standard of review; under § 144 and § 455, the substantive standard for recusal is whether “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- standard of review; under § 144 and § 455, the substantive standard for recusal is whether “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
- “Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”
- person who sends a bad check into the stream of 2 18-15938 commerce, which could and would be seen by numerous individuals, “eschews privacy when the check is launched, and surely does not reacquire it along the way”
- standard of review; court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 27 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALFONSO PADRON, Jr., No. 18-15938
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:16-cv-00549-SAB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF PARLIER; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Stanley Albert Boone, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted August 19, 2019***
Before: SCHROEDER, PAEZ, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Alfonso Padron, Jr. appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s decision on cross-
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
motions for summary judgment. Avery v. First Resolution Mgmt. Corp., 568 F.3d
1018 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Lara on
Padron’s federal privacy claim stemming from public disclosure of the fact of
Padron’s tort claim filing because Padron failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether the disclosed information was sufficiently personal to
implicate a constitutionally protected privacy interest. See Ferm v. U.S. Tr. (In re
Crawford), 194 F.3d 954, 958-59 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing constitutionally-
protected “informational privacy” interest).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Lara on
Padron’s federal privacy claim stemming from public disclosure of Padron’s name,
address, and telephone number because it would not have been clear to every
reasonable official that such disclosure was unlawful under the circumstances. See
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (discussing qualified immunity and
noting that a right is clearly established only if “every reasonable official would
have understood that what he is doing violates that right” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); In re Crawford, 194 F.3d at 959 (noting right to
informational privacy implicated by disclosure of social security number but not
name or telephone number); cf. Mangum v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 575 F.3d
935, 943-44 (9th Cir. 2009) (person who sends a bad check into the stream of
2 18-15938
commerce, which could and would be seen by numerous individuals, “eschews
privacy when the check is launched, and surely does not reacquire it along the
way”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Padron’s motion
for disqualification of the magistrate judge because Padron failed to establish
extrajudicial bias or prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (requirements for recusal),
§ 455 (circumstances requiring disqualification); United States v. Hernandez, 109
F.3d 1450, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1997) (standard of review; under § 144 and § 455, the
substantive standard for recusal is whether “a reasonable person with knowledge of
all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Padron’s state law claims because Padron failed to
state a federal claim. See Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001)
(standard of review; court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state
law claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction).
Padron’s contention that the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction, relying on
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2017), is unpersuasive.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
3 18-15938
appeal, including Padron’s contentions regarding dismissal of his claims against
defendant City of Parlier. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir.
2009); cf. Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir.
2001) (“This court invokes judicial estoppel not only to prevent a party from
gaining an advantage by taking inconsistent positions, but also because of general
considerations of the orderly administration of justice and regard for the dignity of
judicial proceedings, and to protect against a litigant playing fast and loose with
the courts.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Padron’s motion to transmit exhibits (Docket Entry No. 8) is denied. See
United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not
presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).
AFFIRMED.
4 18-15938