In Re Mahaley P.

01/09/2020

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs December 2, 2019

IN RE MAHALEY P. ET AL.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Claiborne County

No. 2016-JV-1884 Robert M. Estep, Judge

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No. E2019-00770-COA-R3-PT

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This is the second appeal concerning the petition filed by the Tennessee Department of

Children’s Services (“DCS”) in the Claiborne County Juvenile Court (“Juvenile Court”)

to terminate the parental rights of Ed P. (“Father”) to the children, Mahaley P. and

Morgan P. (“the Children”). During the first appeal as to Father, this Court reversed the

statutory ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and remanded

for the Juvenile Court to make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law related

to the two remaining grounds and as relevant to the best interest analysis. See In re

Mickeal Z., No. E2018-01069-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 337038 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25,

2019). On April 4, 2019, the Juvenile Court entered an order making additional findings

of fact and conclusions of law. Father appeals the April 4, 2019 order of the Juvenile

Court terminating his parental rights to the Children upon its determination that DCS had

proven by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds of persistent conditions

and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the Children and

that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest.

Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G.

CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., and KENNY W. ARMSTRONG, J., joined.

Dennis M. Bailey, Jr., Jacksboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ed P.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, and Amber L. Seymour, Assistant

Attorney General, for the appellee, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

OPINION

Background

In October 2016, the Juvenile Court entered an order placing the Children in the

custody of DCS. DCS filed a petition for termination of the parents’ rights in June 2017,

which was granted by the Juvenile Court. The parents appealed to this Court. The

previous appeal involved both Father and the Children’s biological mother, Alesha Z.

(“Mother”). The Children’s half-sibling, Mickeal Z., also was involved in the previous

appeal. Mickeal Z. is not involved in this appeal because Father is not his biological

father. During the previous appeal, this Court summarized this case as follows:

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“the

Department”) became involved with the parents and children in October

2016 after Mother was found with the children on the side of the road in

Claiborne County. According to a later-filed “Petition for Temporary

Legal Custody,” the allegations of which were stipulated to by the parents,

the Department’s involvement itself stemmed from allegations that there

was a drug-exposed child. In pertinent part, the Department’s petition for

custody outlined the following:

2. This matter came to the Department’s attention upon a

referral for Drug Exposed Child. CM Gilliam made contact

with the mother, Alesha, who stated that she had broken

down after picking up her children from school in Ed’s truck.

The family has been living part of the time in Clairfield, TN

and the rest of the time in Middlesboro, KY. Alesha stated

that she did not have anyone to help her and so she reached

out to the police. The truck was impounded and Alesha and

the kids were brought to the Justice Center. There was no

insurance on the truck and Alesha did not have her driver’s

license with her. Alesha did not have a booster seat in the

truck for Mahaley. Alesha and the children were in the

broken down vehicle for approximately 6 hours.

3. Alesha stated that she had “messed up” and done meth.

Alesha stated that she had also taken a Hydro 7.5 earlier that

day that she had found from an old prescription. Alesha

consented to a [urine drug screen] and failed for

methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC. Alesha stated

that she did not have anyone to pick her up and help her and

that she and her fiancé Ed had split up because he had kicked

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her in the face. Alesha reported that Ed had kicked her in his

sleep when she tried to wake him.

4. Alesha stated that her children had been staying with her

father . . . at night in Middlesboro, KY by agreement but that

she had kept the children with her since the weekend. Alesha

stated that she had broken down in her car the night before

and had not got the children home until 4:00 am.

5. Alesha stated that the home at . . . Brentwood Circle

Middlesboro, KY was built in 1893, and that it did not have

water or electricity. Alesha stated that she and Ed were trying

to remodel the home.

6. Ed could not be reached and Alesha stated that he was out

of minutes and could not text either. Alesha requested for her

father . . . to go get Ed and bring him to the Justice Center.

[Her father] refused and stated that he does not get along with

Ed. Alesha named several family members in TN but none

could be approved for an IPA.

7. The children appeared tired and dirty. The baby Morgan

was coughing and fussy. The baby smelled like vomit and

the officer reported that the baby had vomited earlier.

Mahaley appeared dirty and her clothes were dirty. Mickeal

appeared appropriate but was very upset that he was going to

have to miss his field trip at school on Wednesday.

On October 13, 2016, the Claiborne County Juvenile Court entered a

protective custody order, pursuant to which the Department was awarded

temporary legal custody of the children. A preliminary hearing was set for

October 19, 2016, and following that hearing, the juvenile court determined

that probable cause had been established to show that the children were

dependent and neglected. An “Adjudicatory Hearing Order” was entered

the following month after both parents waived the scheduled adjudicatory

hearing and stipulated to the allegations in the Department’s petition for

custody. Pursuant to this latest order, the juvenile court held that the

children were “dependent and neglected within the meaning of the law” and

that their removal was required pursuant to the Tennessee Code. Although

the order provided that the Department would retain temporary custody of

the children, it also stated that the parents would be allowed supervised

visitation according to the rules and regulations of the Department.

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During the course of the Department’s involvement with the family,

a number of permanency plans were created. The first permanency plan,

dated October 26, 2016, had several requirements directed to ensuring that

the children had stable housing and that the parents were drug-free. With

respect to the parents’ ability to provide safe and stable housing, for

instance, the permanency plan directed the parents to give the Department

documentation of valid housing, provide information regarding their

address, and provide documentation of legal income. Regarding substance

abuse concerns, the permanency plan required Mother to schedule and

attend an alcohol and drug assessment and follow all recommendations.

Moreover, both parents were required to pass random drug screens and pill

counts.

