Google LLC v. Koninklijke Philips N.V.

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

GOOGLE LLC,

Appellant

v.

KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V.,

Appellee

______________________

2019-1234

______________________

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2017-

00386, IPR2017-01766.

______________________

Decided: January 6, 2020

______________________

ANDREW V. TRASK, Williams & Connolly LLP, Washing-

ton, DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by AARON

P. MAURER, KEVIN HARDY, DAVID M. KRINSKY.

JUSTIN J. OLIVER, Venable LLP, Washington, DC, ar-

gued for appellee.

______________________

Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

2 GOOGLE LLC v. KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V.

TARANTO, Circuit Judge.

Koninklijke Philips N.V. owns U.S. Patent No.

RE44,913, which concerns device keypads that provide

both primary and secondary characters associated with

particular keys. After Philips sued Acer Inc. and other

companies, alleging infringement based on devices that use

Google operating systems, Google Inc. petitioned the Pa-

tent and Trademark Office, naming Acer and others as real

parties in interest, to institute an inter partes review of

claims 1 and 3–16 of the ’913 patent for obviousness under

35 U.S.C. § 103. The PTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board,

acting on behalf of the PTO’s Director, see 37 C.F.R.

§§ 42.4, 42.108, instituted the requested review. In Sep-

tember 2018, the Board issued a final written decision con-

cluding that Google had failed to prove obviousness. Acer

Inc. v. Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V., No. IPR2017-

00386, 2018 WL 4657646 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 26, 2018).

Google appeals. Philips’s claimed invention differs in

at most one way from the specific method (and related de-

vice) described in the principal prior-art reference featured

in Google’s petition. With that prior-art method, primary

and secondary characters are associated with a given key;

the secondary characters are presented to a user when the

key is held for an extended time; and after the user chooses

a secondary character for entry, that character is substi-

tuted for the primary character on the key. The last step

is the only difference from Philips’s claimed invention, in

which the default primary character is retained on the key

after secondary-character selection. That return-to-default

option is what the prior-art reference itself compares its

own character-substitution option to when touting its solu-

tion as enhancing efficiency. We conclude, on the record of

this case, that the Philips invention would have been obvi-

ous in light of the prior art. We therefore reverse the

Board’s decision.

GOOGLE LLC v. KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V. 3

I

The ’913 patent, titled “Text Entry Method and Device

Therefor,” is a reissue of U.S. Patent No. 6,885,318. The

patent describes a method for entering primary and sec-

ondary characters on the keypad of a device such as a

handheld mobile device. ’913 patent, col. 2, lines 20–37.

According to the patent, traditional mobile device keypads

used one of two methods for entering characters: multitap

or predictive text. In the multitap method, each key on the

mobile device keypad is associated with multiple charac-

ters. To select a character, the user repeatedly presses a

key to cycle through the key’s associated characters until

the desired character is located. Id., col. 1, lines 46–48.

The multitap method, the ’913 patent explains, is “slow and

prone to error” because the method “often requires more

than two key taps to select a character.” Id., col. 1, lines

63–67. In the predictive-text method, predictive-text soft-

ware alters the layout of a dynamic, touch-sensitive display

by determining the “next most likely character required by

the user.” Id., col. 2, lines 6–11. But predictive-text key-

pads present “an unfamiliar interface to the average user”

and require “much practice and learning for proficient and

quick text entry.” Id., col. 2, lines 11–17.

The ’913 patent seeks to improve these methods by

providing a keypad that is familiar to users and also allows

for improved character entry. ’913 patent, col. 2, lines 20–

24. Each key on the keypad is associated with a primary

character and a number of secondary characters. Id., col.

3, lines 27–28. In its default state, each key displays its

primary character. Id., col. 2, lines 30–32. To select a pri-

mary character, the user performs a “quick tap[]” on the

key. Id., col. 6, lines 3–6. To select a secondary character,

the user selects the key associated with the desired second-

ary character for “a period longer than [a] predetermined

time period.” Id., col. 6, line 61 through col. 7, line 3. This

action causes the device to display a menu of secondary

characters. The user then taps the desired secondary

4 GOOGLE LLC v. KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V.

character to select it. Id., col. 2, lines 35–37. After the sec-

ondary character is selected, “the keypad . . . is returned to

the default display state,” i.e., each key displays its pri-

mary character. Id., col. 3, lines 60–62; id., col. 2, line 37.

