The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3546-17T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
PROTECTION,
November 13, 2019
Plaintiff-Respondent, APPELLATE DIVISION
v.
ALSOL CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Argued February 13, 2019 – Decided November 13, 2019
Before Judges Fuentes, Accurso, and Vernoia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Middlesex County, Municipal Appeal
No. 29-2017.
Lawrence S. Berger argued the cause for appellant
(Berger & Bornstein, LLC, attorneys; Lawrence S.
Berger, on the briefs).
Robert Gregory Lamilla, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal,
Attorney General, attorney; Jason W. Rockwell,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Robert
Gregory Lamilla, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FUENTES, P.J.A.D.
In this appeal, we are required to determine whether the Law Division
correctly decided that municipal courts have jurisdiction to impose civil
penalties in an enforcement action filed by the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) pursuant to the Spill Compensation and
Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11 to -23.24 (the Spill Act). After reviewing
the record developed by the parties, we affirm. We conclude municipal courts
have jurisdiction pursuant to N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11u(d) to impose civil
penalties under the Spill Act in a summary proceeding conducted pursuant to
the Penalty Enforcement Law of 1999, N.J.S.A 2A:58-10 to -12.
I
This issue arose when an employee of the DEP filed a complaint against
Alsol Corporation (Alsol) in the Milltown Municipal Court, using the "Special
Form of Complaint and Summons" prescribed by the Administrative Director
of the Courts. The summons contains a section that identified the complaining
witness as a representative of the DEP, who certified that
to the best of his/her knowledge or information and
belief, the named defendant on or about [October 4,
2016] in Milltown . . . [,] County of Middlesex
County, N.J., did commit the following offense:
Failure to remediate the property located at BL. 58 Lot
1.01 Ford Ave. & Main St. in violation of . . .
N.J.A.C. 7:26C-2.3(a).
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This DEP regulation provides:
(a) Upon the occurrence of any of the events listed in
N.J.A.C. 7:26C-2.2(a), the person who is responsible
for conducting the remediation at a site pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 7:26C-1.4(a) shall:
1. Hire and maintain a licensed site remediation
professional, unless:
i. The remediation is being conducted partially or
solely to satisfy the obligations under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et
seq., is a priority site under the Government
Performance and Results Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 11101 et
seq., and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is
the lead agency for the remediation;
ii. The remediation is being conducted on a site that is
listed on the National Priorities List pursuant to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et
seq., and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is
the lead agency for the remediation; or
iii. The remediation is being conducted at a Federal
facility;
2. Notify the Department, on a form found on the
Department's website at
www.nj.gov/dep/srp/srra/forms, of the name and
license information of the licensed site remediation
professional hired to conduct or oversee the
remediation and the scope of the remediation,
including the number of contaminated areas of
concern and impacted media known at the time the
form is submitted and determined pursuant to N.J.A.C.
7:26C-4.2, within 45 days after:
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i. May 7, 2012, when the earliest of the events listed
at N.J.A.C. 7:26C-2.2(a) occurred prior to November
4, 2009; or
ii. The date of the occurrence of the earliest of the
events listed at N.J.A.C. 7:26C-2.2(a), when the event
occurred on or after November 4, 2009;
3. Conduct the remediation:
i. Without prior Department approval, except:
(1) If the Department directs otherwise;
(2) If the person is remediating the site, area of
concern or site condition pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:26C-
14;
(3) If the remediation is being conducted pursuant to
(a)1ii or iii above, or the site is being remediated
partially or solely to satisfy the obligations under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901 et seq., and is a priority site under the
Government Performance and Results Act, 40 U.S.C.
