People v. Orozco

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ERNEST OROZCO,

Defendant and Appellant.

S249495

Fourth Appellate District, Division One

D067313

San Diego County Superior Court

SCN335521

March 26, 2020

Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief

Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Kruger

and Groban concurred.

Justice Cuéllar filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

PEOPLE v. OROZCO

S249495

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act,

amended several statutory provisions to reduce certain criminal

offenses from felonies to misdemeanors. Here we consider

whether Proposition 47 applies to an offense under Penal Code

section 496d, subdivision (a), which criminalizes receipt of a

stolen vehicle. (All undesignated statutory citations are to the

Penal Code.) Proposition 47 amended section 496, the general

statute that criminalizes receipt of stolen property, by making

the offense a misdemeanor whenever the value of the property

does not exceed $950. (§ 496, subd. (a) (§ 496(a)).) But

Proposition 47 did not amend section 496d.

Defendant Ernest Orozco pleaded guilty to one felony

count of “unlawfully buying, receiving, concealing, selling or

withholding a stolen vehicle” in violation of section 496d. He

argues that Proposition 47 applies to his offense and seeks to

reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor. The Court of Appeal

held that Proposition 47’s revision to section 496, making the

offense of receiving stolen property a misdemeanor when the

value of the property is $950 or less, does not extend to

convictions for receiving a stolen vehicle under section 496d. We

agree.

I.

Orozco was stopped by police officers on August 7, 2014

while he was driving in Escondido. A routine license plate check

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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

indicated the car Orozco was driving had been reported stolen.

According to the police report, Orozco was the only occupant of

the vehicle, and the car had a damaged ignition starter and was

running without a key. The police report listed the value of the

vehicle as $301. Orozco pleaded guilty to one count of

unlawfully driving a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section

10851, subdivision (a), and one count of receiving a stolen

vehicle in violation of Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a).

He also admitted to three prior convictions for violating Vehicle

Code section 10851 and eight prior prison terms under Penal

Code section 667.5. His prior Vehicle Code section 10851

convictions required him to be sentenced as a felon under section

666.5 for his two August 2014 convictions.

After Orozco pleaded guilty, California voters enacted

Proposition 47. On December 11, 2014, Orozco filed a motion

under Proposition 47 to reduce both his convictions to

misdemeanors. Because Orozco had not yet been sentenced, he

sought relief directly under the new law rather than

resentencing under section 1170.18, subdivision (a). (See People

v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1135 [“Because defendant had not

yet been sentenced at the time Proposition 47 became effective,

its ameliorative provisions apply.”].) The trial court denied

Orozco’s motion and treated both convictions as felonies.

Orozco appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. We

granted review and transferred the case to the Court of Appeal

for reconsideration in light of our decision in People v. Page

(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page). Page held that under Proposition

47, “obtaining an automobile worth $950 or less by theft . . . is

punishable only as a misdemeanor, regardless of the statutory

section under which the theft was charged.” (Page, at p. 1187.)

Upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeal affirmed Orozco’s

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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851 without prejudice

to his filing an amended petition to show that the conviction was

based on theft of a vehicle worth $950 or less. The Court of

Appeal further held that Proposition 47’s revisions to section

496 did not affect Orozco’s conviction under section 496d. We

then granted review on the latter issue.

II.

As amended by Proposition 47, section 496(a) provides in

part: “Every person who buys or receives any property that has

been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner

constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so

stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in

concealing, selling, or withholding any property from the owner,

knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be

punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one

year, or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section

1170. However, if the value of the property does not exceed nine

hundred fifty dollars ($950), the offense shall be a misdemeanor,

punishable only by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding

one year . . . .” (Italics added.) The italicized sentence indicates

the portion of the statute amended by Proposition 47. Before

Proposition 47, that sentence read: “However, if the district

attorney or the grand jury determines that this action would be

in the interests of justice, the district attorney or the grand jury,

as the case may be, may, if the value of the property does not

exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950), specify in the

accusatory pleading that the offense shall be a misdemeanor,

punishable only by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding

one year.” (Former § 496(a); see Voter Information Guide, Gen.

Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, § 9, p. 72.) In other words,

receiving stolen property worth $950 or less was previously a

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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

“wobbler” offense, i.e., a crime punishable as either a felony or a

misdemeanor. As a result of Proposition 47, the statute now

dictates that “the offense shall be a misdemeanor.” (§ 496(a).)