In addition to the above, the permanency plan had several other

discrete requirements. Included among these was the requirement that

Father establish parentage of the children. Further, the parents were

required to attend the children’s medical appointments, as well as create a

transportation plan and provide the Department with proof of insurance on

any vehicle in which the children would be transported. Concerning the

parents’ responsibilities regarding visitation, the permanency plan provided

in relevant part as follows:

Parents will schedule visitation at least one week prior to the

desired visitation with the department FSW or private

provider (if utilized). Parents will cancel any visit at least 24

hours prior to the scheduled visitation. Parents will arrive at

the visit at least 15 minutes prior to the scheduled visit. The

visitation will be cancelled if the parents arrive 15 minutes (or

more) late for the visit. Parents will provide their own

transportation to and from scheduled visit. Parents will

provide for all the needs of the child(ren) during the visit such

as any needed snacks, drinks, and diapers. Parents will

demonstrate appropriate parenting skills during visits.

Parents will not be under the influence of drugs or alcohol

before or during the scheduled visit.

The second permanency plan, dated April 11, 2017,1 added

additional requirements for the parents. Whereas Father was required to

schedule a mental health assessment, both parents were required to begin

1

This second permanency plan was ratified on May 17, 2017.

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family counseling. Both parents were also required to take anger

management classes and provide documentation to the Department that the

classes were completed. Further, the parents were directed to maintain

contact with the Department at least once a week.

Citing concerns that Mother’s diabetes was impeding her ability to

effectively care for the children, the second permanency plan also required

Mother to “follow recommendations from her doctor to maintain her

health.” Moreover, in light of the fact that both parents had criminal

trespassing charges and unpaid tickets, both parents were required to

resolve all legal issues.

The third permanency plan, dated October 11, 2017, was generally

consistent with the previous two plans. However, as the Department has

highlighted, the third plan specifically noted that Mother was not following

the recommendations of her alcohol and drug assessment, whereas it did

acknowledge that both parents had provided copies of valid driver’s

licenses.

On June 12, 2017, the Department filed its “Petition to Terminate

Parental Rights” in the Claiborne County Juvenile Court, requesting that

Mother’s parental rights be terminated as to Mickeal Z., Mahaley P., and

Morgan P., and that Father’s parental rights be terminated as to Morgan P.

The petition was later amended to specify that the Department was also

seeking to terminate Father’s parental rights to Mahaley P. Multiple

grounds for termination were alleged in the Department’s petition. As to

both parents, the following grounds were asserted: abandonment for failure

to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with permanency

plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability to parent. As

to Father alone, the Department alleged that Father had engaged in conduct

that exhibited a wanton disregard for the children’s welfare. In addition to

asserting the above grounds for termination, the Department averred that

the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights would be in the

children’s best interests.

On May 11, 2018, the juvenile court held a hearing on the

Department’s termination petition. The first witness to testify was Nicki

Stone, a case manager with the Department. Ms. Stone testified that when

the family was brought to the attention of the Department, Mother reported

to her that “things had been rough for her and that she had really messed

up, that she had used meth and that she had taken some sort of pain pill.”

According to Ms. Stone, Mother also reported that the home she and Father

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were residing in at that time had no water or electricity. Regarding the

children, Ms. Stone stated that the children appeared “very tired and dirty”

when she first saw them. Although Ms. Stone stated that Father could not

be reached the night that the children came into custody, she testified that,

during her subsequent interaction with him, he was compliant with

everything that she asked him to do.

Next to testify was Jessica Dillon, a family service worker with the

Department. Ms. Dillon was involved in the case from the time the

children came into custody until the end of January 2017. She testified that

she met with the parents to create the initial permanency plan. Among her

concerns was the parents’ housing; according to Ms. Dillon, their previous

housing was not livable “due to bedbugs and several different things going

on in that home.” Mother’s drug issues were also among Ms. Dillon’s

biggest concerns with the family at the time the initial permanency plan

was created. During a drug screen on December 9, 2016, Mother tested

positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, opiate, and Oxycodone. Ms.

Dillon testified, however, that Father tested clean at that time.

After Mother failed to show up on time for a January 13, 2017 visit,

Ms. Dillon tried to find her and eventually located her in a mall bathroom.

Ms. Dillon testified that, although she tried to administer a drug screen to

Mother on that date, Mother refused. A few days later, on January 17,

2017, Ms. Dillon made an unannounced visit to a residence the parents had

obtained at a trailer park in Cumberland Gap. No one was present when

she arrived, and Ms. Dillon observed that there was a large amount of

debris around the home, that there were smashed windows, and that the

home did not appear to be livable. According to Ms. Dillon, at a

subsequent foster care review board meeting on January 19, 2017, Mother

tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC.

Ms. Dillon testified that Mother showed up for about half of her

visitations with the children. Although she testified that the visits went

well overall, she also stated that on some visits she suspected that Mother

was under the influence. Ms. Dillon stated that Father was present at all of

his visitations from what she recalls and that he did not fail any drug

screens while she had the case.

After Ms. Dillon testified, the court heard from Rhonda Combs, an

employee with Youth Villages. Ms. Combs was assigned to work with the

family beginning in December 2016 after a referral from the Department,

and she carried this responsibility through April 2017. Ms. Combs testified

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that her role was as a support to help the parents meet the conditions of the

permanency plan and that she was available three days a week. However,

her testimony revealed that there was a lack of consistency regarding the

parents’ usage of this resource:

Three times a week is what our schedule was. There were

times that we would have a high rate of no-shows, and then

they would do great and meet consistently for the next three

weeks. And then they might fall off the next week, and it’d

be once a week, then twice a week. So it kind of went back

and forth a little bit.

