

3

Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are to

the Education Code.

2

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

made “a conscientious effort to hold at least one conference with

a parent or guardian of the pupil and the pupil himself.”4

On December 31, the District Attorney filed a wardship

petition against A.N. in the juvenile court. (See Welf. & Inst.

Code, § 650.) The petition alleged that A.N. was a habitual

truant under section 48262 and that she was within the

jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions

Code section 601.

Almost two weeks later, on January 12, 2016, A.N. and her

mother attended a SARB meeting. They signed a contract

stating that A.N. would attend school regularly and that her

mother would provide information about any future absences.

During late April and early May, the juvenile court held a

trial on the wardship petition. At trial, the school attendance

supervisor testified that a computerized system automatically

sends a report to the school district whenever a teacher records

a student as absent from or tardy to class. He explained that the

system also generates student attendance profiles that provide

attendance supervisors with a list of each student’s recorded

absences and tardies. Additionally, he testified that he had

spoken with A.N. on multiple occasions and provided her with

information about available services. A.N.’s attendance profile

and the letters sent from the principal to A.N.’s parents were

admitted into evidence.

4

Section 48262 also explains: “[A] conscientious effort

means attempting to communicate with the parents of the pupil

at least once using the most cost-effective method possible,

which may include electronic mail or a telephone call.” Although

the record does not indicate whether A.N.’s parents received the

principal’s letters, it does indicate that a school official spoke

with A.N.’s father over the phone.

3

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

On May 10, the juvenile court sustained the wardship

petition. At A.N.’s request, the court ordered A.N. to pay a $50

fine rather than to complete 20 hours of community service.

(See § 48264.5, subd. (d)(1), (2).)

On appeal, A.N. claimed that the juvenile court lacked

jurisdiction because, at the time the petition was filed, (1) she

had not yet appeared before a SARB and (2) a fourth truancy

report had not been sent to her and her parents. (In re A.N.

(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 403 (A.N.).) The Court of Appeal affirmed

the juvenile court’s judgment, holding that neither of these steps

were prerequisites to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over a

minor on the basis of the minor having “four or more truancies

within one school year” under Welfare and Institutions Code

section 601, subdivision (b) (Welfare and Institutions Code

section 601(b)). We granted A.N.’s petition for review.

II. DISCUSSION

Before turning to the issues before us, we review our

familiar principles of statutory construction. “We start with the

statute’s words, which are the most reliable indicator of

legislative intent.” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 627.) “ ‘We

interpret relevant terms in light of their ordinary meaning,

while also taking account of any related provisions and the

overall structure of the statutory scheme to determine what

interpretation best advances the Legislature’s underlying

purpose.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors

v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282, 293.) “If we find the

statutory language ambiguous or subject to more than one

interpretation, we may look to extrinsic aids, including

legislative history or purpose to inform our views.” (John v.

Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91, 96.)

4

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

A. Background

As is relevant here, Welfare and Institutions Code section

601(b) provides: “If a minor between 12 years of age and 17

years of age, inclusive, has four or more truancies within one

school year as defined in Section 48260 of the Education Code or

a school attendance review board or probation officer determines

that the available public and private services are insufficient or

inappropriate to correct the habitual truancy of the minor, or to

correct the minor’s persistent or habitual refusal to obey the

reasonable and proper orders or directions of school authorities,

or if the minor fails to respond to directives of a school

attendance review board or a probation officer or to services

provided, the minor is then within the jurisdiction of the

juvenile court which may adjudge the minor to be a ward of the

court.” In brief, this subdivision lists three bases of juvenile

court jurisdiction: (1) “four or more truancies within one school

year”; (2) a determination by a SARB or a probation officer that

available services are insufficient or inappropriate to correct the

minor’s truancy; or (3) a minor’s failure to respond to the

directives of a SARB or a probation officer or to services

provided.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that the juvenile

court possessed jurisdiction in the formal wardship proceeding

against A.N. on the basis of her “four or more truancies within

one school year” under Welfare and Institutions Code section

601(b). (A.N., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 406.) Consequently,

we limit our consideration to whether (1) the use of a SARB or a

similar truancy mediation program, or (2) the issuance of a

fourth truancy report to the pupil and his or her parents or

guardians, is a prerequisite to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction in

a formal wardship proceeding upon this basis.

5

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

At the outset, we agree with A.N. that Welfare and

Institutions Code section 601(b) “cannot be read in isolation but

must be harmonized” with the Education Code sections

governing truancy. (See Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment &

Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 [“[S]tatutes or

statutory sections relating to the same subject must be

harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent

possible.”].) So, we briefly review the other sections of the

statutory scheme that are most relevant to our analysis.

First, if a pupil “is absent from school without a valid

excuse three full days in one school year or tardy or absent for

more than a 30-minute period during the schoolday without a

valid excuse on three occasions in one school year, or any

combination thereof,” section 48260, subdivision (a) provides

that the pupil “shall be classified as a truant and shall be

reported to the attendance supervisor or to the superintendent

of the school district.” If the pupil is “again absent from school

without valid excuse one or more days, or tardy on one or more

days,” section 48261 provides that the pupil “shall again be

reported as a truant to the attendance supervisor or the

superintendent of the district.” If the pupil is “reported as a

truant three or more times per school year” and “an appropriate

district officer or employee has made a conscientious effort to

hold at least one conference with a parent or guardian of the

pupil and the pupil himself, after the filing of either of the

reports required by Section 48260 or Section 48261,” section

48262 provides that the pupil “shall be deemed an habitual

truant.”

Meanwhile, section 48264.5 provides increasingly serious

consequences that may result from a pupil’s continued truancy

or his or her failure to complete assigned programs. Subdivision

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In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

(a) states that “[t]he first time a truancy report is issued,” the

pupil and the pupil’s parent or guardian may be requested to

attend a meeting. Subdivision (b) provides that “[t]he second

time a truancy report is issued,” the pupil may be assigned to an

afterschool or weekend study program, and that a pupil who

fails to complete such a program “shall be subject to subdivision

(c).” Subdivision (c) states that “[t]he third time a truancy report

is issued,” the pupil may be required to attend a SARB meeting

or a similar truancy mediation program, and that a pupil who

fails to complete such a program “shall be subject to subdivision

(d).” Finally, subdivision (d) provides that “[t]he fourth time a

truancy is issued,” the pupil “may be within the jurisdiction of

the juvenile court that may adjudge the pupil to be a ward of the

court pursuant to Section 601 of the Welfare and Institutions

Code.”

