Opinion

State of Tennessee v. Nicholas Tyler Beckham

Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
Oct 22, 2019
Status
Published
On the bench
Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 9.3%

The opinion

10/22/2019

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 16, 2019

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. NICHOLAS TYLER BECKHAM

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Cheatham County

No. 18134 Larry J. Wallace, Judge

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No. M2018-02027-CCA-R3-CD

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The Cheatham County Grand Jury indicted Nicholas Tyler Beckham, Defendant, on

twenty-three counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. Pursuant to a plea

agreement, Defendant pled guilty to counts one through five, with an agreed sentence of

five years on each count, counts one through four to be served consecutively, with count

five to run concurrently to count four, for an effective sentence of twenty years at thirty

percent, with the manner of service to be determined by the court. The remainder of the

counts were dismissed. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant

to serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant

claims the trial court abused its discretion when it denied alternative sentencing for

Defendant. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the

judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES

CURWOOD WITT, JR., and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JJ., joined.

William B. Lockhart, III, District Public Defender, and Matthew T. Mitchell, Assistant

District Public Defender, Ashland City, Tennessee, for the appellant, Nicholas Tyler

Beckham.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Ruth Anne Thompson, Senior

Assistant Attorney General; Ray Crouch, District Attorney General; and Margaret F. Sagi

and David Wyatt, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of

Tennessee.

OPINION

Sentencing Hearing

Teresa Geas testified that she was employed with the Tennessee Department of

Correction Board of Probation and Parole and that she prepared a presentence report for

Defendant. The report provided no information asserted by the parties relating to

mitigating factors or enhancement factors. Ms. Geas stated that she received the State’s

enhancement factors after she had prepared her presentence report.. On cross-

examination, Ms. Geas testified that Defendant was eighteen years old at the time of the

offenses and that, based on his risk assessment, Defendant had a moderate risk of re-

offending. Ms. Geas agreed that she did not know why Defendant was placed in the

moderate category when all but one of the risk assessment sub-categories presented as

low risk. On redirect examination, Ms. Geas stated that the risk assessment did not take

into consideration Defendant’s possible depression, pedophilia, or access to small

children.

Detective Timothy Palchak testified as an expert in the investigation of child

exploitation. Detective Palchak said he was a member of the FBI’s Child Exploitation

Task Force at the Washington, D.C. Field Office. He stated that he began specialized law

enforcement training in the year 2000 when he began working with the FBI’s child abuse

unit.

Detective Palchak testified that, while working as an undercover task force officer,

he came into contact with Defendant online. Defendant saw Detective Palchak’s posts

online, on a mobile application called “KiK,” in group forums about pedophilia and

incest. Defendant contacted Detective Palchak online using Defendant’s KiK screen

name “abbissupergirl.” Defendant told Detective Palchak that he was an eighteen-year-

old male who lived in Indiana and that he liked to “play with [his] younger sisters[.]”

Defendant told Detective Palchak that he “do[es] anal” with his five-year-old sister.

Defendant asked Detective Palchak if he would like to see pictures, and Detective

Palchak answered affirmatively. Defendant sent Detective Palchak three pictures via

KiK, as detailed in the Incident Report:1

1. An image of a nude prepubescent female child with her legs

spread exposing her bare vagina. Defendant told Detective Palchak that

this picture was of an eight-year-old girl.

1

Detective Palchak prepared the Incident Report on December 8, 2016. The Incident Report was

admitted as Exhibit 4 to the Sentencing Hearing.

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2. An image of a nude prepubescent female with a penis inserted into

the child’s anus. Defendant told Detective Palchak that this picture was of

a five-year-old girl.

3. An image of a nude prepubescent female from the vagina down to

her anus, legs spread, with a penis inserted into the child’s anus.

Detective Palchak then gave Defendant his undercover cell phone number, and

Defendant contacted Detective Palchak via text message. Defendant sent eleven

additional pictures to Detective Palchak’s undercover cell phone, as detailed in the

Incident Report:

1. An image of a prepubescent child lying on a burgundy sheet with her

legs spread exposing her bare vagina. An erect penis is near the child’s

vagina but not touching it. The image focuses on the child’s vagina, and no

face is visible.

2. An image depicting a prepubescent child spreading her bare vagina

open.

3. An image of a prepubescent child on all fours exposing her bare

buttocks and vagina.

