The opinion
[Cite as Putnam Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Patrick Bros., 2019-Ohio-3722.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
PUTNAM COUNTY
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF PUTNAM COUNTY, OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 12-18-11
v.
PATRICK BROTHERS, OPINION
A GENERAL PARTNERSHIP, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
STATE EX REL. PATRICK BROTHERS,
A GENERAL PARTNERSHIP, ET AL.,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, CASE NO. 12-18-12
v.
BOARD OF PUTNAM COUNTY OPINION
COMMISSIONERS,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeals from Putnam County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court Nos. 12 CV 73 and 12 CV 55
Judgments Reversed
Date of Decision: September 16, 2019
Case Nos. 12-18-11, 12-18-12
APPEARANCES:
Gary L. Lammers and Frank J. Reed, Jr. for Appellant
Linde Hurst Webb and Daniel Ellis for Appellees, Patrick Bros. et al.
Matthew A. Cunningham for Appellee, The Buckeye Stave Co.
ZIMMERMAN, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, the Board of Putnam County Commissioners (“Board”),
appeals the August 10, 2018 judgment entry of the Putnam County Court of
Common Pleas awarding supplemental attorney fees to appellees, Patrick Brothers,
a General Partnership, et al. (collectively, “landowners”). For the reasons that
follow, we reverse.
{¶2} This appeal stems from two consolidated cases—a complaint (assigned
case number 12 CV 55) filed on March 12, 2012 by the landowners against the
Board alleging violations of the Ohio Sunshine Act (“Sunshine Act case”) and
applications for appropriation (assigned case number 12 CV 73) filed on April 6,
2012 by the Board against the landowners (“appropriations case”)—involving the
widening of County Road 5 in Putnam County, Ohio.1 (Case No. 12 CV 55, Doc.
1
The appropriation case consists of 13 consolidated cases.
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Case Nos. 12-18-11, 12-18-12
No. 1); (Case No. 12 CV 73, Doc. No. 1). This court recited much of the factual
and procedural background of the cases in a previous appeal, and we will not
duplicate those efforts here. See State ex rel. Patrick Bros., A Gen. Partnership v.
Putnam Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-05, 2014-Ohio-2717. (See
also Bd. of Cty. Commrs. of Putnam County v. Patrick Bros., A Gen. Partnership,
12-15-06, Dec. 21, 2015 Accelerated JE). The facts relevant to this appeal are as
follows.
{¶3} On June 23, 2014, this court concluded (in the Sunshine Act case) that
the trial court erred by failing to issue the landowners’ requested injunction based
violations of the Ohio Sunshine Act and the Board’s failure to comply with statutory
requirements prior to authorizing the widening of County Road 5, and the case was
remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate remedies in that proceeding.
See State ex rel. Patrick Bros. at ¶ 32-40, 49, 51.
{¶4} After the release of this court’s opinion, the trial court (in the Sunshine
Act case) issued a permanent injunction against the Board on July 2, 2015. (Case
No. 12 CV 55, Doc. No. 140).
{¶5} The landowners filed a motion on February 12, 2015 (in the
appropriations case) and a motion on June 29, 2015 (in the Sunshine Act case) for
attorney fees under R.C. 163.21(B)(1) and (2), and 121.22(I)(2)(a), respectively.
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Case Nos. 12-18-11, 12-18-12
(Case No. 12 CV 55, Doc. No. 135); (Case No. 12 CV 73, Doc. No. 47).2 The Board
filed memoranda in opposition to the landowners’ motions on February 25, 2015
and July 2, 2015, respectively. (Case No. 12 CV 55, Doc. No. 137); (Case No. 12
CV 73, Doc. No. 48). The landowners filed their response to the Board’s
memorandum in opposition to their motion for attorney fees (in the appropriations
case) on March 2, 2015. (Case No. 12 CV 73, Doc. No. 49).
{¶6} On May 26, 2015, the trial court granted the landowners’ motion for
attorney fees (in the appropriations case), but reserved the determination of the
amount of attorney fees for a later time. (Case No. 12 CV 73, Doc. Nos. 53, 58).
The landowners appealed the trial court’s decision on June 15, 2015 and this court
dismissed their appeal for the lack of a final, appealable order on December 21,
2015. (Case No. 12 CV 73, Doc. No. 61); (Bd. of Cty. Commrs. of Putnam County
v. Patrick Bros., A Gen. Partnership, 12-15-06, Dec. 21, 2015 Accelerated JE).
