Ronald C. Young v. E.T. Stamey

03/25/2020

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

January 23, 2020 Session

RONALD C. YOUNG v. E.T. STAMEY, ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Anderson County

No. 18CH0073 M. Nichole Cantrell, Chancellor

No. E2019-00907-COA-R3-CV

This appeal concerns whether a city councilman is disqualified from office because he

also is employed by his city’s municipal school system. Ronald C. Young (“Young”) ran

against E.T. Stamey (“Stamey”) for a seat on the Clinton City Council. Stamey, the

incumbent, won. Afterward, Young filed suit in the Chancery Court for Anderson

County (“the Trial Court”) against Stamey as well as the Anderson County Election

Commission and its members (“the Commission”). Young alleged that, pursuant to

Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1501 and the Clinton City Charter, Stamey is disqualified from

being a city councilman because he works for Clinton City Schools (“CCS”), albeit in a

noninstructional capacity. The Commission filed a motion for judgment on the

pleadings, and Stamey filed a motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted

both motions. Young appeals. We hold, first, that Stamey is not a city employee. We

hold further that even if Stamey is a city employee, as a noninstructional public school

employee he is allowed to run for city council pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-301.

Finally, we hold that Young failed to state a claim against the Commission, which acted

solely in its ministerial capacity in certifying the election results. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed;

Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which RICHARD H.

DINKINS and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JJ., joined.

David A. Stuart, Clinton, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ronald C. Young.

Robert L. Bowman and Brandon L. Morrow, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, the

Anderson County Election Commission and its individual members, Joseph Rainey,

Chairman; Mary Matheny, Secretary; William Gallaher, D. Jane Miller, and William

“Bear” Stephenson.

Tasha C. Blakney, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, E.T. Stamey.

OPINION

Background

On November 6, 2018, city council elections were held in Clinton, Tennessee.

Young ran against Stamey, an incumbent, for one of the seats. Stamey won, receiving

approximately 64% of the vote. On November 21, 2018, Young filed his Complaint to

Contest Election, for Declaratory Judgment, and for Injunctive Relief in the Trial Court

against Stamey and the Commission. In his complaint, Young alleged that “[a]t all times

material hereto, defendant, E. T. Stamey, is and has been an employee of the Town of

Clinton, Tennessee, in the athletic department of the town’s public school system. . . .”

Young asserted that Stamey was disqualified from holding office based on Article I, § 13,

of the Charter for the Town of Clinton, Tennessee, which provides that “[a] vacancy shall

exist if the Mayor or a Councilmember . . . accepts a position of employment with the

City. . . .” Young asserted further that Stamey was disqualified from seeking or holding

office on the basis of Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1501, which provides that “unless

otherwise authorized by law or local ordinance, an employee of a municipal government

or of a metropolitan government shall not be qualified to run for elected office in the

local governing body of such local governmental unit in which the employee is

employed.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1501 (2015). Young requested that the Trial Court

“enter declaratory judgment that defendant, E. T. Stamey, was not qualified to appear on

the ballot, and that plaintiff, the only qualified candidate appearing thereon, was and is

the lawful winner, and is entitled to assume and perform the duties of the office.” Young

also sought injunctive relief to prevent the Commission and its members “from approving

any ballot where an employee of the Town of Clinton seeks or purports to seek election

to the city council and likewise, from certifying any candidate elected to the city council

who is found or revealed to be an employee of the Town of Clinton.”

In January 2019, the Commission filed an answer raising a number of defenses

including that it was unaware of Stamey’s employment status and that if Stamey were

disqualified, the proper remedy would be to declare the election void. Stamey filed his

own answer wherein he denied that he was a city employee. In March 2019, the

Commission filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings stating, in part: “The Election

Commission’s role in the challenged election was limited to its ministerial capacity and it

is not a necessary party to this civil action. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the

Election Commission.” Along with its motion for judgment on the pleadings, the

Commission filed a “Statement of Undisputed Material Facts pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P.

12.03 and 56.” The statement read as follows:

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1. Mr. Young and Mr. Stamey ran against each other for a seat on

the City Council for the Town of Clinton.

