Sepehry-Fard v. United States

In the Gnited States Court of Federal Clanns

No. 18-1118C

(Filed August 30, 2019)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

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FAREED SEPEHRY-FARD,

Plaintiff,

Vv.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

WOLSKI, Judge.

This case was filed pro se on July 26, 2018, by Fareed Sepehry-Fard.!

Plaintiff makes several allegations to the effect that banks had created false

mortgages encumbering his property which resulted in foreclosures, and that when

he told the federal government about it, the federal government failed to protect

him. See Complaint (Compl.), ECF No. 1; Verified Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at

5 (PL’s Resp.), ECF No. 10. He has asserted claims against the federal government

in relation to those foreclosures. See Compl. {{ 24-95. The government has moved

to dismiss this case under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of

Federal Claims (RCFC). See Mot. to Dismiss at 1-5 (Def.’s Mot.), ECF No. 8.

Because My. Sepehry-Fard has failed to state a claim for relief that falls within this

court’s jurisdiction, the government’s motion to dismiss this case must be

GRANTED.

1 Plaintiff objects to being called a “pro se” litigant, see Pl.’s Resp. at 3, as he

apparently fails to recognize that the term simply refers to a party representing

himself without the assistance of legal counsel.

27028 0040 0001 1393 44b0

I. BACKGROUND

On July 26, 2018, plaintiff Fareed Sepehry-Fard filed his complaint in our

court. The complaint contains a number of confusing claims concerning disputed

property in California. See Compl. {| 24-95. Mister Sepehry-Fard complains that

the United States has failed to stop a number of banks and named individuals from

creating false mortgages encumbering his property, see id. { 31, claiming the latter

were “known international money launderers . . . involved in sex trafficking, human

trafficking, prostitution, drug cartel and other illegally obtained monies . . . using

Plaintiff's (and other people’s homes) as a cover up to launder those illegally

obtained monies.” Id. { 24. The entities and individuals plaintiff claims are thieves

and “money launderers” include the U.S. Bank National Association, Greenpoint

Mortgage Trust, Nationstar Mortgage LLC, Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.,

Capital One, N.A., Severson & Werson APC, Joseph W. Guzzetta, Bernard J.

Kornberg, Adam N. Barasch, Mark Joseph Kenney, William A. Aspinwall, Financial

Guaranty Insurance Company, and Clear Recon Corp. Id.?

Plaintiff claims that as a result, he “has become disabled due to Defendant’s

failure to perform its official duties severely damaging plaintiff emotionally,

economically and physically.” Compl. § 31. Mister Sepehry-Fard also claims that

the United States “in fact aided and abetted aforementioned companies to continue

to steal from Plaintiff.” Jd. Plaintiff states that he filed a qui tam complaint in a

California federal district court in an attempt to sue these “known international

money launderers,” but his complaint was dismissed “since Plaintiff is not an

attorney.” Id. [§ 24-27 & n.5. In complaining about this dismissal, Mr. Sepehry-

Fard demands that “attorneys prove the legislative authority” that allows them to

practice law. Id. { 27. Further, Mr. Sepehry-Fard challenges the decision of the

district judge as “void as a matter of law.” Id. 28.

Mister Sepehry-Fard also accuses the previously mentioned entities and

individuals of violations of the California Penal Code and federal law. Specifically,

Mr. Sepehry-Fard claims that the entities/individuals “have consistently fabricated

false, forged, robo signed and robo notarized instruments . . . in clear violation of,

inter alia, Cal. Penal Code 115 (a) and (b) as well as US Code §§§ 471, 472 and 473.”

Compl. 4] 88-89. The complaint also accuses the Financial Guaranty Insurance

Company (FGIC) of “knowingly or through negligence participat[ing] in these

unlawful acts and insur[ing the] aforementioned entities.” Id, |] 92.