§§ 11101 et seq., regardless of whether the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency or the Department
is the lead agency for the remediation; or;
(4) If the site is suspected or known to be
contaminated with anthropogenic radionuclide
contamination of any media;
ii. In accordance with N.J.A.C. 7:26C-1.2(a); and
iii. By addressing all deficiencies identified by the
Department in any submittals made by the person or
by a licensed site remediation professional on behalf
of the person;
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4. Pay all applicable fees and oversight costs as
required pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:26C-4;
5. Establish a remediation funding source, if required,
pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:26C-5;
6. Provide the Department access to the contaminated
site pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:26C-8;
7. Provide the Department copies of all applicable
documents concerning the remediation as required by
this chapter and the Technical Requirements for Site
Remediation rules, N.J.A.C. 7:26E, or upon request of
the Department;
8. Meet the timeframes in this chapter and in the
Technical Requirements for Site Remediation rules,
N.J.A.C. 7:26E; and
9. Obtain and comply with all permits necessary for
the remediation.
[N.J.A.C. 7:26C-2.3(a)(1) to (9).]
Despite the complexity and scope of activity covered by this regulatory
scheme, the summons issued by the DEP provided only the date Alsol
allegedly failed to remediate a particular property. When this matter came
before the Milltown Municipal Court, Alsol moved to dismiss the summons for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Alsol argued that municipal courts do not
have the authority to adjudicate the merits of an enforcement action brought by
the DEP involving alleged violations of the Spill Act. Represented by the
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Attorney General, the DEP argued that municipal courts have subject matter
jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11u(d), which provides:
Any person who violates a provision of P.L.1976,
c.141 ([N.J.S.A.] 58:10-23.11 et seq.), or a court order
issued pursuant thereto, or who fails to pay a civil
administrative penalty in full or to agree to a schedule
of payments therefor, shall be subject to a civil
penalty not to exceed $50,000.00 per day for each
violation, and each day’s continuance of the violation
shall constitute a separate violation. Any penalty
incurred under this subsection may be recovered with
costs in a summary proceeding pursuant to the
“Penalty Enforcement Law of 1999,” P.L.1999, c.274
([N.J.S.A.] 2A:58-10 et seq.) in the Superior Court or
a municipal court. The Superior Court and the
municipal courts shall have jurisdiction to impose a
civil penalty for a violation of P.L.1976, c.141
([N.J.S.A.] 58:10-23.11 et seq.) pursuant to this
subsection and in accordance with the procedures set
forth in the “Penalty Enforcement Law of 1999.”
[(Emphasis added).]
After considering the "extensive briefs and supporting documentation by
both parties[,]" the municipal court judge concluded that N.J.S.A. 58:10 -
23.11u(d) only confers municipal courts with jurisdiction to enforce civil
penalties "where a finding of liability has already been adjudicated." The
municipal court judge also rejected the DEP's interpretation of N.J.S.A. 58:10 -
23.11u(d) and held that municipal courts' jurisdiction in matters arising out of
the Spill Act are limited to conducting summary proceedings to enforce "a
penalty previously imposed by either the administrative law court or the
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[S]uperior [C]ourt." The municipal court judge granted Alsol's motion and
dismissed the summons "without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction to be refiled
either in [S]uperior [C]ourt or the [O]ffice of [A]dministrative [L]aw[.]"
The DEP appealed the municipal court's decision to the Law Division.
The DAG who argued the matter did not present any competent evidence to
support the DEP's allegations against Alsol. As it did before the municipal
court, the DEP made legally incompetent factual assertions to the Law
Division judge that alleged Alsol failed
to remediate discharges of hazardous substances that
occurred at the property located at Ford Avenue and
Main Street, Milltown . . . as required by N.J.A.C.
7:26C-2.3(a). N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f(c)(1) makes
ALSOL, as the owner of the Property when the
discharge occurred, and COBRA, as the person who
has discharged a hazardous substance, the persons
responsible for conducting the remediation.
Prior to the discharges, ALSOL contracted COBRA to
perform demolition on a section of the Property,
which included at least three electrical transformers.
On October 4, 2016, Middlesex County HazMat
received notification that an unknown amount of oil
had spilled into Farrington Lake. Middlesex County
HazMat's investigation revealed that the source of the
spill was three electrical transformers, each containing
approximately 380 gallons of oil, which Middlesex
County HazMat found overturned near a storm drain
at the rear of the property. COBRA improperly
demolished the transformers, which resulted in a
surface spill as well as a spill into the storm drain.