Regarding the parents’ trailer in Cumberland Gap, Ms. Combs

testified that it had weak flooring and that it did not initially have water or

electricity. Although she stated that the parties had made some progress by

the time her involvement ended, she testified that the progress made was

“minimal” and that there were still electrical issues in that wiring was

exposed and not behind drywall. Ms. Combs further stated that, although a

kitchen sink was working when she left, the parties had to use public

facilities or five-gallon buckets they kept in the trailer in order to use the

restroom. Although Ms. Combs advised the parents about public housing,

she testified that no documentation was ever provided to her to confirm a

claim made by Mother that the family was on a waiting list.

According to Ms. Combs, although the parents had put up some

drywall in the trailer “for a little bit,” the progress was removed. As she

explained it:

The problem . . . was whenever there would be an argument

or disagreement in the home, [Mother] told me that -- and I

saw the damage but she told me she did, but she took a

hammer and went all the way down every bit of that drywall

and busted it back up.

Ms. Combs further testified that graffiti had sometimes appeared in the

home, the product of Mother venting her frustration following a

disagreement. We observe that pictures chronicling some of the graffiti

was introduced as an exhibit at trial. One of the messages, written in large

print across a wall, concludes in part with the following: “What are you

f***** in the head! You[’]ll Regret.” Another picture of Mother’s graffiti

shows a message stating that, “I Bought it I Bought it I hung it sorry for

your luck That’s what you get for refusing to take me to Rehab F*** You.”

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Clearly evident and interspersed throughout the graffiti in this latter

message are various holes in the wall. According to Ms. Combs, Mother

never reported that Father had made any of these holes and actually self-

professed that the destruction was her own doing.

Specifically regarding the relationship between the parents, Ms.

Combs testified as follows:

When I first started with the case . . . [Father] . . . was actually

in the hospital at U.T. after his surgery. [Mother] was

extremely concerned with his care and well-being, wanted to

take care of him, make sure he got better. So, initially the

relationship seemed healthy, and they were there for each

other.

As we went on, whether it was high frustration levels or

whatever contributed to it, there were many times that

[Mother] would talk at me and tell me that he’d left her on the

side of the road, that they had gotten in a fight going down

the road -- she never said physical, just a fight going down the

road. And he’d left her on the side of the road multiple times,

that he’d dropped her off in front of the emergency station

down from their house once before.

There were frequent instances that they would be arguing,

and he would leave the home to try to -- my sense would be

to try to calm down before he came back. And she would

follow him, and the situation would escalate again.

Although Ms. Combs recommended couple’s counseling on multiple

occasions to the parents, she claims there was “never any follow-through on

that.”

Ms. Combs also testified at length about Mother’s drug issues. She

claimed that Mother reported using marijuana frequently and that she had

observed marijuana paraphernalia upon one visit to the parents’ home.

Moreover, Ms. Combs stated that Mother had reported to stealing Father’s

pain medication at one point and that she had admitted to going on meth

binges:

She would tell me she would be clean, and she would be very

proud of herself when she hadn’t used anything for several

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days at a time. And I was proud of her, too, when she wasn’t

using. And then she would tell me, you know, that I’m going

to be upset with her, that I’m going to be disappointed with

her because she had used. And it was typically a time when

she would be out of communication for two or three days,

wouldn’t respond when I tried to get in touch with her, and

then she’d get in touch with me and tell me that’s what had

happened.

According to Ms. Combs, Mother was recommended to have in-patient

treatment, and Ms. Combs even accompanied Mother throughout the entire

intake process at a rehabilitation center. However, Ms. Combs testified

that, after she left Mother at the center, Mother checked herself out within

hours.

Father began his trial testimony by confirming that, although he was

the father for Mahaley P. and Morgan P., he was not the biological father of

Mickeal Z. He also stated that his residence at the time of the children’s

removal was at “Brentwood Circle.” At the time of trial, he claimed to be

living in a trailer owned by Mother and located approximately 150 feet

from Mother’s own home.

Father admitted that he oftentimes gets frustrated with Mother, and

when asked how certain parts of the previous home in Cumberland Gap had

been destroyed, he stated as follows:

[A:] We had an argument and I would leave, and she would

write on the wall or knock a hole in the wall one way or

another.

[Q:] And you would come back to her?

[A:] I would come back because she’s the mother of my

children. I love her, yes, I do. But I’m not going to sit there

and be treated or talked to bad because I can’t get out what I

need to.

Father also confirmed that he had broken his cell phone following a

recent argument with Mother, but despite the occurrence of conflicts such

as these, he admitted that he had never engaged in family counseling with

Mother. Although much of Father’s testimony communicated the idea that

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he and Mother were “not together as a couple,”2 the two were still involved

with one another at the time of trial, even if such involvement was not of a

romantic nature. Aside from the fact that the two lived next door to one

another, Father testified that because Mother did not have a driver’s license

he would sometimes drive her and serve as her transportation. For instance,

he stated that he drove Mother to court on the date of trial.

During the course of his testimony, Father recalled two occasions on

which he had dropped off Mother at the police station following an

argument. In explaining this, he stated as follows:

She’d gone off on me. I asked her to get out of my vehicle.

She refused to get out of my vehicle. I’m not going to sit and

be yelled at and stuff and me not able to talk and defend

myself. So I stopped at the police station and had a police

officer get her out of the car so I wouldn’t have to physically

remove her from my vehicle.

When asked how he would avoid Mother if he was to ever regain

custody of his children, Father replied as follows: “If need be, I would find

suitable -- other suitable housing to where DCS could come in and approve

it before I ever moved. Whatever it takes to get my kids home and make

sure they’re safe with me I will do.” He also stated later in his testimony

that “if there is a Court Order that [Mother] is not [to] be around the kids, I

would ask for a petition . . . stating from the Court that she is not to be

around me or the kids.” Father indicated that he would have no problem

calling law enforcement to ensure compliance with any such order.