2. The election was held on November 6, 2018.

3. Mr. Stamey received a majority of the votes.

4. The Election Commission certified Mr. Stamey as the winner of

the election on November 19, 2018.

5. Mr. Young filed his lawsuit on November 21, 2018, alleging that

Mr. Stamey was not qualified to run for or hold the Clinton City Council

seat because he was an employee of the City of Clinton.

6. Prior to the filing of the above-captioned lawsuit, the Election

Commission had no knowledge regarding Mr. Stamey’s employer.

Moreover, the Election Commission was presented with no information,

reliable or otherwise, indicating that Mr. Stamey was in any way ineligible

to run for or hold the office which he sought.

7. Prior to the November 6, 2018 election, neither Plaintiff Young

nor anyone else filed a complaint or challenge with the Anderson County

Election Commission regarding Defendant Stamey’s qualifications to hold

the City Council position for which he sought and received the majority of

the votes.

(Record citations omitted). In March 2019, Stamey filed a motion for summary judgment

acknowledging that he had worked for CCS since 2017, but that this did not make him a

city employee. Young filed a response to both motions. Young did not dispute any facts

contained in Stamey’s statement of undisputed material facts. As part of his response,

Young filed his Declaration Under Penalty of Perjury asserting that he had informed the

Commission of Stamey’s job with CCS but was told that the election results would be

certified anyway. In his Declaration, Young stated:

1. On or about the 10th day of November, 2018, I was told that

defendant, E. T. Stamey, appeared to be an employee of the Clinton City

Schools, and that if he was a school department employee, he would be

disqualified from being a member of the Clinton City Council. I was also

told that there was an Opinion by the Tennessee Attorney General and

Reporter specifically addressing the issue in the context of a teacher

employed by the Clinton City School Department.

2. On or about the 13th day of November, 2018, I visited Mark

Stephens, Administrator of Elections for the Anderson County Election

Commission, in his office and informed him that I had heard that Mr.

Stamey was employed by the Clinton City Schools and therefore

disqualified, according to the previously mentioned Opinion. I also

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expressed my understanding that both a charter provision and a statute

established his disqualification.

3. On or about the 16th day of November, 2018, I visited again with

Mr. Stephens, and on this occasion I provided him with a copy of Opinion

No. 08-72 dated the 31st day of March, 2008, by the Tennessee Attorney

General and Reporter. A true and exact copy of the same is attached hereto

as an exhibit.

4. Mr. Stephens told me in substance that regardless of the Opinion

of the Tennessee Attorney General and Reporter, “We are going to certify

the election.”

The Attorney General Opinion that Young referenced in his Declaration, Opinion

08-72, reads as follows:

QUESTION

Given the provisions of the Charter of the City of Clinton and the

provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1501, is a school teacher of the city

school system eligible to be a candidate for the city legislative body?

OPINION

No. Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1501 disqualifies municipal employees from

eligibility to serve on the municipality’s legislative body unless otherwise

authorized by law or local ordinance. The charter and ordinances of the

City of Clinton do not authorize such eligibility.

ANALYSIS

Section 7-51-1501 of the Tennessee Code provides as follows:

[U]nless otherwise authorized by law or local ordinance, an

employee of a municipal government or of a metropolitan

government shall not be qualified to run for elected office in

the local governing body of such local governmental unit in

which the employee is employed.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1501.

According to the City of Clinton’s charter, the city council is the

city’s legislative body and has the power to establish and administer the

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city’s public school system. See City of Clinton Charter (1990). Thus, a

city school teacher is disqualified from election to Clinton’s city council

unless some other law or local ordinance authorizes a teacher to run for

such an office. Neither the City of Clinton’s charter nor any municipal

ordinance of the City of Clinton authorizes a city school teacher to run for

the city council.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-4-101 does not conflict with Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 7-51-1501. Section 12-4-101 concerns the personal interests of public

officials and provides specific standards of conduct for municipal officials

who are also municipal employees. Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1501’s

prohibition is a general disqualification for candidacy. That statute permits

a city employee to serve on a city legislative body if such candidacy is

“otherwise authorized by law or local ordinance.” A city’s legislative body

may pass an ordinance permitting a city employee to serve on the city’s

legislative body. Thus, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 7-51-1501 and 12-4-101 do

not conflict.

