United States v. Uvaldo Ramirez-Cortinas

Case: 19-50182 Document: 00515236078 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/13/2019

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

No. 19-50182

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 13, 2019

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

UVALDO RAMIREZ-CORTINAS, also known as Javier Martinez, also known

as Ubaldo Cortinas Ramirez, also known as Uvaldo Cortinas Ramirez,

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

Before CLEMENT, ELROD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

STUART KYLE DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

The United States appeals the district court’s dismissal of a 2018

indictment charging Appellee Uvaldo Ramirez-Cortinas (“Ramirez”) with

illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We reverse and remand.

I.

A.

Ramirez is a Mexican citizen who has illegally entered the United States

at least six times since 1998. In 2003, he was convicted of a felony hit-and-run

in Texas. In 2008, after being charged with sexually abusing his 10-year-old

stepdaughter, he was released on bail but failed to appear. He was convicted

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of bail jumping in violation of Texas Penal Code § 38.10(f) and sentenced to

seven years in prison. 1 After his release in 2012, Ramirez was issued a Notice

to Appear for deportation proceedings. The notice declared him deportable for

two reasons: being convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude” and being

“present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.” See 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1227(a)(1)(B), 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

Thus began a series of four hearings before two immigration judges. At

the first hearing, in October 2012, Ramirez was given two months to find

counsel. At the second hearing, without counsel, 2 Ramirez admitted to the

allegations in the Notice to Appear, and the IJ found him deportable. Ramirez

asked whether there was “some type of relief” available. The IJ gave him an

asylum application—because Ramirez said he was uncertain whether he would

be in danger in Mexico—and continued the proceedings. At the third hearing,

the IJ scheduled yet another hearing to consider Ramirez’s asylum request.

The final hearing was in March 2013. Ramirez informed the IJ he did

not “have all the documents,” suggested he might withdraw his asylum

request, and asked if he could instead have voluntary departure. 3 The IJ stated

he would not grant voluntary departure, and later told Ramirez his bail

jumping conviction was “an aggravated felony” that made him ineligible for

voluntary departure. In light of this, the IJ asked Ramirez if he wanted “to

have [the] hearing on [his] application for asylum.” The IJ explained that,

otherwise, he would order Ramirez deported. Ramirez sought more time, but

1According to Ramirez, the sexual abuse charges were dismissed because his step-

daughter recanted.

2 Ramirez never obtained counsel for any of these hearings.

3 The first few times that Ramirez was found in the United States, between 1998 and

2001, authorities allowed him to return to Mexico voluntarily rather than face forcible

removal.

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the IJ denied that request. Later in the hearing, when Ramirez again

suggested he wanted to withdraw the asylum request, the IJ declared he was

going to order Ramirez deported. The IJ then asked if Ramirez wanted to

appeal that decision. When Ramirez answered affirmatively, the IJ said,

“Then, sir, we’re going to have a hearing[.]”

The IJ proceeded to question Ramirez about his “very detailed” asylum

application. Specifically, the IJ asked Ramirez if he was “afraid to return to

Mexico.” Ramirez answered, “I can’t say yes or no.” When asked whether

anything violent had happened to him in Mexico, Ramirez answered “No.”

Ramirez also stated that nobody had threatened to harm him or his parents in

Mexico. Ramirez testified only that he was forced to pay bribes to government

officials, and that someone stole his family’s cattle. The IJ subsequently asked

Ramirez whether somebody had beaten him up. Ramirez said it was a group

called “Preventiva, the police,” but then explained he did not “think they . . .

still exist.” He also testified he had no problems because of his father’s union

activity, although his father may have had some problems when Ramirez “was

a kid.” The IJ then asked whether Ramirez or his family “had any problems in

Mexico because of their religion,” which was Jehovah’s Witness. Ramirez

responded, “No, not that I know of.” The IJ asked Ramirez one last time,

“[W]hat do you think would happen to you if you return to Mexico?” Ramirez

responded, “I don’t know.” Eventually, the IJ informed Ramirez: “[Y]our

feelings about the inadequacy of your application for asylum, the sufficiency of

your application, were good because based on what you told me, you don’t have

a claim to asylum or withholding of removal.”

Ultimately, the IJ decided that Ramirez’s bail jumping conviction was an

aggravated felony. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (defining “aggravated

felony”). That rendered Ramirez ineligible for asylum and “statutorily

ineligible for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality

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Act and under the United Nations Convention against Torture.” 4 This led the

IJ to conclude that Ramirez’s “only form of relief . . . would be deferral of

removal based upon his belief that he will be tortured by the government

officials in Mexico” or that those officials would knowingly allow his torture.

But the IJ found Ramirez had failed to establish any such threat. Similarly,

the IJ explained that “even if [Ramirez] was eligible for asylum or withholding,

he would still be found to have failed to establish his burden because he does

not establish past persecution or future persecution, and a reasonable person

in his circumstance would not fear persecution or torture.” Finally, the IJ

explained that, even “had [Ramirez] been currently eligible for voluntary

departure, [the IJ] would have denied voluntary departure as a matter of

discretion because of [Ramirez’s] criminal record, which is a serious one

involving two felony offenses.”

