State ex rel. Save Your Courthouse Commt. v. Medina (Slip Opinion)

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State

ex rel. Save Your Courthouse Commt. v. Medina, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-3737.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-3737

THE STATE EX REL. SAVE YOUR COURTHOUSE COMMITTEE v. THE CITY OF

MEDINA ET AL.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it

may be cited as State ex rel. Save Your Courthouse Commt. v. Medina,

Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-3737.]

Prohibition and mandamus—Writ of prohibition sought to declare city ordinance

invalid and prevent city fees from being used to build a new courthouse—

Claim for writ of prohibition dismissed—Ordinance passed by the city

council was an exercise of legislative, not judicial, power—Writ of

mandamus sought to compel board of elections and city to allow an

additional ten-day period to gather signatures after board determined there

were not sufficient valid signatures to place initiative measure on the

ballot—Writ of mandamus denied—Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio

Constitution does not impose a duty to allow additional time to gather

signatures in support of a municipal initiative petition.

(No. 2019-1154—Submitted September 11, 2019—Decided September 17, 2019.)

IN MANDAMUS and PROHIBITION.

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, relator, Save Your Courthouse

Committee, seeks writs of mandamus and prohibition against respondents city of

Medina and its director of finance (collectively, “the municipal respondents”), as

well as respondent Medina County Board of Elections. We dismiss the prohibition

claim for failure to state a claim, and we deny the mandamus claim on the merits.

I. Background

{¶ 2} The city of Medina and Medina County have entered into an

agreement to consider the design and plan for a combined city and county

courthouse. The project would move the municipal court into the same structure as

the county courts.

{¶ 3} The committee alleges that the project would require the demolition

of all but the front of the 1841 courthouse, located at 99 Public Square, as well as

the entire 1969 courthouse addition, located at 93 Public Square. The municipal

respondents deny these allegations.

A. Facts relevant to the prohibition claim

{¶ 4} On June 10, 2019, the Medina City Council’s Finance Committee

considered a proposed agreement between the city and the county to share the cost

of retaining an architect, Brandstetter Carroll, Inc., to design a new courthouse. The

finance committee approved the contract, which meant that it could be considered

by the city council.

{¶ 5} The city council held a meeting on June 24 at which it discussed

funding the Brandstetter Carroll design. During the meeting, a proposed ordinance,

No. 98-19, was added to the agenda. The proposed ordinance, which had not been

included in the meeting agenda or the informational packet distributed in advance

of the meeting, authorized the mayor to enter into an agreement with the county

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commissioners to share design, planning, and construction costs for the project.

The council approved the ordinance as an emergency measure.

{¶ 6} The next day, pursuant to the city council’s authorization, the mayor

executed an agreement to share the costs for the design, planning, and construction

of a new city and county courthouse.

B. Facts relevant to the mandamus claim

{¶ 7} The committee prepared an initiative petition that would allow city

electors to vote on the courthouse project. The petition proposed to enact the

following measure:

REQUIRE VOTE ON COURTHOUSE

Absent a majority vote of the qualified electors who are

residents of the City of Medina, Ohio, (“the City”), the City shall

not:

1) authorize, appropriate, or spend any funds for, or

2) use any city resources to carry out, or facilitate carrying

out,

any demolition or construction activity (whether internal or

external) at the Medina County Courthouse or any structure located

at 93 and/or 99 Public Square, Medina, Ohio. This restriction shall

have the effect of law and shall be effective for a period of five (5)

years.

(Capitalization sic.)

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{¶ 8} On July 20, the committee filed a certified copy of the proposed

initiative measure with Keith Dirham, the city’s finance director.1 On July 26, the

committee submitted 1,0172 petition signatures to Dirham. In the cover letter

accompanying the submission, committee member Patricia Walker wrote:

Since the Charter of the City of Medina does not specify, it

is my understanding that the state law and practice of the Medina

County Board of Elections is to allow any petitioners an additional

ten days to obtain signatures of qualified Medina City electors if the

Board of Elections finds that the petitions do not contain the

requisite number of signatures. On behalf of the Save Your

Courthouse Committee, we would like that opportunity to obtain

more signatures if we have not submitted enough signatures to have

this measure placed on the ballot.