Mother testified following Father. She admitted to having a meth

problem at the time the children came into custody and did not dispute that

she had failed several drug screens. She also admitted to having put graffiti

on the walls of the Cumberland Gap home and to having taken a hammer

and “bust[ing] out a piece of drywall” there. When asked if she had ever

had the in-patient treatment recommended by her drug assessment, Mother

stated that she had not. She further admitted that, despite initially checking

into one in-patient rehab, she had not stayed long. Mother claimed to be

clean at trial and testified that she had been clean for some time, even

2

This notion seems to be the primary one communicated by Father, although we do note that the

following exchange is present in the transcript of Father’s testimony: “[Q:] But you stayed together for a

really long time, and you all are still together. [A:] Yes, we have tried to work things out. Yes, we have.”

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asserting that she had been clean during a period when she got a DUI.

Moreover, even though a drug screen from November 2017 indicated that

Mother tested positive for opiates, Mother testified that she believed this

result was incorrect.

Although Mother acknowledged living next to Father, she stated that

she did not have a key to his home. When asked what she would do if

Father got custody back, Mother stated that she would move further away

from Father; she also acknowledged that she was willing to follow any type

of court orders. Additionally, Mother testified that Father had never

approved of any drug use.

Rachel Raines, a foster care worker for the Department, testified

after Mother. According to Ms. Raines, who had worked with the family

since January 2017, she could not recall Mother ever passing a drug screen

prior to the filing of the termination petition. Ms. Raines offered to take

Mother to rehabilitation for treatment, and ultimately did so, as she

described at trial:

Well, first, I had to come and get to her home. We had to

kind of convince her to ride with me. She was very agitated.

We rode down, and she was upset. We talked about her drug

addiction and how long it had been going on and the kids and

how important this was to start on her recommendations.

And we got to the rehabilitation. They explained how

rehabilitation would go. Ms. Combs later on joined us. We

stayed with her through the entire process of them going

through her things. And when she decided she would stay

and go to bed, they asked me to leave and I did so.

Despite Mother’s initial entry into treatment, Ms. Raines stated that Mother

ultimately only stayed “[t]welve hours or less.” Ms. Raines testified that

she had attempted to help Mother find some type of rehab at other times

and provided Mother with contact information of other long-term facilities.

According to Ms. Raines, she had been concerned that Mother might

harm herself on several occasions. Recounting one such incident, Ms.

Raines testified as follows:

There was one occasion she failed a drug screen. She felt that

she didn’t fail. I called Mobile Crisis, because she said she

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was going to get a gun and . . . kill herself. Mobile Crisis told

me if I was that concerned, I needed to call the police, but she

was very upset and, like, walking away from me. This is in

the middle of the mall. I followed her outside, and she just

kept walking away from me.

In addition to specifically addressing Mother’s substance abuse

issues and past concerns that Mother might self-harm, Ms. Raines also

generally testified as to the parties’ compliance with the various

requirements of the permanency plans that were created in the case. In the

course of doing so, she indicated that the parents’ respective residences

were now “environmentally” appropriate. She also offered testimony,

however, expressing her belief that the children would be better off in their

current foster care placement.

The last witness to testify was the children’s foster mother, Diane T.

(“Foster Mother”). Foster Mother testified that she had been a foster parent

for the children since October 2016 and that she felt like she had a bond

with the children. She expressed her intention to adopt the children should

they be made available for adoption.

Foster Mother agreed the children loved Mother and appeared to

have a bond with her, and regarding Father, Foster Mother testified that

there was “absolutely” a bond between him and his children and that he

was always “very attentive to his children” during visitations. She also

stated that the children “feel that they have two moms and two dads.”

Following the conclusion of the termination hearing, on June 1,

2018, the juvenile court entered an order that terminated both Mother’s and

Father’s parental rights. Although the court dismissed the ground of

abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home and also the ground of

wanton disregard that was directed against Father, it found that the

remaining grounds for termination had been established and that

termination of the parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best

interest. This appeal followed.

In re Mickeal Z., No. E2018-01069-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 337038, at *1-7 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Jan. 25, 2019) (footnotes in original but renumbered).

In the previous appeal, this Court reversed the Juvenile’s Court’s finding of the

ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan as to Father and

remanded to the Juvenile Court for entry of further findings of fact in compliance with

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Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k) as to the remaining grounds against Father of

persistent conditions and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody

of the Children, as well as the best interest analysis. The termination of Mother’s

parental rights was affirmed during the previous appeal.

On remand, the Juvenile Court entered an order with additional findings of fact as

instructed by this Court. Father timely appealed to this Court.

Discussion

Although not stated exactly as such, Father raises three issues for our review: (1)

whether the Juvenile Court erred in finding that DCS had proven by clear and convincing

evidence the statutory ground of persistent conditions, (2) whether the Juvenile Court

erred in finding that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence the statutory

ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the

Children, and (3) whether the Juvenile Court erred by finding by clear and convincing

evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the

Children.

With regard to the termination of parental rights, our Supreme Court has

instructed:

A parent’s right to the care and custody of her child is among the

oldest of the judicially recognized fundamental liberty interests protected

by the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.3 Troxel v.