B. Use of a SARB or a Similar Truancy Mediation

Program

First, we consider A.N.’s claim that the statutory scheme

and In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283 (Michael G.) require

the use of a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program

before a pupil comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

In Michael G., supra, 44 Cal.3d 283, we considered

whether the juvenile court may exercise its contempt power to

detain a minor during nonschool hours. Our opinion recognized

that the Legislature had previously amended the statutory

scheme “to require referral of truants to [SARBs] before juvenile

court intervention,” and we described referral to a SARB as a

“condition precedent to the juvenile court’s intervention.” (Id.

at p. 290.) As we explain below, this dictum was abrogated by

subsequent amendments to the statutory scheme.

7

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

When we decided Michael G., supra, 44 Cal.3d 283, in

1988, the statutory scheme required habitual truants to be

referred to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program

before they are referred to the juvenile court. Former section

601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code stated: “Any person

under the age of 18 years who . . . is a habitual truant from

school within the meaning of any law of this state, shall, prior

to any referral to the juvenile court of the county, be referred to a

school attendance review board pursuant to Section 48263 of the

Education Code, or to a truancy mediation program pursuant to

Section 601.3 of this code, or to both a school attendance review

board and a truancy mediation program if both have been

established in the county.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 601.1,

as amended by Stats. 1985, ch. 667, § 1, p. 2256, italics added.)

Additionally, section 601(b) formerly read: “If a school

attendance review board determines that the available public

and private services are insufficient or inappropriate to correct

the habitual truancy of the minor, or to correct the minor’s

persistent or habitual refusal to obey the reasonable and proper

orders or directions of school authorities, or if the minor fails to

respond to directives of a school attendance review board or to

services provided, the minor is then within the jurisdiction of the

juvenile court . . . .” (Welf. & Inst., former § 601(b), as amended

by Stats. 1976, ch. 1071, § 11, p. 4818, italics added.)

So, as our dictum in Michael G., supra, 44 Cal.3d 283,

recognized, former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions

Code mandated initial referral to a SARB or a similar truancy

mediation program, and section 601(b) formerly provided only

two bases of juvenile court jurisdiction—both of which

contemplated the prior use of a SARB or a similar truancy

mediation program. In 1994, however, Senate Bill No. 1728

8

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

(1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1728) repealed former

section 601.1—thereby removing the express requirement that

a minor be initially referred to a SARB or a similar truancy

mediation program—and amended section 601(b) to include a

third basis of jurisdiction—a minor’s “four or more truancies

within one school year.” (Stats. 1994, ch. 1023, §§ 6, 7, p. 6217.)

Without discussing the fact that Senate Bill 1728 repealed

former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, A.N.

asks us to read Education Code section 48264.5—a section

added by Senate Bill 1728—to require initial referral to a SARB

or a similar truancy mediation program. (Stats. 1994, ch. 1023,

§ 4, pp. 6215–2616.) As mentioned above, section 48264.5’s

subdivisions provide graduated consequences that may result

from a pupil’s continued truancy or the pupil’s failure to

complete assigned programs. Specifically, A.N. argues that a

pupil must be referred to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation

program, as described in section 48264.5, subdivision (c), before

she comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, as

described in subdivision (d). Although A.N. acknowledges that

subdivision (c) provides that a habitual truant “may” be referred

to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program, she contends

that this discretionary language merely “reflect[s] the reality

that not every county has established a SARB.” In other words,

she claims that initial referral to a SARB is still required in any

county that has established one.

For support, A.N. looks to Senate Bill 1728’s legislative

history. Specifically, she points to a bill analysis prepared by

the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, which commented:

“Upon the failure of the earlier steps to alleviate the truancy

problem, the juvenile court may exert jurisdiction over the

minor pupil. . . . Court intervention is reserved until after other

9

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

steps have failed, so as not to overburden already heavy court

calendars until necessary.” (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep.

on Sen. Bill No. 1728 (1993–1994 Reg Sess.) as amended June

30, 1994, p. 3, italics added.) Likewise, she cites the Legislative

Counsel’s summary digest, which stated: “This bill would

provide that if a pupil who has attended certain programs

including a school attendance review board program, has a 4th

truancy in the same school year, the pupil shall be classified as

an habitual truant, within the jurisdiction of the of the court.”

(Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1728 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.)

5 Stats. 1994, Summary Dig., p. 417, italics added.) According

to A.N., this legislative history “makes clear” that the

Legislature intended to keep the requirement that a minor be

referred to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program

before the juvenile court.

First, we observe that nothing in the current statutory

scheme expressly requires initial referral to a SARB or a similar

truancy mediation program. Section 48264.5’s subdivisions

refer to actions that “may” be taken in response to a pupil’s

continued truancy or failure to complete assigned programs.

Specifically, section 48264.5, subdivision (c) states that a

habitual truant “may be referred to, and required to attend, an

attendance review board . . . .” (Italics added). We are not

persuaded by A.N.’s argument that this discretionary language

merely “reflect[s] the reality that not every county has

established a SARB,” because the subdivision also provides that

a habitual truant “may” be referred to and required to attend “a

truancy mediation program pursuant to Section 48263 or

pursuant to Section 601.3 of the Welfare and Institutions Code”

or, in a school district that does not have such a program, “a

comparable program deemed acceptable by the school district’s

10

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

attendance supervisor.” (Ibid., italics added.) Similarly, section

48263, subdivision (a) states that a school district attendance

supervisor or another designated school official “may” refer a

habitual truant “to a school attendance review board, or to the

probation department for services if the probation department

has elected to receive these referrals.” (Italics added.) Because

Senate Bill 1728 repealed former section 601.1 of the Welfare

and Institutions Code, which provided that a habitual truant

“shall” be referred to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation

program before the juvenile court, and because current

Education Code sections 48263 and 48264.5 consistently use

“may” to describe referrals to such programs, we understand the

discretionary language of the statutory scheme to authorize, but

not require, school officials to initially refer habitual truants to

SARBs or similar truancy mediation programs. (See In re

Richard E. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 349, 354 [“The ordinary import of

‘may’ is a grant of discretion.”])