Middlesex County HazMat performed a field test on a
sample of the oil, which showed the presence of
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PCB's. The discharge into the storm drain is
particularly significant because the storm drain
terminates in an outfall pipe, which discharges into
Mill Pond/Lawrence Brook, downstream of Farrington
Lake. After the initial spill, a constant stream of oil
was discharging into the Brook. A DEP Fish and
Wildlife officer issued an emergency fishing closure
for Lawrence Brook between Riva Avenue and Ryders
Lane.1
The DAG represented to the Law Division that the Bureau of Emergency
Response "notified Alex Abdalla of COBRA that he was responsible for the
cleanup of the oil from the transformers." Abdalla allegedly contracted with a
company identified as "Insurance Restoration Specialists, who began the
cleanup." According to the DEP, Insurance Restoration Specialists "ceased
work" on October 6, 2016 "because Mr. Abdalla had not paid for their
services." The DEP stepped into this breach and performed "emergency
response work until October 25, 2016 to contain and partially remediate the
spill." No further remediation has taken place.
Alsol denied the accuracy and completeness of the DEP's
unsubstantiated material facts. Although the DEP identified COBRA in its
1
We note that as the case was terminated by the municipal court on
defendant's motion to dismiss, the record is limited. The "facts" we quote here
were not presented by way of affidavit, as required by Rule 1:6-6, and are thus
legally incompetent hearsay. Cheng Lin Wang v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 N.J. 2,
15-16 (1991). We include this only to provide some background of the dispute
for the reader and do not rely on it for any other purpose.
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brief before the municipal court and the Law Division as one of the parties
legally responsible to remediate this contaminated site, COBRA is not a party
in this case.
II
Whether municipal courts have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate
this Spill Act enforcement action brought by the DEP is purely a question of
law. We thus review the decision of the Law Division de novo, without any
deference to the trial judge's interpretation of the law. State v. Ancrum, 449
N.J. Super. 526, 531 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 231 N.J. 222 (2017). The
Legislature has demarcated the subject matter jurisdictional limits of municipal
courts:
A municipal court has jurisdiction over the following
cases within the territorial jurisdiction of the court:
a. Violations of county or municipal ordinances;
b. Violations of the motor vehicle and traffic laws;
c. Disorderly persons offenses, petty disorderly
persons offenses and other non-indictable offenses
except where exclusive jurisdiction is given to the
Superior Court;
d. Violations of the fish and game laws;
e. Proceedings to collect a penalty where jurisdiction
is granted by statute;
f. Violations of laws regulating boating; and
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g. Any other proceedings where jurisdiction is granted
by statute.
[N.J.S.A. 2B:12-17 (emphasis added).]
The Supreme Court has also exercised its constitutional authority over
this issue when it adopted Rule 7:1, which sets out the Rules Governing
Practice in the Municipal Courts. On September 17, 2009, the Administrative
Office of the Courts issued Instructions to Municipal Court Judges and Other
Users with respect to the use of Special Form of Complaint and Summons.
Rule 7-2-1(h) authorizes the summons the DEP used in this case. It provides:
Use of Special Form of Complaint and Summons in
Penalty Enforcement Proceedings. The Special Form
of Complaint and Summons, as prescribed by the
Administrative Director of the Courts, shall be used
for all penalty enforcement proceedings in the
municipal court, including those that may involve the
confiscation and/or forfeiture of chattels. If the
Special Form of Complaint and Summons is made by
a governmental body or officer, it may be certified or
verified on information and belief by any person duly
authorized to act on its or the State's behalf.
[Ibid. (emphasis added).]
Here, the DEP argues N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11u(d) confers the municipal
court with subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate and assess civil penalties
for violations of the Spill Act. The DEP further argues that N.J.S.A. 58:10 -
23.11u(a)(1)(c) "grants the [DEP] the ability to file in municipal court for a
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civil penalty that will be independently adjudicated and assessed by the
municipal court."
We confronted an analogous statutory scheme in Middlesex County v.