In April and May 2019, the Trial Court heard Stamey’s and the Commission’s

motions. In May 2019, the Trial Court resolved the case through two separate orders

granting the respective motions. In its order granting the Commission’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings, the Trial Court stated, as relevant:

The only activity the Plaintiff alleges the Defendants, Anderson

County Election Commission, took in relation to this cause of action was to

certify the election results on November 19, 2018 after the election which

took place on November 6th, 2018. This action is solely within the

ministerial capacity.

There was no challenge made to the qualifications of E.T. Stamey

with the Anderson County Election Commission prior to the election. The

Plaintiff never voiced any concerns with Mr. Stamey’s qualification until

after the election of November 6th, 2018. The Election Commission was

never requested and never conducted any type of review of Mr. Stamey’s

qualifications to be on the ballot. The only action the Plaintiff alleges the

Anderson County Election Commission took in relation to this cause of

action was to certify the results after the election.

Finding that this action by the Anderson County Election

Commission falls solely within its ministerial capacity pursuant to City of

Memphis v. Shelby County Election Com’n, 146 S.W.3d 531, 536-537

(Tenn. 2004); . . . and Bivens v. White, No. E2014-02251-COA-R3-CV,

2015 WL 5444126, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2015). For the reasons

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stated above the Plaintiff makes no claim upon which relief can be granted

against the Anderson County Election Commission and the Motion for

Judgment of the Pleadings is granted.

The court will make no additional findings regarding the allegation

of the Defendants regarding relief requested by the Plaintiff being

inconsistent with T.C.A. §2-17-112 and T.C.A. §2-17-113 due to the fact

that such a determination is not warranted by this court at this time, having

previously found under separate order dated May 6th 2019, that the Plaintiff

is not entitled to relief upon granting the Defendant, E.T. Stamey’s Motion

for Summary Judgment being granted.

The Trial Court granted Stamey’s motion for summary judgment and denied the

remainder of the Commission’s motion as moot, as well. The Trial Court incorporated its

oral ruling into its written order. In its oral ruling, the Trial Court stated, in part:

Article VIII1 of the Charter says that the City shall, by ordinance,

have the power to establish, control, administer, and manage public schools

for its citizens. And then subsection B of Article VIII says, establish a

board of education or other such boards and offices as it may deem

necessary for a City school system. So Article VIII shows that the City of

Clinton did choose, as was its right as a municipality, to form a City school

system. It, also, acknowledges that they are forming a school board. Now,

under the ordinances, Title 2 deals with the school board elects to maintain

a school system under 2-101. 2-106 governs the formation of the board of

education. Once that is done, once the City chooses to form a municipal

school system, and, therefore, establishes its school board, Tennessee Code

Annotated 49-2-203 decides and declares what powers that that school

board has. Whether the Charter -- it goes on to say, that the City is going to

manage, that power is vested by state law with the school board. All right.

In my notes I have a note that at this point I want to note that that 49-2-203

statute that sets forth what are the duties and the powers of the school board

are the same as it would be for any county school system. Why is that

important? That’s important because the Court’s review of case law. So I

want to lay that foundation. So now we are going to look at the case law.

This is the Putnam County Education Association versus Putnam

Commission, and it dealt with a disagreement between the county school

board and the county commission regarding the budget for schools. And

I’m going to read several sections from this case as well. In its holding, the

court found that the supervision and control of the schools of a county, the

1

The Trial Court later would clarify it meant Article VII rather than Article VIII.

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employment of teachers, the fixings of salary, erecting of buildings is

vested with the county board of education pursuant to statute 49-2-203.

However, the county commission has the duty to levy tax for the needed

school funds because it is the only agency clothed with such power. That is

the same in this situation with the City of Clinton. They are the only power

that can levy tax. So the court in Putnam is acknowledging that there is a

monetary connection between the county and the county school system.