Second, we note that multiple analyses of Senate Bill 1728

informed legislators that the bill would repeal the requirement

that a minor be referred to a SARB or a similar truancy

mediation program before the juvenile court. (See, e.g., Assem.

Com. on Education, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1728 (1993–1994

Reg. Sess.) as amended June 30, 1994, pp. 1, 2; Sen. 3d reading

analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1728 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) as

amended Aug. 19, 1994, pp. 1, 2; Sen. 3d reading analysis of Sen.

Bill No. 1728 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 26, 1994,

pp. 1, 2.) To this end, the Legislative Counsel’s summary digest

cited by A.N. also stated: “Under existing law, a juvenile who is

an habitual truant is required to be referred to a school

attendance review board or truancy mediation program, before

referral to the juvenile court. . . . [¶] This bill would repeal the

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In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

section on referral to the school attendance review board or

truancy mediation program . . . .” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen.

Bill No. 1728 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) 5 Stats. 1994, Summary

Dig., p. 417.)

Any contradictory statements in Senate Bill 1728’s

legislative history may be explained by the Legislature’s joint

passage of Senate Bill 1728 and Assembly Bill No. 2658 (1993–

1994 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 2658). (Stats. 1994, ch. 1024,

p. 6218.) As is relevant here, Senate Bill 1728 contained a single

provision to repeal former section 601.1 of the Welfare and

Institutions Code (Stats. 1994, ch. 1023, § 7, p. 6217), but

Assembly Bill 2658 contained alternate provisions: one that

would amend former section 601.1, and another that would

repeal former section 601.1 (Stats. 1994, ch. 1024, §§ 5, 5.5,

pp. 6222–6223). Assembly Bill 2658 clarified that if Senate Bill

1728 was enacted first and Assembly Bill 2658 was enacted

second, its provision repealing former section 601.1 would take

effect, and its provision amending former section 601.1 would

not.5 (Stats. 1994, ch. 1024, § 8, p. 6225.) Because the

Legislature passed both bills on the same day, it effectively

delegated the decision whether to amend or repeal former

5

The Legislature likely included this “double-jointing”

provision to prevent Assembly Bill 2658’s provision amending

former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code from

“chaptering-out” Senate Bill 1728’s provision repealing that

section in the event that Senate Bill 1728 was enacted first and

Assembly Bill 2658 was enacted second. (See In re Thierry

S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 727, 739–740 (Thierry S.) [explaining the

Legislature’s “double-jointing” procedure].)

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Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

section 601.1 to the Governor.6 And, by signing Senate Bill 1728

before Assembly Bill 2658, the Governor elected to repeal

section 601.1, thereby removing the express requirement that a

minor be referred to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation

program before the minor is referred to the juvenile court.7

A.N. and amicus curiae California Rural Legal Assistance

(CRLA) also contend that referring truants directly to the

juvenile court undermines the purposes of SARBs and similar

truancy mediation programs: to address the underlying sources

of attendance problems primarily through the provision of

community services and to make juvenile court intervention a

matter of last resort.

This argument is supported by several sections of the

current statutory scheme. In the article of the Education Code

governing SARBs, the Legislature has declared its intent that

“intensive guidance and coordinated community services may be

provided to meet the special needs of pupils with school

6

Handwritten annotations on the Governor’s chaptered bill

files suggest that the Governor was informed accordingly.

(Legis. Counsel, letter to Governor Pete Wilson (1993–1994 Reg.

Sess.) Sept. 21, 1994, Governor’s chaptered bill files, ch. 1023;

Legis. Counsel, letter to Governor Pete Wilson (1993–1994 Reg.

Sess.) Sept. 19, 1994, Governor’s chaptered bill files, ch. 1024.)

7

Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume the Governor

signed Senate Bill 1728 before Assembly Bill 2658, because the

former is chapter 1023, and the latter is chapter 1024 of the

Statutes of 1994. (See Gov. Code, § 9510; Thierry S., supra, 19

Cal.3d at p. 739 & fns. 10, 11 [explaining the rebuttable

presumption that chapter numbers indicate the order in which

the Governor signs bills into law].)

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Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

attendance problems or school behavior problems.”8 (§ 48320,

subd. (a).) To fulfill this intent, the Legislature has established

a step-by-step process for counties with a SARB or a probation

department that has elected to receive habitual truant referrals.

First, section 482639 authorizes school district attendance

supervisors and other designated school officials to refer

habitual truants to the SARB or to the probation department.

(§ 48263, subd. (a); see § 48264.5, subd. (c).) When issuing such

referrals, these school officials have a responsibility to provide

“documentation of the interventions undertaken at the school”

and “the reason for the referral.” (§ 48263, subd. (a).) Then, the

SARB or the probation officer must determine whether

available community services can resolve the pupil’s attendance

problems. (Id. subd. (b)(1), (b)(2).) If so, the SARB or the

probation officer is required to direct the pupil, the pupil’s

parents or guardians, or both to those services. (Id. subd. (b)(1).)

If not, section 48320 authorizes the SARB to: “(1) Propose and

promote the use of alternatives to the juvenile court system. [¶]

(2) Provide, in any proposed alternative, for maximum

utilization of community and regional resources appropriately

employed in behalf of minors prior to any involvement with the

judicial system. [¶] (3) Encourage an understanding that any

alternative based on the utilization of community resources

8

The bill that originally added this language also added

former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which

originally required initial referral to a SARB. (Stats. 1974,

ch. 1215, §§ 1, 9, pp. 2624–2625, 2629.)

9

The bill that added Education Code section 48263 also

amended former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions

Code to require initial referral to a SARB, or to a truancy

mediation program, or to both. (Stats. 1984, ch. 754, §§ 2, 4, 5,

pp. 2722–2725.)

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Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

carries an inherent agency and citizen commitment directed

toward the continuing improvement of such resources and the

creation of resources where none exist.” (§ 48320, subd. (b),

italics added.) In either case, if the pupil is ultimately referred

to the juvenile court, the SARB or the probation officer must

submit “documentation of efforts to secure attendance as well as

its recommendations on what action the juvenile court should

take in order to bring about a proper disposition of the case.”

(§ 48263, subd. (b)(2).)

