Holguin-Hernandez v. United States

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2019 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

HOLGUIN-HERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18–7739. Argued December 10, 2019—Decided February 26, 2020

A criminal defendant who wants to “preserve a claim of error” for appel-

late review must first inform the trial judge “of [1] the action the party

wishes the court to take, or [2] the party’s objection to the court’s action

and the grounds for that objection.” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 51(b).

Petitioner Holguin-Hernandez was convicted on drug charges and

sentenced to 60 months in prison and five years of supervised release

while he was still serving a term of supervised release for an earlier

conviction. The Government asked the District Court to impose an

additional consecutive prison term of 12 to 18 months for violating the

conditions of the earlier term. Petitioner countered that 18 U. S. C.

§3553’s sentencing factors either did not support imposing any addi-

tional time or supported a sentence of less than 12 months. The court

nonetheless imposed a consecutive 12-month term. Petitioner argued

on appeal that this sentence was unreasonably long because it was

“ ‘greater than necessar[y]’ to accomplish the goals of sentencing,”

Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U. S. 85, 101, but the Fifth Circuit

held that he had forfeited that argument by failing to object to the rea-

sonableness of the sentence in the District Court.

Held: Petitioner’s district-court argument for a specific sentence (nothing

or less than 12 months) preserved his claim on appeal that the sen-

tence imposed was unreasonably long. A party who informs the court

of the “action” he “wishes the court to take,” Rule 51(b), ordinarily

brings to the court’s attention his objection to a contrary decision. That

is certainly true where, as here, the defendant advocates for a sentence

shorter than the one actually imposed. Judges, having in mind their

“overarching duty” under §3553(a) “to ‘impose a sentence sufficient,

but not greater than necessary,’ to serve the purposes of sentencing,”

would ordinarily understand that a defendant in that circumstance

2 HOLGUIN-HERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

was making the argument that the shorter sentence would be “ ‘suffi-

cient’ ” and a longer sentence “ ‘greater than necessary.’ ” Pepper v.

United States, 562 U. S. 476, 493 (quoting §3553(a)). Nothing more is

needed to preserve a claim that a longer sentence is unreasonable. De-

fendants need not also refer to the “reasonableness” of a sentence.

Rule 51 abolished the requirement of making formal “exceptions” to a

district court’s decision. And, in any event, reasonableness pertains to

the standard of “appellate review” of a trial court’s sentencing decision,

Gall v. United States, 552 U. S. 38, 46 (emphasis added); it is not the

substantive standard that trial courts apply under §3553(a). A defend-

ant who, by advocating for a particular sentence, communicates to the

trial judge his view that a longer sentence is “greater than necessary”

has thereby informed the court of the legal error at issue in an appel-

late challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.

Other issues raised by the Government and amicus are not ad-

dressed here because they were not considered by the Fifth Circuit.

Pp. 4–6.

746 Fed. Appx. 403, vacated and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. ALITO, J.,

filed a concurring opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–7739

_________________

GONZALO HOLGUIN-HERNANDEZ, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[February 26, 2020]

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

A criminal defendant who wishes a court of appeals to

consider a claim that a ruling of a trial court was in error

must first make his objection known to the trial-court judge.

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide two ways

of doing so. They say that

“[a] party may preserve a claim of error by informing

the court . . . of [1] the action the party wishes the court

to take, or [2] the party’s objection to the court’s action

and the grounds for that objection.” Fed. Rule Crim.

Proc. 51(b).

Errors “not brought to the court’s attention” in one of these

two ways are subject to review only insofar as they are

“plain.” Rule 52(b); see United States v. Olano, 507 U. S.

725, 732–736 (1993).

In this case, a criminal defendant argued in the District

Court that the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U. S. C.

§3553(a) did not support imposing any prison time for a

supervised-release violation. At the very least, the defend-

ant contended, any term of imprisonment should be less

than 12 months long. The judge nevertheless imposed a

2 HOLGUIN-HERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

sentence of 12 months. The question is whether the defend-

ant’s district-court argument for a specific sentence

(namely, nothing or less than 12 months) preserved his

claim on appeal that the 12-month sentence was unreason-

ably long. We think that it did.

I

The petitioner in this case, Gonzalo Holguin-Hernandez,

was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 60

months in prison and five years of supervised release. At

the time of his conviction, he was also serving a term of su-

pervised release related to an earlier crime. The Govern-

ment asked the court to find that petitioner had violated

the conditions of that earlier term, to revoke it, and to im-

pose an additional consecutive prison term consistent with

the pertinent Sentencing Guidelines, namely, 12 to 18

months in prison. See United States Sentencing Commis-

sion, Guidelines Manual §§7B1.4(a), 7B1.3(f ) (Nov. 2018).