Seemingly unrelated to his claims of criminal conduct, Mr. Sepehry-Fard also

alleges that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo exempts his property from “property

taxation, foreclosure, eminent domain, liens & levy.” Compl. { 80. Although this

section of the complaint is particularly incoherent, plaintiff seems to claim that his

property is legally exempt from taxation because it can be traced back to the Treaty

2 Plaintiff also implicates “Does 1 through 50.” Compl. { 26 n.5.

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of Guadalupe Hidalgo and “[n]o local property tax law can supersede International

Treaty Law.” Id. § 84. Plaintiff claims that attempting to foreclose on his property

would amount to a “criminal violation of Treaty between our country and REPULIC

OF MEXICO, and THAT action would also be a declaration of war on Sovereign

REPUBLIC OF MEXICO.” Jd. { 68 (emphasis in original). Any attempt to tax

plaintiff's property would, he asserts, be “a felony under Federal Law on false

accusation of tax debt at 26 U.S.C. § 7214(a)(1) and/or (2), and/or (3)... and/or (9).”

Id. | 82.

Additionally, Mr. Sepehry-Fard alleges Constitutional violations of the First,

Fourth, and Fifth Amendments along with unspecified violations of due process and

violations of the Constitution of the State of California. Id. {{ 2, 3n.2.2 Plaintiff

also alleges that the Constitution is a contract and that violations of the

Constitution also amount to a breach of contract between the United States and

himself. Id. § 2.

Plaintiff requests both injunctive relief and damages from the United States.

Compl. § 97. Mister Sepehry-Fard requests that this court quiet title regarding his

property and award him $25,000,000 in both compensatory and punitive damages

for the government’s “failure to perform its official duties.” Id. Plaintiff also

requests “a trial by jury be held for all issues so triable.” Id. 4

The government has moved for the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint

pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Def.’s Mot. at 1,

3—4 (Def.’s Mot.), ECF No. 8. Defendant first argues that our court is unable to

review district court decisions involving Mr. Sepehry-Fard because “such decisions

are not reviewable in this Court.” Id. at 4. The government also contends that Mr.

Sepehry-Fard’s criminal claims, tort claims, and constitutional claims are similarly

unreviewable for lack of jurisdiction. Jd. Defendant adds that that claims of

violations of state law fall outside our jurisdiction “because state statutes do not

create a right to money damages against the United States.” Jd. (citing Griffin v.

United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 1, 8 (2010)).

3 He explains the basis of his First Amendment claim as being that he “can’t be

prosecuted for legally asserting... my 1s' Amendment Right to Free Speech.”

Compl. { 84.

4 Neither a trial by jury nor punitive damages are obtainable in our court. See

Arunga v. United States, 465 F. App'x 966, 967, n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“By filing in

the Court of Federal Claims, one waives the right to a jury trial.” (citing James v.

Caldera, 159 F.3d. 578, 589-90 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); Greene v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl.

375, 379 (2005) (“It is well-established that [the Court of Federal Claims] lacks

authority to grant punitive damages.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674)).

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Plaintiff submitted a brief opposing the government’s motion. See Pl.’s Resp.

In it, Mr. Sepehry-Fard argues the government produced “no affidavits nor any

declaration from competent fact witness(es) ... to rebut Plaintiff Verified

Complaint Under Oath.” Jd. at 1. In response to the government’s argument that

this court cannot review decisions of other courts, Mr. Sepehry-Fard states that he

“does not nor ever did request to review the prior other court’s order(s) in this court,

whatever they may be.” Id. at 4.

Mister Sepehry-Fard also recharacterizes his claims, estimating the amount

of property taxes he had paid over more than 21 years and contending he has been

subject to an illegal exaction based on those taxes. Id. at 8. Plaintiff argues that

this alleged illegal exaction violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and

is within our court’s jurisdiction because it involves a tax refund. Id. at 11-12.

Plaintiff also reiterates his theory that the Constitution is a contract and that any

Constitutional violations would also breach this contract between him and the

government. Id. Mister Sepehry-Fard explains that his claim is based on a “non-

judicial judgement [sic]” against defendants based on violations of the Truth in

Lending Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2010) (TILA). Jd. at 16.5 Contemporaneous

with his response, plaintiff also filed a motion in which he claims defendant has

“defaulted” and must pay $25,000,000. See Verified Mot. at 4 (Pl.’s Mot.), ECF No.