Even in counties without a SARB or a probation

department that receives habitual truant referrals, section

48264.5, subdivision (c) authorizes school officials to refer

habitual truants to comparable truancy mediation programs.

The graduated structure of this section’s subdivisions seems to

contemplate, at least as a general matter, that habitual truants

will be brought to the juvenile court only after the truancy

mediation process has failed. (See § 48264.5, subds. (c), (d).)

Collectively, these sections suggest that the Legislature

intended that habitual truants typically be referred to a SARB

or a similar truancy mediation program before the juvenile

court. (See conc. opn., post, at pp. 2–3.)

As explained above, however, after Senate Bill 1728’s

repeal of former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions

Code, no section expressly requires initial referral to a SARB or

a similar truancy mediation program.10 Because Senate Bill

10

Both parties and amicus curiae CRLA also direct our

attention to Welfare and Institutions Code section 258,

subdivision (b), which provides: “If the minor is before the court

on the basis of truancy . . . [¶] (1) The judge, referee, or juvenile

hearing officer shall not proceed with a hearing unless both of

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1728 also amended section 601(b) of the Welfare and

Institutions Code to grant the juvenile court jurisdiction over

minors with “four or more truancies,” the bill may have been

intended to afford local officials the flexibility to go directly to

the juvenile court in such cases. Additionally, because the bill

granted the juvenile court the authority to direct a habitual

truant to attend a “court-approved truancy prevention

program,” the Legislature apparently contemplated that some

minors would be referred to a truancy mediation program after

the juvenile court.11 (§ 48264.5, subd. (d)(3).) In such cases,

the following have been provided to the court: [¶] (A) Evidence

that the minor’s school has undertaken the actions specified in

subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of Section 48264.5 of the Education

Code . . . . [¶ ] (B) The available record of previous attempts to

address the minor’s truancy.” Both parties and CRLA assume

that this subdivision applies to formal wardship proceedings

(see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 650) in addition to hearings by the

informal juvenile and traffic court (see Welf. & Inst. Code,

§§ 255–258). Specifically, they believe that this subdivision

requires a minor to have been referred to a SARB or a similar

truancy mediation program—and, in A.N.’s view, to have failed

to successfully complete such a program—before the juvenile

court may hold a hearing in a formal wardship proceeding on

the basis of truancy. As mentioned above, A.N. and her mother

attended a SARB meeting before the juvenile court held the trial

in the formal wardship proceeding against A.N. (See ante, p. 3.)

Because A.N. does not argue that this subdivision was violated

in her case, we do not address it here. (See also ante, p. 1, fn. 1.)

11

If the juvenile court adjudges a minor to be a ward of the

court solely on the basis of habitual truancy, the juvenile court

may order: 20 to 40 hours of community service, a fine of $50 or

less, attendance at a truancy prevention program, or suspension

or revocation of driving privileges (if the minor has previously

attended a SARB or a truancy mediation program). (Ed. Code,

§ 48264.5, subd. (d); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 601, subd. (b)

16

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

initial referral to the juvenile court may ultimately result in the

provision of services to address the underlying sources of the

pupils’ attendance problems.

For this reason, we hold that the use of a SARB or a

similar truancy mediation program is not a prerequisite to the

juvenile court’s jurisdiction in a formal wardship proceeding on

the basis of a minor having “four or more truancies within one

school year” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 601(b).

We recognize that this conclusion may be in tension with several

sections of the statutory scheme, and we appreciate A.N. and

CRLA’s contention that referring habitual truants directly to

the juvenile court is counterproductive to the goal of improving

attendance. (See generally, conc. opn., post, at pp. 3–7.) But it

is up to the Legislature to resolve any such tension and to act

upon such policy arguments, if it deems such action

appropriate.12

C. Jurisdiction on the Basis of “Four or More

Truancies”

We next turn to A.N.’s claim that Education Code section

48264.5, subdivision (d) (section 48264.5(d)) requires (1) a fourth

truancy report to be issued, and (2) that the report be issued to

the pupil and the pupil’s parents or guardians, before the

[minor who is adjudged a ward of the juvenile court solely on the

basis of habitual truancy shall not be held in a secure facility or

removed from the custody of his or her parents or guardians

except for the purposes of school attendance].)

12

We are aware that pending legislation would eliminate the

juvenile court’s jurisdiction over minors on the basis of truancy

by repealing and replacing Welfare and Institutions Code

section 601. (Assem. Bill No. 901 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) §§ 19,

20, as amended by Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Sept. 6, 2019.)

17

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a minor on the

basis of the minor having “four or more truancies within one

school year” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 601(b).

Again, Welfare and Institutions Code section 601(b)

provides in relevant part: “If a minor . . . has four or more

truancies within one school year as defined in Section 48260 of

the Education Code . . . , the minor is then within the

jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge the minor

to be a ward of the court.” (Italics added.) And, as stated above,

Education Code section 48264.5(d) provides: “The fourth time a

truancy is issued within the same school year, the pupil may be

within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court that may adjudge

the pupil to be a ward of the court pursuant to Section 601 of the

Welfare and Institutions Code.” (Italics added.)

Because these subdivisions are in pari materia, we

construe them together “so that all parts of the statutory scheme

are given effect.” (Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th

1050, 1090–1091.) In particular, we note that the same bill

(Senate Bill 1728) that amended Welfare and Institutions Code

section 601(b) to provide that a minor with “four or more

truancies” is “within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court” also

added Education Code section 48264.5(d), which originally

provided that “[u]pon the fourth truancy within the same school

year,” a pupil is “within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”

(Stats. 1994, ch. 1023, § 4, pp. 6215–2616.) For this reason, and

because one section expressly references the other, we believe

the Legislature intended “four . . . truancies” in Welfare and

Institutions Code section 601(b) and “fourth truancy” in

Education Code section 48264.5(d) to refer to the same set of

circumstances, upon which the minor comes within the

jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

18

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

1. Four “Truancies” and the “Issuance of a Fourth

Truancy”

As already discussed, section 48264.5 provides

increasingly serious consequences for a pupil’s continued

truancy or failure to complete assigned programs. As is relevant

here, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of section 48264.5 begin, “The

[first/second/third] time a truancy report is issued . . . .” (Italics

added.) But the term “report” is missing from section

48264.5(d), which begins: “The fourth time a truancy is

issued . . . .” (Italics added.)