{¶ 9} As required by R.C. 731.28, Dirham held the petition for ten days for

public inspection. On August 6, he transmitted the petition to the board of elections.

{¶ 10} On August 7, the board of elections advised Dirham that the petition

did not have enough valid signatures to qualify for the ballot. To qualify for the

ballot, the petition had to contain at least 983 valid signatures, but the board of

elections verified only 690 valid signatures. Later that same day, Dirham informed

the committee of the signature shortfall.

{¶ 11} A few hours later, Walker responded to Dirham with the following

e-mail message:

1. Before circulating a municipal initiative petition, a petition committee must file a certified copy

of the proposed measure with the city auditor or village clerk. R.C. 731.32. In Medina, the finance

director serves as the municipal fiscal officer. Medina City Charter, Article V, Section V-3(c).

2. The official report of the board of elections shows that only 1,016 signatures were submitted for

verification. The discrepancy is not material.

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The Ohio Constitution and the past practice that has been

consistently adhered to by the Board of Elections, should grant the

Committee an additional 10 days to gather the needed number of

signatures to place the measure on the ballot this November. Do we

have your authorization to begin collection of the additional

signatures beginning August 8, 2019?

{¶ 12} Dirham forwarded Walker’s question to Gregory Huber, the

municipal law director, who responded to Walker the next day. Huber wrote:

In my opinion, no city official has the authority to either

authorize or deny authorization to you with respect to collecting

additional signatures.

Moreover, I do not believe the Ohio Constitution allows you

an additional 10 days to obtain signatures as I believe the additional

10 days only applies to State issues. The initiative petition that we

are talking about does not involve a State issue. If you are thinking

differently, let me know as it would not be the first time I am dead

wrong.

{¶ 13} On August 8, Walker asked again whether the committee would be

afforded ten additional days to gather signatures. Huber responded the next day,

again stating that the provision for a ten-day extension to collect additional

signatures applied only for statewide petitions.

{¶ 14} The next day, Walker asked the Medina County prosecutor and the

director of the board of elections if they agreed with the city law director’s opinion

that the committee was not entitled to a ten-day period to collect additional

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signatures. The county prosecutor replied that he was unable to answer her

question.

{¶ 15} On August 13, Walker appeared before the board of elections to

request the additional ten days. The minutes from the meeting state:

The Chair stated that the [board] had consulted with the

Prosecutor’s Office on the Courthouse Initiative Petition. The

opinion of the prosecutor is that State Law does not allow an

additional ten days for collecting signatures in the case of a

municipal initiative.

The board voted unanimously to deny the request for an extra ten days to collect

signatures.

II. Procedural history

{¶ 16} The committee filed its complaint for writs of prohibition and

mandamus on August 19. Because the complaint was filed within 90 days of the

relevant election, the case was automatically expedited pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R.

12.08.

III. Legal analysis

A. Laches

{¶ 17} As a preliminary matter, the municipal respondents assert a laches

defense. Laches may bar relief in an election-related matter if the person seeking

relief fails to act with the “ ‘utmost diligence.’ ” State ex rel. Monroe v. Mahoning

Cty. Bd. of Elections, 137 Ohio St.3d 62, 2013-Ohio-4490, 997 N.E.2d 524, ¶ 30,

quoting State ex rel. Fuller v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Elections, 97 Ohio St.3d 221,

2002-Ohio-5922, 778 N.E.2d 37, ¶ 7. The elements of a laches defense are (1)

unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse

for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4)

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prejudice to the other party. State ex rel. Carrier v. Hilliard City Council, 144 Ohio

St.3d 592, 2016-Ohio-155, 45 N.E.3d 1006, ¶ 8.