The case at hand, the Putnam County case, had to do with the limitation of

power to exercise a line-item veto, but the court went on to say that the case

requires an understanding that a local school system is separate from the

county government, and noted back to the 1926 case of Boles, holding that

our courts have long recognized the separation of powers of the two

entities. It, also, requires an understanding that while a county government

controls funding, the local board of education has exclusive control over

many operational aspects of educational policy. The two entities have

separate origins, functions, and management. The separate origin of each is

succinctly explained in this other case, which we don’t need to go into.

***

I am aware that this is in opposition to the 20[0]8 Attorney General’s

opinion that was filed as part of this case. However, I want to note several

things. One, the Attorney General’s opinion is not binding on this Court. I

have reviewed the Attorney General’s opinion and find that it did not take

into account the state law governing municipal school systems under Title

49 and the statutes that I have previously discussed. I, also, found that it

did not take into account the powers and duties that are vested with the city

school system under 49-2-203. And that, also, did not take into account the

history of the case law holding that school boards are separate and distinct

from their local governing bodies. Therefore, this Court issues its ruling. I

am aware it’s in opposition of that Attorney General’s opinion, but the

Court finds, as a matter of law, reviewing the statutes, as well as the case

law, that Mr. Stamey is an employee of Clinton City Schools and not an

employee of the City of Clinton. And as such, the statute governing the

alleged ineligibility to hold the Clinton City Council position, 7-51-1501,

does not apply in this case. Summary judgment is granted to Mr. Stamey.

And that concludes this matter.

(Format modified). Young timely appealed to this Court.

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Discussion

Although not stated exactly as such, Young raises the following two issues on

appeal: 1) whether the Trial Court erred in declining to hold that the seat Stamey held on

the Clinton City Council became vacant when he accepted a job with CCS and that

Stamey was disqualified from appearing on the ballot for that seat; and, 2) whether the

Trial Court erred in granting the Commission’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, or,

if converted, motion for summary judgment, on grounds that the Commission acted

solely in its ministerial capacity. The Commission raises its own separate issue of

whether the Trial Court’s judgment should be affirmed on alternative grounds, namely

that the Commission was not a necessary party to the election challenge and that the

relief requested by Young is inconsistent with Tennessee law.

Stamey filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted. As our

Supreme Court has instructed regarding the standard of review on motions for summary

judgment:

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for

summary judgment de novo, without a presumption of correctness. Bain v.

Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997); see also Abshure v. Methodist

Healthcare–Memphis Hosp., 325 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tenn. 2010). In doing

so, we make a fresh determination of whether the requirements of Rule 56

of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied. Estate of

Brown, 402 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Hughes v. New Life Dev.

Corp., 387 S.W.3d 453, 471 (Tenn. 2012)).

***

[I]n Tennessee, as in the federal system, when the moving party does not

bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden of

production either (1) by affirmatively negating an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s claim or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving

party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish

the nonmoving party’s claim or defense. We reiterate that a moving party

seeking summary judgment by attacking the nonmoving party’s evidence

must do more than make a conclusory assertion that summary judgment is

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appropriate on this basis. Rather, Tennessee Rule 56.03 requires the

moving party to support its motion with “a separate concise statement of

material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine

issue for trial.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. “Each fact is to be set forth in a

separate, numbered paragraph and supported by a specific citation to the

record.” Id. When such a motion is made, any party opposing summary

judgment must file a response to each fact set forth by the movant in the

manner provided in Tennessee Rule 56.03. “[W]hen a motion for summary

judgment is made [and] . . . supported as provided in [Tennessee Rule 56],”

to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party “may not rest upon the

mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading,” but must respond, and by

affidavits or one of the other means provided in Tennessee Rule 56, “set

forth specific facts” at the summary judgment stage “showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06. The nonmoving party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as

to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.

Ct. 1348. The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific

facts in the record which could lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of

the nonmoving party. If a summary judgment motion is filed before

adequate time for discovery has been provided, the nonmoving party may

seek a continuance to engage in additional discovery as provided in

Tennessee Rule 56.07. However, after adequate time for discovery has

been provided, summary judgment should be granted if the nonmoving

party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish

the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Tenn. R. Civ. P.