The Court of Appeal determined that the Legislature

intentionally omitted “report” from section 48264.5(d), and it

concluded that a pupil comes within the jurisdiction of the

juvenile court if she is “truant a fourth time (i.e., accrues six or

more unexcused absences [or tardies]),” even if a fourth truancy

report has not been issued. (A.N., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at

p. 406.) Under its reasoning, a “truancy” is the minimum

number of unexcused absences or tardies needed to require the

issuance of a truancy report. Because three unexcused absences

or tardies are needed to require a first report (§ 48240), and a

subsequent unexcused absence or tardy is needed to require an

additional report (§ 48261), six unexcused absences or tardies

are needed to require a fourth report. We reach a different

interpretation.

To begin, we find the phrase “[t]he fourth time a truancy

is issued” in section 48264.5(d) to be ambiguous. As used in each

of section 48264.5’s subdivisions, “issued” is a transitive verb—

one that requires a direct object. In the first three subdivisions,

“report” follows naturally as an object of “issued” because it is a

concrete noun. In the fourth subdivision, “truancy” follows

awkwardly because it is an abstract noun, generally defined as

19

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

“an act or instance of playing truant” or “the state of being

truant.” (Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (10th ed. 1993) p. 1267.)

The Court of Appeal may have implicitly read “[t]he fourth

time a truancy is issued” in section 48264.5(d) to mean “the

fourth time a truancy report is required to be issued.” Although

this construction would solve the subdivision’s grammatical

problems, it would also mean that the consequences of

subdivision (d) would be triggered by an unexcused absence or

tardy, whereas the consequences of subdivisions (a), (b), and (c)

would be triggered by the issuance of a truancy report. This

could lead to the odd result that a pupil could be subject to the

most serious consequences of the statutory scheme in

subdivision (d) without being subject to the least serious

consequences in subdivision (a), in the event that she accrues a

sixth unexcused absence or tardy before being reported as

truant.

We believe a better interpretation of section 48264.5(d) is

“the fourth time a truancy report is issued.” Specifically, the

parallel structure of section 48264.5’s subdivisions indicates

that the Legislature intended subsequent occurrences of the

same event—the issuance of a truancy report—to trigger the

increasingly serious consequences of the section. More

generally, when section 48264.5 is read in context, it seems that

the Legislature did not intend unexcused absences or tardies to

trigger increasingly serious consequences unless they are

reported in accordance with the statutory scheme. For example,

a third unexcused absence or tardy does not lead to any

consequences unless the pupil is “reported to the attendance

supervisor or to the superintendent of the school district” as

required by section 48260. (See § 48264.5, subd. (a).) A fourth

unexcused absence or tardy does not lead to more serious

20

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

consequences unless the pupil “has once been reported as a

truant” and is “again . . . reported as a truant” as required by

section 48261. (See § 48264.5, subd. (b).) Likewise, a fifth

unexcused absence or tardy does not lead to classification as a

habitual truant and to more serious consequences unless the

pupil is “again . . . reported as a truant” as required by section

48261. (See §§ 48262, 48264.5, subd. (c).) This suggests that a

sixth unexcused absence or tardy should not lead to the most

serious consequences of the statutory scheme unless the pupil is

“again . . . reported as a truant” as required by section 48261.

(See § 48264.5, subd. (d).)

Even if the Legislature intentionally omitted the term

“report” from subdivision (d), we do not believe it intended the

omission to have substantive significance. When the

Legislature added section 48264.5 in 1994, the section’s

subdivisions began: “Upon the [first/second/third/fourth]

truancy . . . .” (Stats. 1994, ch. 1023, § 4, p. 6215). Thus, the

subdivisions originally shared identical language and meaning;

successive “truanc[ies]” triggered the increasingly serious

consequences of each subdivision. In 2001, the Legislature

amended the section such that subdivisions (a), (b), and (c)

began, “The [first/second/third] time a truancy report is

required . . . ,” and subdivision (d) began, “The fourth time a

truancy is required to be reported . . . .” (Stats. 2001, ch. 734,

§ 29, pp. 5786–5787.) At this time, the introductory language of

subdivision (d) was slightly different from that of the other

subdivisions, but its meaning was the same; successive

truancies continued to trigger the increasingly serious

consequences of each subdivision because successive truancies

required successive reports under section 48261. In 2012, the

Legislature again amended the section such that subdivisions

21

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

(a), (b), and (c) now begin, “The [first/second/third] time a

truancy report is issued . . . ,” and subdivision (d) now begins,

“The fourth time a truancy is issued . . . .” (Stats. 2012, ch. 432,

§ 2.) With the 2012 amendment, the Legislature substituted

“issued” for “required” in subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) and for

“required to be reported” in subdivision (d). The apparent

purpose of this amendment was to clarify that successive

truancies must be reported in order to trigger the increasingly

serious consequences of each subdivision. Nothing in the

legislative history suggests that the Legislature intended the

language in subdivision (d) to have different meaning than the

language of the other subdivisions.

For these reasons, we interpret “[t]he fourth time a

truancy is issued” in section 48264.5(d) to mean “the fourth time

a truancy report is issued.” Accordingly, we read “four or more

truancies” in Welfare and Institutions Code section 601(b) to

refer to four or more acts of being truant that have been reported

in accordance with the statutory scheme.

2. Recipient of Truancy Reports

Next, we must determine the appropriate recipient of the

truancy reports referenced in section 48264.5. A.N. contends

that each of the section’s subdivisions requires a report be sent

to the pupil’s parents or guardians before the juvenile court may

exercise jurisdiction. In response, the Attorney General argues

that the subdivisions reference the internal reports that must

be sent to the attendance supervisor or the superintendent of

the school district under sections 48260 and 48261. He observes,

“[A.N.]’s argument may rest on a misapprehension that the

‘truancy reports’ in section 48264.5 are parental notifications

[required by section 48260.5].”