{¶ 18} The municipal respondents argue that the committee unreasonably

delayed in circulating and submitting its petitions. They point out that the city

council approved Ordinance No. 98-19 on June 24 but the committee did not begin

to gather signatures until July 20 and did not file its signed petitions until July 26,

“the cusp of the 90-day deadline on August 7, 2019 to get the measure certified and

placed on the ballot.” The municipal respondents claim to have been prejudiced by

this delay because the committee’s “failure to use utmost diligence to start the

initiative process caused this case to become an expedited election case.”

{¶ 19} We have applied laches in election cases when a relator

unreasonably delays in filing a lawsuit to challenge an adverse decision by a board

of elections. See, e.g., State ex rel. Citizens for Responsible Green Govt. v. Green,

155 Ohio St.3d 28, 2018-Ohio-3489, 118 N.E.3d 236, ¶ 17, 27 (applying laches

when relator waited 56 days after board’s decision before filing mandamus

complaint). Laches also may bar a lawsuit when an interested party unreasonably

delays in filing a protest with the board of elections. See, e.g., Mason City School

Dist. v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 107 Ohio St.3d 373, 2005-Ohio-5363, 840

N.E.2d 147, ¶ 14 (relators waited 90 days to file protest). And laches applies when

both types of delay—filing the protest and filing the complaint—combine to cause

prejudice. See, e.g., State ex rel. Chillicothe v. Ross Cty. Bd. of Elections, 123 Ohio

St.3d 439, 2009-Ohio-5523, 917 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 10 (city delayed filing protest for

119 days and delayed filing suit for 26 days).

{¶ 20} These scenarios all share one thing in common: the relator had an

alleged legal right to vindicate, either in a protest before the board or in a court

action for an extraordinary writ. Our cases emphasize that the first element of the

laches analysis is an unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right. See,

e.g., Carrier, 144 Ohio St.3d 592, 2016-Ohio-155, 45 N.E.3d 1006, at ¶ 8; State ex

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rel. Leneghan v. Husted, 154 Ohio St.3d 60, 2018-Ohio-3361, 110 N.E.3d 1275,

¶ 18. But in this case, at the time the city council approved Ordinance No. 98-19,

the committee had no legal interest to vindicate; it had only a process for placing

an initiative on the ballot and a specified time by which to complete the process in

order to qualify for the November 2019 ballot. If laches were to apply in this

situation, petition circulators could no longer rely on the deadlines established by

the Revised Code (or local laws) for submitting petitions. Rather, circulators would

be subject to a duty to act with haste in the gathering of their petition signatures,

with no clear idea when the petitions would need to be submitted.

{¶ 21} We decline to expand the laches doctrine in the manner suggested

by the municipal respondents. Laches is a defense that we apply sparingly in

expedited election cases. State ex rel. Duclos v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections,

145 Ohio St.3d 254, 2016-Ohio-367, 48 N.E.3d 543, ¶ 8. There is no need to

expand the scope of that defense to the circumstances here.

{¶ 22} We reject the laches defense and proceed to decide the case on its

merits.

B. Prohibition

{¶ 23} Three elements are necessary for a writ of prohibition to issue: the

exercise of judicial (or quasi-judicial) power, the lack of authority to exercise that

power, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State

ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138,

¶ 13.

{¶ 24} In the second count of the complaint, the committee “requests that

Ordinance No. 98-19 be declared invalid and of no further effect.” In addition, the

committee asks that the city “be prohibited from compensating or reimbursing the

County of Medina, Bradstetter Carroll architects, or anyone else that the City of

Medina would have been authorized to pay money to if Ordinance No. 98-19 were

a valid ordinance of the City of Medina.”

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{¶ 25} The crux of the committee’s argument is that Ordinance No. 98-19

is invalid because the city council passed it as an emergency measure.3 Article III,

Section III-11 of the Medina City Charter states that “[n]o action of the [city]

Council in authorizing * * * the surrender or joint exercise of any of its powers

* * * shall be taken as an emergency measure.” According to the committee, the

city, in the ordinance, either surrendered its power to design and plan the courthouse

or provided for the exercise of that power jointly with the county. Therefore, the

committee asserts, “Ordinance No. 98-19 cannot be valid as it was passed as an

emergency measure.”

