Opinion

Tulare Pediatric Health etc. v. State Dept. of Health Care etc.

Court
California Court of Appeal
Filed
Oct 16, 2019
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 9.2%

The opinion

Filed 10/16/19

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

TULARE PEDIATRIC HEALTH B287876

CARE CENTER,

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct.

Petitioner and Respondent, No. BS166705)

v.

STATE DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH CARE SERVICES et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Amy D. Hogue, Judge. Affirmed.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Richard T. Waldow,

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Jacquelyn Y. Young,

Deputy Attorney General, for Defendants and Appellants.

Foley & Lardner, Erik K. Swanholt, and Adam J. Hepworth

for Petitioner and Respondent.

__________________________

Because California participates in the federal Medicaid

program, California must pay federally qualified health centers

for their services to Medicaid beneficiaries. (42 U.S.C. §

1396a(bb)(4).) The question is how much California must pay the

counties and their clinics for providing this care. The answer is

“100 percent” of the cost of a defined list of services. (42 U.S.C. §

1396a(bb)(4), italics added.)

Tulare County runs Tulare Pediatric Health Care Center

(“Tulare Clinic”). The clinic is a federally qualified health center.

California’s Department of Health Care Services (“the State”)

refused to pay Tulare Clinic the full amount the clinic paid to a

contractor. Instead, the State paid Tulare Clinic an amount

equal to only the contractor’s underlying costs. By statute, that

was too little.

Tulare Clinic petitioned the court to require the State to

pay 100 percent of the amount Tulare Clinic paid the contractor.

The trial court rightly granted the petition, so we affirm.

I

We begin with the statutory backdrop, which is extensive.

Then we state the facts.

A

Medicaid is a federal program subsidizing state spending

on medical care for the poor. (42 U.S.C. § 1396-1; 42 C.F.R. §

430.0.) To get Medicaid funds, states must agree with the federal

government to spend the funds in accord with federally imposed

conditions. (42 C.F.R. § 430.10; see also Armstrong v. Exceptional

Child Center, Inc. (2015) 135 S.Ct. 1378, 1382.) And states must

match federal dollars with their own, at a rate set by Congress.

(42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a, 1396b.)

2

Federal regulations require each participating state to

adopt a “State plan” outlining how it will follow federal Medicaid

rules. (42 C.F.R. § 430.10 et seq.) States develop standards to

determine who qualifies for medical assistance under their State

plan. (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(17).)

Medicaid beneficiaries are people getting medical

assistance under a State plan.

Alongside Medicaid, a similar but independent federal

program subsidizes healthcare by awarding grants to federally

qualified health centers. This is under the aegis of the Public

Health Services Act. (42 U.S.C. § 254b.) Health centers like

Tulare Clinic qualify for grants by providing primary health

services — immunizations, prenatal care, and the like — to

medically underserved communities. (42 U.S.C. § 254b.) Some in

these underserved communities are also Medicaid beneficiaries.

(See Community Health Care Association of New York v. Shah

(2d Cir. 2014) 770 F.3d 129, 136 (Community Health).)

When Congress authorized grants for health centers under

the Public Health Services Act, it expected states to reimburse

centers for all or part of centers’ cost of treating Medicaid

beneficiaries. (See Pub.L. No. 94–63, § 330 (July 29, 1975) 89

Stat. 304; Community Health, supra, 770 F.3d at p. 136 [the

grant program for health centers was established in 1975 as

Section 330 of the Public Health Services Act, now codified at 42

U.S.C. § 254b].) Congress heard testimony that, on average,

states’ payments covered less than 70 percent of the centers’ cost

of treating Medicaid beneficiaries. (H.R.Rep. No. 101-247, 1st

Sess., p. 392 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

News, p. 2118; see also Community Health, supra, 770 F.3d at p.

136.)