Ramirez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), arguing

the IJ erred in finding he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. The BIA

dismissed Ramirez’s appeal in a written decision. The BIA agreed with the IJ

that Ramirez’s bail jumping conviction was “both an aggravated felony and a

particularly serious crime,” rendering him ineligible for asylum, withholding

of removal, and voluntary departure. The BIA incorrectly stated, however, that

Ramirez did not dispute on appeal that he had been convicted of “an offense

that is an aggravated felony and also a particularly serious crime.” Finally, the

BIA agreed with the IJ that Ramirez failed to show he would likely be tortured

by, or at the behest of, Mexican officials.

4An alien is ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal if he has been convicted

of a “particularly serious crime,” which includes “aggravated felonies.” 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1158(b)(2)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B).

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The BIA denied relief on July 24, 2013, and mailed its decision the same

day. Ramirez was deported to Mexico a week later, on August 2, 2013. For

reasons unexplained in the record, the BIA’s decision was not received at the

immigration court adjacent to the facility where Ramirez had been detained

until December 10, 2013—four months after his deportation. Ramirez did not

appeal the BIA’s decision.

B.

In 2018, Ramirez was arrested in Texas and charged with illegal reentry

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He moved to dismiss the indictment under

§ 1326(d), which permits collateral attack on the underlying deportation order

under certain circumstances. See id. § 1326(d)(1)–(3) (collateral attack

permitted only if (1) alien exhausted administrative remedies, (2) he lacked

“opportunity for judicial review,” and (3) his deportation order was

“fundamentally unfair”); see also, e.g., United States v. Benitez-Villafuerte, 186

F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1999) (alien must also show “actual prejudice” to satisfy

§ 1326(d)). The district court found all the collateral attack requirements met. 5

Specifically, because the BIA erroneously thought Ramirez did not dispute that

bail jumping was an aggravated felony, the court concluded the proceedings

deprived him of judicial review and were fundamentally unfair. The court also

concluded that the IJ and BIA incorrectly determined that bail jumping was

an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act. See

generally 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)–(U). The court concluded this error

“actually prejudiced” Ramirez because it led the IJ not to consider his claims

for asylum and withholding of removal, “which might have prevented

5 The district court concluded, and the government does not contest, that Ramirez

exhausted all available administrative remedies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(1).

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[Ramirez’s] ultimate deportation.” 6 The court therefore dismissed Ramirez’s

illegal-reentry indictment.

The government timely appealed. In May 2019, while the government’s

appeal was pending, Ramirez was deported. 7

II.

We review a district court’s dismissal of an indictment de novo. United

States v. Parrales-Guzman, 922 F.3d 706, 707 (5th Cir. 2019).

III.

On appeal, the government contends that the district court erred in

sustaining Ramirez’s collateral attack on his underlying 2013 deportation

order and dismissing the 2018 illegal-reentry indictment. We agree and

therefore reverse the district court’s judgment dismissing the indictment.

Section § 1326(a) makes it a crime for certain aliens who have been

previously deported from the United States to reenter the country unlawfully.

8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). An alien charged under § 1326(a) may collaterally attack

the validity of the underlying deportation order only by showing that:

(1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may

have been available to seek relief against the order;

(2) the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued

improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial

review; and

(3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.

Id. § 1326(d); see also United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 838–39

6 The district court did not consider denial of Ramirez’s application for voluntary

departure prejudicial because the IJ stated he “would have denied voluntary departure as a

matter of discretion.”

7 At oral argument, Ramirez’s counsel conceded that our recent decision in United

States v. Pedroza-Rocha, 933 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2019), means that his deportation does not

moot the government’s appeal.

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(1987). Moreover, “[t]he law is clearly established that a showing of actual

prejudice is required to succeed in such a collateral attack.” Benitez-Villafuerte,

186 F.3d at 658 (and collecting decisions); see also, e.g., United States v.

Villanueva-Diaz, 634 F.3d 844, 852 (5th Cir. 2011) (same). “A showing of

prejudice means there was a reasonable likelihood that but for the errors

complained of the defendant would not have been deported.” Benitez-

Villafuerte, 186 F.3d at 658–59 (internal quotations and citation omitted). As

indicated, the district court found each of these requirements met, including

actual prejudice, in dismissing Ramirez’s illegal-reentry indictment.

On appeal, the government attacks the district court’s dismissal on two

grounds. First, the government argues the district court erred in finding the

2013 deportation proceedings “effectively eliminated” Ramirez’s right to

challenge his deportation “by means of judicial review.” See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(d)(2). Second, the government argues that, regardless, Ramirez failed

to demonstrate the “actual prejudice” required by our precedent. We need not

reach the government’s first argument because we conclude that the district

court erred in finding actual prejudice.