11.

In its reply, the government argues that its motion to dismiss does not

depend on any evidentiary issues and that our court does not possess jurisdiction to

entertain Mr. Sepehry-Fard’s motion. Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Its Mot. to Dismiss

(Def.’s Reply) at 1-2, ECF No. 12. Plaintiffin turn replied, restating his previous

arguments and accusing attorneys for the government of “ganging up” on him. Pl.’s

Reply at 2, ECF No. 14.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Under RCFC 12(b)(1), claims brought before this court must be dismissed

when it is shown that the court lacks jurisdiction over their subject matter. When

considering a motion to dismiss a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, courts

will accept as true all factual allegations the non-movant made and draw all

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to that party. See Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Pixton v. B&B Plastics, Inc., 291 F.3d 1324, 1326

(Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction this court views “the alleged facts in the complaint as true, and if the

facts reveal any reasonable basis upon which the non-movant may prevail,

5 Although Mr. Sepehry-Fard cites TILA, he does not specify how the government

allegedly violated the act or explain what this “non-judicial judgement [sic]” is.

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dismissal is inappropriate”); CBY Design Builders v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl.

308, 325 (2012).

Though a pro se plaintiff's filings are to be liberally construed, see Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Schirripa v. United States, No. 1:16-01073, 2018 WL

4049126, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 2018) (relying on Erickson); Ottah v. Fiat

Chrysler, 884 F.3d 1185, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2018), this lenient standard will not spare

claims from dismissal which fall outside this court’s jurisdiction for failing to

establish a breach of contract by the federal government or to identify a money-

mandating law which was allegedly violated by the federal government. See United

States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216-17 (1983). A plaintiff’s pro se status does not

relieve him of the obligation to demonstrate jurisdiction by a preponderance of the

evidence. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189

(1936) (explaining the plaintiff's responsibility for showing that the claim falls

within the court’s jurisdiction); Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir.

1995) (noting that a plaintiff's status does not excuse defects in the complaint);

Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988)

(stating that the burden of proof for establishing jurisdiction is by a preponderance

of the evidence).

B. Analysis

1. Tort Claims

Plaintiff seems to allege tortious conduct in several instances. To the extent

plaintiff alleges that the federal government failed to protect him from false

mortgages, such allegations of “the negligent or careless performance of a duty by

the government sounds in tort and fall outside of this court’s jurisdiction.” Lion

Raisins, Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 427, 434 (2002); see also Krigel v. United

States, 229 Ct. Cl. 73, 81 (1981) (‘A claim based on the careless performance of duty

by a government employee sounds in tort and is beyond the jurisdiction of this

court.”). As the Tucker Act explicitly excludes tort claims from our jurisdiction, and

the negligent performance of government duties is a tort, the Tucker Act denies our

court jurisdiction over such claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).

Plaintiff also alleges that private entities engaged in tortious behavior, also

raising matters which our Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain. See, e.g.,

Compl. {{ 2, 31, 61, 89, 92 (complaining that various defendants engaged in fraud

and intentional deceit, negligence, trespass, defamation, the negligent infliction of

emotional distress, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress). These

claims are related to plaintiff’s allegations that “the aforementioned companies...

have sold Plaintiff's private property” in violation of his property rights. Compl.

{ 25. As previously noted, even if the actions of these defendants could be

attributed to the federal government, the Tucker Act specifically withholds from

this court jurisdiction over any claims sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1);

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Khalil v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 390, 392 (2017). Indeed, the Federal Tort

Claims Act vests only the United States district courts with jurisdiction over tort

claims against the United States---including those for loss of property. 28 U.S.C.

§ 13846(b)(1); U.S. Marine, Inc. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir.

20138). See also Cottrell v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 144, 149 (1998) (“Even where

the claim is framed under non-tort law, the court lacks jurisdiction if the essence of

the claim lies in tort.”). Thus, to the extent that Mr. Sepehry-Fard argues that the

government or private persons or entities committed any of the torts he alleges, this

court lacks jurisdiction to hear such claims.