3

Congress was concerned that, because Medicaid fell short of

covering the full cost of treating its own beneficiaries, health

centers would use Public Health Services Act grants to subsidize

treatment of Medicaid patients. (H.R.Rep. No. 101-247, 1st Sess.,

pp. 392–393 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

News, pp. 2118–2119.) This practice compromised centers’ ability

to care for those without any public or private coverage

whatsoever, who were the very people Congress sought to help

when it passed the Public Health Services Act. (See ibid.) So

Congress amended Medicaid rules to require states to pay health

centers 100 percent of their costs for a defined list of services.

(H.R.Rep. No. 101-247, 1st Sess., p. 393 (1989), reprinted in 1989

U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 2119; see also Three Lower

Counties Community Health Services, Inc. v. Maryland (4th Cir.

2007) 498 F.3d 294, 297–298 (Three Lower Counties).)

This situation has created a complex payment structure:

one funding source is a combination of federal and state funding,

while another is solely federal. That is, a combination of federal

and state funds support care for patients who are Medicaid

beneficiaries. But federal funds alone support care for patients

without any health coverage, because those monies come from

Public Health Services Act grants, which are strictly federal in

origin. (See Alameda Health System v. Centers for Medicare &

Medicaid Services (N.D.Cal. 2017) 287 F.Supp.3d 896, 902.)

This scheme continues to the present day, with a

modification for administrative purposes. The modification was

in 2000, when Congress adopted a “prospective payment system”

to relieve health centers from the burden of providing new cost

data every year. (Three Lower Counties, supra, 498 F.3d at p.

298.) Under this new system, health centers that become

4

federally qualified after 2000, including Tulare Clinic, receive

Medicaid payment equal to “100 percent of the costs of furnishing

[defined] services” during their first year. (42 U.S.C. §

1396a(bb)(4).) In later years, payment is increased by a set

percentage and is adjusted only to account for changes in the

scope of the centers’ services. (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb)(3).)

Federal law gives states different ways of determining “100

percent of the costs of furnishing [defined] services” in the initial

year. One option — the one pertinent here — is to determine the

costs according to “the regulations and methodology” for centers

federally qualified before 2000. (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb)(4).) That

method requires states to pay “an amount (calculated on a per

visit basis) that is equal to 100 percent of the average of the costs

of the center . . . of furnishing such services during fiscal years

1999 and 2000 which are reasonable and related to the cost of

furnishing such services.” (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb)(2).)

California incorporated these rules into its Medicaid

program, which is Medi-Cal. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 14063,

14132.100, subd. (i)(3).) The Department of Health Care Services

administers Medi-Cal and audits payments to health centers.

(Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 14100.1, 14170, subd. (a)(1).)

B

Here are some facts.

Tulare County operates Tulare Clinic, which is a federally

qualified health center. Tulare County staffed the clinic by

contracting with Dr. Prem Kamboj, who agreed to provide

necessary personnel to run the clinic. Tulare agreed to pay

Kamboj $106 per patient visit, whether it was Kamboj personally

or some other individual who provided the care.

5

In 2011, Tulare Clinic submitted a cost report to the State.

The purpose was to set the clinic’s rate under the prospective

payment system. Tulare Clinic incorporated Kamboj’s fee of $106

per patient visit. The clinic then added up its other costs, like

office and printing supplies and so forth, and calculated its total

cost to be $167.85 per patient visit.

This $167.85 rate apparently was a bargain. The preceding

rate had been $226 per patient visit. Tulare County previously

ran a different health center that provided the same services as

Tulare Clinic, but it cost 35% more than Tulare Clinic’s cost per

patient visit. At oral argument all counsel embraced this fact.

The State’s lawyer admitted this fact placed Tulare County in a

“sympathetic” light, presumably because the county’s actions

seemed like good government at work.

Even though Tulare County’s new arrangement seemed to

be a more efficient arrangement than its old system, the State

audited Tulare Clinic’s 2009 to 2010 fiscal year expenses. No one

disputes Tulare Clinic indeed paid Kamboj $106 per patient visit.

But the State did not accept what Tulare Clinic actually paid as

Tulare Clinic’s actual cost. Instead, it demanded Kamboj’s

records so it could determine his costs. This is akin to demanding

cost records from the subcontractor water company that

resupplies the clinic’s water cooler.