{¶7} Meanwhile, the trial court denied the landowners’ motion for attorney
fees (in the Sunshine Act case) on July 29, 2015. (Case No. 12 CV 55, Doc. No.
148). Accordingly, on September 28, 2015, the landowners filed a motion (in the
Sunshine Act Case) for attorney fees under Civ.R. 54(D) and R.C. 121.22(I)(1) and
2
We are using the term “attorney fees” synonymously with the terms “fees,” “costs,” and “expenses” in this
opinion. See R.C. 121.22(I)(2)(a) (permitting an award of court costs and reasonable attorney fees); R.C.
163.21(B)(1)(a), (b) (permitting an award of jury fees and “reasonable disbursements and expenses, to
include witness fees, expert witness fees, attorney’s [sic] fees, appraisal and engineering fees, and for other
actual expenses”); Civ.R. 54(D) (permitting an award for costs).
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Case Nos. 12-18-11, 12-18-12
(2) “as a result of the success of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeals,
Case No. 2014-Ohio-2717, which is a case of public interest, and move[d] the court
to assess the expenses attached, as court costs.” (Case No. 12 CV 55, Doc. No.
165). On March 30, 2016, the landowners filed an updated motion for costs, which
was “filed for costs incurred after September 17, 2015, including [the landowners’
expert witness’s] additional time, resulting in a total [landowner] costs of
$23,609.30.” (Case No. 12 CV 55, Doc. No. 188).
{¶8} The landowners filed a motion on January 14, 2016 for a hearing to
determine the amount of attorney fees and expenses (in the appropriations case) that
the trial court previously awarded. (Case No. 12 CV 73, Doc. No. 66). On January
28, 2016, the Board dismissed its appropriation petitions. (Case No. 12 CV 73,
Docs. No. 68, 70).
{¶9} On May 6, 2016, the trial court awarded the landowners (in the
appropriations case) $113,661.00 in attorney fees. (Case No. 12 CV 73, Doc. Nos.
78, 79). On May 18, 2016, the trial court awarded the landowners (in the Sunshine
Act case) “$527,828.30 plus interest (civil forfeiture in the amount of $6,500.00,
attorney fees awarded in the amount of $497,714.00 and costs in the amount of
$23,609.30).” (Case No. 12 CV 55, Doc. Nos. 190, 191). No appeal was taken
from these orders, and all sums were paid by the Board.
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Case Nos. 12-18-11, 12-18-12
{¶10} However, on December 29, 2017, the landowners filed motions in both
cases for supplemental attorney fees. (Case No. 12 CV 55, Doc. No. 194); (Case
No. 12 CV 73, Doc. No. 82). The Board filed memoranda in opposition to the
landowners’ motions for supplemental attorney fees on January 12, 2018. (Case
No. 12 CV 55, Doc. No. 198); (Case No. 12 CV 73, Doc. No. 84). After a hearing
on July 2, 2018, the trial court awarded the landowners $26,502.25 in supplemental
attorney fees (in the Sunshine Act case) and $10,739.09 in supplemental attorney
fees (in the appropriations case) on October 2, 2018. (Case No. 12 CV 55, Doc.
Nos. 212, 213); (Case No. 12 CV 73, Doc. Nos. 92, 95).
{¶11} The Board filed a notice of appeal in both cases on November 8, 2018,
which we consolidated for purposes of appeal. (Case No. 2012 CV 55, Doc. No.
215); (Case No. 2012 CV 73, Doc. No. 97). The Board raises one assignment of
error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The lower court erred in granting supplemental attorneys’ fees to
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
{¶12} In its assignment of error, the Board argues that the trial court erred by
granting the landowners supplemental attorney fees.
{¶13} Before we review the merits of the Board’s assignment of error, we
must address a threshold jurisdictional issue. Courts of appeal in Ohio have
appellate jurisdiction over “final appealable orders.” Ohio Constitution, Article IV,
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Case Nos. 12-18-11, 12-18-12
Section 3(B)(2). See also R.C. 2505.02. If a judgment appealed is not a final order,
an appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider it and the appeal must be dismissed.
Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 44 Ohio St. 3d 17, 20 (1989). This Court
must raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte. In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 159-
160, (1990), fn. 2; Whitaker-Merrell Co. v. Geupel Const. Co., 29 Ohio St.2d 184,
186 (1972).
{¶14} To answer our ultimate jurisdictional question, we must determine
whether the trial court’s May 6 and 18, 2016 entries constitute final orders. “What
constitutes a ‘final’ order is defined in R.C. 2505.02, which, as applicable here,
includes ‘[a]n order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or
upon a summary application in an action after judgment[.]’” Grover v. Dourson,
12th Dist. Preble No. CA2017-09-009, 2018-Ohio-1456, ¶ 16, quoting R.C.