{¶ 26} These allegations do not state a claim for a writ of prohibition

because the committee cannot satisfy the first and fundamental element of a

prohibition claim: the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power. “Quasi-judicial

authority” refers to “the power to hear and determine controversies between the

public and individuals that require a hearing resembling a judicial trial.” State ex

rel. Wright v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, Ohio St.3d 184, 186, 718 N.E.2d 908

(1999).

{¶ 27} When a public entity takes official action but does not conduct

proceedings akin to a judicial trial, prohibition will not issue. For example, a board

of elections did not exercise quasi-judicial authority when it denied an election

protest, because it did not consider sworn testimony, receive documents into

evidence, or in any other fashion “conduct a hearing sufficiently resembling a

judicial trial.” State ex rel. Baldzicki v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 90 Ohio

St.3d 238, 242, 736 N.E.2d 893 (2000). Likewise, in Wright at 186, we affirmed

the denial of a writ of prohibition against the registrar of the Bureau of Motor

Vehicles because the issuance of an administrative license suspension, without a

formal hearing, was not quasi-judicial.

3. An emergency measure takes effect immediately, upon approval by at least two-thirds of the

council members. Medina City Charter, Article III, Section III-11.

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{¶ 28} Here, the committee targets the exercise of legislative—not

judicial—power by city council. The committee disputes this conclusion. The

committee claims that the city exercised quasi-judicial power “when [it] reviewed

the case law and statutes * * * and decided that the [committee] was not entitled to

the Constitution’s 10 additional days to gather signatures.” The committee’s logic

would transform every legislative decision into a quasi-judicial act, if the legislature

considered the law in reaching its decision. Although the city took an action that

had legal ramifications, it did not receive evidence, place witnesses under oath, or

take any other actions that qualify as judicial.

{¶ 29} The committee argues that this case is similar to State ex rel. Home

Fed. S. & L. Assn. of Hamilton v. Moser, 40 Ohio St.2d 94, 320 N.E.2d 672 (1974),

rev’g 40 Ohio St.2d 42, 319 N.E.2d 361 (1974), in which we issued a writ of

prohibition to prevent a board of elections from placing a measure on the ballot,

even though no protest had been filed, see 40 Ohio St.2d at 43, and therefore the

board had never conducted a quasi-judicial hearing. But even assuming the

committee has characterized Moser correctly, that decision is inconsistent with our

more recent decisions, in which we have diligently policed the limits of our

prohibition powers. Thus, when a board of elections conducts a protest hearing

pursuant to statute, it is exercising quasi-judicial authority. See, e.g., State ex rel.

Varnau v. Wenninger, 128 Ohio St.3d 361, 2011-Ohio-759, 944 N.E.2d 663, ¶ 13.

But “the mere fact that the board of elections held a hearing resembling a judicial

trial” does not mean that the board exercised quasi-judicial power if there was no

legal requirement for the board to hold a hearing. State ex rel. Scherach v. Lorain

Cty. Bd. of Elections, 123 Ohio St.3d 245, 2009-Ohio-5349, 915 N.E.2d 647, ¶ 23;

see also State ex rel. Zeigler v. Zumbar, 129 Ohio St.3d 240, 2011-Ohio-2939, 951

N.E.2d 405, ¶ 21 (“The requirement of conducting a quasi-judicial hearing is the

key point of exercising that authority” [emphasis sic]). And it necessarily follows

that when a board of elections takes an action without conducting a hearing, the

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January Term, 2019

first element for relief in prohibition cannot be met. State ex rel. Miller v. Warren

Cty. Bd. of Elections, 130 Ohio St.3d 24, 2011-Ohio-4623, 955 N.E.2d 379,

¶ 16-17.

{¶ 30} In its reply brief, the committee also argues that this case involves

quasi-judicial power because “it involves a courthouse and a judge’s power to order

sufficient facilities for the judge’s court.” The theory here is that the city acted to

preempt the municipal judge from exercising judicial authority to order the city to

provide a better facility. But even if, as the committee maintains, the city sought

to preempt an exercise of judicial authority, that action does not mean the city was

itself exercising quasi-judicial authority.