The patent includes three independent claims that are

at issue in this appeal: claims 1, 3, and 4. Claim 1, which

is illustrative, recites:

1. A method for inputting a character to a device,

the device including a keypad, the keypad includ-

ing a plurality of keys, at least one of the keys has

a primary character, a plurality of secondary char-

acters and an associated display area, the keypad

in a default state displaying the primary character

associated with the at least one key in the associ-

ated display area, the method comprising acts of:

in the default state,

returning the primary character as an input

character in response to selection of the at least

one key for a period shorter than a predeter-

mined time period;

switching to a second state after detecting a

first key selection of the at least one key for a

period longer than the predetermined time pe-

riod;

in the second state

displaying each of the secondary characters

associated with the first selected key in a respec-

tive display area;

detecting a second key selection;

selecting for the input character the second-

ary character associated with the second key se-

lection; and

returning the keypad to the default state.

GOOGLE LLC v. KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V. 5

Id., col. 6, line 48 through col. 7, line 3 (bracketed material

omitted) (emphasis added). Claims 3 and 4 are similar to

claim 1, except that claim 3 claims a computer program

product that executes the method of claim 1, and claim 4

claims the device described in claim 1. Id., col. 7, line 11

through col. 8, line 5.

In the inter partes review at issue here, Google chal-

lenged claims 1 and 3–16 of the ’913 patent as unpatenta-

ble for obviousness, stating two (related) grounds:

obviousness over an English translation of Japanese Pa-

tent Application No. 2000–148366 to Sakata (Sakata II);

and obviousness over Sakata II in view of U.S. Patent No.

6,094,197 to Buxton (Buxton). The Board determined that

Google failed to prove unpatentability on either ground.

Acer, 2018 WL 4657646, at *1, *12.

Google timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

Google asserts that claim 1 is representative and seeks

reversal as to all challenged claims based on arguments fo-

cused on claim 1. Philips does not dispute the representa-

tiveness of claim 1, and it makes no argument against

reversal as to all challenged claims if reversal is warranted

as to claim 1, as we conclude it is. Accordingly, we may and

do limit our discussion to claim 1.

II

Obviousness is a question of law, to be determined by

the court based on underlying findings of fact. See KSR

Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007); Belden

Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015);

Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324,

1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009). We review the Board’s ultimate con-

clusion of obviousness de novo and any underlying factual

findings for substantial evidence. In re Varma, 816 F.3d

1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “Substantial evidence review

asks whether a reasonable fact finder could have arrived at

6 GOOGLE LLC v. KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V.

the agency’s decision and requires examination of the rec-

ord as a whole, taking into account evidence that both jus-

tifies and detracts from an agency’s decision.” Intelligent

Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d

1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted).

It is undisputed that a relevant artisan, as of the effec-

tive date of the ’913 patent, would have known the teach-

ings of Sakata II. Sakata II discloses a method for

inputting text using a keyboard displayed on a touch

screen. To select a character displayed on the keyboard,

the user touches and quickly releases the associated key on

the display screen. But when the user touches a key on a

specific portion of the keyboard for longer than a preset

“threshold time,” a drag menu appears above the key, dis-

playing a series of related characters. J.A. 311, ¶ 55. The

user then drags over to the desired character on the drag

menu and releases to select that character for entry. As a

last step, after the selected character is input, that charac-

ter replaces the character previously displayed on the key.

J.A. 310, ¶ 41. 1

In its petition to the Board, Google argued that a per-

son of ordinary skill in the art would have found the ’913

patent claim obvious in light of the Sakata II method hav-

ing character substitution as the last step, with or without

Buxton. The parties do not dispute that the ’913 patent

claim differs from that Sakata II method in only one re-

spect. In the ’913 patent claim, after a secondary character

is selected, the relevant key “return[s] . . . to the default

1 Sakata II includes method (claim 9) and device

(claim 4) versions of its claimed improvement in keypads.

J.A. 307. Sakata II also refers to “symbols” as well as

“characters” made available for selection. Id. For simplic-

ity, we describe Sakata II as involving a method and char-

acters.

GOOGLE LLC v. KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V. 7

state” rather than, as in the described Sakata II method,

changing to the selected secondary character.

In KSR, the Supreme Court set forth various articula-

tions of “a properly flexible obviousness inquiry” that is

“not subject to a rigid formula.” Perfect Web, 587 F.3d at

1327, 1329 (internal quotation omitted). The Court’s re-

lated formulations reflect the need for grounding such de-

terminations in facts indicating why the claimed invention

would have been obvious, while recognizing real-world

pressures for innovation and both the “background

knowledge” and “ordinary creativity” of a relevant artisan.

