The opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JASON LEE BROWN :
:
Appellant : No. 2741 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered August 20, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-23-CR-0000151-2003
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED APRIL 27, 2020
Jason Lee Brown appeals from the denial of his application for relief.
Because the application is properly considered a petition under the Post-
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, and because Brown
is no longer serving his sentence, we affirm.
On December 1, 2003, Brown pleaded guilty to robbery and was
sentenced to not less than two nor more than five years of incarceration. He
filed the instant application for relief on August 9, 2019, and the trial court
denied it on August 20, 2019. Brown filed a timely notice of appeal pro se.
In his appellate brief, which fails to comport with the briefing
requirements set forth in our rules of appellate procedure, Brown claims that
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he is entitled to dismissal of all charges because his rights to a jury trial and
to confront his victim were violated when he entered a guilty plea to robbery.1
“It is well-settled that the PCRA is intended to be the sole means of
achieving post-conviction relief.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462,
465 (Pa.Super. 2013); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (“The action established
in this subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and
encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same
purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect”).
Brown’s claims challenging his knowing waiver of his right to a jury trial
and his right to confront witnesses, concern the legality of his conviction and
are clearly encompassed by the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(iii).
Hence, Brown’s application for relief is properly considered a PCRA petition.
The law is clear that a petitioner is not eligible for PCRA relief if his sentence
is complete. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i); Commonwealth v. Ahlborn,
699 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. 1997). As Brown’s sentence was for a maximum of
five years’ incarceration beginning in December 2003, he is no longer serving
his sentence. He was thus ineligible for PCRA relief, and we affirm the PCRA
court’s order.
Order affirmed. Application for remand denied as moot.
____________________________________________
1Although Brown also claims that the PCRA court failed to serve a copy of its
order on him, we note that Brown learned of the denial of his application and
was able to file a timely notice of appeal.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/27/20
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