Section 496d, subdivision (a) also criminalizes buying or

receiving stolen property, but it applies specifically to buying or

receiving a stolen “motor vehicle, as defined in Section 415 of the

Vehicle Code, any trailer, as defined in Section 630 of the

Vehicle Code, any special construction equipment, as defined in

Section 565 of the Vehicle Code, or any vessel, as defined in

Section 21 of the Harbors and Navigation Code . . . .” (§ 496d,

subd. (a).) A violation of this statute is a wobbler offense:

receiving a stolen vehicle “shall be punished by imprisonment

. . . for 16 months or two or three years or a fine of not more than

ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both, or by imprisonment in a

county jail not to exceed one year or a fine of not more than one

thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.” (Ibid.) As noted,

Proposition 47 did not amend section 496d.

Orozco contends that because the term “any property” in

section 496(a) includes automobiles, his conviction for receiving

a stolen vehicle in violation of section 496d must be treated as a

misdemeanor under the amended language of section 496(a).

The Attorney General argues that Orozco’s conviction for

receiving a stolen vehicle is unaffected by Proposition 47’s

amendment of section 496 because section 496d is a “separate

and distinct” statute from section 496.

“We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain

and commonsense meaning” “in the context of the statutory

framework as a whole.” (Coalition of Concerned Communities,

Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737.) Orozco

was charged and convicted under section 496d and not section

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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

496(a), a separate statute. Proposition 47 amended section

496(a) to require receipt of stolen property worth $950 or less to

be punished as a misdemeanor. It did not add a similar

provision to section 496d. Section 496d remains the same as it

was prior to the enactment of Proposition 47. It makes no

reference to a value threshold below which receipt of a stolen

vehicle must be punished as a misdemeanor.

It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that

when voters have “ ‘ “employed a term or phrase in one place

and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where

excluded.” ’ ” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 880

(Buycks).) In Buycks, we examined whether section 1170.18,

subdivision (k), enacted by Proposition 47, “retroactively

mitigates the already-imposed collateral consequence of a felony

conviction that is subsequently reduced under [Proposition 47].”

(Buycks, at p. 878.) Section 1170.18, subdivision (k) provides

that a felony conviction reduced by Proposition 47 to a

misdemeanor “shall be considered a misdemeanor for all

purposes.” In Buycks, we acknowledged that the statute’s text

clearly reduces the future collateral consequences of offenses

that Proposition 47 reduces. But we noted that the language is

silent as to whether it also reduces the already-imposed

collateral consequences of such offenses. (Buycks, at p. 878.) We

found it “significant” that the language in subdivisions (a)

and (f) of section 1170.18, nearby provisions which Proposition

47 also added, clearly reflect an intent to have full retroactive

application. (Buycks, at p. 880.) Because section 1170.18,

subdivision (k) “uses no similar language,” we held that it does

not have full retroactive effect. (Buycks, at p. 881.)

The same reasoning applies here. “[W]e generally

presume that the electorate is aware of existing laws.” (People

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v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903, 909, citing In re Lance W.

(1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890 & fn. 10.) We therefore presume it

was aware of section 496d when it approved Proposition 47.

Proposition 47 only amended section 496(a) to reduce receipt of

stolen property valued at $950 or less to a misdemeanor. If the

electorate had intended to reclassify section 496d offenses as

well, it could have done so in the same way that it did in

amending section 496(a). It also could have created a new

misdemeanor sentencing provision governing all receipt of

stolen property offenses, akin to the misdemeanor sentencing

provision governing petty theft in section 490.2, which, as

discussed below, reclassified offenses for theft of property valued

at $950 or less into the offense of petty theft. But the electorate

did not do so. Based on this straightforward reading, Orozco’s

section 496d conviction is not eligible for a sentence reduction

under Proposition 47.

Orozco argues that the term “any property” in section

496(a) renders his conviction under section 496d a

misdemeanor. He relies on our decision in Page, supra, 3

Cal.5th 1175, where we examined the reach of Proposition 47’s

petty theft provision, section 490.2. Section 490.2, subdivision

(a) provides: “Notwithstanding Section 487 or any other

provision of law defining grand theft, obtaining any property by

theft where the value of the money, labor, real or personal

property taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950)

shall be considered petty theft and shall be punished as a

misdemeanor . . . .” The defendant in Page had received a felony

conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851, which “may be

violated in several ways, including by theft of the vehicle.”

(Page, at p. 1180.) The question was whether the defendant

could be resentenced to a misdemeanor term under section 490.2

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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

if his Vehicle Code section 10851 conviction was based on theft

of a vehicle worth $950 or less.