KSR, 550 U.S. at 416−21. In one formulation that is key to

this case, the Court explained that when “there is a design

need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are

a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a per-

son of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known

options within his or her technical grasp.” Id. at 421. If

such an option is in that way “obvious to try,” and the “an-

ticipated success” results, a conclusion of obviousness may

follow. Id. That formulation is related to, and its applica-

tion must be informed by, other explanations the Court set

forth about “predictab[ility]” and “known” options and their

effect on obviousness determinations. Id. at 416 (precedent

established that “when a patent claims a structure already

known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitu-

tion of one element for another known in the field, the com-

bination must do more than yield a predictable result”); id.

at 417 (“a court must ask whether the improvement is more

than the predictable use of prior art elements according to

their established functions”; referring to “simple substitu-

tion of one known element for another” as basis for obvi-

ousness).

Invoking the obvious-to-try formulation, Google argues

that a relevant artisan presented with Sakata II would

have realized that there are only “two options following en-

try of a secondary character: (1) either substitute the key

with the last selected secondary character,” i.e., character

8 GOOGLE LLC v. KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V.

substitution, or “(2) simply return the key to the default

state without substituting the secondary character.” Ap-

pellant’s Br. at 50. The Board did not disagree with that

characterization of options. Nor does Philips, which in-

stead shifts the inquiry away from the question of what op-

tions are available at the last step—after a secondary

character is selected—of the Sakata II process involving

presentation of secondary characters in a drag menu for

possible selection after an extended hold of a key. Philips

asserts that there is a wide variety of keypad techniques in

general. Appellee’s Br. at 51–52 (citing J.A. 2583–85).

The problem with this response is not that it lacks rec-

ord support as a factual matter but that it shifts the inquiry

improperly as a legal matter. Philips’s wide-scope inquiry

into all keypad possibilities does not fairly reflect the point

of KSR’s relevant discussion as it applies to a case, like this

one, in which it is not disputed that a relevant artisan

would in fact be studying a particular piece of prior art in

thinking about the artisan’s own possible further work. In

that situation, the Court’s declarations about “mere substi-

tution of one element for another known in the field,” with

“predictable results,” KSR, 550 at 416, indicate that the ob-

vious-to-try inquiry at least sometimes must focus on

known options at what is undisputedly the sole point of

novelty in the claim at issue. Moreover, that is the inquiry

we conducted in Perfect Web, where we asked if the sole

contested step of the claim at issue was obvious to try, tak-

ing the remaining steps as a given. 587 F.3d at 1331; see

also In re Copaxone Consolidated Cases, 906 F.3d 1013,

1025–27 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (determining that dosage and fre-

quency limitations in method of treatment claim were ob-

vious to try, while taking remaining limitations as a given).

The same focus is appropriate in this case.

The Board did not deny, and we see no reasonable dis-

pute in the record, that a skilled artisan would know of the

return-to-default option at the last step of the ’913 patent

claim. Buxton itself confirms the familiarity of the option,

GOOGLE LLC v. KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V. 9

though we need not rely on Buxton. See Acer, 2018 WL

4657646, at *10; J.A. 370. Moreover, the return-to-default

option is the long-familiar function of a keyboard’s Shift

key—which, while it is being held, makes available a sec-

ondary character (e.g., an upper-case letter), with the pri-

mary character (e.g., the corresponding lower-case letter)

restored to availability when the Shift key is released. See

J.A. 228 (¶ 177); J.A. 2537 (¶ 43). And in this case, recog-

nition of the alternative option does not require a skilled

artisan to bring to bear knowledge from outside the princi-

pal reference.

Sakata II itself asserts that the character substitution

at the last step provides an efficiency benefit over the evi-

dent alternative of requiring that the secondary-character

menu be summoned each time one of those characters was

to be re-used. J.A. 311 (stating that by putting a selected

character or symbol on the key, “when the same special

character or symbol is selected again, selective input can

be carried out quickly without having to perform dragging

operation”). The Board so recognized the centrality of this

efficiency assertion in Sakata II, Acer, 2018 WL 4657646,

at *7, and the point has been recognized by Philips, see Ap-

pellee’s Br. at 17, 50; J.A. 2564−65, as well as Google, J.A.