Browning Ferris, 252 N.J. Super. 134, 137 (App. Div. 1991), in which we were
required "to interpret a section of the Solid Waste Management Act [SWMA],
N.J.S.A. 13:1E-9f, to determine if civil actions to impose fines for violations
of the act may be brought in the Municipal Court in addition to the Superior
Court."
As amended over the years, the SWMA authorized county health
inspectors "to make visual inspections of the unloading of waste transport
vehicles . . . to determine if the loads consisted of 20% or more of designated
recyclables." Ibid. The controversy arose when the Middlesex County Health
Department issued a "'Notice of Violation' and 'Penalty Assessment Notice' to
[the] defendant Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI)." Ibid. When the defendant
failed to pay a $100 penalty within fifteen days, the Middlesex County Health
Department "brought an action in the Municipal Court of the Township of
Edison[.]" Id. at 137-38.
The defendant moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction,
arguing only the Superior Court had the authority to enforce the SWMA. Id. at
138. The municipal court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the action
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for lack of jurisdiction. 2 Ibid. The Law Division agreed and held "that
municipal courts lack jurisdiction under the statute to hear cases." Ibid. Our
analysis and ultimate resolution of this issue was based on the Legislature's
decision to amend N.J.S.A. 13:1E-9f in 1985.
As amended, N.J.S.A. 13:1E-9f provided as follows:
Any person who violates the provisions of P.L.1970,
c. 39, or any code, rule or regulation adopted pursuant
thereto shall be liable to a penalty of not more than
$50,000.00 per day, to be collected in a civil action
commenced by a local board of health, a county health
department, or the [DEP] commissioner.
....
Any penalty imposed pursuant to this subsection may
be collected with costs in a summary proceeding
pursuant to "the penalty enforcement law" ([N.J.S.A]
2A:58-1 et seq.). The Superior Court and the
municipal court shall have jurisdiction to enforce the
provisions of "the penalty enforcement law" in
connection with this act.
[Id. at 138-139 (emphasis added).]
Under the "old statute," the DEP Commissioner was limited to seeking
injunctive relief from the Superior Court, "or civil penalties (fines) in the
Superior, County, county district, or municipal courts. Local boards were
2
Although not relevant to the jurisdiction issue raised in this appeal, the
municipal court also found the Middlesex County Recycling Plan was invalid.
On appeal, the Law Division reversed that aspect of the municipal court's
decision. Ibid. We upheld the Law Division's decision. Id. at 142.
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limited to civil penalties in these same courts. Any action for penalties was to
be by way of a summary proceeding under the 'penalty enforcement law'
(N.J.S.A. 2A:58-1)." Id. at 140. By contrast, the amended version gave the
DEP Commissioner "additional enforcement weapons in the form of abatement
actions and penalties, both of which may be administratively initiated. He
retains the original remedies of injunctive relief and civil penalties. By virtue
of the amendment, local boards now have the additional right to seek
injunctive relief." Ibid.
Against this statutory history, we construed "civil action" as used in the
pre-amended version of N.J.S.A. 13:1E-9f "to indicate the court in which relief
might be sought since those courts were specified. Those words were used to
label the type of remedy referred to, namely a civil court action for fines as
opposed to injunctive relief." Id. at 141. We further held that these
jurisdictional limits remained after the Legislature's amendment of the statute
"in exactly the same manner . . . [.] Local boards may continue to seek the
imposition of fines against violators of the act, in a quick and simple summary
procedure, brought locally in a municipal court if they so choose." Ibid.
A close examination of the provisions in N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11u reveals a
statutory framework similar to the one in Middlesex County. Under N.J.S.A.
58:10-23.11u(a), when the DEP determines
A-3546-17T1
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(1) . . . on the basis of available information . . . that a
person is in violation of a provision of [the Spill Act],
including any rule, regulation, plan, information
request, access request, order or directive promulgated
or issued pursuant thereto, or that a person knowingly
has given false testimony, documents or information
to the [DEP], the [DEP] may:
(a) Bring a civil action in accordance with
subsection b. of this section;
(b) Levy a civil administrative penalty in
accordance with subsection c. of this section; or
(c) Bring an action for a civil penalty in
accordance with subsection d. of this section.