4. An image of a prepubescent child spreading her legs open and exposing

her bare vagina. The image is taken from the waist down.

5. An image of a female child wearing a multi-colored shirt and no panties.

The child’s hand and fingers are on her bare vagina.

6. The same child as the previous (photo 5). The child is touching her bare

vagina with her fingers, and a penis is near her vagina.

7. The same child as the previous (photo 6). The child is inserting her

finger into her bare vagina.

8. An image depicting a male spreading the vagina of a prepubescent child

with his fingers.

9. Three images depicting a male inserting his penis into a prepubescent

child’s anus.

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At Detective Palchak’s request, Defendant sent him a picture of “half [of] the face

of the girl that was described in the images.” Based on the picture of the child’s face,

Detective Palchak estimated that the child was between seven and ten years old.

Detective Palchak asked Defendant if he obtained the pictures from the internet, and

Defendant agreed that he had. Defendant told Detective Palchak, “I do have sisters, I just

don’t take pics. . . . I’ve licked [the eight-year-old’s] p***y and fingered her butt.” Then

Defendant sent a non-pornographic picture of a child he claimed to be his sister.

Following this series of communications, Detective Palchak worked with another

FBI agent to identify Defendant as the user of the KiK username “abbissupergirl.” After

obtaining Defendant’s name and address, Detective Palchak contacted the local FBI

office because he was concerned that “there was a kid in jeopardy” since Defendant sent

a picture of a set of panties at his residence.

On cross-examination, Detective Palchak clarified that Defendant stated he never

took pictures of the two girls purported to be his sisters but that Defendant claimed he

“did things” to the girls while they were sleeping. On redirect-examination, Detective

Palchak stated that, based on his communications with Defendant, Defendant was

looking for “homemade child pornography[,]” but Detective Palchak was unable to

ascertain whether Defendant’s disclosures of abuse were true.

Kenneth Ray testified that he was the Assistant Police Chief with the Ashland City

Police Department. Detective Ray obtained a search warrant for Defendant’s home on

Batson Street in Ashland City. When officers arrived, there were “some underage

children” at the home, appearing to be between five and eight years of age. Detective

Ray identified one of the children present in the home as the same child in the non-

pornographic image that Defendant sent to Detective Palchak. Detective Ray stated that

he and the other officers obtained several electronic devices, as well as some children’s

panties, which matched the panties in the images that Defendant sent to Detective

Palchak. Detective Ray said that the FBI report on a cell phone that was recovered from

Defendant’s residence stated that the cell phone had been “wiped remotely.”

Detective Ray testified that Defendant accompanied the officers back to the police

department and, following Miranda warnings, Detective Ray and another detective

questioned Defendant. Defendant told the detectives that “he had been exchanging

information with someone on the internet and sending pictures, and he disclosed that he

had a preference for children, young girls, between the ages of [eight] and [ten].”

Defendant also disclosed that he had been viewing internet pornography for “about two

years” and admitted to “masturbating to the pictures.” Detective Ray stated that forensic

interviews were conducted on the minor children found in Defendant’s home and that

neither child disclosed any abuse.

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On cross-examination, Detective Ray testified that none of Defendant’s DNA was

found on any of the items belonging to the children. On redirect examination, Detective

Ray stated that, in the stationhouse interview, Defendant explained that he preferred

young girls “before they had hair[.]”

Michelle Binkley testified that she worked for PSI Probation in Charlotte. Ms.

Binkley stated that she placed a GPS monitor on Defendant’s ankle on March 20, 2018,

shortly after Defendant submitted a guilty plea, as a condition of Defendant’s remaining

released on bond. She told Defendant to keep the GPS monitor’s battery charged at all

times. Ms. Binkley said that Defendant was supposed to be on the sex offender registry

after his guilty plea submission; thus, Defendant was not allowed near schools, parks, or

childcare facilities. Ms. Binkley stated that, on March 21, 2018, Defendant was tracked

to a residence on Achievement Drive in Nashville, three tenths of a mile from an

elementary school. The same day, Defendant was tracked to a park near a middle school

and a youth community center. On March 25, 2018, Defendant’s battery died, and his

tracking device stopped working. Approximately twenty-two hours later, Defendant’s

GPS monitor began tracking again. When Ms. Binkley noticed that Defendant had failed

to register as a sex offender, she contacted the District Attorney’s office and provided

them information with Defendant’s movements. Due to his failure to comply with the

requirements of his plea agreement as a sex offender, Defendant’s bond was revoked.