22

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

As referenced above, section 48260, subdivision (a)

requires a pupil to “be reported to the attendance supervisor or

to the superintendent of the school district” upon his or her third

unexcused absence or tardy. (Italics added.) Likewise, section

48261 requires a pupil previously “reported as a truant” to

“again be reported as a truant to the attendance supervisor or

the superintendent of the district” if he or she is again absent or

tardy without excuse. (Italics added.) Moreover, section 48262

provides that a pupil who “has been reported as a truant three

or more times per school year” is a habitual truant, provided

that a school official has made “a conscientious effort to hold at

least one conference with a parent or guardian of the pupil and

the pupil himself, after the filing of either of the reports required

by Section 48260 or Section 48261.” (Italics added.) Meanwhile,

section 48260.5, requires the school district to “notify the pupil’s

parent or guardian” upon the pupil’s “initial classification as a

truant.” (Italics added.)

The Attorney General has the better interpretation.

Section 48264.5’s references to “truancy report[s]” must be

interpreted in light of the entire statutory scheme. “[W]hen the

same word appears in different places within a statutory

scheme, courts generally presume the Legislature intended the

word to have the same meaning each time it is used.” (People v.

Gray (2014) 58 Cal.4th 901, 906.) Accordingly, we presume the

Legislature used “report” in section 48264.5 as a cross reference

to “reports” in section 48262 and “reported” in sections 48260

and 48261, not to “notify” in section 48260.5. Additionally, we

note that section 48260.5 requires a parental notification only

upon the pupil’s initial classification as a truant, whereas

sections 48260 and 48261 require reports to be issued to the

attendance supervisor or the superintendent upon the pupil’s

23

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

initial classification as a truant and upon every subsequent

unexcused absence or tardy. Therefore, the “first time,” “second

time,” and “third time” a “truancy report is issued” in

subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of section 48264.5 more likely refer

to the reports required by sections 48260 and 48261. This

interpretation ensures that school officials are informed of a

pupil’s continued truancy and thus can take appropriate steps

to address the situation, such as requesting the pupil and the

pupil’s parent or guardian attend a meeting (§ 48264.5,

subd. (a)), assigning the pupil to an afterschool or weekend

study program (id., subd. (b)), requiring the pupil to attend a

SARB meeting or a similar truancy mediation program (id.,

subd. (c); see §§ 48260.6, subd. (a); 48263, subd. (a)), or issuing

a notice to appear in juvenile court (§ 48264,5, subd. (d); see

Welf. & Inst. Code, § 601, subd. (d)).

A.N. and CRLA argue that this construction would violate

the due process rights of pupils and their parents and guardians.

Assuming A.N. did not forfeit this argument by failing to raise

it in her opening brief, we reject it on the merits. Although

section 48264.5 does not require external reports be sent to the

pupil’s home, government officials must comply with basic due

process requirements, including the statutory provisions meant

to ensure the pupil and his or her parents or guardians receive

adequate notice of the pupil’s truancy and the potential

consequences. For example, section 51101, subdivision (a)(4)

requires the pupil’s parent or guardian “[t]o be notified on a

timely basis if their child is absent from school without

permission.” As previously explained, section 48260.5 requires

the school district to notify the pupil’s parent or guardian upon

the pupil’s “initial classification as a truant.” Additionally,

section 48262 provides that “no pupil shall be deemed an

24

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

habitual truant unless an appropriate district officer or

employee has made a conscientious effort to hold at least one

conference with a parent or guardian of the pupil and the pupil

himself, after the filing of either of the reports required by

Section 48260 or Section 48261.”13

Therefore, we hold that a fourth truancy report must be

issued to the attendance supervisor or the superintendent of the

school district before the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction

over a minor on the basis of the minor’s “four or more truancies

within one school year” under Welfare and Institutions Code

section 601(b).

D. The District Attorney’s Petition Against A.N.

Finally, we consider whether the juvenile court had

jurisdiction over A.N.

The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court had

jurisdiction on the basis of A.N.’s “four or more truancies within

one school year” under Welfare and Institutions Code section

601(b), but the court did not consider whether a fourth truancy

report had been issued to the attendance supervisor or the

superintendent of the school district. (A.N., supra, 11

Cal.App.5th at pp. 406–407.) Before this court, the Attorney

General argues that a fourth truancy report had been issued.

13

As referenced above, section 48262 defines a

“conscientious effort” as “attempting to communicate with the

parents of the pupil at least once using the most cost-effective

method possible, which may include electronic mail or a

telephone call.” (See ante, p. 3, fn. 4.) We do not address

whether the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a

minor when a school official has made a conscientious effort to

communicate with the minor’s parents or guardians but has

been unable to actually communicate with them. (See ibid.)

25

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

A.N. does not argue otherwise, and the record supports the

Attorney General’s argument. Specifically, A.N.’s attendance

supervisor testified that a computerized system automatically

sends a report to the school district whenever a teacher records

a student as absent from or tardy to class and that the same

system generates student attendance profiles that provide

attendance supervisors with a list of each student’s recorded

unexcused absences and tardies. A.N.’s student attendance

profile lists dozens of recorded unexcused absences or tardies

prior to the filing of the wardship petition. Consequently, the

juvenile court had jurisdiction over A.N. on the basis of A.N.’s

four or more acts of being truant that were reported in

accordance with the statutory scheme.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeal declared that A.N. “refused to go to

school” and “demonstrated [an] unwavering commitment to

avoiding an education.” (A.N., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 405.)

But the record suggests that A.N.’s attendance problems arose

out of difficult circumstances at home and in her personal life.

Both parties and amicus curiae CRLA agree that students often

fall into truancy for reasons beyond their control. (See conc.

opn., post, at p. 4.) The Court of Appeal also opined that school

officials “did everything they could and should do to educate—

not abandon—A.N.” (A.N., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 406.)

But a SARB meeting was not held until A.N. had accumulated

dozens of unexcused absences or tardies, and there is no

evidence that any services were provided to her or her parents.

When a habitual truant is adjudged a ward of the juvenile court

but is never offered any services to address the underlying

causes of his or her attendance problems, we question whether

the statutory scheme functions as the Legislature expected.

26

In re A.N.

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

That being said, we agree that the juvenile court possessed

jurisdiction over A.N. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the

Court of Appeal.

CHIN, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

27

In Re A.N.