2505.02(B)(2). See also In re Estate of Sickmiller, 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-13-01,
2013-Ohio-3788, ¶ 6. “In other words, ‘[f]inal orders are generally those that
dispose of the whole case or some separate and distinct branch of it, and leave
nothing for future determination.’” Grover at ¶ 16, quoting Dudley v. Dudley, 12th
Dist. No. CA2010-05-114, 2012-Ohio-225, ¶ 12. A post-judgment motion for
attorney fees—of which the trial court retains post-judgment jurisdiction—is a
summary application in an action after judgment. See Troja v. Pleatman, 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-160447, 2016-Ohio-7683, ¶ 21, citing State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v.
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Case Nos. 12-18-11, 12-18-12
Tatone, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21753, 2007-Ohio-4726, ¶ 10, Victoria’s Garden
v. Sheehy, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 93AP-404, 1993 WL 302835, *2 (July 27, 1993),
and Monda v. Shore, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2008-P-0078, 2009-Ohio-2088, ¶ 18-
25. See also In re Ross, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18847, 2001 WL 815043, *2
(July 20, 2001).
{¶15} After the release of this court’s opinion in State ex rel. Patrick Bros.,
the landowners obtained a permanent injunction in the Sunshine Act case and,
subsequently, filed a motion for attorney fees. In particular, the landowners’ motion
requested attorney fees under Civ.R. 54(D) and R.C. 121.22(I)(1) and (2) “as a result
of the success of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeals, Case No. 2014-
Ohio-2717, which is a case of public interest, and move[d] the court to assess the
expenses attached, as court costs.” (Case No. 12 CV 55, Doc. No. 165). Later, the
landowners filed an “updated” motion for attorney fees for “costs incurred after
September 17, 2015, including [landowners’ expert witness’s] additional time,
resulting in a total [landowner] costs of $23,609.30.” (Case No. 12 CV 55, Doc.
No. 188).
{¶16} Similarly, after the release of this court’s opinion in the Sunshine Act
case, the landowners filed (in the appropriations case) a motion seeking judgment
in their favor under R.C. 163.21(B)(1) and (2) and for attorney fees, which the trial
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Case Nos. 12-18-11, 12-18-12
court granted. Later, the Board dismissed its petitions. (See Case No. 12 CV 73,
Doc. Nos. 68, 70).
{¶17} After hearings, (and reviewing affidavits and a stipulation submitted
by the parties), the trial court awarded the landowners $527,823.30 in attorney fees
(in the Sunshine Act case) and $113,661.00 in attorney fees (in the appropriations
case) on May 2, 2016. The trial court finalized its order by entries filed on May 18,
2016 and May 6, 2016, respectively. Both entries specifically state, “The Court
expressly determines that * * * this Judgment entry is a final and appealable order,
judgment and decree of the Court.” (Case No. 12 CV 55, Doc. No. 191); (Case No.
12 CV 73, Doc. No. 79).
{¶18} There can be no dispute that the trial court’s orders meet the
requirements of R.C. 2505.02(B)(2). See In re Guardianship of Freeman, 4th Dist.
Adams No. 02CA737, 2002-Ohio-6386, ¶ 12; Hlavin v. W. E. Plechaty Co., 28 Ohio
App.2d 43, 44 (8th Dist.1971). Specifically, the landowners’ motions for attorney
fees are post-judgment motions for attorney fees of which a trial court retains post-
judgment jurisdiction. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hummel v. Sadler, 96 Ohio St.3d 84,
2002-Ohio-3605, ¶ 23, citing Miami Valley Hosp. v. Payson, 2d Dist. Montgomery
No. CA 17830, 1999 WL 1207064, *4 (Dec. 17, 1999); McHenry v. McHenry, 5th
Dist. No. 2016CA00158, 2017-Ohio-1534, ¶ 65-66, quoting Klein v. Moutz, 118
Ohio St.3d 256, 2008-Ohio-2329, ¶ 13-15 (2008). Thus, the landowners’ motions
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Case Nos. 12-18-11, 12-18-12
for attorney fees constitute a summary application in an action after judgment.