Petitioner’s counsel argued that there “would be no rea-

son under [18 U. S. C. §]3553 that an additional consecutive

sentence would get [petitioner’s] attention any better than”

the five years in prison the court had already imposed for

the current trafficking offense. App. 10. She added that

the petitioner understood that, if he offended again, he was

“going to serve his life in prison.” Ibid. And she urged the

court to impose either “no additional time or certainly less

than the [G]uidelines.” Ibid. At the least, she said, the

court should “depart” from the Guidelines, imposing a sen-

tence “below” the applicable range “because it is a substan-

tial sentence and to me over represents the role that he

played in” the underlying offense. Ibid.

The court then imposed a consecutive term of 12 months,

a sentence at the bottom of, but not below, the Guidelines

range. See id., at 11. The judge indicated that he did not

disagree with counsel’s argument, but thought that circum-

stances justified a greater sentence. He asked counsel if

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 3

Opinion of the Court

there was “[a]nything further.” Ibid. Counsel said that

there was not. See ibid.

Petitioner appealed, arguing that the 12-month sentence

was unreasonably long in that it was “ ‘greater than neces-

sar[y]’ to accomplish the goals of sentencing.” Kimbrough

v. United States, 552 U. S. 85, 101 (2007) (quoting 18

U. S. C. §3553(a)); see also, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552

U. S. 38, 49–50 (2007) (noting the District Court’s obliga-

tion to “consider all of the §3553(a) factors to determine” the

“appropriate sentence”); 18 U. S. C. §3583(e) (making these

factors applicable in substantial part to proceedings to re-

voke or modify a term of supervised release). The Court of

Appeals held that petitioner had forfeited this argument by

failing to “object in the district court to the reasonableness

of the sentence imposed.” 746 Fed. Appx. 403 (CA5 2018)

(per curiam). The court would, of course, consider whether

the error petitioner asserted was “plain.” See ibid.; Rule

52(b) (permitting review of a plain error “even though it was

not brought to the court’s attention”). But it found no plain

error, and so it affirmed.

Petitioner sought review in this Court and, in light of dif-

ferences among the Courts of Appeals, we granted his peti-

tion for certiorari. Compare 746 Fed. Appx. 403 with, e.g.,

United States v. Curry, 461 F. 3d 452, 459 (CA4 2006);

United States v. Vonner, 516 F. 3d 382, 389 (CA6 2008) (en

banc); United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F. 3d 430, 433–

434 (CA7 2005); United States v. Sullivan, 327 Fed. Appx.

643, 645 (CA7 2009); United States v. Autery, 555 F. 3d 864,

868–871 (CA9 2009); United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461

F. 3d 1178, 1183 (CA10 2006); United States v. Gonzalez-

Mendez, 545 Fed. Appx. 848, 849, and n. 1 (CA11 2013);

United States v. Bras, 483 F. 3d 103, 113 (CADC 2007). Be-

cause the Government agrees with petitioner that the Fifth

Circuit’s approach is inconsistent with the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure, we appointed K. Winn Allen to defend

4 HOLGUIN-HERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

the judgment below as amicus curiae. He has ably dis-

charged his responsibilities.

II

Congress has instructed sentencing courts to impose sen-

tences that are “ ‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary,

to comply with’ ” (among other things) certain basic objec-

tives, including the need for “just punishment, deterrence,

protection of the public, and rehabilitation.” Dean v. United

States, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 4) (quoting 18

U. S. C. §3553(a)(2); emphasis added); see Pepper v. United

States, 562 U. S. 476, 491, 493 (2011). If the trial court fol-

lows proper procedures and gives adequate consideration to

these and the other listed factors, then the question for an

appellate court is simply, as here, whether the trial court’s

chosen sentence was “reasonable” or whether the judge in-

stead “abused his discretion in determining that the

§3553(a) factors supported” the sentence imposed. Gall,

552 U. S., at 56; see United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220,

261–262 (2005).

By “informing the court” of the “action” he “wishes the

court to take,” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 51(b), a party ordinar-

ily brings to the court’s attention his objection to a contrary

decision. See Rule 52(b). And that is certainly true in cases

such as this one, where a criminal defendant advocates for

a sentence shorter than the one ultimately imposed.

Judges, having in mind their “overarching duty” under

§3553(a), would ordinarily understand that a defendant in

that circumstance was making the argument (to put it in

statutory terms) that the shorter sentence would be “ ‘suffi-

cient’ ” and a longer sentence “ ‘greater than necessary’ ” to

achieve the purposes of sentencing. Pepper, 562 U. S., at

493 (quoting §3553(a)). Nothing more is needed to preserve

the claim that a longer sentence is unreasonable.

We do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ suggestion

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 5

Opinion of the Court

that defendants are required to refer to the “reasonable-

ness” of a sentence to preserve such claims for appeal. See

746 Fed. Appx. 403; United States v. Peltier, 505 F. 3d 389,

391 (CA5 2007). The rulemakers, in promulgating Rule 51,

intended to dispense with the need for formal “exceptions”

to a trial court’s rulings. Rule 51(a); see also Advisory Com-

mittee’s 1944 Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 51, 18 U. S. C.