The State’s auditor concluded, in some instances, Kamboj’s

costs were less than $106 per visit. Apparently, the State’s

reasoning was the Kamboj’s costs had to be less, because “the

doctor is providing more than just one-on-one professional

services to patients. He’s providing his staff. He’s providing his

medical assistants . . . , doctors from his private practice, and, of

course, the contract doesn’t say that, but he’s providing any

6

specialists and physicians to the clinic, and he’s charging a

hundred and six dollars per visit to the County.”

In other instances, the State faulted Kamboj because he

could not support his cost claims with documentation.

As a result, the State made seven audit adjustments that

reduced Tulare Clinic’s cost of “Physician Services Under

Agreement” from $2,308,058 to $1,696,095. These adjustments,

and others not on appeal, reduced California’s payment rate to

Tulare Clinic to $120.98 per patient visit.

Tulare Clinic petitioned the trial court to require the State

to set aside the adjustments to the clinic’s costs and to recalculate

its payment rate accordingly. The trial court granted the

petition, finding 42 United States Code section 1396a(bb)

required the State to accept the Tulare Clinic’s cost of paying

Kamboj $106 per patient visit.

II

The trial court correctly determined the State must accept

Tulare Clinic’s cost of paying Kamboj $106 per patient visit.

A

First we review the standard of review. On this appeal, the

question is whether the State has proceeded as required by a

federal Medicaid statute, state Medi-Cal statute, and state

regulation mandating implementation of California’s State plan.

No facts are disputed; the question is solely one of statutory

interpretation. Thus, we independently review the trial court’s

decision. (Cassidy v. California Bd. of Accountancy (2013) 220

Cal.App.4th 620, 627.)

We do not defer to the State’s interpretation of the federal

statute at issue: 42 United States Code section 1396a(bb), which

we will call subdivision (bb). (Orthopaedic Hospital v. Belshe (9th

7

Cir. 1997) 103 F.3d 1491, 1495 [state agencies’ interpretation of

federal statutes get no deference].)

The State contests this point. It wants deference. It notes

the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, a federal agency

entitled to deference in interpreting federal Medicaid law, has

approved California’s State plan, which implements subdivision

(bb). (Community Health Center v. Wilson-Coker (2d Cir. 2002)

311 F.3d 132, 137–138 [explaining the deference owed to the

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services].) Therefore,

according to the State, by “approv[ing] of California’s

interpretation and application of” subdivision (bb), the federal

agency has somehow imbued the State with the deference owed

to the Centers.

This argument fails. The federal Centers may have

approved the State plan as a general matter, but there is no sign

it approved the State’s application of the State plan to Tulare

Clinic, or even the State’s application of the State plan in similar

situations.

We do not defer to the State’s interpretation of state law

because we do not defer to agency interpretations that are clearly

erroneous, as the State’s interpretation is here. (Bonnell v.

Medical Bd. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1255, 1265.)

We thus independently review this question of statutory

interpretation.

B

Now we decide the merits: federal law requires the State

pay Tulare Clinic 100 percent of the $106-per-patient-visit sum

that Tulare Clinic paid Kamboj. In other words, the State must

make Tulare County whole on this score. California’s Medi-Cal

statute is consistent with this federal requirement.

8

The plain language of subdivision (bb) requires states to

pay centers’ full cost. It provides, “In any case in which an entity

first qualifies as a Federally-qualified health center . . . after

fiscal year 2000, the State plan shall provide for payment for

services . . . furnished by the center . . . that is equal to 100

percent of the costs of furnishing such services.” (42 U.S.C. §

1396a(bb)(4).) The method for determining 100 percent of the

costs at issue requires states to pay “an amount (calculated on a

per visit basis) that is equal to 100 percent of the average of the

costs of the center . . . of furnishing such services . . . which are

reasonable and related to the cost of furnishing such services.”