In answering yes, we held that “Proposition 47’s new petty

theft provision, section 490.2, covers the theft form of the

Vehicle Code section 10851 offense,” even though Vehicle Code

section 10851 was not amended by Proposition 47 and “is not

mentioned in the opening clause of section 490.2,

subdivision (a).” (Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 1183, 1186.) We

explained that “the operative language” of section 490.2

“ ‘stands on its own and means what it says — the act of

“obtaining any property by theft where the value . . . does not

exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950)” constitutes petty theft

and must be charged as a misdemeanor.’ ” (Page, at p. 1186.)

Because “[a]n automobile is personal property,” we said, “ ‘an

offender who obtains a car valued at less than $950 by

theft must be charged with petty theft and may not be charged

as a felon under any other criminal provision.’ ” (Id. at p. 1183.)

Page also concluded that the ballot material was

consistent with this reading. We noted the Legislative Analyst’s

explanation in the Proposition 47 voter guide, which said that

“under existing law, theft of property worth $950 or less could

be charged as a felony ‘if the crime involves the theft of certain

property (such as cars).’ (Voter Information Guide, supra,

analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, p. 35.) Under the

initiative, according to the analysis, such crimes would no longer

be charged as grand theft ‘solely because of the type of property

involved.’ ” (Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1187.)

According to Orozco, the term “any property” in section

496(a) is just as encompassing as the term “any property” in

section 490.2. Therefore, under Page’s logic, the act of receiving

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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

a stolen vehicle worth $950 or less is punishable only as a

misdemeanor under Proposition 47’s amendment of section

496(a), even if the offense was prosecuted under section 496d.

The Court of Appeal in People v. Wehr (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 123

(Wehr), relied on the same reasoning: “Just as section 490.2

applies to obtaining any property by theft, section 496 applies to

‘buy[ing] or receiv[ing] any property that has been stolen.’

(§ 496, subd. (a), italics added.) . . . . Thus, receiving a stolen car

valued at no more than $950 must be treated as a misdemeanor

pursuant to section 496.” (Id. at p. 131.)

However, section 490.2 differs from section 496(a) in two

ways that together make Orozco’s analogy inapt. First, section

490.2 is intended to reclassify conduct previously criminalized

by other offenses into the offense of petty theft. Instead of

modifying the penalties for the existing grand theft statutes,

section 490.2 separately defines a category of conduct called

“petty theft” that sweeps broadly to include theft of any property

valued at $950 or less. (See Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1183

[“[S]ection 490.2, subdivision (a), mandates misdemeanor

punishment for a defendant who ‘obtain[ed] any property by

theft’ where the property is worth no more than $950.”].) For

this reason, “ ‘the independent clause [in section 490.2]

containing the definition of petty theft stands on its own and

means what it says.’ ” (Page, at p. 1186.) Section 490.2 was

therefore intended to function as a sweeping catch-all that

would capture all forms of theft, including those chargeable

under Penal Code section 484e or Vehicle Code section 10851.

Proposition 47’s amendment to section 496(a), by contrast,

does not exhibit the same intent to reclassify conduct

criminalized by section 496d. Section 496(a) is a longstanding

statute that previously authorized charging receipt of stolen

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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

property as a felony regardless of the property’s value. As a

result of Proposition 47, section 496(a) was amended to state

that “if the value of the property does not exceed [$950], the

offense shall be a misdemeanor . . . . ” (Italics added.)

Proposition 47’s amendment to section 496(a) did not create a

new offense or purport to broadly reclassify several existing

offenses, but rather reduced the punishment for a subset of an

existing offense. The term “the offense” in the amended portion

plainly refers to the offense specified in the previous sentence,

i.e., receipt of stolen property punished under section 496(a).

Thus, unlike section 490.2, the clause in section 496(a) reducing

punishment for receipt of stolen property valued at $950 or less

does not “ ‘stand[] on its own.’ ” (Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at

p. 1186.) It refers exclusively to offenses punished under section

496(a). The amended statute says nothing about an offense

under section 496d, suggesting that the drafters intended to

allow prosecutors to retain their discretion to charge section

496d offenses involving vehicles worth $950 or less as felonies.

Second, section 490.2 applies “[n]otwithstanding Section

487 or any other provision of law defining grand theft.” (§ 490.2,

subd. (a).) In Page, we concluded that this “notwithstanding”

clause did not limit the application of the operative part of

section 490.2 (Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1186), but we did not

say that the clause was irrelevant either. Rather, we

acknowledged that the “notwithstanding” clause “saves [the]

operation [of the statute] against interference from other

statutory provisions defining certain conduct as grand theft.”

