Monica Voss v. Gregory Goode

Case: 19-20167 Document: 00515356702 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/24/2020

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 24, 2020

No. 19-20167 Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

MONICA VOSS,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

GREGORY G. GOODE; FORT BEND COUNTY, TEXAS,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

Before CLEMENT, HIGGINSON, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Monica Voss appeals the district court’s grant of summary

judgment on her claim of false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment

against Gregory Goode, a deputy of the Fort Bend County Sheriff’s Office. For

the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

I.

Slightly before midnight on June 20, 2016, Goode responded to a welfare

check from Texas Child Protective Services (CPS) at Voss’s house. Voss’s

fourteen-year-old daughter K.V. had allegedly reported suicidal thoughts to an

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No. 19-20167

adult friend. Deputy Philip McGuigan was also dispatched to Voss’s house as

backup.

Goode approached Voss’s house, knocked on her front door, and

announced himself. Voss, a retired detective, answered the door and identified

herself as Monica. Goode explained that he was there at the request of CPS to

perform a welfare check on K.V. because of a report that K.V. was

contemplating suicide. Voss called K.V. downstairs to speak with Goode and

woke her husband, who also came down. K.V. denied being depressed or

suicidal. Voss’s husband went to bed. Goode then interviewed K.V. outside,

away from her parents, at Voss’s suggestion and with her consent. During this

interview, K.V. confirmed to Goode that she had reported suicidal ideation.

She also told Goode that she was in a mental health crisis, was depressed and

wanted to “end her misery,” and that her parents had acted abusively toward

her. She stated that Voss had previously thrown hard or sharp objects at her,

including a telephone and a pair of scissors. K.V. said that she was afraid of

Voss because Voss acted like she was going to throw something at her, and

because Voss had access to guns under her bed. K.V. did not have any visible

injuries, but she reported that her home environment led her to thoughts of

drowning herself in the family’s pool or hanging herself. Goode determined

that further investigation was warranted based on K.V.’s statements.

Voss came outside after 20 to 30 minutes. Goode told Voss that he

needed to contact Texana Crisis Center to request an assessment by a mental

health professional and that K.V. would wait in his squad car until the

counselor arrived. Voss protested and demanded that she take K.V. to the

hospital herself instead. Voss told K.V. to get in her car rather than the patrol

car. She threatened to lock K.V. out of the house if Goode put her in the squad

car. At this point, Goode explained to Voss that he had placed K.V. under his

protective custody and that Voss could not leave the scene with K.V. in her car.

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Goode also warned Voss that she was getting close to being arrested for

interfering with his investigation. Voss’s declaration states that she went

inside for a few minutes “to sort the confusing situation out.” When she came

out a few minutes later, Goode ordered Voss to provide identifying information.

Voss told Goode that she did not have an ID on her person and that it was in

the house. Voss refused to go in the house and retrieve it.

Goode then arrested Voss. The reason Goode gave for the arrest at the

time was “failure to identify to a police officer.” McGuigan placed Voss in

Goode’s patrol car. After a short period of time in the parked car, Voss asked

to get out, which Goode permitted her to do. Goode then agreed to remove her

handcuffs. Voss asked Goode to call his supervisor. Sergeant Jerome Ellis

arrived and allegedly told Voss that the events leading to her arrest had been

“a big misunderstanding that had gotten out of hand.” Shortly thereafter, a

Texana counselor arrived and conducted an evaluation of K.V. K.V. was

released into her mother’s custody. The state did not press charges against

Voss.

Voss filed a complaint in the Southern District of Texas on May 6, 2017.

Voss asserted claims against Goode under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments for allegedly detaining and arresting her without probable cause.

She also asserted a municipal-liability claim against Fort Bend County,

alleging that the County was the moving force behind Goode’s unconstitutional

actions. The district court dismissed all claims against the County and all of

Voss’s claims against Goode—except for the Fourth Amendment false arrest

claim—for failure to state a claim. On April 17, 2018, Goode filed a motion for

summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity on the last remaining

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claim. On February 20, 2019, the district court granted the motion and entered

judgment against Voss. Voss timely appealed.