2. Claims Against Defendants Other Than the United States

Much of the complaint concerns the actions of a number of private individuals

and companies. See, e.g., Compl. J 16, 24-26, 29, 39, 41-42. These include the

U.S. Bank National Association, Greenpoint Mortgage Trust, Nationstar Mortgage

LLC, Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., Capital One, N.A., Severson & Werson

APC, Joseph W. Guzzetta, Bernard J. Kornberg, Adam N. Barasch, Mark Joseph

Kenney, William A. Aspinwall, Financial Guaranty Insurance Company, and Clear

Recon Corp. Id. { 24.

As is common in cases brought by pro se plaintiffs, Mr. Sepehry-Fard

misunderstands the purpose of this court’s jurisdiction. The Tucker Act grants this

court jurisdiction over cases against the United States government seeking damages

for certain claims founded upon the Constitution, statutes, or regulations of the

United States, as well as damages for breaches of contracts with the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).6 And, as explained above, even where the United States is

named as a defendant, Congress has specifically withheld from our subject-matter

jurisdiction cases seeking damages for torts, as well as claims based on crimes

allegedly committed against the plaintiff. Id.; Stanwyck v. United States, 127 Fed.

Cl. 308, 312-14 (2016).

Insofar as Mr. Sepehry-Fard’s complaint is directed at conduct by private

parties, this court lacks authority to hear the matter. Viahakis v. United States,

215 Ct. Cl. 1018, 1018-19 (1978); see also Ambase Corp. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl.

794, 796 (2004) (explaining that this court lacks jurisdiction over private parties).

Also, to the extent plaintiff's complaint may be construed as alleging conduct by

California state officers, this court also lacks jurisdiction over such claims. In

general, “[t]his court does not have jurisdiction over any claims alleged against

states, localities, state and local government entities, or state and local government

6 The Constitution cannot be considered either an express or implied-in-fact

contract between plaintiff and the government. See Taylor v. United States, 118

Fed. Cl. 171, 173 (2018); Griffith v. United States, No. 14-793C, 2015 WL 430285, at

*2—3 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 30, 2015).

officials and employees; jurisdiction only extends to suits against the United States

itself.” Anderson v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 3380, 331 (2014); see also Trevino v.

United States, 557 F. App’x 995, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that this court

cannot hear claims against “states, localities, state and local government officials,

state courts, state prisons, or state employees”). Plaintiff’s allegations against

parties other than the United States thus fall outside our jurisdiction.” And no

action by a federal agency, nor any failure by a federal agency to perform a

required, money-mandating duty, is alleged.

Because plaintiff appears to make no specific allegation concerning anything

done by any federal actor, this case does not come within our court’s Jurisdiction.®

To the extent plaintiff discusses the United States government, he argues that it

failed “to adhere to specific requirements” it is bound to perform “pursuant to the

signed contract (i.e. the Constitution),” Pl.’s Resp. at 5, and that the government

somehow aided and abetted the theft of his property, Compl. { 31, all without

describing specific government actions. See also Pl.’s Resp. at 6. But even if

plaintiff’s allegations were construed to implicate the United States government, he

has failed to allege a matter within our jurisdiction, as explained below.

8. Criminal Claims

Plaintiff raises allegations of criminal conduct which include the commission

and aiding and abetting of grand theft. See Compl. {J 2, 30-31, 48; see also id.

{{] 24 (alleging “sex trafficking, human trafficking, prostitution, drug cartel and

other illegally obtained monies” and “funding terrorist groups including but not

limited to funding ISIS”), 25 (complaining of credit default swaps, tax write-offs,

7 In limited situations, the federal government may be liable for the actions of state

agents, but this is not such a case. See Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 373

F.3d 1177, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that attribution of state acts to the federal

government “is proper . . . only if the state officials were acting as agents of the

federal government or pursuant to federal authority.”) (citing B & G Enterprises,

Ltd., v. United States, 220 F.3d 1318, 1823-24 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also, e.g., Hassan

v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 149, 150 (1998).