S242494

Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu

I agree with today’s opinion that Welfare and Institutions

Code section 601, subdivision (b) (section 601(b)) authorizes

juvenile court jurisdiction upon a minor’s fourth truancy, even

if the minor has not received services through a school

attendance review board (SARB) or similar truancy mediation

program. I write separately to highlight the tension between

section 601(b)’s grant of jurisdiction and the rehabilitative and

diversionary purpose of the Education Code’s SARB provisions.

(See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13–17.) Those provisions signal the

Legislature’s recognition that school attendance problems are

often traceable to family instability, poverty, homelessness,

transportation issues, safety concerns, trauma, mental health

challenges, or learning disabilities, and that appropriate

guidance and assistance to students and their families can

ameliorate such problems. By contrast, as studies have shown,

a wardship petition in juvenile court may put students on a

different path — one that significantly increases their likelihood

of dropping out of school and entering the criminal justice

system. Given its potentially profound consequences, it is

widely believed that juvenile court involvement should be “a

matter of last resort.” (Id. at p. 13.) The jurisdictional statute

at issue in this case is a funnel into what many call the school-

to-prison pipeline. In light of today’s decision, the Legislature

1

In re A.N.

Liu, J., concurring

may wish to revisit what services or interventions are required

before a student can be put onto this unpromising path.

Education Code section 48320, subdivision (a) provides

that in establishing SARBs and defining their broad authority,

“it is the intent of the Legislature that intensive guidance and

coordinated community services may be provided to meet the

special needs of pupils with school attendance problems or

school behavior problems.” “Composed of representatives from

various youth-serving agencies, SARBs help truant or

recalcitrant students and their parents or guardians solve

school attendance and behavior problems through the use of

available school and community resources.” (SARB Handbook:

A Road Map for Improved School Attendance and Behavior

(2018) p. 11 (SARB Handbook); see Ed. Code, § 48321, subds.

(a)(2) & (b)(1).) According to the State SARB, “the Legislature

enacted . . . [s]ection 48320 to enhance the enforcement of

compulsory education laws and to divert students with school

attendance or behavior problems from the juvenile justice

system until all available resources have been exhausted.”

(SARB Handbook, p. 10; see Ed. Code, § 48325.)

Other provisions of the Education Code also evince the

Legislature’s intent that “minors typically be referred to a SARB

or a similar truancy mediation program before the juvenile

court.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.) Education Code section

48264.5 establishes a step-by-step process for addressing “the

root causes” of school attendance problems (Ed. Code, § 48264.5,

subd. (a)) and for utilizing SARBs or a similar truancy

mediation program to improve attendance (id., subd. (c)) in a

manner consistent with the due process rights of students and

their parents. To initiate the SARB process, the “school district

supervisor of attendance” or another designated school official

2

In re A.N.

Liu, J., concurring

must first refer the minor to the SARB. (Id., § 48263, subd. (a).)

Upon referral, the SARB then “determines [whether] available

community services can resolve the problem of the truant or

insubordinate pupil.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).) Education Code section

48320, subdivision (b) directs SARBs to: “(1) Propose and

promote the use of alternatives to the juvenile court system.

[¶] (2) Provide, in any proposed alternative, for maximum

utilization of community and regional resources appropriately

employed in behalf of minors prior to any involvement with the

judicial system. [¶] (3) Encourage an understanding that any

alternative based on the utilization of community resources

carries an inherent agency and citizen commitment directed

toward the continuing improvement of such resources and the

creation of resources where none exist.” (See also id., § 32261,

subd. (b) [“the establishment of an interagency coordination

system is the most efficient and long-lasting means of resolving

school and community problems of truancy and crime”].) If the

SARB concludes that “available community services cannot

resolve the problem” or if “the pupil or the parents or guardians

of the pupil, or both, have failed to respond to [SARB]

directives,” the SARB may refer the minor to juvenile court.

(Id., § 48263, subd. (b)(2).) These statutes envision

individualized guidance and community-based services

coordinated through SARBs or a similar mechanism as

preferred alternatives to juvenile court intervention.

The desirability of such alternatives is supported by

empirical studies. (See, e.g., Petrosino et al., Formal System

Processing of Juveniles: Effects on Delinquency: A Systematic

Review (2010) Campbell Systematic Reviews, at p. 36 [reviewing

29 controlled trials and finding that juvenile court intervention

increases the severity and frequency of subsequent delinquency,

3

In re A.N.

Liu, J., concurring

especially compared to diversionary alternatives]; Petitclerc et

al., Effects of Juvenile Court Exposure on Crime in Young

Adulthood (2013) 54 J. Child Psych. & Psychiatry 291, 294

[identifying increased criminality into early adulthood among

minors exposed to the juvenile court system, after controlling for

covariates].) It is also supported by the experiences of juvenile

court judges and other judicial branch officers. (See Coalition

for Juvenile Justice, Positive Power: Exercising Judicial

Leadership to Prevent Court Involvement and Incarceration of

Non-Delinquent Youth (2012) pp. 6–7 [reporting judicial

perspective that “bringing youth petitioned as truants before

[the] court failed to improve their academic performance or

attendance” and that “school-based and family-based responses

to high-need youth” resulted in better outcomes]; id. at pp. 5–14

[collecting similar perspectives from juvenile court judges].)

A 2012 Judicial Council of California report noted that

“[t]ruant children and children with school behavior problems

tend to come from poor minority families that may be

experiencing unemployment, hunger, housing issues,

transportation issues, family dissolution or dysfunction,

domestic violence, or community safety issues. Children may

also have learning disabilities or other issues that impact their

ability to attend school. . . . As such, truancy and school behavior

interventions should involve addressing child and family issues

holistically . . . . Interventions should be supportive and involve

the least punitive responses available, while at the same time

reinforcing student and parent accountability . . . . They should

also focus on re-engaging the student in school, including

attention to both attendance and academic problems.” (Judicial

Council of Cal., Truancy and School Discipline: An Overview of

the Literature and Statistics (2012) p. 11, citations omitted.)

4

In re A.N.

Liu, J., concurring

Since 2014, the Judicial Council’s Keeping Kids in School

and Out of Court (KKIS) Initiative has worked to “change[]

attitudes regarding school discipline in California” by promoting

diversionary alternatives to the justice system. (Judicial

Council of California, Summit Caps Five-Year Effort to Keep

Kids in School and Out of Court (2020) <https://newsroom.courts

.ca.gov/news/KKIS_rural_summit> [as of May 4, 2020]; all

Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, docket

number, and case name at <http://www.courts.ca.gov/

38324.htm>.) The KKIS Initiative has collected research

suggesting the greater efficacy of community-based services

than juvenile court intervention in addressing the causes of

truancy and in improving school attendance and outcomes.