(Ibid.) In other words, the “notwithstanding” clause in section

490.2 clarifies that if the statute conflicts with a preexisting

statute punishing the same conduct, section 490.2 would

override that other statute. Although “the fact that the opening

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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

clause does not mention Vehicle Code section 10851 may suggest

its drafters did not have that statute specifically in mind as a

potential source of conflict,” the existence of the

“notwithstanding” clause at least indicates that the drafters

anticipated that conduct criminalized by section 490.2 would

overlap with conduct criminalized by other statutes and that

they intended section 490.2 to reclassify such conduct as “petty

theft” punishable only as a misdemeanor. (Page, at p. 1186.)

The absence of any “notwithstanding” clause in section 496(a)

indicates that the drafters did not intend for the statute to affect

conduct criminalized in other statutes, let alone reclassify

conduct covered in those statutes. Section 490.2 is therefore not

comparable to section 496(a) in the way that Orozco claims.

The concurring opinion in Wehr reasoned that a

“notwithstanding” clause expressly stating that section 496(a)

overrides section 496d is unnecessary because “the relationship

between section 496 and the more specific receiving stolen

property provisions [like section 496d] is obvious. The latter are

special cases of the former.” (Wehr, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at

p. 139 (conc. opn. of Slough, Acting P. J.).) But there is nothing

obvious about construing amendments to one statute as

impliedly amending another, even if the unamended statute is

a more specific version of the amended statute. As explained

above, such construction contravenes the settled principle

against reading language used in one place into places where it

is not used. (Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 880.)

We also reject the alternative rationale that People v.

Williams (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 641 (Williams) relied upon to

reach the conclusion that Orozco here urges. Williams held that

section 496d qualifies as a “theft offense” within the meaning of

section 490.2 and is thus subject to section 490.2’s general

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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

provision that all theft offenses involving property valued at

$950 or less are misdemeanors. (Williams, at pp. 649–650.)

This reasoning is unpersuasive for several reasons.

First, we have defined theft as a “taking with intent to

steal the property — that is, the intent to permanently deprive

the owner of its possession.” (Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1182.)

The elements of receipt of stolen property, in contrast, do not

require the defendant to have engaged in any such taking. (See

generally People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1425

[setting forth the elements of receipt of stolen property],

disapproved on another ground in People v. Covarrubias (2016)

1 Cal.5th 838, 874, fn. 14.) Second, it is well established that a

person who steals property cannot be convicted of receiving that

property. (See People v. Ceja (2010) 49 Cal.4th 1, 6 [“commission

of the theft excludes the possibility of a receiving conviction”].)

Because a “theft conviction operates as a bar to a receiving

conviction” (id. at p. 3), it is difficult to understand how receiving

stolen property could amount to theft. Third, interpreting

receiving stolen property to be a form of a theft offense would

render part of Proposition 47 superfluous. Proposition 47 both

amended section 496, receiving stolen property, and added

section 490.2, petty theft. There would be no need to amend

section 496 if the amendments to section 490.2 applied to

receiving stolen property offenses. We disapprove People v.

Wehr, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th 123 and People v. Williams, supra,

23 Cal.App.5th 641 to the extent they are inconsistent with this

opinion.

Finally, we conclude that the construction we adopt here

results in no absurdity because the electorate plausibly could

have chosen to punish receipt of stolen vehicles more severely

than vehicle theft or receipt of other types of stolen property.

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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

For example, the electorate could have concluded that stolen

vehicles, unlike other items of stolen property, are often

dismantled and sold for parts on the secondary market, which

can raise their worth above retail value.

Because the language of sections 496 and 496d is clear

that a conviction for receiving a stolen vehicle valued at $950 or

less under section 496d does not qualify for sentence reduction,

we need not look to extrinsic sources for guidance. (In re D.B.

(2014) 58 Cal.4th 941, 945 [“ ‘If the statutory language is clear

and unambiguous our inquiry ends.’ ”].) We recognize that there

is language in the ballot material suggesting that voters

intended Proposition 47 to reach convictions under section 496d.

In the voter guide, the analysis by the Legislative Analyst said:

“Receiving Stolen Property. Under current law, individuals

found with stolen property may be charged with receiving stolen

property, which is a wobbler crime. Under this measure,

receiving stolen property worth $950 or less would always be a

misdemeanor.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra,

analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, p. 35.) The word “always”

may have conveyed to voters that every conviction for receiving

stolen property, regardless of the type of property or statute of

conviction, would be a misdemeanor if the property is worth

$950 or less. Alternatively, it may have conveyed to voters that

every conviction for receiving stolen property worth $950 or less

pursuant to section 496(a) would always be a misdemeanor.