{¶ 31} Finally, the committee argues that “the subject matter of this

lawsuit” is judicial because the Rules of Superintendence “contain many provisions

concerning the design and planning of courthouses.” The question here turns not

on the subject matter of the dispute but on the nature of the power exercised by the

entity whose action is being challenged. And because that power was legislative in

nature, not judicial, it is not subject to restraint by prohibition.

{¶ 32} Because the city did not exercise quasi-judicial authority, prohibition

is not available to block the ordinance. In reaching this decision, we express no

opinion as to the merits of the committee’s claim that the passage of this ordinance

as an emergency measure violated the city charter. We simply dismiss the

prohibition claim for failure to state a claim.

C. Mandamus

{¶ 33} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a party must establish, by clear

and convincing evidence, (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear

legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate

remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio

St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6.

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{¶ 34} The committee seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the municipal

respondents and the board of elections to (1) allow the committee an additional ten-

day period in which to gather petition signatures, (2) “clearly notify [the committee

of] the exact time and date that the additional ten-day period for obtaining

additional signatures begins and ends,” and (3) place the initiative measure on the

November 5, 2019 ballot if the committee gathers the necessary signatures. The

question presented by these requests is whether Ohio law gives the committee the

right to ten additional days to gather supplemental signatures.

{¶ 35} Article II, Section 1f of the Ohio Constitution provides, “The

initiative and referendum powers are hereby reserved to the people of each

municipality on all questions which such municipalities may now or hereafter be

authorized by law to control by legislative action; such powers shall be exercised

in the manner now or hereafter provided by law.” R.C. 731.28 sets forth the manner

in which municipal initiative petitions are to be submitted, verified, and certified to

boards of elections. R.C. 731.28 establishes the signature threshold to qualify for

the ballot and describes the process by which boards of elections must verify the

petition signatures. The statute does not give circulators the right to cure a shortfall

by gathering and submitting additional signatures.

{¶ 36} The right to propose ordinances by initiative petition is also

expressly guaranteed by the Medina City Charter, Article VII, Section VII-1. The

charter lays out a detailed procedure for zoning-related initiative petitions, id., but

is silent as to the procedures governing nonzoning initiative petitions. It does not

give circulators the right to gather supplemental signatures.

{¶ 37} In support of its alleged right to a ten-day cure period, the committee

looks to Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio Constitution, which provides that “[i]f

the petitions or signatures are determined to be insufficient, ten additional days shall

be allowed for the filing of additional signatures to such petition.” However,

Section 1g “appl[ies] only to statewide initiative and referendum petitions,” not to

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local initiatives and referenda. (Emphasis added.) State ex rel. Huebner v. W.

Jefferson Village Council, 72 Ohio St.3d 589, 591, 651 N.E.2d 1001 (1995) (citing

cases), rev’d on reconsideration on other grounds, 75 Ohio St.3d 381, 662 N.E.2d

339 (1996).

{¶ 38} But the committee argues that Section 1g does apply to local

initiatives because it fills gaps in the city charter’s initiative procedures. According

to the committee, this court “has established that Ohio law must be read into the

municipal initiative process if the Charter of the City does not have any contrary

provision.” The committee cites State ex rel. Harris v. Rubino, 155 Ohio St.3d 123,

2018-Ohio-3609, 119 N.E.3d 1238, as authority for this proposition.

{¶ 39} The committee misconstrues Harris. That case does not suggest that

the constitutional procedures in Section 1g governing statewide petitions fill gaps

in a municipal charter’s initiative procedures. Harris merely reaffirmed the

unremarkable rule that Revised Code provisions governing municipal petitions

apply until and unless preempted by a municipal charter that expressly conflicts

with state law. Id. at ¶ 16.