(42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb)(2).) The statute is clear: the State must

pay 100 percent of the center’s costs for the defined services. We

effectuate this plain meaning. (Bonnell v. Medical Bd., supra, 31

Cal.4th at p. 1261.)

Instead of adhering to subdivision (bb), the State tries to do

exactly what Congress sought to avoid: pay a health center less

than the center’s full cost of treating Medicaid beneficiaries,

creating a risk this clinic will use Public Health Services Act

grant funds to subsidize Medicaid beneficiaries. (See H.R.Rep.

No. 101-247, 1st Sess., pp. 392–393 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.

Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 2118–2119.) Due to this

problem, Congress changed the law to include the 100-percent-of-

costs requirement. The State cannot shirk its responsibility to

pay health centers’ full costs.

State law is in accord. The Welfare and Institutions Code

allows the State to establish a payment rate for new health

centers “that is equal to 100 percent of the projected allowable

costs to the [federally qualified health center] of furnishing [the

health center’s] services during the first 12 months of operation. .

9

. . The projected allowable costs for the first 12 months shall be

cost settled and the prospective payment reimbursement rate

shall be adjusted based on actual and allowable cost per visit.”

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 14132.100, subd. (i)(3)(C).) Like

subdivision (bb), the Welfare and Institutions Code creates a

clear mandate to pay health centers their full costs.

C

The State defends its adjustments on the ground that

subdivision (bb) requires costs to be “reasonable.” (42 U.S.C. §

1396a(bb)(2).) This defense fails. The authorities relied on by

the State either do not support its narrow understanding of

“reasonable,” or they do not apply at all.

At the core of the State’s argument is California’s State

plan. The State uses the State plan as the first link in a chain of

authorities, which the State claims supports its interpretation of

“reasonable.”

The State’s argument proceeds in several steps. First, the

State contends the State plan requires it to determine the

reasonableness of costs according to the principles in 42 Code of

Federal Regulations part 413 (“part 413”)—a federal regulation of

Medicare, not Medicaid. Medicare is a federal program that

subsidizes health insurance for the elderly and disabled. (42

U.S.C. § 1395c.) Next, the State argues part 413 incorporates 42

Code of Federal Regulations parts 405 and 415, also Medicare

regulations. The State says 42 Code of Federal Regulations part

415, in turn, requires application of the Centers for Medicare and

Medicaid Services’ Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual.

Finally, the State contends the Medicare Provider

Reimbursement Manual limits costs to “the contractor’s [that is,

10

Kamboj’s] reasonable costs, rather than the payments made by”

Tulare Clinic.

There are three fatal problems with this argument.

The first fatal problem with the State’s argument is that

the record does not include California’s State plan. The Tables of

Authorities in the State’s briefs do not mention the State plan.

When the State quotes the State plan, it cites a portion of the

trial court’s opinion that quotes the plan rather than the plan

itself. Neither party addresses which version of the State plan

controls. There is a version of the State plan on the State’s

website, but it is unclear if it is the relevant version.

The trial court said the “parties agree that California’s May

1, 2006 ‘State Plan Amendment Prospective Payment

Reimbursement’ is the operative ‘[S]tate plan,’” and then

immediately quotes from the State plan’s Attachment 4.19-B.

The first page of Attachment 4.19-B accessible from the State’s

website shows an approval date of May 1, 2006. (Department of

Health Care Services, State Plan Amendment – Prospective

Payment Reimbursement, Attachment 4.19(B)

<https://www.dhcs.ca.gov/formsandpubs/laws/Documents/4.19B_6

-6V.pdf> [as of Oct. 2, 2019], archived at <https://perma.cc/23GS-

UKMD>.) But other pages have different approval dates;

notably, the page containing the section quoted by the trial court

shows an approval date of February 28, 2012. (Ibid.) Even if we

assumed the trial court quoted the plan correctly, we would still

have no understanding of the quoted portions’ surrounding

context. Because the State plan is not in the record, and because

the parties provide no guidance on how we can locate the relevant

version, we cannot properly consider the State’s argument.