Use of any of the remedies specified in this section
shall not preclude use of any other remedy. The [DEP]
may simultaneously pursue administrative and judicial
remedies provided in this section.
[(Emphasis added).]
N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11u(b) describes the remedies available to the DEP in
an enforcement action brought in the Superior Court:
b. The [DEP] may commence a civil action in
Superior Court for, singly or in combination:
(1) a temporary or permanent injunction;
(2) the costs of any investigation, cleanup or removal,
and for the reasonable costs of preparing and
successfully litigating an action under this subsection;
(3) the cost of restoring, repairing, or replacing real or
personal property damaged or destroyed by a
discharge, any income lost from the time the property
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is damaged to the time it is restored, repaired or
replaced, and any reduction in value of the property
caused by the discharge by comparison with its value
prior thereto;
(4) the cost of restoration and replacement, where
practicable, of any natural resource damaged or
destroyed by a discharge; and
(5) any other costs incurred by the [DEP] pursuant to
P.L.1976, c.141.
Compensatory damages for damages awarded to a
person other than the State shall be paid to the person
injured by the discharge.
N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11u(c) describes the civil administrative penalties
available to the DEP in an enforcement action brought in an administrative
proceeding in the Office of Administrative Law:
(1) The [DEP] may assess a civil administrative
penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation,
and each day of violation shall constitute an
additional, separate and distinct violation. A civil
administrative penalty shall not be levied until a
violator has been notified by certified mail or personal
service of:
(a) the statutory or regulatory basis of the violation;
(b) the specific citation of the act or omission
constituting the violation;
(c) the amount of the civil administrative penalty to
be imposed;
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(d) the right of the violator to a hearing on any matter
contained in the notice and the procedures for
requesting a hearing.
(2)
(a) A violator shall have 20 calendar days following
receipt of notice within which to request a hearing on
any matter contained in the notice, and shall comply
with all procedures for requesting a hearing. Failure to
submit a timely request or to comply with all
departmental procedures shall constitute grounds for
denial of a hearing request. After a hearing and upon a
finding that a violation has occurred, the [DEP] shall
issue a final order assessing the amount of the civil
administrative penalty specified in the notice. If a
violator does not request a hearing or fails to satisfy
the statutory and administrative requirements for
requesting a hearing, the notice of assessment of a
civil administrative penalty shall become a final order
on the 21st calendar day following receipt of the
notice by the violator. If the [DEP] denies a hearing
request, the notice of denial shall become a final order
upon receipt of the notice by the violator.
(b) A civil administrative penalty may be settled by
the [DEP] on such terms and conditions as the [DEP]
may determine.
(c) Payment of a civil administrative penalty shall not
be deemed to affect the availability of any other
enforcement remedy in connection with the violation
for which the penalty was levied.
(3) If a civil administrative penalty imposed pursuant
to this section is not paid within 30 days of the date
that the penalty is due and owing, and the penalty is
not contested by the person against whom the penalty
has been assessed, or the person fails to make a
payment pursuant to a payment schedule entered into
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with the department, an interest charge shall accrue on
the amount of the penalty from the 30th day that
amount was due and owing. In the case of an appeal of
a civil administrative penalty, if the amount of the
penalty is upheld, in whole or in part, the rate of
interest shall be calculated on that amount as of the
30th day from the date the amount was due and owing
under the administrative order. The rate of interest
shall be that established by the New Jersey Supreme
Court for interest rates on judgments, as set forth in
the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New
Jersey.
(4) The [DEP] may assess and recover, by civil
administrative order, the costs of any investigation,
cleanup or removal, and the reasonable costs of
preparing and successfully enforcing a civil
administrative penalty pursuant to this subsection. The
assessment may be recovered at the same time as a
civil administrative penalty, and shall be in addition to
the penalty assessment.
