M.C. v. State of Indiana

FILED

Oct 09 2019, 8:11 am

CLERK

Indiana Supreme Court

Court of Appeals

and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Joel C. Wieneke Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Brooklyn, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Caroline G. Templeton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

M.C., October 9, 2019

Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JV-703

v. Appeal from the Rush Superior

Court

State of Indiana, The Honorable Brian D. Hill,

Appellee-Petitioner. Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

70D01-1812-JD-94, 70D01-1805-

JD-31

Altice, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JV-703 | October 9, 2019 Page 1 of 19

Case Summary

[1] M.C. was sixteen years old when the juvenile court declared him a ward of the

Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). M.C. now appeals, claiming that

the juvenile court abused its discretion in awarding wardship to the DOC, that

such a determination violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Equal Privileges and

Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution, and also violated the cruel and

unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and the proportionality clause of the Indiana Constitution. We

affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[2] On March 23, 2018, officers from the Rushville Police Department responded

to a report of a fight and observed fifteen-year-old M.C. and another individual

leaving the area. When asked for identification, M.C. provided a false name to

one of the officers. M.C. smelled of alcohol and submitted to a portable breath

test, which revealed a blood alcohol level of .05%.

[3] On May 11, 2018, the State filed a petition alleging that M.C. was a delinquent

child. M.C. admitted the allegation, and the parties agreed to an immediate

disposition. M.C. was placed under the supervision of the county probation

department for six months and was ordered to submit to random drug testing.

The juvenile court also required M.C. to attend school regularly and to not

possess and use marijuana or other controlled substances.

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[4] On October 2, 2018, the State filed a petition to modify the disposition, alleging

that M.C. had admitted to continued marijuana use, failed to submit a urine

sample on August 20, 2018, was suspended from school for two days on

September 10, 2018, and was again suspended for smoking tobacco on

September 13, 2018. Before the juvenile court held an initial hearing on that

petition, the State filed an amendment on December 18, 2018, adding

allegations that M.C. was referred to the probation department for committing

theft, that he was suspended from school again in October and early November

for possessing marijuana, had been again referred to the probation department

for marijuana possession, and that he was expelled from school on November

20, 2018.

[5] The evidence showed that during M.C.’s suspension meeting at the school on

November 14, 2018, M.C. stated that he “want[ed] to join the military. I want

to kill people. I would like to kill people. I love violence and blood. You know

I almost killed <omit> (sic) right?” Appendix Vol. II at 93. The theft allegation

arose out of an October 13, 2018 incident where M.C. went to a Pizza King,

ordered a pizza and two drinks with another juvenile, ate the food and then left

without paying. M.C. admitted that it was his idea to avoid paying.

[6] In November 2018, a resource officer for Rush County Schools was handed a

foil ball by the dean of students that had been obtained from M.C. The officer

unrolled the aluminum foil and observed suspected marijuana inside. M.C.

volunteered to the officer that it was “good stuff.” Id. at 125. The act of theft

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from Pizza King and M.C.’s possession of marijuana in November resulted in

another allegation of delinquency.

[7] At a hearing on February 12, 2019, M.C. admitted to the allegations in the

modification and those set forth in the delinquency petition. M.C. also

admitted that he had smoked marijuana the previous Friday and a few days

prior to that. The juvenile court ordered M.C. detained at the Youth

Opportunity Center (YOC) until his scheduled dispositional hearing on

February 26, 2019.

[8] The record shows that M.C. had previously been diagnosed with ADHD and

had received counseling and medication for that condition. In 2015, M.C.

received a competency evaluation, outpatient sex offender treatment, and a

psychosexual risk assessment and evaluation. In light of a proceeding through

the Department of Child Services (DCS), M.C. received inpatient treatment,

individual and group therapy, and substance abuse treatment at Wernle Youth

and Family Treatment Facility (Wernle) in 2016. Following discharge from

Wernle, M.C. was provided with various services to assist him transition to his

residence. Those services, which included home-based individual and family

therapy, medication management, and a mentor, took place three times per

week. The services ceased in January 2017, when DCS terminated its case.

[9] At the February 26 dispositional hearing, the Rush County probation officer

recommended that wardship of M.C. be awarded to the DOC. The probation

officer made that recommendation based on unsuccessful community and

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home-based treatment and residential placement services through Marion

County probation, Marion County DCS, Rush County probation, and Rush

County DCS. When the probation officer spoke with M.C. regarding the

disposition, M.C. indicated that if he was placed on home detention, he would

continue to have access to drugs and would have others bring marijuana and

other drugs to him. M.C. testified at the hearing that he possessed and smoked

marijuana on November 14, because it was his birthday and it “took the edge

off.” Transcript Vol. II at 39.