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed.2d 49 (2000);

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed.2d 551

(1972); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010); In re Adoption

of Female Child, 896 S.W.2d 546, 547-48 (Tenn. 1995); Hawk v. Hawk,

855 S.W.2d 573, 578-79 (Tenn. 1993). But parental rights, although

fundamental and constitutionally protected, are not absolute. In re Angela

E., 303 S.W.3d at 250. “‘[T]he [S]tate as parens patriae has a special duty

to protect minors . . . .’ Tennessee law, thus, upholds the [S]tate’s authority

as parens patriae when interference with parenting is necessary to prevent

serious harm to a child.” Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580 (quoting In re

Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)); see also Santosky

v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed.2d 599 (1982); In

3

U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law . . . .”). Similarly, article 1, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution states

“[t]hat no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or

outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the

judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”

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re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 250. “When the State initiates a parental rights

termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental

liberty interest, but to end it.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759, 102 S. Ct. 1388.

[“]Few consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of

natural family ties.” Id. at 787, 102 S. Ct. 1388; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,

519 U.S. 102, 119, 117 S. Ct. 555, 136 L. Ed.2d 473 (1996). The parental

rights at stake are [“]far more precious than any property right.” Santosky,

455 U.S. at 758-59 102 S. Ct. 1388. Termination of parental rights has the

legal effect of reducing the parent to the role of a complete stranger and of

[“]severing forever all legal rights and obligations of the parent or guardian

of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)(1); see also Santosky, 455

U.S. at 759, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (recognizing that a decision terminating

parental rights is [“]final and irrevocable”). In light of the interests and

consequences at stake, parents are constitutionally entitled to

[“]fundamentally fair procedures” in termination proceedings. Santosky,

455 U.S. at 754, 102 S. Ct. 1388; see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of

Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed.2d 640

(1981) (discussing the due process right of parents to fundamentally fair

procedures).

Among the constitutionally mandated [“]fundamentally fair

procedures” is a heightened standard of proof – clear and convincing

evidence. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769, 102 S. Ct. 1388. This standard

minimizes the risk of unnecessary or erroneous governmental interference

with fundamental parental rights. Id.; In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586,

596 (Tenn. 2010). [“]Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact-finder

to form a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and

eliminates any serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of these

factual findings.” In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596 (citations omitted).

The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard ensures that the facts are

established as highly probable, rather than as simply more probable than

not. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); In re

M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Tennessee statutes governing parental termination proceedings

incorporate this constitutionally mandated standard of proof. Tennessee

Code Annotated section 36-1113[sic](c) provides:

Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based

upon:

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(1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that

the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights

have been established; and

(2) That termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the

best interests of the child.

This statute requires the State to establish by clear and convincing proof

that at least one of the enumerated statutory grounds4 for termination exists

and that termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Angela E., 303

S.W.3d at 250; In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tenn. 2006); In re

Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002). “The best interests analysis is

separate from and subsequent to the determination that there is clear and

convincing evidence of grounds for termination.” In re Angela E., 303

S.W.3d at 254. Although several factors relevant to the best interests

analysis are statutorily enumerated,5 the list is illustrative, not exclusive.

The parties are free to offer proof of other relevant factors. In re Audrey S.,

182 S.W.3d at 878. The trial court must then determine whether the

combined weight of the facts “amount[s] to clear and convincing evidence

that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re Kaliyah S., 455

S.W.3d 533, 555 (Tenn. 2015). These requirements ensure that each parent

receives the constitutionally required “individualized determination that a

parent is either unfit or will cause substantial harm to his or her child before

the fundamental right to the care and custody of the child can be taken

away.” In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tenn. 1999).

Furthermore, other statutes impose certain requirements upon trial

courts hearing termination petitions. A trial court must “ensure that the

hearing on the petition takes place within six (6) months of the date that the

petition is filed, unless the court determines an extension is in the best

interests of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1113[sic](k). A trial court

must “enter an order that makes specific findings of fact and conclusions of

law within thirty (30) days of the conclusion of the hearing.” Id. This

portion of the statute requires a trial court to make “findings of fact and

conclusions of law as to whether clear and convincing evidence establishes

the existence of each of the grounds asserted for terminating [parental]

rights.” In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 255. “Should the trial court

conclude that clear and convincing evidence of ground(s) for termination

does exist, then the trial court must also make a written finding whether

clear and convincing evidence establishes that termination of [parental]

4

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1)-(13).

5

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i).

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rights is in the [child’s] best interests.” Id. If the trial court’s best interests

analysis “is based on additional factual findings besides the ones made in

conjunction with the grounds for termination, the trial court must also

include these findings in the written order.” Id. Appellate courts “may not

conduct de novo review of the termination decision in the absence of such

findings.” Id. (citing Adoption Place, Inc. v. Doe, 273 S.W.3d 142, 151 &

n.15 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)).

B. Standards of Appellate Review

An appellate court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact in

termination proceedings using the standard of review in Tenn. R. App. P.

13(d). In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at

246. Under Rule 13(d), appellate courts review factual findings de novo on

the record and accord these findings a presumption of correctness unless

the evidence preponderates otherwise. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at

596; In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009); In re Adoption of

A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 809 (Tenn. 2007). In light of the heightened

burden of proof in termination proceedings, however, the reviewing court

must make its own determination as to whether the facts, either as found by

the trial court or as supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount

to clear and convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate

parental rights. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596-97. The trial court’s

ruling that the evidence sufficiently supports termination of parental rights

is a conclusion of law, which appellate courts review de novo with no

presumption of correctness. In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d at 393 (quoting In re

Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d at 810). Additionally, all other questions

of law in parental termination appeals, as in other appeals, are reviewed de

novo with no presumption of correctness. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at

246.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 521-24 (Tenn. 2016) (footnotes in original but

renumbered).