Indeed, the trial court’s entries resolved the entirety of the landowners’ requests for
attorney fees under R.C. 121.22(I), 163.21(B), and Civ.R. 54(D)—that is, the
landowners did not request any additional attorney fees of which the trial court
reserved jurisdiction to consider or calculate. Although the trial court’s May 6 and
18, 2016 entries constituted final, appealable orders, neither party appealed from
those entries and the landowners did not file a motion under Civ.R. 60(B) to correct
any error. See United Gulf Marine, LLC v. Continental Refining Co., LLC, 3d Dist.
Allen No. 1-18-35, 2019-Ohio-666, ¶ 15.
{¶19} Instead, more than 19 months later, the landowners filed motions for
supplemental attorney fees on December 29, 2017. In their motion (in the Sunshine
Act case), the landowners specifically state, in relevant part, as follows:
[Landowners] file their Updated Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs
pursuant to R.C. 54(D) [sic] and R.C. §121.22(I)(1) and (2) as a result
of their success in obtaining the decision of the Third District Court
of Appeals, Case No. 2014-Ohio-2717. This Updated Motion is being
filed for Attorney fees which were incurred but were not a part of the
award by the Court, and covers time spent in the last attorney fee
hearing and additional pleadings necessitated by continual opposition
by the [Board].
(Case No. 12 CV 55, Doc. No. 194). Likewise, the landowners’ motion (in the
appropriations case), states, in its relevant part, as follows:
[Landowners] file their Updated Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs
pursuant to R.C. 54(D) [sic] as a result of their success in obtaining
the decision of the Third District Court of Appeals, Case No. 2014-
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Case Nos. 12-18-11, 12-18-12
Ohio-2717. This Updated Motion is being filed for Attorney fees
which were incurred but were not part of the award by the Court, and
covers time spent in the last attorney fee hearing and additional
pleadings.
(Case No. 12 CV 73, Doc. No. 82).3
{¶20} In other words, the landowners’ motions seek reconsideration of the
trial court’s final orders awarding attorney fees under R.C. 121.22(I), 163.21(B),
and Civ.R. 54(D). “‘The Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for motions for
reconsideration; and therefore, “motions for reconsideration of a final judgment in
the trial court are a nullity.”’” United Gulf Marine, LLC at ¶ 16, quoting Miller v.
Cass, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-09-15, 2010-Ohio-1930, ¶ 44, quoting Pitts v. Dept.
of Transp., 67 Ohio St.2d 378, 379-380 (1981), and citing Ham v. Ham, 3d Dist.
Wyandot No. 16-07-04, 2008-Ohio-828, ¶ 15. “‘Furthermore, any order that a trial
court enters granting or denying any such motion is also a legal nullity.’” Id.,
quoting Miller at ¶ 44, citing Robinson v. Robinson, 168 Ohio App.3d 476, 2006-
Ohio-4282, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), citing Pitts at 381. See also Miller at ¶ 44 (explaining
that “Civ.R.60(B), not a motion for reconsideration, is the proper way to bring to
the trial court’s attention its errors following a final judgment entry”), citing Reagan
3
To the extent that the landowners argue that they are entitled to attorney fees (in the appropriations case)
“pursuant to R.C. 54(D) [sic] as a result of their success in obtaining the decision of the Third District Court
of Appeals, Case No. 2014-Ohio-2717,” the landowners’ assertion is misguided. “Case No. 2014-Ohio-
2717” involved only the Sunshine Act Case. See State ex rel. Patrick Bros., A Gen. Partnership v. Putnam
Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-05, 2014-Ohio-2717. The landowners were not successful
in obtaining any appellate decision in the appropriations case. Accordingly, the landowners are not entitled
to any attorney fees in the appropriations case related to success in obtaining a favorable appellate decision
in another case.
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Case Nos. 12-18-11, 12-18-12
v. Ranger Transp., Inc., 11th Dist. Portage Nos. 95-P-0123 and 95-P-0124, 1996
WL 494886, *3 (Aug. 9, 1996). In the appeal before us, we conclude that the
landowners’ motions for supplemental attorney fees are nullities and the trial court’s
judgment entries awarding supplemental attorney fees as to R.C. 121.22(I),
163.21(B), and Civ.R. 54(D) are likewise nullities. See United Gulf Marine, LLC
at ¶ 16, citing Bank of Am., N.A. v. Sullivan, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-15-09, 2015-Ohio-
2736, ¶ 16.
