“Typically, administrative segregation in and of itself does not implicate a protected liberty interest”
How later courts described this case
- “Typically, administrative segregation in and of itself does not implicate a protected liberty interest”
- for a right “[t]o be clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity, “a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
- outlining two- prong test for qualified immunity and explaining that district courts may “address the two prongs in whichever order would expedite resolution of the case”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 7 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRADLEY WILLIAM MONICAL, No. 18-36057
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:17-cv-00501-YY
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHRISTINA TOWERS; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
JANE DOE; JOHN DOE,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Youlee Yim You, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted February 4, 2020***
Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Oregon state prisoner Bradley William Monical appeals pro se the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process and
equal protection claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo. S.R. Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2019). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Monical’s due
process claim related to his 16-day stay in administrative segregation and
temporary segregation because Monical failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether his stay “implicated a protected liberty interest.”
Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “a
prisoner is entitled to certain due process protections . . . only when the
disciplinary action implicates a protected liberty interest” or imposes an “atypical
and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 1078 (“Typically,
administrative segregation in and of itself does not implicate a protected liberty
interest”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Monical’s due
process claim related to the alleged errors in the misconduct report because
Monical failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether the information in the report
was incorrect. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (the court shall grant summary judgment
where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact”).
2 18-36057
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Monical’s due
process claim relating to the alleged misapplication of the Oregon Administrative
Rules which resulted in defendants’ failure to credit properly Monical’s time spent
in segregation at Jackson County Jail because defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity. See Morales v. Fry, 873 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 2017) (outlining two-
prong test for qualified immunity and explaining that district courts may “address
the two prongs in whichever order would expedite resolution of the case”). It
would not have been clear to every reasonable prison official that such conduct
was unlawful under the circumstances. See Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085,
1090 (9th Cir. 2016) (for a right “[t]o be clearly established” for purposes of
qualified immunity, “a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Monical’s equal
protection claim because Monical failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether
defendants “intentionally treated [him] differently from others similarly situated”
or whether “there [was] no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”
Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation
omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Monical’s motion to
3 18-36057
appoint counsel because Monical did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances.
See Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting
forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Monical’s motion to
compel discovery because Monical failed to demonstrate “actual and substantial
prejudice” as a result of the denied discovery. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732,
751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district
court’s “decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the clearest
showing that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the
complaining litigant” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We reject as meritless Monical’s contentions that the district court failed to
consider his verified civil complaint as summary judgment evidence and should
have sua sponte granted him summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
4 18-36057