(Judicial Council of Cal., Keeping Kids in School and Out of

Court Initiative (2020) <https://www.courts.ca.gov/23902.htm>

[as of May 4, 2020].) The initiative has also promoted a range

of alternatives, including informal youth courts, community

collaborations, and SARBs, that are designed to prevent

students from entering the school-to-prison pipeline. (Ibid.)

Before 1994, “former section 601.1 of the Welfare and

Institutions Code mandated initial referral to a SARB or a

similar truancy mediation program, and section 601(b) formerly

provided only two bases of juvenile court jurisdiction—both of

which contemplated the prior use of a SARB or a similar truancy

mediation program.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.) In that context,

we explained that “[t]he Education Code establishes a

comprehensive mechanism for dealing with truants ranging

from resort to various community programs, to special

mediation programs. [Citations.] Truants are not, except in

aggravated circumstances involving ‘habitual’ offenders, subject

to the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts.” (In re James D. (1987)

5

In re A.N.

Liu, J., concurring

43 Cal.3d 903, 910.) Six unexcused absences, comprising four

truancies, did not constitute “aggravated circumstances” at that

time. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 8–9.) We observed that “[t]he

Legislature’s move towards utilizing the school attendance

review boards as a condition precedent to the juvenile court’s

intervention is understandable and in keeping with legal

commentary calling for greater participation of school and social

welfare professionals, even to the exclusion of the juvenile

court’s jurisdiction.” (In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283,

290.)

As today’s opinion explains, the Legislature in 1994

repealed former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions

Code and amended section 601(b) to authorize juvenile court

jurisdiction after six unexcused absences. (Maj. opn., ante, at

pp. 8–9.) Even so, the 1994 legislation encouraged SARB

intervention before juvenile court jurisdiction. According to its

summary digest, the bill “provide[d] that if a pupil who has

attended certain programs including a school attendance review

board program, has a 4th truancy in the same school year, the

pupil shall be classified as an habitual truant, within the

jurisdiction of the court, and may be adjudged a ward of the

court.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1728 (1993-1994

Reg. Sess.) 5 Stats. 1994, Summary Dig., p. 417, italics added.)

In cases like A.N.’s, the diversionary purpose of SARBs

appears compromised by section 601(b)’s grant of jurisdiction to

the juvenile court before the student has had an opportunity to

benefit from SARB services. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 26 [“we

question whether the statutory scheme functions as the

Legislature expected”].) The record here indicates that at least

some of A.N.’s school attendance difficulties arose from

challenging circumstances beyond her control. Less than a year

6

In re A.N.

Liu, J., concurring

before her multiple ninth grade absences, a school counselor

reported that A.N. was “feeling very troubled” because her

nephew Daniel, whom she cared for regularly, was taken away

from her family by Child Protective Services. This event, the

counselor wrote, led A.N. to “engag[e] in self-mutilation.” Yet

before the school district referred A.N. to a SARB that could

offer her services to identify and ameliorate these difficulties,

the District Attorney filed a wardship petition against her.

The broad prosecutorial discretion arising under section

601(b) extends to an enormous number of students. In the

2018–2019 school year, at least 650,000 students in California

public schools — nearly one-eighth of our schoolchildren — were

chronically absent, meaning they were absent at least 10

percent of the school year, which is three times the number of

absences necessary to be classified as an habitual truant.

(Keeping Kids in School and Out of Court Initiative, About

Chronic Absenteeism and School Discipline (2019)

<https://www.courts.ca.gov/23904.htm> [as of May 4, 2020].)

The highest rates of chronic absenteeism were observed among

African American, American Indian, and Latino students.

(Ibid.)

Not all counties have pursued truancy prosecutions as

aggressively as Ventura County, where the petition against A.N.

was filed. According to Ventura County’s 2015–2016 annual

SARB report, the District Attorney cited 869 students and 482

parents for truancy that school year. (Ventura County Off. of

Education, Ventura County School Attendance Review Board

Data Summary 2015-2016 (2016).) Amicus curiae California

Rural Legal Assistance notes that Ventura County children and

their parents were criminally charged at “much higher rates

than students and parents in other counties.” (See Pen. Code,

7

In re A.N.

Liu, J., concurring

§ 270.1 [authorizing criminal prosecution of parents and

guardians for their child’s truancy]; Ed. Code, § 48293

[authorizing civil penalties ranging from $100 to $1000].) By

contrast, Los Angeles County, which serves 10 times as many

students, reported only 43 referrals to juvenile court during that

same period. (Los Angeles County Off. of Education, Annual

School Attendance Review Board (SARB) Report 2015-2016:

Final Report (2016).) In light of such stark disparities, the

Legislature may wish to reconsider the breadth of jurisdiction

conferred by section 601(b). (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 17, fn. 12

[citing pending legislation that would eliminate juvenile court

jurisdiction on the basis of four or more truancies].)

In sum, although the language of section 601(b) compels

today’s holding, the statute is in substantial tension with the

Legislature’s evident purpose in the Education Code to

encourage diversionary alternatives to juvenile court

intervention. This tension warrants renewed legislative

consideration.

LIU, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

8

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion In re A.N.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XXX 11 Cal.App.5th 403

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S242494

Date Filed: May 4, 2020

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Ventura

Judge: William R. Redmond

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Stephen P. Lipson and Todd W. Howeth, Public Defenders, Michael C. McMahon, Chief Deputy Public

Defender, and William Quest, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant.

Franchesca S. Verdin, Monica De La Hoya and Cynthia L. Rice for California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc.,

as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Janill L. Richards, Deputy State Solicitor General,

Christina Bull Arndt, Scott A. Taryle and Tannaz Kouhpainezhad, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff

and Respondent.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

William Quest

Senior Deputy Public Defender

800 S. Victoria Ave., 2nd Floor

Ventura, CA 93009

(850) 654-3032

Christina Bull Arndt

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

300 South Spring St., Suite 1702

Los Angeles, CA 90013

(213) 269-6383