II.

We review the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo,

applying the same legal standard used by the district court. Hyatt v. Thomas,

843 F.3d 172, 176–77 (5th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate if

“the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

“A genuine dispute of material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Romero v.

City of Grapevine, 888 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). To decide if the non-movant has

raised a genuine dispute of material fact, we view all facts and evidence in the

light most favorable to her and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.

Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 743 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Griggs v. Brewer,

841 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2016)). “Summary judgment must be affirmed if it

is sustainable on any legal ground in the record, and it may be affirmed on

grounds rejected or not stated by the district court.” S&W Enters., L.L.C. v.

SouthTrust Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d 533, 537–38 (5th Cir. 2003) (citations

omitted).

III.

Voss makes two arguments on appeal as to why Goode is not entitled to

qualified immunity.1 First, she asserts that Goode cannot prevail on the theory

1 Voss also asserts that the district court “drew every inference in favor of the

movant, resolved fact and credibility disputes inappropriate for summary judgment, and

failed to credit evidence that contradicted some of its key factual conclusions.” This argument

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that he had probable cause to arrest her for interfering with his investigation

when he told her at the time that she was being arrested for failure to identify.

Second, she argues that, even if Goode can use a new crime to justify her arrest,

he did not have probable cause to arrest her for any crime.

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so

long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”

Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555

U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). “A good-faith assertion of qualified immunity alters the

usual summary judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show

that the defense is not available.” Melton v. Phillips, 875 F.3d 256, 261 (5th

Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quoting King v. Handorf, 821 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir.

2016)). A plaintiff must make a two-part showing to overcome a qualified

immunity defense. First, a plaintiff must show that the official violated a

statutory or constitutional right; second, she must show that the right was

clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Id. The order in

which to address the two prongs rests in the reviewing court’s discretion.

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

Voss argues that, because Goode originally told her that she was being

arrested for failure to identify, he is not entitled to qualified immunity if it was

clearly established at the time of her arrest that no probable cause existed for

is contradicted by the district court’s opinion, which mainly relies on Voss’s account in

reciting the facts of the case. The only time that the report and recommendation explicitly

deviates from Voss’s account is to discredit Voss’s alleged characterization that she “was

cooperative at all times, that she was calm, posed no threat, and was not argumentative.”

Voss’s demeanor has no bearing on whether Goode had probable cause to arrest her for

interference because interference requires physical action. See Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d

404, 414 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that “‘yelling’ and ‘screaming’ . . . alone does not take [a

plaintiff’s] conduct out of the realm of speech”). Therefore, we find no material error in the

district court’s account of the facts.

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that particular offense. A person commits failure to identify if he or she

“intentionally refuses to give his [or her] name, residence address, or date of

birth to a peace officer who has lawfully arrested the person and requested the

information.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.02(a). Goode concedes that he did not

have probable cause to arrest Voss for failure to identify, because the offense

applies only to someone who has already been “lawfully arrested” for another

crime. Id. Goode instead seeks to show that he had probable cause to arrest

Voss for a different crime: interference with public duties. See id. § 38.15(a)(1).

Despite Voss’s assertions to the contrary, Goode may justify the arrest

by showing probable cause for any crime. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S.

146, 153 (2004) (holding that because “an arresting officer’s state of mind . . .

is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause,” there is “no basis in precedent

or reason” to require an officer to justify an arrest with reasons given at the

scene); see also Sam v. Richard, 887 F.3d 710, 715–16 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding

that justifying an arrest by pointing to probable cause for the misdemeanor of

crossing an interstate highway was permissible even if it was “only an after-

the-fact justification for the arrest”). Goode is therefore entitled to qualified

immunity unless it was clearly established that no probable cause existed to

arrest Voss for interference with public duties or any other crime at the time

of arrest. Probable cause exists when an officer is aware of “reasonably

trustworthy facts which, given the totality of the circumstances, are sufficient

to lead a prudent person to believe” that a crime has been or will be committed.

Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104, 1109 (5th Cir. 2006).