{¶21} Nonetheless, the landowners contend that they are entitled to
supplemental attorney fees by way of a post-attorney-fee-judgment motion under
the authority of Village of W. Unity ex rel. v. Merillat. 169 Ohio App.3d 71, 2006-
Ohio-5105 (6th Dist.). However, a close review of that case reveals that it does not
stand for the proposition of which the landowners suggest. Rather, we find that the
cited case provides that supplemental-attorney-fee requests are within the
jurisdiction of a trial court and must be considered prior to entering a final judgment
on the determination of attorney fees that are, for instance, tied to a particular statute
or appellate success. See id. at ¶ 5, ¶ 38 (concluding that the trial court abused its
discretion by disregarding a post-hearing, pre-judgment request for supplemental
attorney fees).
{¶22} If the landowners intended to seek recovery of attorney fees associated
with their requests under R.C. 121.22(I), 163.21(B), or Civ.R. 54(D), including their
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Case Nos. 12-18-11, 12-18-12
participation in the attorney-fee hearing, they could have and should have sought
the award prior to the trial court’s issuance of its final entries in each case.
Importantly, the landowners had ample opportunity to request such attorney fees
prior to the issuance of the final entries—that is, the landowners had ample
opportunity to seek recovery of those attorney fees (1) prior to the hearing on
attorney fees; (2) at that hearing; (3) after that hearing but before the trial court
issued its orders awarding attorney fees on May 2, 2016; or (4) after the trial court
issued its orders on May 2 but before it issued its final entries on May 6 and 18,
2016. Moreover, the trial court’s orders awarding supplemental attorney fees
specifically acknowledge that the landowners
should have advised the Court in the March 2016 hearing they would
be seeking supplemental fees (as they did in the July, 2018 hearing).
At the latest they should have applied for supplemental fees after they
were advised by the Court on May 2, 2016 that they were entitled to
fees.
(Case No. 12 CV 55, Doc. No. 209); (Case No. 12 CV 73, Doc. No. 92).
{¶23} Therefore, because an order of a trial court granting or denying
reconsideration of a prior final and appealable order is a nullity and not subject to
appeal, the trial court’s October 2, 2018 entries granting the landowners’ requests
for supplemental attorney fees is not a final, appealable order. See McCualsky v.
Appalachian Behavioral Healthcare, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-442, 2017-
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Case Nos. 12-18-11, 12-18-12
Ohio-1064, ¶ 13. Consequently, the trial court’s entries awarding supplemental
attorney fees are void, and the Board’s assignment of error is sustained.
{¶24} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars
assigned and argued in his first assignment of error, we reverse the judgments of the
trial court.
Judgments Reversed
PRESTON, J., concurs.
/jlr
WILLAMOWSKI, J., dissenting.
{¶25} I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority for the following
two reasons. First, the issue upon which the majority bases its decision was not
raised by the parties on appeal. “[A]ppellate courts should not decide cases on the
basis of a new, unbriefed issue without ‘giv[ing] the parties notice of its intention
and an opportunity to brief the issue.’ ” State v. Tate, 140 Ohio St.3d 442, 2014-
Ohio-3667, ¶ 21, 19 N.E.3d 888 quoting State v. 1981 Dodge Ram Van, 36 Ohio
St.3d 168, 170, 522 N.E.2d 524 (1988). The parties in this case were not given the
opportunity to brief the issue, as has been required by the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Thus this court should not be issuing a decision based upon a new, unbriefed issue.
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Case Nos. 12-18-11, 12-18-12
{¶26} Second, I do not find that the motion for supplemental fees is the same
as a motion for reconsideration of a prior opinion. The original judgment entry
awarding attorney fees dealt with all fees and expenses through the dates of the
affidavits. In the affidavits of the attorneys, they reserved the right to file for
supplemental fees. At that time, the hearing on the motion for attorney fees had not
been concluded, the judgment had not been collected, and no one knew if a party
would appeal the judgment of the trial court. Thus, although the judgment awarding
attorney fees was a final appealable order, it was not necessarily the end of the case.
Parties are given the right to seek supplemental attorney fees. See W. Unity ex rel.
Beltz v. Merillat, 169 Ohio App.3d 71, 2006-Ohio5105, 861 N.E.2d 902 (6th Dist.)
and Turner v. Progressive Corp., 140 Ohio App.3d 112, 746 N.E.2d 702 (8th Dist.
2000). The request for supplemental fees did not ask the trial court to reconsider
any award previously given. Instead, it merely sought additional fees earned from
the date of the affidavit through the supplemental hearing. As the issue before the
trial court was not the same as was previously heard and ruled upon, the motion for
supplemental fees could not be a motion for reconsideration. Therefore, I
respectfully dissent with the conclusion of the majority that it is. I would rule upon
the errors assigned rather than dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
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