Barbara Stevenson testified that she worked for the Tennessee Department of

Correction Board of Probation and Parole in Cheatham County. Officer Stevenson stated

that she worked with Kathleen High, who was a “sex offender officer.” Officer

Stevenson said that Officer High “swore out a warrant based on a sex offender registry

violation” because Defendant failed to register as a sex offender within forty-eight hours

of the trial court’s acceptance of his guilty plea.

Dr. Kimberly Brown testified that she had a Ph.D. in clinical psychology with a

specialization in law. Dr. Brown stated that she was board-certified in forensic

psychology and that she did an internship in forensic psychology at Napa State Hospital

in California and a post-doctoral fellowship in forensic psychology at the University of

Washington. Dr. Brown stated that she worked for Vanderbilt University Medical Center

as an associate professor in the department of psychiatry and as the director of the

forensic evaluation team. Dr. Brown testified that she evaluated Defendant using four

tests and eight research-based risk factors for “child-pornography-only” offenders.

Dr. Brown stated that the risk factors present in this case included (1) that

Defendant was very young at the time of the offense, (2) that Defendant violated the

terms of his bond, and (3) that Defendant was sexually aroused by children. Dr. Brown

stated that the risk factors absent in this case included (1) that Defendant had no known

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sexual offense contacts against children or adults, (2) that Defendant had no prior

criminal history, (3) that Defendant had no known violent history, (4) that Defendant did

not consider criminal activity to be acceptable, and (5) that Defendant had only female

child pornography rather than both male and female pictures. Based on these factors, Dr.

Brown diagnosed Defendant with pedophilia disorder.

To determine whether Defendant’s condition was treatable, Dr. Brown considered

Defendant’s social support from friends and family, his romantic relationship with an

adult female, Defendant’s lack of substance abuse, his lack of minimizing the harm of his

offenses, and the fact that Defendant committed these offenses while in a “major

depressive episode” shortly after his best friend’s murder in April 2016. Dr. Brown also

considered that Defendant was “not very expressive[,]” which would not facilitate

treatment, and that another major depressive episode may increase his risk of re-

offending. Dr. Brown stated that she could not predict Defendant’s success in treatment.

Dr. Brown also noted that Defendant was on bond for one year and four months prior to

pleading guilty and that, during that time, Defendant had no offenses. She stated, “[W]e

know that the longer people are offense[-]free in the community, the greater their risk is

reduced exponentially[.]” She further noted that, while a young age can be a risk factor

for re-offending, Defendant’s

brain [was] still not even fully developed [at the time of the offenses]. So

[Defendant was] more at risk to be impulsive, to use poor judgment, to not

exercise good decision-making. With continued development of his brain,

the -- he should make better choices. That’s the natural development of a

brain. So I think his age of [eighteen] at the time [of the offense] is

significant.

Dr. Brown noted several inconsistencies between what Defendant told her and

what Defendant told officers during his interrogation. Specifically, Defendant told Dr.

Brown that he had no sexual interest in children, but he told detectives that he had a

“fetish for young girls[.]” Defendant also told Dr. Brown that he had been looking at

pornography for two years, “not necessarily child pornography,” but he told detectives

that he “had been viewing these types of images for two years.” Dr. Brown indicated that

these inconsistencies show that Defendant was “somewhat defensive and guarded [and

that he] kind of glosses over things and doesn’t want . . . to see himself as having a

problem. Admits to what he did, but doesn’t think it’s indicative of a larger problem.”

Dr. Brown then stated that, based on current research, there is no relation between a

Defendant’s refusal to admit he has a problem and his risk to re-offend. She said that

there was no difference in the risk of re-offending “between admitters and deniers, but it

does affect participation and amenability for treatment.”

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On redirect examination, Dr. Brown concluded that, because Defendant had no

contact offenses in the past, Defendant was at low risk for a contact sexual offense

against a child. On re-cross-examination, Dr. Brown stated that, when Defendant talked

to Detective Palchak online about “doing things” to his sisters, “it [was] just a part of the

sexual fantasies that are part of the [pedophilic] disorder[.]”

Defendant testified that he was a high school graduate and that he was arrested on

December 9, 2016. Defendant said that he told Detective Ray that he viewed images of

child pornography and that he sent some of those images to Detective Palchak.