(Ritschel v. City of Fountain Valley (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 107,

11

122–123 [appellants have the burden of preparing a record

showing trial court error, and courts reject arguments

unsupported by an adequate record].)

The second fatal problem with the State’s argument is

ambiguity about whether the portion of the State plan quoted by

the trial court applies to health centers, like Tulare Clinic, that

became federally qualified after 2000. The trial court quotes

Attachment 4.19-B, Paragraph D.2.(a) of the State plan, which

apparently provides, “Beginning on January 1, 2001, the

prospective payment reimbursement rate for [a federally

qualified health center] was equal to 100 percent of the average

reported cost-based reimbursement rate per visit for fiscal years

1999 and 2000 for the [federally qualified health center], as

determined in accordance with cost reimbursement principles for

allowable costs explained in 42 C.F.R. Part 413, as well as

Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.” (Tulare Pediatric

Health Care Center v. Cal. Dept. of Health Care Services (Super.

Ct. L.A. County, 2018, No. BS166705) at p. 6 [quoting the State

Medicaid Plan, Attachment 4.19-B, Paragraph D.2.(a)].) On its

face, this provision simply appears to describe how costs were

determined in the past. A description of past practice would not

seem to govern the present controversy.

Still, there is some reason to believe the principles in part

413 should be used to determine the reasonableness of costs for

new centers. The trial court quoted other language from the

State plan that suggests the method of Paragraph D.2.(a) should

be applied to all centers. Other Medi-Cal rules reference

reasonable cost principles set forth in part 413, suggesting the

Medi-Cal scheme generally intends to incorporate those

regulations. (See, e.g., Welf. & Inst. Code, § 14132.100, subd.

12

(e)(1) [providing that, if a health center applies for a rate change

based on a change in its scope of services, the rate change “shall

be evaluated in accordance with Medicare reasonable cost

principles, as set forth in Part 413.”].) And Tulare Clinic

concedes the applicability of part 413 on appeal.

Yet even if we accept that part 413 applies, we encounter

the third fatal problem with the State’s argument: part 413

undermines rather than supports the State’s position. For

instance, part 413 includes the principle that Medicare should

pay enough to cover the costs of its own beneficiaries, but not so

much that it covers the cost of those who are not beneficiaries.

(42 C.F.R. § 413.5(a).) This principle echoes Congress’s mandate

that states must fully reimburse health centers for the cost of

Medicaid beneficiaries. The State violates this mandate by

failing to pay Tulare County the full $106 the County pays to

Kamboj for each patient visit.

The State highlights part 413’s focus on actual costs: the

part provides reasonable cost is “cost actually incurred, to the

extent that cost is necessary for the efficient delivery of the

service,” and “actual costs of providing quality care.” (42 C.F.R.

§§ 413.13, 413.9.) Similarly, the approach outlined in part 413

should “result in meeting actual costs of services to beneficiaries

as such costs vary from institution to institution.” (42 C.F.R. §

413.5; italics added.) These provisions also cut against the State.

The actual cost incurred by Tulare Clinic was the $106 per

patient visit paid to Kamboj.

Part 413 uses broad and inclusive phrases when outlining

reasonable costs. It requires payment of “[a]ll necessary and

proper expenses of an institution in the production of services.”

(42 C.F.R. § 413.5.) It later defines “[n]ecessary and proper costs”

13

as “costs that are appropriate and helpful in developing and

maintaining the operation of patient care facilities and

activities.” (42 C.F.R. § 413.9(b)(2).) This broad wording also

favors paying Tulare Clinic the full $106 per patient visit that

Tulare Clinic paid to Kamboj.

There is only one narrow exception where part 413 directs

payment based on the costs of a contractor rather than the costs

of a provider. (42 C.F.R. § 413.17.) That exception is when the

provider and contractor are related by common ownership or

control. (42 C.F.R. § 413.17.) This exception makes sense

because, when parties are related, the amount a provider pays a

contractor may reflect internal accounting or non-pecuniary

considerations rather than the value of a service. But when a

provider and contractor are not related, the amount a provider

pays a contractor presumably represents the amount the provider

had to pay to induce the contractor to provide services.