Whatever the meaning of the ballot material, it cannot overcome

the unambiguous statutory text, which indicates that

Proposition 47’s amendments to section 496(a) do not affect

punishments for receipt of stolen vehicles under section 496d.

We must interpret the statutory language that the electorate

actually wrote. (See Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11

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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

Cal.4th 1243, 1260–1261 [voters “ ‘must be assumed to have

voted intelligently upon an [initiative], the whole text of which

was supplied each of them prior to the election, and which they

must be assumed to have duly considered, regardless of any

insufficient recitals in the instructions to voters or the

arguments pro and con of its advocates or opponents

accompanying the text of the proposed measure’ ”].)

CONCLUSION

We hold that Proposition 47’s amendment to section

496(a) did not affect convictions for receiving stolen property

under section 496d. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the

Court of Appeal.

LIU, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CHIN, J.

CORRIGAN, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

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PEOPLE v. OROZCO

S249495

Opinion by Cuéllar, J., concurring in the judgment

When California’s voters approved Proposition 47 in 2014,

they amended the crime of receiving stolen property under

Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a) (section 496(a)). What

the court holds today is that this change “did not affect”

convictions for receiving a stolen vehicle under section 496d.

(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.) I agree. But this conclusion is less

mysterious –– and more snugly consistent not only with the

language of the statute, but also the ballot materials explaining

Proposition 47 to California’s voters –– than the majority

opinion suggests.

Prior to Proposition 47, the crime of receiving stolen

property when the value of the property did not exceed $950 was

a so-called wobbler offense: a crime punishable as either a

felony or a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, former § 496(a); Voter

Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47,

§ 9, p. 72.) What Proposition 47 did was transform this offense

from a wobbler into a misdemeanor, provided the property’s

value does not exceed $950. (§ 496(a).)

Contrast this with Penal Code section 496d, which defines

a separate offense: receiving stolen vehicles, trailers, vessels,

and certain related equipment. Irrespective of a vehicle’s value,

the offense remains a wobbler. The Legislature enacted this

separate statute, “specific to vehicles” and related equipment,

“in order to better track” such conduct. (Sen. Rules Com., Off.

PEOPLE v. OROZCO

Cuéllar, J., concurring in judgment

of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No.

2390 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 23, 1998, p. 2.) As

the parties readily conceded at oral argument, that purpose

would be poorly served if prosecutors retained unfettered

discretion to prosecute the crime of receiving a stolen vehicle

under the more general provision of receiving stolen property

(§ 496(a)) instead of section 496d.

If a person receiving a stolen vehicle may indeed be

charged only under Penal Code section 496d, then the resolution

of this case is straightforward. By amending section 496(a)

while leaving section 496d untouched, California’s voters

embraced a reduction in punishment that left unchanged the

penalties for receiving a stolen vehicle. That latter offense was

a wobbler before Proposition 47, and so it remains.

The distinct reach of these two statutes also helps make

sense of the Proposition 47 ballot materials. As the Legislative

Analyst explained, “[u]nder current law, individuals found with

stolen property may be charged with receiving stolen property,

which is a wobbler crime. Under this measure, receiving stolen

property worth $950 or less would always be a misdemeanor.”

(Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, analysis of Prop.

47 by Legis. Analyst, p. 35.) When they read that “receiving

stolen property worth $950 or less would always be a

misdemeanor” (ibid., italics added) without any reference to a

specific statute, reasonable voters likely would have understood

the mitigated punishment to encompass only general “property

that has been stolen” within the meaning of section 496(a) —

which necessarily excludes stolen vehicles. Because defendant

was convicted of receiving a stolen vehicle in violation of section

496d, he’s not entitled to relief under Proposition 47. For these

reasons, I agree the judgment below should be affirmed.

2

PEOPLE v. OROZCO

Cuéllar, J., concurring in judgment

CUÉLLAR, J.

3

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Orozco

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XXX 24 Cal.App.5th 667

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S249495

Date Filed: March 26, 2020

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: San Diego

Judge: Michael J. Popkins

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Benjamin B. Kington, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief

Assistant Attorneys General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Meagan

Beale, Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Michael Pulos, Minh U. Le and Daniel Hilton, Deputy Attorneys

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Benjamin Kington

Boyce & Schaefer

934 23rd Street

San Diego, CA 92102-1914

(619) 232-3320

Minh U. Le

Deputy Attorney General

600 West Broadway, Suite 1800

San Diego, CA 92101

(619) 738-9055