The district court found that the IJ and the BIA erroneously classified

bail jumping as an aggravated felony under the Act. 8 This error, the district

court reasoned, led the IJ not to consider Ramirez’s claims for asylum and

withholding of removal. And this in turn “actually prejudiced” Ramirez

8Specifically, the court concluded that bail jumping under Texas Penal Code § 38.10(f)

could not qualify as an “aggravated felony” under either subsection Q or T of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43) because the elements of the Texas crime are not a “generic categorical match”

with the crimes defined in those subsections. We do not consider whether the district court

was correct because, as explained below, Ramirez could not show actual prejudice even

assuming the IJ and BIA erred on this point.

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because consideration of those claims “might have prevented his ultimate

deportation.” We disagree with the district court for two reasons.

First, the district court diluted the actual-prejudice standard. Under our

cases, Ramirez bore the burden of showing that “there was a reasonable

likelihood that but for the errors complained of [he] would not have been

deported.” Benitez-Villafuerte, 186 F.3d at 659 (internal quotations and

citation omitted); accord United States v. Cordova-Soto, 804 F.3d 714, 719 (5th

Cir. 2015); Villanueva-Diaz, 634 F.3d at 852; United States v. Mendoza-Mata,

322 F.3d 829, 832 (5th Cir. 2003). The district court applied a lower prejudice

standard, however. The court reasoned that—had the IJ and BIA not erred in

classifying bail jumping as an aggravated felony—Ramirez’s asylum and

withholding claims “might have prevented [Ramirez’s] ultimate deportation.”

Our precedents demand a more robust prejudice showing.

We have emphasized that prejudice under § 1326(d) “means there was a

reasonable likelihood that but for the errors complained of the defendant would

not have been deported.” Benitez-Villafuerte, 186 F.3d at 659 (emphasis added)

(internal quotations and citation omitted). If “despite the [alleged] errors, the

proceeding could not have yielded a different result, the deportation is valid

for purposes of section 1326.” Id. at 659 (internal quotations and citation

omitted); see also, e.g., Rosales v. Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 426

F.3d 733, 737 (5th Cir. 2005) (failure to inform petitioner of consular rights did

not prejudice him given “no showing that [such] assistance . . . would have

changed the result of the hearing”). So, for example, if an alien claims he is

eligible for asylum, but “nothing in the record . . . even remotely suggests

. . . any grounds” for asylum, the alien fails to show prejudice. United States v.

Encarnacion-Galvez, 964 F.2d 402, 410 (5th Cir. 1992). In sum, the district

court’s conclusion that Ramirez “might” not have been deported absent the

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alleged error is “far too slender a reed to support a showing of prejudice” under

§ 1326(d). 9 Id.

Second, applying the correct actual-prejudice standard, the record

forecloses any notion that Ramirez likely would have escaped deportation

either through asylum or withholding of removal. We therefore cannot affirm

the district court’s dismissal of the indictment on alternative grounds. Cf.

United States v. Real Prop. Located at 14301 Gateway Blvd. W., 123 F.3d 312,

313 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “we will not reverse a judgment of the

district court if it can be affirmed on any ground”). Asylum is available to “an

alien who is unable or unwilling to return to his home country ‘because of

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” INS

v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).

“Withholding of deportation involves a slightly different analysis. To be eligible

for such relief, the alien must demonstrate a ‘clear probability’ of persecution

upon return.” Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Rivera-

Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1991)); see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8

C.F.R. § 1208.16. The record leaves us no doubt that Ramirez would not have

obtained relief on either basis. For instance, after questioning Ramirez in

detail about his application, the IJ told him that “your feelings about the

inadequacy of your application for asylum, the sufficiency of your application,

were good because based on what you told me, you don’t have a claim to asylum

or withholding of removal.” And in its order the IJ found that “even if [Ramirez]

9 Elsewhere in its opinion, the district court articulated the prejudice inquiry as

whether any error “improperly deprived [Ramirez of] due consideration of the discretionary

relief he sought.” This also dilutes the actual-prejudice standard. The inquiry is not whether

an alien was denied “due consideration” of the relief sought, but whether, absent error, he

likely “would not have been deported.” Benitez-Villafuerte, 186 F.3d at 658–59.

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was eligible for asylum or withholding, he would still be found to have failed

to establish his burden because he does not establish past persecution or future

persecution, and a reasonable person in his circumstance would not fear

persecution or torture.” Most pointedly, when the IJ asked Ramirez if he “was

afraid to return to Mexico,” Ramirez candidly answered, “I can’t say yes or no.”

Ramirez could not articulate even a subjective fear of persecution, much less a

well-founded one. We see nothing in the record indicating that Ramirez was

likely eligible for asylum or withholding of removal.

Therefore, even assuming the IJ and BIA erred in classifying Ramirez’s

bail jumping conviction as an aggravated felony (something we do not decide),

Ramirez still could not show actual prejudice under § 1326(d). Consequently,

the district court erred in dismissing Ramirez’s indictment for illegal reentry.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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