We first address Father’s issue of whether the Juvenile Court erred in finding by

clear and convincing evidence that the conditions leading to the Children’s removal from

the parents persisted. Although the statute at issue has since been amended, the version

of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3) (2017) that was in effect at the time of

the termination petition’s filing and is applicable to the current proceeding stated as

follows:

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The child has been removed from the home of the parent or guardian by

order of a court for a period of six (6) months and:

(A) The conditions that led to the child’s removal or other conditions

that in all reasonable probability would cause the child to be

subjected to further abuse or neglect and that, therefore, prevent the

child’s safe return to the care of the parent or parents or the guardian

or guardians, still persist;

(B) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at

an early date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent or

parents or the guardian or guardians in the near future; and

(C) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship

greatly diminishes the child’s chances of early integration into a

safe, stable and permanent home[.]

On appeal, Father contends that this ground is not applicable because the Children

were not removed from his home. In order to establish the statutory ground of persistent

conditions, the child must have been removed from the home of the parent whose rights

are the subject of the termination proceeding. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)

(2017); In re Mickia J., No. E2016-00046-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 5210794, at *5 (Tenn.

Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2016) (“[A]s a threshold requirement for applicability of the ground of

persistence of conditions in termination of parental rights cases, the child must not only

have been adjudicated dependent and neglected, but he or she must also have been

removed from the defendant parent’s home.”).

Father argues on appeal that the Children were residing with the maternal

grandfather and not with the parents at the time of removal. The record does not support

this contention. The evidence reflects that the parents were living together in

Middlesboro, Kentucky at the time of the removal. Both the initial removal petition and

order identified the parents as residing at a Brentwood Circle address in Middlesboro,

Kentucky. During trial, Father testified that he was living at the Brentwood Circle

address at the time of the removal and that they had recently moved from a home in

Clairfield. Mother also testified that she was living at the Brentwood Circle home in

October 2016 when the Children were removed.

During trial, both Mother and Father testified that the Children had been staying

with the maternal grandfather. According to Father, this arrangement resulted from DCS

instructing Mother to place the Children with the maternal grandfather “until [they] got

better living conditions.” Although the parents testified during trial that the Children had

been placed with the maternal grandfather by agreement, the facts in the removal petition,

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which both Mother and Father had stipulated as true, indicate that Mother informed DCS

that the Children had been staying with the maternal grandfather at night but had been

with Mother since the weekend. The Children were removed and placed in DCS custody

on October 12, 2016, which was a Wednesday. Mother and Father were residing together

at the time, and the Children had been living with them exclusively for at least several

days. We find and hold that the Children were removed from the home of the parents for

purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3). Therefore, we find Father’s

argument on this issue to be without merit.

We next address whether the evidence supports the Juvenile Court’s finding

regarding the ground of persistent conditions. The Juvenile Court found that the parents’

inability to have “appropriate conflict resolution” was the condition that led to the

Children’s removal from the parents. As the Juvenile Court found, the Children’s

removal from the parents “was predicated upon the domestic violence in the home, drug

use of the mother, lack of a suitable home and lack of proper/safe transportation.” At the

time of the removal, Mother had informed DCS that she and Father were no longer

together because he had kicked her in the face when she tried to wake him up. During

trial, Father testified that he remembered Mother telling him that he had kicked her in the

face and stated that they broke up after the incident. Father testified that Mother left in

his truck and said “‘Bye Sucker. I won’t be back because you ain’t going to kick me like

that.’” Mother and the Children were found later that day in a broken-down vehicle on

the side of the road, having been stranded for six hours. Shortly after the removal, the

Children were found by the Juvenile Court to be dependent and neglected based on the

facts stipulated to by the parents in the removal petition.

The parents’ relationship consisted of frequent fighting, much of which was

centered around Mother’s drug use. The Juvenile Court found that domestic violence

issues with the parents existed as recently as March 2018 relating to a gun. The Juvenile

Court pointed to Mother’s testimony that she had woken up with a gun laying beside her

and that they began arguing with Father accusing her of stealing a gun. The Juvenile

Court further emphasized an incident where Mother told Ms. Raines that Father had

thrown Mother out of the car and tried to break her finger. Ms. Raines had testified to the

volatility of the parents’ relationship and the bickering and shouting she observed.

Additionally, Father described an argument between him and Mother. According to

Father, Mother accused him of being on the internet with people. Father testified that he

decided he did not need the phone and trashed the phone to get rid of it.

Ms. Raines visited the parents’ home in April 2017. Father was not present at the

time because the parents had a fight, and he had left for a few days. During that visit,

Ms. Raines observed profanity written on the wall and holes in the wall. Father testified

that after they had an argument and he left the home, Mother would write on the wall or

knock a hole in the wall. Despite the condition of that home, the home where Father was

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living at the time of trial was an appropriate physical home. However, DCS raised

concerns with Mother’s close proximity to Father’s home. Both Mother and Father

testified that Mother owned the home where Father was residing. Furthermore, Mother

had made statements to DCS that she had placed a baby monitor in the trailer where

Father and the Children were residing and that she would “run over and help him” if she

heard any issues.

Despite Father’s continued contact with Mother and the frequent arguments and

incidents between the two, Father did not attend family counseling as recommended by

DCS. He reasoned that “it seemed like everybody wanted us to split up and not be a

family.” According to Father, Mother could not be around the Children if she were not

clean. Father questioned, “if she’s not there, why do we need counseling with each

other?” The Juvenile Court found that Father’s refusal to attend family counseling was a

“major concern” for the Court.

Father had maintained a relationship with Mother, whether romantic or not.

Father testified that he had driven Mother to court on the day of trial. As found by the

Juvenile Court, the parents resided in trailers beside one another at the time of trial.