90 (petition). This efficiency assertion is on its face a com-

parative one, and what is plainly being compared to the Sa-

kata II choice is the no-substitution option—where the

primary character returns to the key upon disappearance

of the secondary-character menu. That is Philips’s return-

to-default claim element. A relevant artisan could not

avoid recognizing the existence of this option from the com-

parative-efficiency assertion of Sakata II. And Philips

10 GOOGLE LLC v. KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V.

neither identifies nor relies on nor explains the real-world

substantiality of any other options at this step. 2

Further, it is clear that, while the substitution option

of Sakata II might be more efficient for some users and con-

texts, it might be inefficient, compared to the return-to-de-

fault option, for others. Which option is more efficient for

a particular performance of the method at issue self-evi-

dently will have different answers for different users, de-

pending on whether the user is likely to use the default

character more, or one of the substitute characters more,

on the particular occasion. A chemist might often prefer

substitution of a secondary-character “mg” for a primary-

character “mm” (to use Sakata II’s example), whereas a

wire maker (using Sakata II’s keyboard) might prefer the

opposite while writing about diameters rather than

weights. Or a writer of English prose might prefer to retain

unaccented vowels as the default option, with accented

forms of those vowels as the secondary characters, while a

writer of international financial news might prefer to have

a key for currency symbols substitute and retain a

2 In this court, Google argues that Sakata II dis-

closes the return-to-default option through the disparity

between the independent claims (method claim 6, device

claim 1), which leave unspecified what happens to the key

after the selection of a secondary character, and the de-

pendent claims (method claim 9, device claim 4) that in-

clude the character substitution step for that stage. See

J.A. 307. Google made reference to the Sakata II claims

before the Board, but it did not present this contention in

its petition. We need not and do not rely on this argument

of Google’s for our decision, and so we do not decide

whether the contention was a proper one under the princi-

ples allowing reply material that answers arguments made

in the patent owner’s response.

GOOGLE LLC v. KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V. 11

particular symbol (such as $ or €) while writing a particular

article.

Google’s expert Dr. Cockburn explained this general

point, while also giving some specific illustrations. See,

e.g., J.A. 206−07 (¶¶ 146, 147), J.A. 226 (¶ 174), J.A. 228

(¶ 177), J.A. 230−32 (¶¶ 179−181). Philips’s expert, Dr.

Porter, did not disagree; in fact, he seemed to recognize the

absence of a one-size-fits-all efficiency solution. J.A.

3285−88. The Board, though rejecting certain specific il-

lustrations advanced by Dr. Cockburn, Acer, 2018 WL

4657646, at *8−9, did not make, and lacked substantial ev-

idence to make, a contrary finding on the general effi-

ciency-will-vary point, which suffices for the obviousness-

to-try analysis in this case. In these circumstances, there

is a clear reason for a skilled artisan, knowing of the re-

turn-to-default option, to try that option. And there is no

finding or argument that success would be in doubt, see

J.A. 231−32 (evidence that implementation is readily pos-

sible), or that unexpected results would be produced.

Our decision in Perfect Web, though of course involving

its own facts, supports our conclusion of obviousness here.

In Perfect Web, the patented invention sought to solve the

problem of sending too few or too many e-mails through

bulk e-mail distribution to meet a marketing quota, and

the parties collectively identified three solutions to solve

the problem: (1) e-mailing an excess of recipients; (2)

resending the e-mail to those addresses from which the e-

mail “bounced” back; or (3) identifying a new group of ad-

dresses and sending the e-mail to them. 587 F.3d at 1331.

The claims recited a four-step method for managing bulk e-

mail distribution with the last step requiring that the first

three steps be repeated, which encompassed the third op-

tion identified by the parties. Id. The parties agreed that

the prior art disclosed the first three steps and not the

fourth step. We conducted the obvious-to-try analysis with

a focus entirely on the fourth step, and we determined that

“[e]ven without experimentation, simple logic suggest[ed]”

12 GOOGLE LLC v. KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V.

that repeating the previous steps for managing a bulk e-

mail distribution list solved the stated problem. Id. And

because no party offered evidence to show that this repeat-

ing step exhibited “unexpected results or was not reasona-

bly expected to succeed” there were a “finite number of

identified, predictable solutions,” rendering the patented

method not only obvious to try but obvious. Id.

Here, the record reveals only two options for what hap-

pens to a key in Sakata II’s method after the secondary

character is selected: (1) character substitution and (2) re-

turning to the default state. And “even without experimen-

tation, simple logic suggest[s],” id., that returning to the

default state is a readily achievable option and often will

serve the undisputed goal of “reducing the user’s burden”

of obtaining the desired character, J.A. 312. We conclude,

on this record, that the return-to-default alternative to

character substitution would have been obvious to try and,

as in Perfect Web, obvious.

III

We hold that claims 1 and 3–16 of the ’913 patent are

unpatentable for obviousness. The Board’s decision is re-

versed.

The parties shall bear their own costs.

REVERSED