56.04, 56.06. The focus is on the evidence the nonmoving party comes

forward with at the summary judgment stage, not on hypothetical evidence

that theoretically could be adduced, despite the passage of discovery

deadlines, at a future trial.

Rye v. Women’s Care Cntr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250, 264-65 (Tenn.

2015).

For its part, the Commission filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which

was granted. “[A] motion for judgment on the pleadings is ‘in effect a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.’” King v. Betts, 354 S.W.3d

691, 709 (Tenn. 2011) (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has instructed:

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment on the

pleadings, we must accept as true “all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom” alleged by the party opposing the motion.

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McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tenn. 1991). In addition,

“[c]onclusions of law are not admitted nor should judgment on the

pleadings be granted unless the moving party is clearly entitled to

judgment.” Id.

Cherokee Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 152 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Tenn. 2004).

“We should uphold granting the motion only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of a claim that will entitle him or her to relief.” Young v.

Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Our standard of review is de novo

with no presumption of correctness as to the Trial Court’s decision. Id.

We first address whether the Trial Court erred in declining to hold that the seat

Stamey held on the Clinton City Council became vacant when he accepted a job with

CCS and that Stamey was disqualified from appearing on the ballot for that seat. A key

statute relied upon by Young is Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1501, which provides in full:

Notwithstanding any county, municipal, metropolitan, or other local

governmental charter to the contrary, and notwithstanding any resolution or

ordinance adopted by any such county, municipality or other local

governmental unit to the contrary, every employee of every such local

governmental unit shall enjoy the same rights of other citizens of Tennessee

to be a candidate for any state or local political office, the right to

participate in political activities by supporting or opposing political parties,

political candidates, and petitions to governmental entities; provided,

further, the city, county, municipal, metropolitan or other local government

is not required to pay the employee’s salary for work not performed for the

governmental entity; and provided, further, that unless otherwise authorized

by law or local ordinance, an employee of a municipal government or of a

metropolitan government shall not be qualified to run for elected office in

the local governing body of such local governmental unit in which the

employee is employed.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1501 (2015) (emphasis added). Young also cites Article I, § 13,

of the Charter for the Town of Clinton, Tennessee, which provides, as relevant, that “[a]

vacancy shall exist if the Mayor or a Councilmember . . . accepts a position of

employment with the City. . . .” In addition, Young cites to certain statutes that in his

view reveal that municipalities retain control over their own school systems. One such

statute provides that “[t]he board of each municipality voting for and collecting the tax

provided for in § 49-2-401 shall have exclusive control and management over such

common schools.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-402 (2016). As to what constitutes a board,

“unless the context otherwise requires . . . ‘Board,’ ‘local board,’ or ‘local board of

education’ means the board of education that manages and controls the respective local

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public school system.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-1-103(1) (2016). In his reply brief, Young

argues thusly:

Obviously, “the board” of a “municipality” is its chief governing

body, here, the Board of Mayor and Councilmembers, not the school board.

Likewise, the only governing body of a municipality authorized to set tax

rates, vote for and collect any kind of tax, including a school tax, is the city

council or other chief governmental body. School boards, on the other

hand, have no power of taxation whatsoever, and their annual budgets

require approval, appropriation and tax ordinances or resolutions by the

municipality.

Summarizing his position, Young contends that “[t]he Clinton City School Board and

Clinton Board of Mayor and Councilmembers are separate governing bodies of the same

municipal corporation, and as an employee of the Clinton City School System, Mr.

Stamey is an employee of the municipal corporation.”

In response, Stamey argues that CCS and Clinton are distinct entities

notwithstanding the fact that CCS depends on Clinton for its budget. Stamey asserts that

in every other respect, CCS effectively is autonomous. In his brief, Stamey argues:

In practice, it is nonsensical for Mr. Stamey to be considered a city

employee. If Mr. Stamey were to engage in misconduct, the City Council

would have no mechanism for his discipline or removal. The City Council

does not have the power to make line-item changes to CCS’s budget to

harm or enrich Mr. Stamey. The decision about his employment and the

conditions thereof rests with the director of schools. That director of

schools is employed by virtue of a contract with the Board of Education,

not the City. To the extent that [CCS Director of Schools] Ms. [Kelly]

Johnson needs oversight in her employment, that oversight does not come

from the City of Clinton; rather, it comes from the Board of Education.