N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11u(d) provides the DEP with two different
approaches to enforce monetary remedies previously ordered or imposed by
the Superior Court under N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11u(b) or in an administrative
hearing before an administrative law judge under N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11u(c).
Subsections (b) and (c) provide a person or entity charged with a violation of
the Spill Act constitutionally required due process protections.
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the guiding principles judges
must follow when confronted with a question of statutory construction:
Our objective in interpreting any statute is to give
effect to the Legislature's intent. Frugis v. Bracigliano,
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177 N.J. 250, 280 (2003). When the clear language of
the statute expresses the Legislature's intent, our
analysis need go no further. Shelton v.
Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 429 (2013). When
a plain reading of the statute allows for more than one
plausible interpretation or leads to an absurd result or
a result at odds with the overall statutory scheme, we
may turn to extrinsic evidence. DiProspero v. Penn,
183 N.J. 477, 492-93 (2005).
[McClain v. Bd. of Review, Dept. of Labor, 237 N.J.
445, 456 (2019).]
We construe the language in N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11u(d) to provide the
DEP with a choice to enforce these monetary penalties in a summary
proceeding in either the Superior Court or in the municipal court that has
territorial jurisdiction:
Any person who violates a provision of [N.J.S.A.
58:10-23.11], or a court order issued pursuant thereto,
or who fails to pay a civil administrative penalty in
full or to agree to a schedule of payments therefor,
shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed
$50,000.00 per day for each violation, and each day’s
continuance of the violation shall constitute a separate
violation. Any penalty incurred under this subsection
may be recovered with costs in a summary proceeding
pursuant to “the penalty enforcement law” (N.J.S.A.
2A:58-1 et seq.) in the Superior Court or a municipal
court.
[(Emphasis added).]
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The forum selection authority available to the DEP under N.J.S.A.
58:10-23.11u(d) must be construed in para materia with the procedural
mechanism in N.J.S.A. 2A:58-11, which provides:
a. If a statute or ordinance allows a court action to
impose a civil penalty or a penalty has been imposed
that may not be enforced pursuant to section 1 of this
act, an action to impose a penalty shall be brought as
provided by this section.
b. The action may be brought in the Superior Court. If
the statute that establishes the civil penalty provides
that the action may be brought in a municipal court,
the action may be brought in any municipal court that
has territorial jurisdiction over the action or in the
Superior Court.
c. The court shall decide the case in a summary
manner without a jury unless otherwise provided in
the statute imposing the penalty. The court shall hear
testimony on any factual issues, and if it finds that the
violation occurred, shall impose a penalty as provided
by the statute. The defendant shall not be precluded
from contesting the amount of the penalty.
d. Unless precluded by the statute imposing the
penalty, informal disposition may be made of any case
by stipulation, agreed settlement, or consent order.
Payment of a penalty pursuant to an informal
disposition shall be considered a prior violation for the
purpose of determining subsequent offender status.
e. An action in Superior Court to impose a civil
penalty may be joined with an action brought to
restrain related violations.
f. If a judgment for a civil penalty is rendered against
a defendant, payment shall be made to the court and
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shall be remitted to the State Treasurer of New Jersey,
unless other disposition is provided for in the statute
imposing the penalty.
In this light, a plain reading of the text in N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11u(d)
reveals the Legislature intended to authorize the DEP to bring a penalty
enforcement action against "[a]ny person who violates a provision of [N.J.S.A.
58:10-23.11], or a court order issued pursuant thereto, or who fails to pay a
civil administrative penalty in full or to agree to a schedule of payments." The
Supreme Court endorsed this approach in Rule 7:2-1(h) by making this type of
summary action cognizable in the municipal courts using the Special Summon s
the DEP used here.
Although our analysis differs from the approach employed by the Law
Division, it is a long-settled principle of appellate jurisprudence that "an
appeal is taken from a trial court's ruling rather than reasons for the ruling."
State v. Adubato, 420 N.J. Super. 167, 176 (App. Div. 2011). We thus affirm
the final judgment of the trial court "on grounds other than those upon which
the trial court relied." Ibid.
Affirmed.
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