Defendant stated that he was in jail for seven weeks after his arrest before he was

released on bond and that he remained released on bond for “a year and a half, give or

take[.]” He said that, while he was released on bond, he was not charged with any other

offense. In March of 2018, Defendant submitted guilty pleas in counts one through five

and reported to Ms. Binkley to receive an ankle monitor on March 20, 2018. Defendant

stated that he was not aware that he only had forty-eight hours after submission of his

guilty plea in which to register as a sex offender. He said that he understood that he had

to inform Ms. Binkley of his residence, even if he moved for only a short time.

Defendant agreed that he told Ms. Binkley he would be living with his grandfather and

that, for two days after he received his ankle monitor, he was staying at a friend’s house

because he was going to work with his friend’s father.

Defendant testified that he was “disgusted” by the charges and “disappointed” in

himself. He said he felt “sorry” for the girls in the pictures and that he “kind of threw

[his] life away just making a stupid mistake like that.” Defendant stated that he knew his

sentence would be for twenty years and that he was asking the court to “give [him] an

opportunity on community corrections.”

On cross-examination, Defendant stated that he accessed child pornography in

nine or ten sessions within two years. He said that he would search for child

pornography on Google and in pedophilia forums online which would direct him to a file-

sharing site. Defendant bookmarked a page of child pornography which had thirty to

forty images. Defendant testified that, before his friend’s murder in April 2016, he

accessed child pornography once every two months. After his friend’s murder, he would

view child pornography during his free time for “a day or two straight” at a time. From

the time Defendant graduated from high school in May 2016 until he was arrested in

December 2016, Defendant was not working or attending school but spent his days

watching television, playing games, and looking at child pornography. Defendant

admitted that some of the pictures that he sent to Detective Palchak depicted “molestation

and rape[.]” Defendant stated that people who take such pictures should go to prison and

that people who view such pictures and “don’t want to stop” should also go to prison.

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On cross-examination, Defendant stated that he was sixteen years old when he

started viewing pornography. He said that he knew he “had a long way to go” with

maturity and that he wanted to change. Defendant said that, when the GPS tracked him

to a park near a school, he was picking up a friend from the youth center who had been

playing basketball. On redirect examination, Defendant stated that, when he viewed the

pictures of child rape, he “didn’t think about the people” in the pictures but that he now

understood that “what [he] did [was] wrong and why that’s so wrong.” He stated that he

took the picture of his cousin’s panties and sent it to Detective Palchak because he was

consumed with “want[ing] to get pictures” and because he “wasn’t really thinking at the

time.”

Upon examination by the trial court, Defendant testified that he told Detective

Palchak “I like to play with my younger sisters” because he thought that was what he

needed to say to get more pictures. Defendant stated that, the first time he viewed

pornography, it was “regular” pornography of adults. After a few months, Defendant

decided to seek out child pornography because he “thought it was more erotic, more

taboo.” Defendant testified that he was not sorry he “got caught” because it brought his

family closer together and that they started attending church again. Defendant assured

the court that, if the court imposed alternative sentencing, Defendant would not re-offend.

Defendant stated, “I know what it’s like to be away from my family, and I don’t want to

have to feel that again. I don’t want to punish them for what I do, make them have

sleepless nights . . . crying for me.” Defendant told the court that, after his guilty plea

submission, he failed to register as a sex offender because he believed that someone

would contact him when it was time to register. He also stated that he “didn’t think it

was that big a deal” for him to spend two nights at a friend’s house after he told Ms.

Binkley he resided with his grandfather. Defendant said that he did not view or discuss

child pornography while staying at his friend’s house.

Defendant stated that he masturbated to the pictures of children “just for the thrill”

but that he did not “feel like [he] was the person doing the acts to . . . the individual in the

picture[.]” Defendant testified that he “kind of felt bad” and “scared” when he sent

Detective Palchak a picture of his cousin, so he “stopped and blocked” Detective

Palchak’s number. Defendant agreed that child pornography “hurts kids” and that

viewing it creates a demand for it.

Following closing arguments, the trial court placed on the record its findings

regarding sentencing factors. The trial court applied with substantial weight

enhancement factor (3), that there was more than one victim, because “even though it’s

not a direct-contact victim like where somebody gets assaulted or raped or something like

that directly, this behavior helps fuel the industry and leads to more victims being

victimized[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(3) (2018). The trial court applied with little

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weight enhancement factor (1), history of criminal behavior, because even though

Defendant had no criminal record, Defendant testified to looking at child pornography for

two years prior to his arrest. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1) (2018). The trial court

then applied with substantial weight enhancement factor (7), that the offense involved a

victim and was committed to gratify the defendant’s desire for pleasure or excitement,

because Defendant admitted to masturbating to the images. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

114(7) (2018).