Absent the ability to control, hire, or terminate, the City of Clinton cannot

be found to be Mr. Stamey’s employer.

(Citation omitted). Stamey relies heavily on Putnam County Educ. Ass’n v. Putnam

County Com’n, a Tennessee Court of Appeals case articulating the distinct natures of

county governments and county school systems. While the present case involves a

municipal school system, Stamey argues the same reasoning applies. In Putnam County

Educ. Ass’n, this Court discussed as follows:

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The limitation on a county commission’s right to exercise a line-item

veto requires an understanding that the local school systems are separate

from the county governments. Cloudia Hill v. McNairy County, No. 03-

1219-T, 2004 WL 187314, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 15, 2004); see also

Boles, 280 S.W. 27 (Tenn. 1926) (holding that our courts have long

recognized the separation of the powers of the two entities). It also requires

an understanding that while the county government controls funding, “the

local board of education has exclusive control over many operational

aspects of education policy.” State ex rel. Weaver v. Ayers, 756 S.W.2d

217, 221-22 (Tenn. 1988). The two entities have separate origins,

functions, and management. The separate origin of each is succinctly

explained in Rollins v. Wilson County Government, 967 F.Supp. 990, 996

(M.D. Tenn. 1997).

[P]ublic school systems within the state of Tennessee were

established by the Constitution of the State of Tennessee. See

Art. 11, § 12, Tenn. Const. Although counties were also

established as arms of state government, counties were

statutorily created by the state legislature, rather than by the

state constitution. State v. Stine, 200 Tenn. 561, 292 S.W.2d

771, 772 (1956); Bayless v. Knox County, 199 Tenn. 268, 286

S.W.2d 579, 587 (1955).

Rollins, 967 F.Supp. at 996. Counties and school systems perform separate

functions. Hill v. McNairy County, 2004 WL 187314, at *2. The fact that

there are financial connections between a local school system and local

government does not detract from the essentially separate functions of these

two entities. Id.

A county is a corporation run by its local officials.

See, e.g. State v. Read, 152 Tenn. 442, 446-47, 278 S.W. 71

(Tenn. 1925). The schools of a county, on the other hand, are

operated and maintained through the agency of the county

board of education and a superintendent. Reed v. Rhea

County, 189 Tenn. 247, 225 S.W.2d 49, 50 (1949). The

school board and superintendent are not employees of the

county government, but rather perform separate and distinct

functions. Affidavit of James L. Francis. See also, State ex

rel. Boles v. Groce, 152 Tenn. 566, 280 S.W. 27, 28 (1926)

(discussing the separation of powers between a county school

board and county government officials); Morgan County Bd.

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of Commissioners, et al. v. Morgan County Bd. of Ed., 1994

WL 111457, *3-*4 (Tenn. App. 1994) (describing county

school board and county commission as two separate entities

with separate powers).

Hill v. McNairy County, 2004 WL 187314, at *2 (citing Rollins v. Wilson

County Government, 154 F.3d 626, 629-630 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting the

District Court in Rollins v. Wilson County Government, 967 F.Supp. 996-97

(some citations omitted in the original)).

Putnam County Educ. Ass’n v. Putnam County Com’n, No. M2003-03031-COA-R3-CV,

2005 WL 1812624, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2005) (footnote omitted), no appl.

perm. appeal filed.

Stamey cites also to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-127 for the proposition that

municipal school systems are entities empowered along the same lines as county school

systems. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-127 provides, as pertinent:

The initial board of education shall plan and manage the formation of the

new city school system and, subsequently, shall manage and operate the

system when student instruction commences. The board shall possess all

powers and duties granted to or required of boards of education as set forth

by § 49-2-203 or other statute, including, but not limited to, employment of

a full-time director of schools and other personnel; and construction,

acquisition, lease, or modification of buildings and facilities.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-127(c) (2016) (emphasis added).