[10] In the end, the juvenile court granted wardship of M.C. to the DOC. Following

the hearing, the juvenile court stated

[M.C.], I don’t have any choice other than to recommend the,

uh, wardship to [the] Department of Corrections. You’ve been

through the probation system several times, received services

from Probation, DCS. [I]t’s clear to this Court, this isn’t a matter

of impulse control or some psychological disorder or strong

addiction problem. This is that you don’t have any regard for the

rules. You don’t see why they would be important and nothing’s

gonna change until you decide to change. And the fact that you

may have, may or may not have come to some realization in the

last week, um, doesn’t mean a whole lot at this point. Um,

you’ve been on probation. You’ve continued, you just do

whatever you want. We have a Court hearing and by the time we

have another hearing you do something else and just keep it up

until now. So, um, the only time where you haven’t violated

really between court hearings is the time that you’ve been secured

. . . in [the] YOC. So . . . it’s a DOC commitment . . . [and you

will be] held at the YOC in secure, um, detention until you can

be transported to the Department of Corrections.

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Transcript at 33.

[11] On March 19, 2019, M.C. was transferred to the Pendleton Juvenile

Correctional facility after completing the DOC intake phase. As a ward of the

DOC, M.C. will participate in programs that will include a “growth phase” and

a “transition phase.” Appendix Vol. II at 157. During the growth phase, a

treatment plan will be developed for M.C. Once M.C. has successfully

completed that program, M.C. will move to the transition phase, which

involves the development of an aftercare plan. M.C.’s release from the DOC

“will depend primarily on how well [M.C.] progresses in his program.” Id.

[12] M.C. now appeals.

I. Abuse of Discretion

A. Standard of Review

[13] In addressing M.C.’s claim that the juvenile court abused its discretion in

granting wardship to the DOC, we observe that the choice of the specific

disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent child will only be reversed if

the juvenile court abuses its discretion. J.S. v. State, 881 N.E.2d 26, 28 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2008). The juvenile court’s discretion is subject to the statutory

considerations of the welfare of the child, the safety of the community, and the

policy of favoring the least harsh disposition. C.C. v. State, 831 N.E.2d 215, 216–

17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court’s

action is clearly erroneous and against the logic and effect of the facts and

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circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual inferences

that can be drawn therefrom. Id. The juvenile court is accorded wide latitude

and great flexibility in its dealings with juveniles. C.T.S. v. State, 781 N.E.2d

1193, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

[14] Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6 sets forth the following factors that a juvenile court must

consider when entering a dispositional decree:

If consistent with the safety of the community and the best

interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional

decree that

(1) is: (A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most

appropriate setting available; and (B) close to the parents’ home,

consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child; (2)

least interferes with family autonomy; (3) is least disruptive of

family life; (4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the

child and the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian; and (5)

provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child’s

parent, guardian, or custodian.

[15] Although the statute requires the juvenile court to select the least restrictive

placement, it allows for a more restrictive placement under certain

circumstances. K.A. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 382, 386-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002),

trans. denied. That is, the statute requires placement in the least restrictive

setting only ‘‘[i]f consistent with the safety of the community and the best

interest of the child.’’ See I.C. § 31-37-18-6. Thus, the statute recognizes that in

certain situations the best interest of the child is better served by a more

restrictive placement because “commitment to a public institution is in the best

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interest of the juvenile and society.” D.S. v. State, 829 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2005).

[16] Here, the evidence establishes that many less restrictive rehabilitative efforts

have failed to reach M.C. and have not produced positive changes in his

behavior. Indeed, M.C. has admitted that he intended to continue using illegal

drugs, and he possessed marijuana during the pendency of the modification

petition. These are certainly compelling reasons for a more closely-supervised

and restrictive environment than a setting that would permit M.C. to reoffend

and disregard the juvenile court’s rules.