The related party rule of part 413 does not apply here. On

an audit adjustment not at issue on this appeal, the

administrative law judge found Tulare Clinic and Kamboj were

not related. The State did not challenge that finding at the trial

court, nor does it challenge the finding on appeal. Tulare Clinic

discusses the related party rule at length in its briefing. The

State does not even attempt to reply.

The exception does not apply. The general rule does: part

413 directs payment based on the costs of a provider rather than

the costs of a contractor. The State must pay 100 percent of the

$106 sum that Tulare County paid.

The State’s alternative theory, which we reject, suggests

the State can reduce payment to a center based solely on the

ground that the center pays a contractor more than the

14

contractor’s underlying expenses. Under this theory, the State

might acknowledge that Tulare Clinic actually paid Joe’s

Photocopier Rental Place $50 per month to rent the photocopier.

But the State would want to see Joe’s records to see how much

Joe was paying for the machine. This approach would prevent

centers from ever hiring contractors. And, in many cases, it may

be more efficient for a center to hire a contractor to provide some

services, like water delivery or photocopying, than for the center

to do that work itself. This is true even when the contractor

turns a profit, as every successful business must.

The State notes 42 Code of Federal Regulations part 413.9

provides, “Reasonable cost of any services must be determined in

accordance with regulations establishing the method or methods

to be used, and the items to be included.” (42 C.F.R. §

413.9(b)(1).) The State uses this sentence as a vehicle to attempt

to bring in every other Medicare rule that might favor its case. It

claims the sentence justifies reference to 42 Code of Federal

Regulations parts 405 and 415, and 42 Code of Federal

Regulations part 415 requires application of the Medicare

Provider Reimbursement Manual.

The State plan’s reference to part 413 does not allow the

State to apply any Medicare regulation it sees fit. If the drafters

of the State plan intended reasonable costs to be determined

according to all Medicare regulations, it would have said so.

Instead, those drafters specified part 413.

The State cites Oroville Hospital v. Dept. of Health Services

(2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 468 (Oroville Hospital) for the proposition

that allowable costs are determined in accordance with Medicare

standards and the Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual.

But Oroville Hospital involved a hospital and a regulation that

15

expressly applies Medicare standards and the Provider

Reimbursement Manual to hospital inpatient services. (Id. at p.

492; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 51536.) That regulation does not

appear to apply to federally qualified health centers. (Cal. Code

Regs., tit. 22, § 51536.)

The State warns that we risk creating “an untenable

situation where ‘reasonable costs’ are determined by the provider

and only the provider because the provider is the entity that

contracts with other medical professionals.” According to the

State, the result will be excessive contractor costs, courtesy of

taxpayer dollars. Not so.

First, on this record the contract between Kamboj and

Tulare Clinic was an arms-length deal. When health centers

bargain with contractors, they will likely negotiate vigorously to

keep their costs down. That will limit contractor payment to the

minimum necessary to get the contractors’ services. As we

already have noted, Tulare Clinic is charging Tulare County 35

percent less than its predecessor. Both Tulare County and

Tulare Clinic has incentives to economize, and this incentive

structure seems to be working. The State’s fear of excessive

contractor costs seems unfounded here.

Second, the State has ample ways to attack health center

costs that indeed are unreasonable. Our decision in this case

does not change that. But the State cannot reduce payment

based on regulations that do not apply, with no other showing of

unreasonableness. That is what the State seeks to do here.

Congress recognized states tend to shortchange health

centers. That tendency means some health centers are forced to

subsidize Medicaid beneficiaries with unrelated grant money.

Other health centers, denied full funding, may simply close and

16

leave underserved communities without affordable care.

Congress’s remedy was to require states to pay “100 percent” of

centers’ costs for a defined list of services. (42 U.S.C. §

1396a(bb)(4).) The State must comply with Congress’s mandate.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Costs to Tulare Clinic.

WILEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

BIGELOW, P. J.

GRIMES, J.

17

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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