8 The one exception is the allegation concerning the order of a federal district court,

see Compl. 4] 26-28, 89, which plaintiff contends “is void as a matter of law since

there is nothing in [the] False Claims Act (FCA’) that corroborates and

substantiates the judge’s erroneous and void decision,” id. {[ 28; see generally

Sepehry-Fard v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 18-cv-03885, 2018 WL 5099287 (N.D.

Cal. Aug. 7, 2018). But Mr. Sepehry-Fard disclaims any intention of seeking review

of that order, see Pl.’s Resp. at 4. In any event, our court is unable to review the

correctness of decisions by other courts. See Vereda, Ltda. v. United States, 271

F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380

(Fed. Cir. 1994)); Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 367, 380 (2016).

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and “Cross Collaritization [sic] of Plaintiff’s alleged loan based on a non[-]existing

alleged loan on Plaintiffs private property”), 30 (alleging literal theft), 38 (alleging

defendants “are international money launderers and [P]onzi schemers, which are

also known to illegally obtain and launder drug cartel, human trafficking, minor

prostitution, sex trafficking and other illegally obtained monies, dressed falsely as

alleged mortgage servicers, trustee of a closed trust that had shut down operations

more than 10 years ago and whatever else one wants to call these sham entities”),

40. These allegations presumably relate to the foreclosure actions on his properties.

See Compl. {{ 39, 41-42, 58-54. Plaintiff also alleges identity theft. Compl. 4] 44—

45,47. The Tucker Act, however, does not give our court jurisdiction over criminal

actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); Khalil, 133 Fed. Cl. at 392 (“This court,

however, ‘has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal

criminal code.”) (quoting Joshua, 17 F.3d at 379). While it is theoretically possible

that Congress could place a money-mandating statute in the criminal code,

Stanwyck, 127 Fed. Cl. at 314, the Court is unaware of any such provision, and

plaintiff fails to cite any. Thus, insofar as Mr. Sepehry-Fard alleges criminal

conduct, this court lacks jurisdiction over those elements of his complaint.

4. Constitutional Claims

Without any specifics, plaintiff argues that defendants engaged in the

following: “Violation of Due Process, Breach of contract (Constitution), [and]

Violations of Constitution of United States 1st 4th 5th [Amendments].” Compl.

{4 2, 3n.2. Our court, however, has not been empowered to opine on every matter

involving an alleged violation of a constitutional provision. Under the Tucker Act,

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), our jurisdiction is restricted to claims for money damages,

and requires “the identification of a money-mandating law which was allegedly

violated by the federal government.” Stanwyck, 127 Fed. Cl. at 312 (citing Mitchell,

463 U.S. at 216-17). For jurisdiction to rest on the transgression of a constitutional

provision, that provision must mandate that money be paid to particular

individuals if violated. See Smith v. United States, 709 F.8d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir.

2013) (“To be cognizable under the Tucker Act, the claim must be for money

damages against the United States, and the substantive law must be money-

mandating.”); see also Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 605

(1967) (holding that our predecessor did not have jurisdiction over “every claim

involving or invoking the Constitution”).

The First and Fourth Amendments lack money-mandating provisions,

thereby precluding this court’s jurisdiction. See United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d

882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (explaining that “the [F]irst [A]Jmendment, standing alone,

cannot be so interpreted to command the payment of money”); Brown v. United

States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (‘Because monetary damages are not

available for a Fourth Amendment violation, the Court of Federal Claims does not

have jurisdiction over such a violation.”). Concerning the Fifth Amendment, while

violations of the Just Compensation Clause are within our jurisdiction, plaintiff

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does not allege the taking of his property by federal government. And, as a general

matter, violations of the Due Process Clause are not within our jurisdiction. See

LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The exception is

when the alleged due process violation has resulted in the exaction of money from a

plaintiff. See Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d 1564, 1573 (Fed. Cir.

1996).

To be sure, Mr. Sepehry-Fard alleges that he is owed a refund of taxes

improperly imposed, Compl. {J 80-84, and explains that these payments were

illegal exactions in violation of his due process rights, see Pl.’s Resp. at 6-8, 11-14.