App., p. 591. They chose not to require an objecting party

to use any particular language or even to wait until the

court issues its ruling. Rule 51(b) (a party may “infor[m]

the court” of its position either “when the court ruling or

order is made or” when it is “sought”). The question is

simply whether the claimed error was “brought to the

court’s attention.” Rule 52(b). Here, it was.

The Court of Appeals properly noted that, to win on ap-

peal, a defendant making such a claim must show that the

trial court’s decision was not “reasonable.” Gall, 552 U. S.,

at 56. But that fact is not relevant to the issue here. Our

decisions make plain that reasonableness is the label we

have given to “the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard”

that “applies to appellate review” of the trial court’s sen-

tencing decision. Id., at 46 (emphasis added); see Kim-

brough, 552 U. S., at 90–91; Rita v. United States, 551 U. S.

338, 351 (2007); Booker, 543 U. S., at 261. The substantive

standard that Congress has prescribed for trial courts is the

“parsimony principle” enshrined in §3553(a). Dean, 581

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4); see Pepper, 562 U. S., at 491. A

defendant who, by advocating for a particular sentence,

communicates to the trial judge his view that a longer sen-

tence is “greater than necessary” has thereby informed the

court of the legal error at issue in an appellate challenge to

the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. He need

not also refer to the standard of review.

III

The Government and amicus raise other issues. They ask

6 HOLGUIN-HERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

us to decide what is sufficient to preserve a claim that a

trial court used improper procedures in arriving at its cho-

sen sentence. And they ask us to decide when a party has

properly preserved the right to make particular arguments

supporting its claim that a sentence is unreasonably long.

We shall not consider these matters, however, for the Court

of Appeals has not considered them. See, e.g., Tapia v.

United States, 564 U. S. 319, 335 (2011); Cutter v. Wil-

kinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005). We hold only that

the defendant here properly preserved the claim that his

12-month sentence was unreasonably long by advocating

for a shorter sentence and thereby arguing, in effect, that

this shorter sentence would have proved “sufficient,” while

a sentence of 12 months or longer would be “greater than

necessary” to “comply with” the statutory purposes of pun-

ishment. 18 U. S. C. §3553(a).

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the

case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 1

ALITO, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–7739

_________________

GONZALO HOLGUIN-HERNANDEZ, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[February 26, 2020]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins,

concurring.

I agree with the Court that a defendant who requests a

specific sentence during a sentencing hearing need not ob-

ject to the sentence after its pronouncement in order to pre-

serve a challenge to its substantive reasonableness (i.e.,

length) on appeal. I write to emphasize what we are not

deciding.

First, we do not decide “what is sufficient to preserve a

claim that a trial court used improper procedures in arriv-

ing at its chosen sentence.” Ante, at 6. That question is not

currently before us. Nevertheless, as we have previously

explained, failing to object at all to a procedural error (e.g.,

a district court’s miscalculation of the Guidelines range)

will subject a procedural challenge to plain-error review.

Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U. S. ___, ___–___

(2016) (slip op., at 4).

Second, we do not decide what is sufficient to preserve

any “particular” substantive-reasonableness argument.

Ante, at 6. Again, the question here “is simply whether the

claimed error was ‘brought to the court’s attention.’ ” Ante,

at 5 (quoting Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b)). Thus, we do not

suggest that a generalized argument in favor of less impris-

onment will insulate all arguments regarding the length of

a sentence from plain-error review. The plain-error rule

2 HOLGUIN-HERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., concurring

serves many interests, judicial efficiency and finality being

chief among them. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U. S.

129, 134–135 (2009). Requiring a party to bring an error to

the attention of the court enables the court to correct itself,

obviating the need for an appeal. At the very least, the

court can explain its reasoning and thus assist the appel-

late process. A court cannot address particular arguments

or facts not brought to its attention.

Third, we do not decide whether this petitioner properly

preserved his particular substantive-reasonableness argu-

ments, namely, that he did not pose a danger to the public

and that a 12-month sentence would not serve deterrence

purposes. See ante, at 2, 5–6. In determining whether ar-

guments have been preserved, courts should make a case-

specific assessment of how the error was “brought to the

court’s attention.” Rule 52(b); see also, e.g., United States

v. Vonner, 516 F. 3d 382, 392 (CA6) (en banc) (“While we do

not require defendants to challenge the ‘reasonableness’ of

their sentences in front of the district court, we surely

should apply plain-error review to any arguments for leni-

ency that the defendant does not present to the trial court”),

cert. denied, 555 U. S. 816 (2008). On remand, the Fifth

Circuit can decide whether petitioner preserved these spe-

cific arguments and whether the sentence was substan-

tively unreasonable.