[17] M.C.’s continued marijuana use, the commission of additional offenses, school

suspensions, and the act of theft after his involvement with the juvenile justice

system warranted the juvenile court’s determination that a more intensive

services program involving a supervised environment is necessary to prevent

M.C. from continuing to commit acts that are harmful to himself and the

community. Put another way, M.C.’s wardship to the DOC serves the juvenile

justice system’s purpose, inasmuch as intervention was needed to prevent

M.C.’s behavior from declining, with the hope that M.C. will not commit

criminal offenses as an adult. To that end, we conclude that the juvenile court

did not abuse its discretion in ordering the wardship of M.C. to the DOC. See

C.C., 831 N.E.2d at 218-19 (observing that a juvenile’s repeated involvement

with the juvenile justice system and repeated failures at rehabilitation efforts,

coupled with the failure to alter behavior despite several placements by the

court were appropriate considerations for a grant of wardship to the DOC).

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II. Constitutional Issues

[18] M.C. presents several constitutional challenges on appeal regarding the

wardship that he did not raise at the juvenile court level. While the State asserts

that these issues are waived, our Supreme Court has determined that ‘‘[e]ven

though the general rule is that failure to challenge the constitutionality of a

statute at trial results in waiver of review on appeal, this Court as well as the

Court of Appeals has long exercised its discretion to address the merits of a

party’s constitutional claim notwithstanding waiver.’’ Plank Cmty. Hosps. of Ind.,

Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013). We exercise our discretion to review

M.C.’s claims.

A. Federal Equal Protection and Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution

[19] M.C. argues, inter alia, that imposing greater restrictions on M.C.’s liberty than

what an adult offender would receive for the same conduct violates equal

protection principles under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and those defined in Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana

Constitution. M.C. further contends that “the government action of

committing M.C. to the DOC is not substantially related to a sufficiently

important government interest.” Appellant’s Brief at 25 (emphasis in original).

[20] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part

that the government should not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws.” Because the juvenile justice statutes do not

involve a suspect classification, rational basis review applies. FCC v. Beach

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Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). This is a heavy burden for M.C. to

overcome, in that in accordance with a rational basis review, a statutory

classification comes to court bearing “a strong presumption of validity,” and the

challenger must “negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” Id.

“To uphold a legislative choice, we need only find a ‘reasonably conceivable

state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”

Goodpaster v. City of Indianapolis, 736 F.3d 1060, 1072 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).

[21] States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth

Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a

legitimate state interest. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000).

A statutory classification will not be overturned under rational basis review

unless the varying treatment is so unrelated to the achievement of a legitimate

purpose that a reviewing court can only conclude that the government’s actions

were irrational. Because M.C. is arguing his equal protection right was violated

because he was not treated as an adult offender would be, M.C. must

demonstrate that there is no rational basis to treat juvenile delinquents

differently than adult offenders. See id. at 83-84.

[22] M.C. correctly acknowledges that cases have applied the rational basis review

to classifications based on age, yet he claims that is only because the

classifications have been based on advanced age rather than youth. He argues

that there should be a heightened standard of review because juveniles cannot

vote for judges, legislators, and prosecutors. Hence, he asserts that juveniles are

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“those least likely to obtain legislative cures for their disparate treatments.”

Appellant’s Brief at 20.

[23] This argument is unavailing. The United States Supreme Court has determined

that advanced age is not a suspect class because it “does not define a discrete

and insular minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans,

will experience it.” Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83. Similarly, it cannot be said that

youth is a “discrete and insular minority,” because all persons, including

everyone drafting, interpreting, and applying the laws involved in a juvenile-

delinquency case, will have experienced life as a juvenile.

[24] Indiana has long recognized that its juvenile system is directed toward

providing “aid to the juvenile to direct his behavior so that he will not later

become a criminal.” Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ind. 1987). The

juvenile justice system was founded on the principle of parens patriae, which

allows courts to step into the shoes of the parents when required. In re K.G.,

808 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ind. 2004). That notion permits juvenile courts to care

for and further the best interests of the child, “which implies a broad discretion

unknown in the adult criminal court system.” Id. at 636.

[25] None of the dispositional options available to the juvenile court amount to

“sentences” for “crimes.” Jordan, 512 N.E.2d at 408. “When a juvenile is

found to be delinquent, a program is attempted to deter him from going further

in that direction in the hope that he can straighten out his life before the stigma

of criminal conviction and the resultant detriment to society is realized.” Id. at

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408-09. Instead of a punishment, the recommended wardship to the DOC

ensures that the juvenile “receives, in a secure environment, the extended

rehabilitative counseling” needed. S.C. v. State, 779 N.E.2d 937, 940 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2002), trans. denied. M.C.’s own argument demonstrates that disparate

treatment between adults and juvenile offenders is required to address the

nuances of youth.