Voss’s second argument is that Goode is not entitled to qualified

immunity because a reasonable officer would not have thought that he had

probable cause to arrest her for interference with public duties.

We need not determine whether Goode had probable cause under the

first part of the qualified immunity test, because Goode’s behavior was

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reasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time of the incident.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity even if he did not have probable

cause to arrest a suspect, “if a reasonable person in [his] position ‘would have

believed that [his] conduct conformed to the constitutional standard in light of

the information available to [him] and the clearly established law.’” Freeman

v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 415 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Goodson v. City of Corpus

Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000)). To determine whether a reasonable

officer would have believed that his or her conduct conformed to the

constitutional standard, courts look at the state of the law at the time of the

incident. See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018). The Supreme

Court has not required a case “directly on point for a right to be clearly

established,” but “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct.

548, 551 (2017)). In other words, “[a] clearly established right is one that is

‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that

what he is doing violates that right.’” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting

Reichle v. Howards, 556 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)).

Texas Penal Code § 38.15 provides, “[a] person commits an offense if the

person with criminal negligence interrupts, disrupts, impedes, or otherwise

interferes with . . . a peace officer while the peace officer is performing a duty

or exercising authority imposed or granted by law.” Id. § 38.15(a)(1). In order

to violate the statute, a person’s interference must consist of more than speech

alone. Id. § 38.15(d) (“It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the

interruption, disruption, impediment, or interference alleged consisted of

speech only.”). Accordingly, we have held that “merely arguing with police

officers about the propriety of their conduct . . . falls within the speech

exception to section 38.15” and thus does not constitute probable cause to

arrest someone for interference. Freeman, 483 F.3d at 414; see also Westfall v.

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Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 544 (5th Cir. 2018). By contrast, actions such as “ma[king]

physical contact with any of the officers or physically obstruct[ing]” them from

performing their legally authorized duties could constitute interference.

Freeman, 483 F.3d at 414. And “fail[ing] to comply with an officer’s instruction,

made within the scope of the officer’s official duty and pertaining to physical

conduct rather than speech” can also constitute interference. Childers v.

Iglesias, 848 F.3d 412, 415 (5th Cir. 2017) (describing the state of the law as of

September 2013).

Here, a reasonable officer could believe that Voss’s conduct did not fall

within the speech-only exception. While Voss maintains that she did not

physically put K.V. in her car, she does not deny that she told K.V. to get in

her car, contravening Goode’s order that K.V. get in his patrol car.

Importantly, her counsel acknowledged at oral argument that K.V. obeyed

Voss and got in Voss’s car after Voss ordered her to do so. A reasonable officer

could think that this behavior gave rise to probable cause for interference. In

Barnes v. State, 206 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals held that a woman’s shout to her son to “run” as police

attempted to restrain them did not fall within the speech-only exception

because it was a “command to act.” Id. at 605–06. The court found that in the

First Amendment context, words specifically designed to prompt action are not

given full protection, and similarly, a command of this kind should be treated

as conduct that can form the basis for probable cause. Id. at 606 (citing

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)). The facts of Barnes, in which

a mother told her minor child to physically disobey police orders and the child

did so, are analogous to this case. Barnes therefore gave Goode reason to

believe that probable cause existed to arrest Voss after Voss instructed her

child to physically disobey an officer and the child complied.

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Voss’s conduct also went beyond the types of speech we have recognized

as protected. While courts have sometimes held that similar behavior fell

within the speech exception, those cases involved unlawful orders by police.

See, e.g., Freeman, 483 F.3d at 413 (holding that plaintiff’s yelling and refusing

to obey an unlawful order fell within speech exception); Carney v. State, 31

S.W.3d 392, 398 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding that defendant arguing with police

officers about an unconstitutional search fell within the speech exception).

Here, Goode had legal authority to place K.V. in protective custody, and Voss

told her child to disobey a physical order. These circumstances are more

similar to the facts of our cases upholding qualified immunity. See Haggerty

v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that arresting

someone for stepping within 10 to 15 feet of an officer after being ordered to

move away did not violate clearly established law). Accordingly, Goode’s

conduct was not unreasonable in light of the prevailing law.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

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