{¶ 40} Indeed, to import Section 1g’s procedures into local initiatives

would conflict with Article II, Section 1f of the Ohio Constitution, which requires

that the powers of local initiative and referendum shall be exercised “in the manner

now or hereafter provided by law” (emphasis added), that is, by an act of the

General Assembly or of the legislative authority of a charter municipality. Dillon

v. Cleveland, 117 Ohio St. 258, 275-277, 158 N.E. 606 (1927). Adopting the

committee’s argument would also thwart the will of the General Assembly, which

chose not to include a ten-day cure period when it enacted the provisions governing

municipal petitions in R.C. 731.28.

{¶ 41} The committee also relies on State ex rel. Spadafora v. Toledo City

Council, 71 Ohio St.3d 546, 644 N.E.2d 393 (1994), to argue that state law can

apply to local initiative petitions. But Spadafora did not hold that circulators of

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local measures are required to satisfy requirements applicable to statewide ballot

measures. Rather, as we explained in later decisions, Spadafora “ ‘merely requires

that if a municipal initiative or referendum petition includes an R.C. 3519.05

circulator’s compensation or elector-knowledge statement, it may be required to

comply with R.C. 3519.06 to the extent that the statements must be truthful and

cannot be altered.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) State ex rel. Commt. for the Charter

Amendment Petition v. Hamilton, 93 Ohio St.3d 508, 510, 757 N.E.2d 294 (2001),

quoting State ex rel. Sinay v. Sodders, 80 Ohio St.3d 224, 229, 685 N.E.2d 754

(1997).

{¶ 42} Next, the committee argues that the Medina City Charter expressly

incorporates Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio Constitution into its petition

procedures. The first paragraph of Article VII, Section VII-1 of the Medina City

Charter, governing initiatives, reads:

Ordinances and other measures may be proposed by

initiative petition and adopted by election * * *, to the extent and in

the manner now or hereafter provided by the Constitution, the laws

of Ohio, or this Charter.

(Emphasis added.) The committee argues that the “ ‘manner’ of the Ohio

Constitution includes the ten days to gather additional signatures.” But the charter

refers to the manner set forth in the Constitution for proposing municipal

ordinances by initiative petition: the language the charter uses—“in the manner

now or hereafter provided by”—directly tracks the language of Section 1f,

governing the powers of municipalities. The charter language does not expressly

impose the terms of Section 1g, which is the provision that allows ten days to gather

additional signatures if the original petition falls short.

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{¶ 43} The committee has abandoned its argument that the board of

elections has a custom or past practice of allowing an extra ten days when a

municipal initiative petition does not contain enough valid signatures. But it insists

that “fundamental fairness” requires the additional ten-day period because “[t]he

secrecy and the imminent destruction of the Courthouse set[] this cause apart from

others.” But “ ‘subjective principles of equity and fundamental fairness’ ” do not

dictate whether a writ of mandamus will issue; instead the question is whether there

is a clear legal duty to perform the requested act. State ex rel. VanCleave v. School

Emps. Retirement Sys., 120 Ohio St.3d 261, 2008-Ohio-5377, 898 N.E.2d 33, ¶ 26,

quoting State ex rel. Schwaben v. School Emps. Retirement Sys., 76 Ohio St.3d 280,

285, 667 N.E.2d 398 (1996).

{¶ 44} In short, the committee cannot show that Article II, Section 1g of the

Ohio Constitution imposes a duty to allow ten days to gather additional signatures

in support of a municipal initiative petition. We therefore deny the requested writ

of mandamus.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 45} For the reasons discussed, we dismiss the claim for a writ of

prohibition and we deny the request for a writ of mandamus.

Claim for writ of prohibition dismissed

and writ of mandamus denied.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ.,

concur.

KENNEDY and DEWINE, JJ., concur in judgment only.

_________________

Walker & Jocke Co., L.P.A., Patricia A. Walker, and Ralph E. Jocke, for

relator.

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S. Forrest Thompson, Medina County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael

K. Lyons, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent Medina County Board of

Elections.

Gregory A. Huber, Medina Law Director, for respondents city of Medina

and Medina Finance Director.

_________________

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