[26] Additionally, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) and Graham v. Florida, 560

U.S. 48 (2010), both highlight the widely-held belief that juveniles are different

because of a diminished capacity to appreciate the nature of their actions and a

greater capability to change. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68-69.

While neither case mandates a separate system for juvenile offenders, the

considerations that support less-severe treatment when juveniles are sentenced

as adults, also support the State’s legitimate interest in a separate juvenile

justice system. The ability of juveniles to demonstrate changed behavior

advances the State’s goal of providing a separate system that focuses on

reformation.

[27] As discussed above, the juvenile justice system had provided M.C. less-

restrictive alternatives, like community and home-based therapy, before the

juvenile court resorted to granting wardship to the DOC. The DOC was not

granted wardship of M.C. because M.C. only possessed marijuana or only failed

to pay for some pizza. Rather, it is apparent that the juvenile court resorted to

the DOC for the purpose of reforming M.C.’s behavior before M.C. reached

adulthood because M.C. demonstrated that he would ignore other less-

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restrictive attempts at reformation. M.C.’s treatment by the juvenile court was

well suited to provide structured guidance and personalized rehabilitative

services to him. As a result, the separate systems for juvenile delinquents and

adult criminal offenders are rationally related to the goal of ensuring

rehabilitation of juveniles. See K.G., 808 N.E.2d at 636 (holding that the State

can adjust the legal system to account for children’s vulnerability and needs).

M.C.’s Equal Protection Argument under the Fourteenth Amendment fails.

[28] Turning to M.C.’s claim that he was denied the privileges and immunities

guaranteed under the Indiana Constitution, Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana

Constitution (Section 23) provides that “[t]he General Assembly shall not grant

to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the

same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Section 23 is given

independent interpretation and application from federal Fourteenth

Amendment claims. Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind. 1994). This section

imposes two requirements on statutes that grant unequal privileges or

immunities to different classes of persons: 1) the disparate treatment must be

reasonably related to inherent characteristics that distinguish the unequally

treated classes; and 2) the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable

and equally available to all persons similarly situated. League of Women Voters of

Indiana, Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 770 (Ind. 2010). The first prong has two

necessary components. Ledbetter v. Hunter, 842 N.E.2d 810, 813 (Ind. 2006).

Specifically, the classification must initially be based upon distinctive, inherent

characteristics that rationally distinguish the disparately treated class. Id. And

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secondly, the disparate treatment must be reasonably related to the

distinguishing characteristics. Id.

[29] Reviewing courts give substantial deference to legislative discretion when

framing laws under the Indiana Constitution. League of Women Voters, 929

N.E.2d at 770; Ledbetter, 842 N.E.2d at 812-13. So long as a classification is

based upon substantial distinctions, we will not substitute our judgment for that

of the legislature nor inquire into motives prompting such classification. See

Ledbetter, 842 N.E.2d at 813. To succeed on such a claim, the challenger must

negate every conceivable basis which might have supported the classification.

Id.

[30] In our view, distinguishing between juvenile delinquents and adult offenders is

rationally related to the goal of promoting rehabilitation among juvenile

delinquents. Restrictive placements, including the DOC, can promote

rehabilitation and the policy of individual accountability. S.C., 779 N.E.2d at

940; K.A. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. Here,

M.C. can essentially control the length of his placement in the DOC. As soon

as he completes his program and demonstrates that he has been rehabilitated,

he will be released from the DOC.

[31] Additionally, M.C.’s argument, under both the Fourteenth Amendment and

Section 23, makes much of the fact that M.C. was sent to the DOC rather than

a county jail. While it is unlikely that an adult offender would be incarcerated

at a DOC facility rather than a county jail for the commission of these offenses,

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see I.C. § 35-38-3-3, M.C. offers no reason why the distinction between a county

facility and a statewide DOC facility specifically designed to meet the needs of

a juvenile is a meaningful distinction that would support a claim of

unconstitutional disparate treatment. To the contrary, this type of disparate

treatment seems to address the uniqueness of juvenile offenders and provides

more specialized rehabilitative efforts that might otherwise be unavailable or

impractical for such offenders.

[32] For all these reasons, we conclude that M.C. has failed to show that the

wardship in favor of the DOC violated either the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, or Article 1, Section

23, of the Indiana Constitution.