Defense counsel requested that the trial court consider mitigating factors (1), (6)

and (13). The trial court declined to apply mitigating factor (1), that the defendant’s

criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious bodily injury, because “the

conduct does cause serious bodily injury in future situations because, again, it fuels the

industry of child pornography.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(1) (2018). The trial court

applied mitigating factor (6), that the defendant lacked substantial judgment in

committing the offense due to young age. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(6) (2018).

The trial court noted that Defendant was not statutorily eligible for probation

under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(a) because Defendant was convicted

of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated

section 39-17-1004. However, the trial court agreed that Defendant was eligible for

community corrections. Nevertheless, the trial court found that confinement was

“necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense or confinement is

especially suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely to commit similar

offenses.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(B) (2018). The court stated:

[T]he Court does consider that there’s a high deterrence value regarding

this particular offense, part of that is the fact that the public needs to know

and understand that –. . . [D]efendant’s actions . . . are continuing to

encourage individuals to take pictures and put them on the internet of

children under the age of [eighteen] in sexual activity -- or simulated sexual

activity. And, of course, society should not tolerate that. You know, child

pornography is about as serious as it gets. It says, before the judge can

deny alternative sentence for deterrence, there must be some proof that the

sentence will have a deterrent effect. It says, to find a deterrence cannot be

merely conclusionary, [sic] but child sex cases seem to be listed as an

exception here, based on case law. Those offenses by their very nature

need no extrinsic proof to establish the deterrent value of punishment.

In denying alternative sentencing, the trial court also considered that “measures

less restrictive than confinement have . . . recently been applied unsuccessfully to the

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defendant” because Defendant violated the terms of his bond after his guilty plea

submission. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(C) (2018).

The trial court stated that Defendant did not meet his burden to establish that

alternative sentencing “will subserve the ends of justice and be in the best interest of both

the public and [D]efendant.” The trial court stated that “the nature and circumstances of

the criminal conduct involved . . . paint a terrible picture.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

210(B)(4) (2018). Moreover, the trial court found that Defendant lacked “potential for

rehabilitation[,] including the risk that during the period of . . . alternative sentencing

[D]efendant will commit another crime” because Defendant did not comply with the

conditions of his bond after he submitted a guilty plea. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

103(5) (2018). The trial court denied alternative sentencing and imposed a sentence of

twenty years’ incarceration at thirty percent. This timely appeal now follows.

Analysis

Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that

alternative sentencing was “not sufficient as punishment in this case.” Defendant

contends that the trial court “did not fully consider the arguments as to sentencing

alternatives.” Further, Defendant asserts that the trial court did “not consider[] the

guiding purposes and principles of sentencing[.]” Defendant emphasizes that his

“argument that the [t]rial [c]ourt misapplied sentencing factors is but a part of the [t]rial

[c]ourt’s overall failure to properly account for the purposes and principles of

sentencing.” Finally, Defendant argues that incarceration is “not the least severe measure

necessary to achieve the purpose of the sentence.”

The State responds that incarceration is appropriate in this case because Defendant

exchanged child pornography online and also refused to comply with the conditions of

his bond release.

We first note that the record on appeal does not contain the guilty plea submission

hearing transcript. The absence of the guilty plea submission hearing transcript is

particularly important because

[f]or those defendants who plead guilty, the guilty plea hearing is the

equivalent of trial, in that it allows the State the opportunity to present the

facts underlying the offense. For this reason, a transcript of the guilty plea

hearing is often (if not always) needed in order to conduct a proper review

of the sentence imposed.

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State v. Keen, 996 S.W.2d 842, 843-44 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (citations omitted). It is

Defendant’s duty to prepare the record “as is necessary to convey a fair, accurate and

complete account of what transpired with respect to those issues which are the bases of

appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). “Where the record is incomplete and does not contain a

transcript of the proceedings relevant to an issue presented for review, or portions of the

record upon which the party relies, an appellate court is precluded from considering the

issue.” State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 560-61 (Tenn. 1993) (citing State v. Roberts,

755 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988)). However, “when a record does not

include a transcript of the hearing on a guilty plea, the Court of Criminal Appeals should

determine on a case-by-case basis whether the record is sufficient for a meaningful

review under the standard adopted in [State v. ]Bise.” State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273,

279 (Tenn. 2012).