We note that our research yielded one opinion wherein our Supreme Court

arguably referred to city school employees as city employees. In a case dealing with the

pension fallout from the abolition of Knoxville’s city school system, our Supreme Court

observed that “the city [of Knoxville] maintained a local pension plan for all of its

employees, including employees of the City School System.” Knox County v. City of

Knoxville, 786 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tenn. 1990). The High Court went on to conclude that

“[t]he members of the City Pension System are entitled to all the benefits provided for

them in accordance with their contractual relationship with the City of Knoxville under

the provisions of the pension act.” Id. at 941.

We do not believe this opinion answers the question before us, however. In Knox

County, there was no question but that the employees at issue were in the pension plan.

Our Supreme Court did not address how or why these city school employees were city

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employees; it simply referred to them as such. Given this, we cannot conclude that our

Supreme Court has ruled on whether municipal school board employees are city

employees. This being so, our inquiry continues.

In determining whether Stamey is a Clinton city employee, we consider CCS’s

relationship to Clinton in light of the aforementioned statutes and caselaw. Young points

out correctly that Putnam County Educ. Ass’n is an unpublished case, thus is not binding.

We find it persuasive, nevertheless. This is so even though that case involved a county

rather than municipal school system. The same reasoning applies. To regard CCS and

Clinton as two conjoined entities of the same municipal body would be to ignore the

statutory framework reflecting the relative independence of school boards, including

municipal school boards. Municipal boards of education “shall manage and operate the

system” and “shall possess all powers and duties granted to or required of boards of

education as set forth by § 49-2-203 or other statute. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-

127(c) (2016). Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-203 sets out the range of duties and powers for

local boards of education. Municipal school boards are not, therefore, mere appendages

of cities. They enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Like county schools relative to county

governments, they “perform separate functions.” Putnam County Educ. Ass’n, 2005 WL

1812624, at *5.

Young’s reliance on Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-402 and its provision regarding

exclusive control and management by boards of municipalities collecting tax for common

schools is, in our view, misplaced. As stated in Putnam County Educ. Ass’n, “[t]he fact

that there are financial connections between a local school system and local government

does not detract from the essentially separate functions of these two entities.” 2005 WL

1812624, at *5 (footnote omitted). Young is correct that CCS depends on Clinton for its

budget and funding. To that extent, Clinton “manages” or “controls” CCS. However,

Clinton does not actually administer CCS. Clinton provides funding and then CCS

manages its own affairs. Despite being a creation of Clinton, CCS is autonomous in its

day-to-day functions. For instance, Stamey was hired by the CCS Director of schools,

not the Clinton City Council. Stamey is not accountable to the Clinton City Council.

The Clinton City Council lacks authority to discipline or fire Stamey. It would be an odd

employment relationship indeed were Stamey to be a city employee when the city can do

nothing about him. Were Stamey a member of the CCS Board of Education, this case

likely would have a different result. However, Stamey is a Clinton city councilman, and

in that role, he has no direct input on the management of CCS.

As was the Trial Court, we are unpersuaded by Tennessee Attorney General

Opinion 08-72, which addressed a different scenario, and also failed to grasp the

autonomy of the municipal school system. Given the caselaw explaining the separate

nature of county school systems as distinct from county governments, the logic of

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analogizing that to municipal school boards, and a statutory framework that empowers

municipal school boards in a manner akin to any other local board of education, we hold

that Stamey is not a city employee. Rather, Stamey is a city councilman for Clinton, and

he works separately for CCS. Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1501 does not bar him from

serving on the city council under these circumstances.

Even if we err in our determination and Stamey is, in fact, a city employee,

another basis would lead to affirmance of the Trial Court’s judgment. One statute, Tenn.

Code Ann. § 49-5-301, specifically permits noninstructional public school personnel like

Stamey to run for public office. This statute provides: “Notwithstanding any law except

§§ 8-23-201 and 49-2-203 to the contrary, noninstructional personnel employed by any

public school in this state shall be eligible to run for public office.” Tenn. Code Ann. §

49-5-301 (2016). Neither Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-23-201, which deals with overtime and

related matters, nor Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-203, insofar as it renders members of local

boards of education ineligible for election as teacher or other compensated position under

the board, have any application here.