Mother continued using drugs throughout the case, and Father was aware of Mother’s

failed drug screens and her recent methamphetamine-related criminal charges. Despite

the parties’ arguments about Mother’s drug use, Mother called Father to pick her up from

rehab when she left just twelve hours after entering the program.

We further note that Father had incurred criminal charges while the Children were

in DCS custody. Although the Juvenile Court did not specifically identify Father’s

criminal charges, the record shows Father’s criminal history. Father had been arrested

for criminal trespassing and shoplifting. Father was arrested for first degree criminal

trespassing in April 2017, and Father testified that the charge resulted in a fine. The

record further reflects that Father was charged with shoplifting in August 2017 and was

later convicted. Two bench warrants were issued out of Kentucky for Father’s arrest due

to a failure to appear and failure to pay fines. Father only resolved those issues the week

before trial. Although not particularly serious offenses, Father’s criminal activity,

combined with his volatile relationship with Mother, is indicative that the conditions

which led to the Children’s removal persist and would, in all likelihood as found by the

Juvenile Court, lead to further abuse or neglect to the Children if they were returned to

his custody.

Father’s continued relationship with Mother was a concern for the Juvenile Court

due to Mother’s drug use and the parents’ continued inability to communicate, which had

resulted in continuing turmoil and domestic violence in the family setting. The Juvenile

Court emphasized that at the time of trial, the parents were still living in side-by-side

trailers and “continuing to have domestic issues and civility issues that simply could not

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be remedied to provide a safe return of the children.” According to the Juvenile Court,

Father’s failure to recognize that turmoil and domestic violence and his refusal to attend

family counseling would in all likelihood prevent the conditions from being remedied,

lead to further neglect for the Children, and would prevent a safe return to the care of

Father. Additionally, continuation of the parent-child relationship between Father and

the Children would diminish the Children’s chances of early integration into a safe and

stable home. The evidence does not preponderate against any of the Juvenile Court’s

findings. We find and hold, as did the Juvenile Court, that DCS has proven the ground of

persistent conditions by clear and convincing evidence.

We next address whether the Juvenile Court erred in its finding that DCS had

proven by clear and convincing evidence the statutory ground of failure to manifest an

ability and willingness to assume custody of the Children. Tennessee Code Annotated §

36-1-113(g)(14) (2017) provides:

A legal parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an

ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or

financial responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s

legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the

physical or psychological welfare of the child[.]

As to this ground, the Juvenile Court focused on the fact that Mother and Father

continued to live in two trailers side by side each other as recent as May 2018, the day of

trial. The Juvenile Court found that “[t]he act of having the two (2) trailers side by side

clearly provided proof that the parents intended to always be together if the children were

returned.” Mother’s and Father’s relationship clearly is tumultuous. The Juvenile Court

found that domestic issues had continued between Mother and Father and that the parents

were evicted from a mobile home due to their continuous fighting and Mother’s drug use.

The Juvenile Court also emphasized other incidents of fighting and arguing between the

parties, including the argument regarding a gun and the statements Mother made to Ms.

Raines about Father kicking her out of the vehicle and attempting to break her finger.

Mother had broken into the trailer where Father was residing after he had locked her out

and had “used the hammer to destroy the drywall” and written “vulgar graffiti on the

walls.” Mother’s drug use also hampered the relationship. Father clearly had made a

decision to maintain some kind of relationship with Mother despite her drug use and the

volatility of their relationship.

Additionally, Father’s ongoing criminal activity while the case was pending is

concerning. Although the offenses were not particularly serious, Father only resolved

those issues one week before trial. The Juvenile Court did acknowledge that Father had

completed parenting and anger management classes as requested. However, the Juvenile

Court found that Father’s refusal to comply with family counseling was a “major

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concern.” As such, the Juvenile Court found that “it is clear and convincing that

[Father’s] refusal to engage in the task of family counseling and learn how to act

appropriately and civilly around his family indicated an unwillingness to assume legal

and physical custody of the children.” Based on the same evidence, the Juvenile Court

found that Father had not demonstrated “an ability to conduct himself in an appropriate

way” such that he is able to care for the Children. Additionally, the Juvenile Court found

that the situation which caused the Children to be placed in DCS custody resulted in large

part from Father’s action of kicking Mother in the face. The Juvenile Court found that

due to Father’s behaviors and his failure to conduct himself appropriately, returning the

Children to his custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the Children’s physical

or psychological welfare. The evidence does not preponderate against any of these

findings by the Juvenile Court. We find and hold, as did the Juvenile Court, that DCS

has proven this statutory ground by clear and convincing evidence.

Having determined that grounds exist for the termination of Father’s parental

rights, we next address the best interest analysis. Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-

113(i) provides a set of non-exclusive factors courts are to consider in determining

whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest:

(i) In determining whether termination of parental or guardianship

rights is in the best interest of the child pursuant to this part, the

court shall consider, but is not limited to, the following

(1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment of

circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the

child’s best interest to be in the home of the parent or guardian;

(2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a lasting

adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social services

agencies for such duration of time that lasting adjustment does not

reasonably appear possible;

(3) Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular visitation or

other contact with the child;

(4) Whether a meaningful relationship has otherwise been established

between the parent or guardian and the child;

(5) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely

to have on the child’s emotional, psychological and medical

condition;

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(6) Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing with the

parent or guardian, has shown brutality, physical, sexual, emotional

or psychological abuse, or neglect toward the child, or another child

or adult in the family or household;

(7) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s or guardian’s

home is healthy and safe, whether there is criminal activity in the

home, or whether there is such use of alcohol, controlled substances

or controlled substance analogues as may render the parent or

guardian consistently unable to care for the child in a safe and stable

manner;

(8) Whether the parent’s or guardian’s mental and/or emotional status

would be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent or guardian

from effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision for

the child; or

(9) Whether the parent or guardian has paid child support consistent

with the child support guidelines promulgated by the department

pursuant to § 36-5-101.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) (Supp. 2019).