Here, the State concedes, and we agree, that the record is sufficient for meaningful

review in this matter because seven witnesses testified at the sentencing hearing and the

exhibits to the hearing included the evidence that would have been presented at trial.

Therefore, we will address Defendant’s claims on the merits.

The sentence range for a Range I standard offender, convicted of a Class C felony,

is three to six years. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112(a)(3) (2018). When the record

clearly establishes that the trial court imposed a sentence within the appropriate range

after a “proper application of the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act,” this

court reviews the trial court’s sentencing decision under an abuse of discretion standard

with a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707 (Tenn. 2012).

The party challenging the sentence on appeal bears the burden of establishing that the

sentence was improper. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401 (2018), Sentencing Comm’n

Cmts.

To facilitate meaningful appellate review, the trial court must state on the record

the factors it considered and the reasons for imposing the sentence chosen. Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-35-210(e) (2014); Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706. While the trial court should

consider enhancement and mitigating factors, such factors are advisory only. See Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-15-114 (Supp. 2015); see also Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 699 n.33, 704; State

v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 346 (Tenn. 2008). A trial court’s “misapplication of an

enhancement or mitigation factor does not invalidate the sentence imposed unless the trial

court wholly departed from the 1989 Act, as amended in 2005.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706.

The intent of the Community Corrections Act was to “[e]stablish a policy within

the state to punish selected, nonviolent felony offenders in front-end community based

alternatives to incarceration, thereby reserving secure confinement facilities for violent

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felony offenders.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-103(1) (2018). Eligible offenders under the

Community Corrections Act include:

(A) Persons who, without this option, would be incarcerated in a

correctional institution;

(B) Persons who are convicted of property-related, or drug- or

alcohol-related felony offenses or other felony offenses not involving

crimes against the person as provided in title 39, chapter 13, parts 1-5;

(C) Persons who are convicted of nonviolent felony offenses;

(D) Persons who are convicted of felony offenses in which the use or

possession of a weapon was not involved;

(E) Persons who do not demonstrate a present or past pattern of

behavior indicating violence; and

(F) Persons who do not demonstrate a pattern of committing violent

offenses.

Id. § 40-36-106(a)(1)(A)-(F) (2018).

Simply because an offender meets the minimum requirements under the

Community Corrections Act “does not mean that he is entitled to be sentenced under the

Act as a matter of law or right.” State v. Ball, 973 S.W.2d 288, 294 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1998) (citing State v. Taylor, 744 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)). Instead,

the Act’s criteria “shall be interpreted as minimum state standards, guiding the

determination of eligibility of offenders under this chapter.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-

106(d) (2018).

In his brief, Defendant does not explain which sentencing factors the trial court

misapplied or how it misapplied them, nor does Defendant explain which purposes and

principles of sentencing the trial court misapplied or how it misapplied them. Defendant

appears to claim that incarceration was inappropriate in this case because incarceration

was “not the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purpose of the sentence.” See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(4) (2018).

In State v. Jessica Tramel, the defendant complained that the trial court failed to

consider Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103(4) and (6) when it decided

against alternative sentencing. No. E2015-00694-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 3570371, at *9

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(Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 23, 2016). In affirming

the trial court, this court found that

[t]he trial court’s extensive explanation for denying the appellant’s request

for alternative sentencing demonstrates that the court carefully considered

the principles applicable to sentencing. The court went into great detail,

explaining why each factor weighed in favor of or against an alternative

sentence. The court found that very few factors weighed in favor of the

appellant’s request.

Id. In the same way, the trial court in the present case did not expressly address

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103(4) in its determination against alternative

sentencing. However, the trial court “went into great detail, explaining why each factor

weighed in favor of or against an alternative sentence.” Id. In this case, the trial court

considered factors set out in code sections 40-35-210, 40-35-113, 40-35-114, 40-35-103,

and 40-35-303 and stated on the record the reasons for the sentence it imposed. Thus, the

trial court’s sentencing decisions are entitled to a presumption of reasonableness, and

Defendant has failed to establish any abuse of discretion. He is not entitled to relief.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

____________________________________

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE

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