B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the Eighth Amendment and the

Proportionality Clause Under the Indiana Constitution

[33] M.C. maintains that his loss of liberty is disproportionate with what an adult

would receive for the same conduct and that juveniles are inherently less

culpable than adults. Therefore, M.C. argues that the disposition declaring him

a ward of the DOC violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the proportionality

clause of the Indiana Constitution.

[34] The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual

punishment. Article 1, Section 16 explicitly requires that “All penalties shall be

proportioned to the nature of the offense.” Punishment for a crime should be

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graduated and proportioned to the offense, and the concept of proportionality is

central to the Eighth Amendment. Graham, 560 U.S. at 59. Both clauses apply

to the criminal process—that is, to direct actions by the government to inflict

punishment. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inv. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.

257, 260 (1989).

[35] The United States Supreme Court has recognized that juvenile proceedings are

not criminal prosecutions. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971).

Similarly, our Supreme Court has held that juvenile delinquency is not a crime

and juvenile dispositions are not criminal sentences. See D.M. v. State, 949

N.E.2d 327, 333 n.6 (Ind. 2011) (observing that juvenile proceedings are civil,

not criminal, and are based on a philosophy of social welfare rather than

criminal punishment); see also T.K. v. State, 899 N.E.2d 686, 687-88 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2009) (declining to apply Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 7 to

juvenile dispositions because juvenile disposition orders are not the same as

criminal sentences).

[36] While our courts have yet to specifically address whether the Eighth

Amendment applies to delinquency proceedings, the Illinois Supreme Court has

concluded that its state juvenile code does not implicate Eighth Amendment

concerns. In In re Rodney H., 861 N.E.2d 623, 629-30 (Ill. 2006), the Illinois

Supreme Court arrived at that conclusion, observing that the goal of the

juvenile system is rehabilitation. Id. Ultimately, the Illinois court determined

that a petition for adjudication for wardship was not an action to inflict

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punishment. Therefore, it determined that the Eighth Amendment does not

apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings. Id.

[37] We adhere to the reasoning advanced in Rodney H., in that the goal in Indiana

is rehabilitation for its juvenile offenders. A juvenile delinquency petition is not

about the State seeking to punish a young offender. Rather, our General

Assembly has codified the goal of the juvenile system by requiring juvenile

courts to consider the needs of the child, efforts made to prevent removal from

the parents, and various services that must be offered to juvenile offenders. I.C.

§ 31-37-18-9. 1 Furthermore, our legislature has imposed strict requirements on

juvenile facilities to provide recreation, education, counseling, and health care

that must be operated by qualified staff to provide such programs and

treatment. See I.C. § 31-37-19-21. Delinquency actions are designed to

1

The juvenile court shall accompany the court’s dispositional decree with written findings and

conclusions upon the record concerning approval, modification, or rejection of the dispositional

recommendations submitted in the predispositional report, including the following specific findings:

(1) The needs of the child for care, treatment, rehabilitation, or placement.

(2) The need for participation by the parent, guardian, or custodian in the plan of care for the

child.

(3) Efforts made, if the child is removed from the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian, to:

(A) prevent the child’s removal from; or

(B) reunite the child with;

the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.

(4) Family services that were offered and provided to:

(A) the child; or

(B) the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.

(5) The court’s reasons for the disposition.

Id.

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rehabilitate and correct, and they encourage juveniles to “straighten out [their

lives] before the stigma of criminal conviction and the resultant detriment to

society is realized.” Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 409 (Ind. 1987). Indeed,

Article 9, Section 2 of Indiana Constitution states “The General Assembly shall

provide institutions for the correction and reformation of juvenile offenders.”

[38] Inasmuch as the juvenile court’s dispositional order was not a penalty or

punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, M.C.’s claim that awarding wardship to the DOC was cruel and

unusual punishment and violated the proportionality provision of Article 1,

Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution, is unavailing.

III. Conclusion

[39] We conclude that M.C. has failed to show that the juvenile court’s disposition

granting wardship to the DOC was an abuse of discretion. Additionally, there

was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution or the Privileges and Immunities

Clause of the Indiana Constitution. Finally, we conclude that juvenile

proceedings are not criminal in nature and do not amount to a direct action by

the State to inflict punishment upon a juvenile. Therefore, neither the cruel and

unusual punishment clause under the United States Constitution nor the

proportionate penalties clause under the Indiana Constitution is implicated.

[40] Judgment affirmed.

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Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.

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