Young, unbowed, argues that Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-301 “is superceded by both

the more recent and specific statute [Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1501] as well as by the

more recent and specific charter provision itself.” We believe Young has it backwards.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1501 (2015) contains the caveat “unless otherwise authorized by

law or local ordinance.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-301 is an example of “otherwise”

authorizing law. Young’s reliance on the Clinton City Charter is misplaced, as well. As

our Supreme Court has stated regarding conflicts between city charters and statutes,

“[e]ven if such a requirement was in the charter . . . the above Code Section, which is a

general law of the State, would take precedence over what is contained in the City

charter.” Walldorf v. City of Chattanooga, 237 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tenn. 1951).

Additionally, Attorney General Opinion 08-72 dealt with a school teacher and not

“noninstructional personnel employed by any public school in this state. . .” as is Stamey.

The clear intent of our General Assembly in enacting Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-301 was to

treat noninstructional personnel differently from instructional personnel as to their being

“eligible to run for public office.”

As did the Trial Court, we find no genuine issues of material fact for trial. For the

reasons stated, Stamey is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We affirm the Trial

Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Stamey.

The next and final issue we address is whether the Trial Court erred in granting the

Commission’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, or, if converted, motion for

summary judgment, on grounds that the Commission acted solely in its ministerial

capacity. Young contends that the Commission’s motion should be regarded as one for

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summary judgment because matters outside the pleadings were presented in support of it.

As we will discuss, the outcome is the same under either standard.

“In discharging their statutory duties, county election commissions perform both

ministerial and discretionary functions.” McFarland v. Pemberton, 530 S.W.3d 76, 94

(Tenn. 2017). The Commission argues that certifying election results falls under its

ministerial functions. According to statute, “[a]fter completing the comparison of the

returns, the county election commission shall make and certify the official tabulation and

certification of results, showing both precinct and county totals. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. §

2-8-105 (2014). This leaves no flexibility as to what the Commission must do with

respect to certification. In another case where an allegation of disqualification was made

after voting had commenced, we stated:

The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The MCEC argued that its

role was limited to a ministerial capacity and that it was statutorily required

to place qualified candidates on the ballot, tabulate the votes cast, and

certify the results. The MCEC claimed that it did not receive information

concerning White’s alleged disqualification until after early voting had

commenced. The commissioners argued that they were not individually

liable because they acted in their official capacity as commissioners.

***

While not raised as an issue on appeal by Bivens, the MCEC argues

that the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint against it and its

commissioners. We agree with the MCEC. The MCEC operates in a

ministerial capacity and does not have the discretion to remove candidates

from the ballot without statutory authority. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-5-204;

see City of Memphis v. Shelby Cnty. Election Comm’n, 146 S.W.3d 531,

535 (Tenn. 2004) (discussing the ministerial role of an election

commission);. . . White never filed a request to withdraw from the election.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-5204(b). Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the

MCEC and its commissioners as parties to this suit.

Bivens v. White, No. E2014-02251-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 5444126, at *2, 8 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Sept. 16, 2015) (footnote omitted), Rule 11 appl. perm. appeal denied Jan. 14,

2016.

Here, Young’s allegation of Stamey’s disqualification occurred after the election

was over. The Commission was legally bound in its ministerial capacity to certify the

election results. Our General Assembly has not seen fit to bestow upon election

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commissions the discretion to refrain from certifying election winners on the basis of

tardy challenges to a candidate’s qualifications. This is true irrespective of when—after

the election—the Commission received notice of a potential issue with Stamey’s

qualifications. Whether couched as a motion for summary judgment or judgment on the

pleadings, Young has failed to state a claim against the Commission.

We find it unnecessary to address the Commission’s issue of whether additional

grounds would sustain the Trial Court’s judgment. Any discussion of remedy is moot as

a result of our conclusion that Stamey is not disqualified from serving on the city council

and his seat never became vacant. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its

entirety.

Conclusion

The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to the

Trial Court for collection of the costs below. The costs on appeal are assessed against the

Appellant, Ronald C. Young, and his surety, if any.

_____________________________________

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE

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