With regard to making a determination concerning a child’s best interest, our

Supreme Court has instructed:

When conducting the best interests analysis, courts must consider

nine statutory factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-

113(i). These statutory factors are illustrative, not exclusive, and any party

to the termination proceeding is free to offer proof of any other factor

relevant to the best interests analysis. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at

523 (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)).

Facts considered in the best interests analysis must be proven by “a

preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.” In

re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 555 (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at

861). “After making the underlying factual findings, the trial court should

then consider the combined weight of those facts to determine whether they

amount to clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s

best interest[s].” Id. When considering these statutory factors, courts must

remember that “[t]he child’s best interests [are] viewed from the child’s,

rather than the parent’s, perspective.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878.

Indeed, “[a] focus on the perspective of the child is the common theme”

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evident in all of the statutory factors. Id. “[W]hen the best interests of the

child and those of the adults are in conflict, such conflict shall always be

resolved to favor the rights and the best interests of the child. . . .” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d) (2017).

Ascertaining a child’s best interests involves more than a “rote

examination” of the statutory factors. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878.

And the best interests analysis consists of more than tallying the number of

statutory factors weighing in favor of or against termination. White v.

Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Rather, the facts

and circumstances of each unique case dictate how weighty and relevant

each statutory factor is in the context of the case. See In re Audrey S., 182

S.W.3d at 878. Simply put, the best interests analysis is and must remain a

factually intensive undertaking, so as to ensure that every parent receives

individualized consideration before fundamental parental rights are

terminated. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523. “[D]epending upon

the circumstances of a particular child and a particular parent, the

consideration of one factor may very well dictate the outcome of the

analysis.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (citing White v. Moody, 171

S.W.3d at 194). But this does not mean that a court is relieved of the

obligation of considering all the factors and all the proof. Even if the

circumstances of a particular case ultimately result in the court ascribing

more weight—even outcome determinative weight—to a particular

statutory factor, the court must consider all of the statutory factors, as well

as any other relevant proof any party offers.

In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 681-82 (Tenn. 2017).

On appeal, Father contends that the Juvenile Court erred by finding clear and

convincing evidence that termination of his parental rights was in the Children’s best

interest. The Juvenile Court considered the factors enumerated in Tennessee Code

Annotated § 36-1-113(i) before ultimately concluding that those relevant factors weighed

in favor of terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children.

As relevant to factor (1), the Juvenile Court found that although Father’s home

was environmentally safe, Mother lived next door to Father. According to the Juvenile

Court, the parents “cannot conduct themselves in a civil manner such as to make the

conditions safe for the children.” The Juvenile Court found that “the proof is clear and

convincing that when [Mother] and [Father] are together, then there is a substantial risk

of domestic violence, fighting, arguing, kicking, drug use, destruction and vandalism,

threats of self-harm to themselves and threats of harm to others.” Despite the volatile

relationship and Mother’s drug use, Father maintains a relationship with Mother. The

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Juvenile Court found that Father had nineteen months to make appropriate adjustments to

his conduct but that he had not improved his situation such that it was safe for the

Children to return home to him.

In its analysis regarding factor (2), the Juvenile Court addressed Father’s failure to

address the conflict resolution issue between the parents and found that the requirement

for Father to complete family counseling was very important in this case. Despite its

importance, Father had not completed family counseling. According to the Juvenile

Court, services were made available to the parents but Father had failed to effect a lasting

change to his conduct.

Pursuant to factors (3) and (4), Father had maintained regular visitation with the

Children, and they had a meaningful relationship with him. The Juvenile Court

recognized that Father had acted appropriately during visits with the Children and that

Father and the Children have a bond and love for one another. However, as to factor (5),

the Juvenile Court found that the foster home was peaceful and that Father’s home would

not be peaceful but instead full of turmoil, fighting, and bickering. The Juvenile Court,

therefore, found that changing the Children’s caretakers from the foster home to Father

would have a negative effect on the emotional, psychological, and medical conditions of

the Children.

The Juvenile Court found that factor (6) did not apply to the present case. As to

factor (7), the Juvenile Court found that Father had only resolved his criminal issues one

week before trial, and prior to that, there was a warrant for his arrest in Bell County,

Kentucky. Furthermore, the Juvenile Court found that Father’s physical home was not

safe or healthy for the Children with Mother residing next door. We note that Mother

had consistently used illegal substances throughout the time the Children were in DCS

custody and that Father continued to maintain some form of relationship with her. The

Juvenile Court found that Father was unable to consistently care for the Children in a safe

and stable manner.

Pursuant to factor (8), the Juvenile Court recognized that Father had completed

anger management classes and parenting classes. However, the Juvenile Court found that

Father had not attended family counseling in order to “learn how to resolve conflict in

appropriate ways so as to not place the children in unsafe and unstable situations.” The

Juvenile Court noted that the parties had not presented evidence regarding factor (9).

Based on the statutory factors in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i), the

Juvenile Court concluded that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that

termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Upon our

review of the record on appeal, we determine that the evidence presented does not

preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings and that those findings are clear and

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convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of

the Children. We, therefore, affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment terminating Father’s

parental rights to the Children.

Conclusion

The judgment of the Juvenile Court terminating Father’s parental rights to the

Children is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to the Juvenile Court for collection of

the costs assessed below. The costs on appeal are assessed against the appellant, Ed P.,

and his surety, if any.

_________________________________

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE

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