But plaintiff does not identify any federal taxes that were improperly exacted, and

instead references local property taxes which he alleges violated the Treaty of

Guadalupe Hidalgo. See Compl. { 84; Pl.’s Resp. at 8. State and local taxes are not

taxes paid to the United States and thus cannot be recovered in our court. See

Gharb v. United States, No. 12-911C, 2013 WL 4828589, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 9,

2013) (explaining dual sovereignty and that states are not “mere appendages of the

Federal Government” (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. So. Carolina State Ports Auth.,

535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002)). Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to allege an illegal

exaction falling within our court’s jurisdiction.

§. Miscellaneous Claims

Plaintiff also asserts that he has suffered from the deprivation of his civil

rights, presumably in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl. {{ 2, 11-12. But

Section 1983 and its related statutes do not confer jurisdiction on this court, even

when claims are stated against the United States. See Khalil, 133 Fed. Cl. at 392

(noting that “[i]t is well established, however, that § 1983 does not confer

jurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims over claims against the United States”)

(quoting Johnson v. United States, No. 97-5107, 1998 WL 39162, at *2 (Fed. Cir.

Feb. 3, 1998)). Indeed, these provisions do not even apply to the federal

government. See Hardin v. United States, No. 15-585C, 2015 WL 6437379, at *A &

n.5 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 22, 2015) (noting that district courts have exclusive jurisdiction

over claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, and that such

provisions “apply to actions of state and local, not federal, officials”) (emphasis in

original). Therefore, even if plaintiff somehow attributed civil rights violations to

misconduct by the United States, this court would still lack jurisdiction over those

claims.

Plaintiff makes several references to sources of law which cannot be the basis

for our court’s jurisdiction. He repeatedly alleges violations of California law.

Compl. {{ 1-2, 22, 30, 48; Pl.’s Resp. at 6. But state law violations cannot come

within our power, as “state statutes do not create a right to money damages against

the United States.” Griffin v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 1, 8 (2010). Mister

Sepehry-Fard also seems to be under the impression that the 1848 Treaty of

Guadalupe Hidalgo protects his “land patent ownership” rights in this court.

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Compl. J{ 6, 66-81, 83-84. But as this court has indicated in a similar context,

plaintiff “fails to explain why the court has jurisdiction, when Congress established

a separate administrative scheme for claims brought under the Treaty, and when

such claims were required to be brought over 160 years ago.” Daniels v. United

States, No. 17-1598C, 2018 WL 1664476, at *8 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 6, 2018). Plaintiff also

refers to President Trump’s Executive Order dated December 20, 2017, which

freezes the assets of identified human rights violators. See Compl. {{ 7, 63 & Ex. X.

But far from containing a money-mandating clause, to the contrary this order

expressly states (in Section 18) that it “is not intended to, and does not, create any

right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any

party against the United States.” Exec. Order No. 13,818, 82 Fed. Reg. 60,839 (Dec.

20, 2017).

In sum, as explained above, the complaint in this case fails to contain any

allegations that place its claims within the subject-matter of our court, and

dismissal is thus required.?

III. CONCLUSION

Even if everything that Mr. Sepehry-Fard alleges is true, there is nothing

that our court can do about it, as Congress has not given us jurisdiction to hear

cases like his. Our court is unable to review the decisions of federal district courts,

or to entertain claims based on the actions of private persons. Our power extends to

cases against the United States government for non-tortious violations of federal

laws that require the payment of money damages by the federal government. See

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Plaintiff has not alleged anything done by the feder al

government in violation of any identified, money-mandating federal sources of law

that would place his claims within our court’s jurisdiction. For these reasons, the

government’s motion to dismiss this case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,

under RCFC 12(b)(1), is GRANTED. The Clerk shall close the case.

Lgltite.

ed WOLSKI

Senior Judge

IT IS SO ORDERED.

9 The Court notes that another case brought in our court by Mr. Sepehry-Fard,

containing many of the same claims as this one, was recently dismissed for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction. See Sepehry-Fard v. United States, No. 19-560C, 2019

WL 2070746, at *1—3 (Fed. Cl. May 9, 2019).

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